Many of the British generals in the Crimean War had previously worked
together at the Horse Guards, all pursuing the only cursus honorum open to
high-ranking officers with no wars to fight. Upon the death of the Duke of
Wellington in 1852 Lord Hardinge became Commander-in-Chief of the British
Army, Fitzroy Somerset succeeded Hardinge as Master General of the Ordnance
(and was ennobled as Lord Raglan), and Lieutenant-Colonel Airey (who
had already moved from being Assistant Adjutant-General to being Deputy
Quartermaster-General), was promoted to Colonel and succeeded Somerset as
Military Secretary. When war with Russia impended, Raglan was appointed to be
Commander-in-Chief of the expeditionary force. He wanted Airey as his
Quartermaster-General, but Airey chose an infantry assignment and became
commander of the 1st Brigade of the Light Division. Lord de Ros was appointed
as Raglan’s QMG. Just before the invasion of the Crimea, however, while the
forces were still at Varna, de Ros was invalided home, and Airey was offered,
and accepted, the post of QMG.
Throughout the war Airey and Hardinge wrote privately to each other. More
than 80 of the surviving letters, mostly from Airey to Hardinge, are
reproduced here. They illuminate the character of the two men as much as the
progress of the war. Airey clearly thought that he had a personal
relationship with Hardinge, and wrote as a friend. Hardinge's letters to
Airey, however, are distinctly cooler in tone.
The letters are now in the collection of the Cambridge University Library.
The references are shown thus:- CUL Add.9554/x/xx
(Many of the missing letters from Hardinge to Airey are held by the Herefordshire Record Office in the "Garnons Collection - Airey papers")
In addition to details of operations, a number of other themes occur:
1. Personal and social matters.
Hardinge had asked Airey to keep a fatherly eye on his son Arthur, while
Hardinge watched out for Mrs Airey and family at home. At this time Arthur
Hardinge had been in the army 10 years. He had seen action in India, and was
now serving as a Captain in the Coldstream Guards. Airey’s reports on him
verge on the comic, detailing his hours, his diet, his smoking, his card
playing habits, the state of his liver, and the size of his waist. Hardinge,
however, seems more concerned with his own well-being than that of Airey’s
family. This is how he informs Airey that one of his children has scarlet
fever: “I have not seen Mrs Airey lately, as one of the children has the
Scarletina.”
2. The uncertainties at Varna.
Airey reports the ravages of cholera, and the doubts as to the wisdom of
invading the Crimea. These doubts he resurrects later when he is blamed for
the winter troubles.
3. The difficulties of the allies before Sebastopol.
Airey has a perceptive and realistic view. As early as the 8th October
1854 he sees that they are there for the winter. He describes the strength of
the Russians, the difficulties of the terrain, and the need for more men.
4. The supply problems.
Airey swiftly identifies “want of transport” as the key to their
difficulties, and sees the need for re-organisation: “The Commissariat is a
Department of Accounts & Contracts, but not a Field Commissariat;” — “We
fail for want of Commissariat Transport — and a Storekeepers Department.”
5. The blame game.
When the plight of the troops in the Crimean winter became known in
England, there was a call for heads to roll. In January 1855 an ominous note
is apparent in Hardinge’s letters. Although he assures Airey that he is doing
what he can to defend him, there is an implied “but.” He leaves Airey in no
doubt that he is a prime candidate to take the blame. Hardinge is indignant
at the criticisms of Lord Raglan, but equivocal as to those directed against
Airey. He takes pains to distance himself from the matter: “the head of the
Army at home not being a Political Character, ought not to have anything to
say to the Military operations.”
Airey protests at the injustice of the criticisms of himself and Raglan by
the Duke of Newcastle, the Secretary of War. He claims: “I am in no sort of
way a Store Keeper of the Army — . . . All I do is to approve Requisitions,
so that each Division gets its fair proportion.” But Hardinge is equally
insistent that his own responsibilities are less than might be supposed: “all
Instructions to the General in the field must proceed from the Minister of
the Crown — & my information is very much confined to what I see in the
Newspapers.” Under the guise of giving advice, he sets out the case against
Airey: “What I would advise would be, to take a date of departure, say the
14th. Novr. after the great Storm, and explain why the Stores were not issued
till late in Decr.”
Airey tries to shift the blame higher up. First he observes: “The Duke of
N. is not a very staunch protector of his Subordinates,” implying, perhaps,
that neither is Hardinge. Then he counter-attacks: “The first mistake was the
only one, viz — ordering the Invasion . . . it was decided, upon what
Military authority I know not, that the Invasion of the Crimea should take
place.” The chief military authority in the country at the time was, of
course, the Commander-in-Chief, Lord Hardinge. Hardinge gives Airey his
orders: “The Govt. is in a critical state — . . . Your course is clear — to
stand firmly by Lord Raglan .”
By March, Airey is resigned to being the sacrificial lamb: “At the same
time I am fully aware that . . . my career is finished. — The fact is . . .
victims must be furnished. Lord Panmure does not hesitate at once to apply
the word ‘delinquent’ to me, — and that I am not to ‘escape.’ - . . . I wait
the result.”
With the coming of spring, resumed field operations and Lucan’s recall
provided a diversion, but by July Airey’s rancour was reactivated. Raglan had
died and General Simpson, who had been sent out by Palmerston’s Government as
Chief of Staff (partly as an implied rebuke of Airey) succeeded as
Commander-in-Chief of the expeditionary force. It would seem that Airey had
hoped to become the new Chief of Staff, for when he learnt that a replacement
was to be sent out from England instead, he threatens to resign: “I have no
desire to remain any longer with this Army. . . . I am thoroughly and quite
disgusted with the whole state of things. — I see nothing but ruin . . .,
staring one in the face. — Any vile accusation . . . is listened to . . . and
I would ten times over prefer passing the rest of my days in the back woods
in Canada.” He is scathing as to the qualifications of General Barnard, the
new Chief of Staff, and complains: “I feel degraded in the eyes of this Army
. . . It is impossible for me to conceal a feeling of excessive annoyance and
mortification.”
By August, after being awarded a KCB, he relents: “I will not resign now,
if I be not superseded in my rank.” His condition is met, and he thanks
Hardinge for his “kindness with regard to my Local rank — of which I have
just been informed from Head Quarters.”
In November, Airey returned home and was appointed QMG at the Horse
Guards. The last letter here, dated 12 February 1856, is about the selection of counsel to prepare
“the Case,” in which Airey and Hardinge appear to have a mutual interest, and
in connection with which Airey expresses himself as “impressed with the
importance of not allowing time to beat us.” (Kinglake was the first choice of
counsel, but needed too much time.) What “the Case,” was is not made explicit. Airey was one of the officers whose
criticism by the McNeill-Tulloch report would be overturned by the Chelsea Board
of Generals (popularly known as the “Whitewash Board”) in July 1856. It is a matter for conjecture whether
“the Case” relates to preparation for the Board’s hearings.
6. Lucan’s recall.
On his return to London in February 1855, Lord Lucan sought to clear
himself from blame for the Light Brigade disaster. In doing so, he implied
that Airey had misled him as to how the action would be reported. In these
letters, Hardinge keeps Airey au fait with how Lucan is being handled. Airey
replies with his version of what transpired between himself and Lucan when
the latter was complaining against Raglan’s despatch of the battle. In his
account of what he told Lucan, he states that during the battle “we could see
the Russians hooking their long traces to the Turkish Guns, with the
intention of carrying them off. It was expected that by rapidity of movement
this would have been prevented. — and that by following the retiring Enemy
closely, that they would have been taken at disadvantage. — but that
certainly it was very evident the orders given could not be construed into
orders to attack the Enemy in position at all hazard, after the
accomplishment of the very operation, it was intended to prevent.” The
implication, that the Russians not only intended to carry off our guns but had
in fact done so before the charge, goes much further than other accounts.
Many of the British generals in the Crimean War had previously worked together at the Horse Guards, all pursuing the only cursus honorum open to high-ranking officers with no wars to fight. Upon the death of the Duke of Wellington in 1852 Lord Hardinge became Commander-in-Chief of the British Army, Fitzroy Somerset succeeded Hardinge as Master General of the Ordnance (and was ennobled as Lord Raglan), and Lieutenant-Colonel Airey (who had already moved from being Assistant Adjutant-General to being Deputy Quartermaster-General), was promoted to Colonel and succeeded Somerset as Military Secretary. When war with Russia impended, Raglan was appointed to be Commander-in-Chief of the expeditionary force. He wanted Airey as his Quartermaster-General, but Airey chose an infantry assignment and became commander of the 1st Brigade of the Light Division. Lord de Ros was appointed as Raglan’s QMG. Just before the invasion of the Crimea, however, while the forces were still at Varna, de Ros was invalided home, and Airey was offered, and accepted, the post of QMG.
Throughout the war Airey and Hardinge wrote privately to each other. More than 80 of the surviving letters, mostly from Airey to Hardinge, are reproduced here. They illuminate the character of the two men as much as the progress of the war. Airey clearly thought that he had a personal relationship with Hardinge, and wrote as a friend. Hardinge's letters to Airey, however, are distinctly cooler in tone.
The letters are now in the collection of the Cambridge University Library. The references are shown thus:- CUL Add.9554/x/xx
(Many of the missing letters from Hardinge to Airey are held by the Herefordshire Record Office in the "Garnons Collection - Airey papers")
In addition to details of operations, a number of other themes occur:
1. Personal and social matters.
Hardinge had asked Airey to keep a fatherly eye on his son Arthur, while Hardinge watched out for Mrs Airey and family at home. At this time Arthur Hardinge had been in the army 10 years. He had seen action in India, and was now serving as a Captain in the Coldstream Guards. Airey’s reports on him verge on the comic, detailing his hours, his diet, his smoking, his card playing habits, the state of his liver, and the size of his waist. Hardinge, however, seems more concerned with his own well-being than that of Airey’s family. This is how he informs Airey that one of his children has scarlet fever: “I have not seen Mrs Airey lately, as one of the children has the Scarletina.”
2. The uncertainties at Varna.
Airey reports the ravages of cholera, and the doubts as to the wisdom of invading the Crimea. These doubts he resurrects later when he is blamed for the winter troubles.
3. The difficulties of the allies before Sebastopol.
Airey has a perceptive and realistic view. As early as the 8th October 1854 he sees that they are there for the winter. He describes the strength of the Russians, the difficulties of the terrain, and the need for more men.
4. The supply problems.
Airey swiftly identifies “want of transport” as the key to their difficulties, and sees the need for re-organisation: “The Commissariat is a Department of Accounts & Contracts, but not a Field Commissariat;” — “We fail for want of Commissariat Transport — and a Storekeepers Department.”
5. The blame game.
When the plight of the troops in the Crimean winter became known in England, there was a call for heads to roll. In January 1855 an ominous note is apparent in Hardinge’s letters. Although he assures Airey that he is doing what he can to defend him, there is an implied “but.” He leaves Airey in no doubt that he is a prime candidate to take the blame. Hardinge is indignant at the criticisms of Lord Raglan, but equivocal as to those directed against Airey. He takes pains to distance himself from the matter: “the head of the Army at home not being a Political Character, ought not to have anything to say to the Military operations.”
Airey protests at the injustice of the criticisms of himself and Raglan by the Duke of Newcastle, the Secretary of War. He claims: “I am in no sort of way a Store Keeper of the Army — . . . All I do is to approve Requisitions, so that each Division gets its fair proportion.” But Hardinge is equally insistent that his own responsibilities are less than might be supposed: “all Instructions to the General in the field must proceed from the Minister of the Crown — & my information is very much confined to what I see in the Newspapers.” Under the guise of giving advice, he sets out the case against Airey: “What I would advise would be, to take a date of departure, say the 14th. Novr. after the great Storm, and explain why the Stores were not issued till late in Decr.”
Airey tries to shift the blame higher up. First he observes: “The Duke of N. is not a very staunch protector of his Subordinates,” implying, perhaps, that neither is Hardinge. Then he counter-attacks: “The first mistake was the only one, viz — ordering the Invasion . . . it was decided, upon what Military authority I know not, that the Invasion of the Crimea should take place.” The chief military authority in the country at the time was, of course, the Commander-in-Chief, Lord Hardinge. Hardinge gives Airey his orders: “The Govt. is in a critical state — . . . Your course is clear — to stand firmly by Lord Raglan .”
By March, Airey is resigned to being the sacrificial lamb: “At the same time I am fully aware that . . . my career is finished. — The fact is . . . victims must be furnished. Lord Panmure does not hesitate at once to apply the word ‘delinquent’ to me, — and that I am not to ‘escape.’ - . . . I wait the result.”
With the coming of spring, resumed field operations and Lucan’s recall provided a diversion, but by July Airey’s rancour was reactivated. Raglan had died and General Simpson, who had been sent out by Palmerston’s Government as Chief of Staff (partly as an implied rebuke of Airey) succeeded as Commander-in-Chief of the expeditionary force. It would seem that Airey had hoped to become the new Chief of Staff, for when he learnt that a replacement was to be sent out from England instead, he threatens to resign: “I have no desire to remain any longer with this Army. . . . I am thoroughly and quite disgusted with the whole state of things. — I see nothing but ruin . . ., staring one in the face. — Any vile accusation . . . is listened to . . . and I would ten times over prefer passing the rest of my days in the back woods in Canada.” He is scathing as to the qualifications of General Barnard, the new Chief of Staff, and complains: “I feel degraded in the eyes of this Army . . . It is impossible for me to conceal a feeling of excessive annoyance and mortification.”
By August, after being awarded a KCB, he relents: “I will not resign now, if I be not superseded in my rank.” His condition is met, and he thanks Hardinge for his “kindness with regard to my Local rank — of which I have just been informed from Head Quarters.”
In November, Airey returned home and was appointed QMG at the Horse Guards. The last letter here, dated 12 February 1856, is about the selection of counsel to prepare “the Case,” in which Airey and Hardinge appear to have a mutual interest, and in connection with which Airey expresses himself as “impressed with the importance of not allowing time to beat us.” (Kinglake was the first choice of counsel, but needed too much time.) What “the Case,” was is not made explicit. Airey was one of the officers whose criticism by the McNeill-Tulloch report would be overturned by the Chelsea Board of Generals (popularly known as the “Whitewash Board”) in July 1856. It is a matter for conjecture whether “the Case” relates to preparation for the Board’s hearings.
6. Lucan’s recall.
On his return to London in February 1855, Lord Lucan sought to clear himself from blame for the Light Brigade disaster. In doing so, he implied that Airey had misled him as to how the action would be reported. In these letters, Hardinge keeps Airey au fait with how Lucan is being handled. Airey replies with his version of what transpired between himself and Lucan when the latter was complaining against Raglan’s despatch of the battle. In his account of what he told Lucan, he states that during the battle “we could see the Russians hooking their long traces to the Turkish Guns, with the intention of carrying them off. It was expected that by rapidity of movement this would have been prevented. — and that by following the retiring Enemy closely, that they would have been taken at disadvantage. — but that certainly it was very evident the orders given could not be construed into orders to attack the Enemy in position at all hazard, after the accomplishment of the very operation, it was intended to prevent.” The implication, that the Russians not only intended to carry off our guns but had in fact done so before the charge, goes much further than other accounts.