Lucan and Kinglake

CUL Add.9554/5/29

1. The differences with C. L^d. R's exhortation to both.

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1. Thick constructions.

2. Why Kamara not held?

3. Picquet surprised?

4.} {Why Russians, Genl Gribbe, from the
5.} { Baidar direction suffered to march unimpeded? In his writing.

6. Statement of the grounds on w^h it was judged right for Cavalry to acquiesce in capture of Turkish forts. In writing.

7. Did it not represent the army?

8. L. as to the character of the Turkish forts?

9. The extent to w^h our honour involved.

10. Was retreat of Turks covered?

11. The place where [illegible insert. Could be ‘before the HB charge’] the Light Brigade was posted?

12. The orders to C. [illegible addition]

13. Did Lord Bingham take the message?

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1. No new light.

2. Not forces to do it with.

3. Don't know.

4.5. Attention concentrated – notwithstanding the report of the spy – upon the Tourgoun direction. Statement to be in writing.

6. Could not without undue risk. C. Campbell kept on saying "mind [?] demonstration only. To be in writing.

7. Nothing said about this.

8. No new light. A horseman could ride through them, a mere ditch & breastwork.

9. Nothing said exactly on that. L^d. L. thought the plan of defending Balaclava by means of these sure [?] but distant works was a necessary sacrifice.

10. Thinks so; & does not believe that Russian horsemen got into the South valley riding down the fugitive Turks.

11. At the spot where Lord Raglan had sent it, close to the No. 6 redoubt. The distance from the scene of the Light Heavy Cavalry charge estimated by L^d. L. at not more than 4 or 5 hundred yards.

12. These taken down by me from L^d. L.'s dictation.

13. Yes. Statement to be made by L^d. B.

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a. How came it that the advance of the Russian Cavalry into the English camp was a surprise?

b. Were there mounted picquets?

c. Look out men?

d. Mounted skirmishers?

e. The heavy cavalry fight.

The sharing between L. & S.

f. Particulars of what L. did after Scarlett had gone in.

g. Royals?

(h.) When he charged with the 5^th Dragoon Guards how did he place himself?

(i.) Particulars?

(j) What did 5^th do?

(k) 4^th Dragoon Guards? "traversed"?

(l) Nature of noise? - pistols? - yells?

(m) Russians, were they "Hussars" as we understand them or turned into lancers?

(n) How clad? Great coats?

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a. No precautions taken to prevent it. Statement upon this to be in writing.

b. I did not ask, but there were.

c. No.

d. Did not ask.

e. No very new light.

f. He sent Fellowes to order 4^th. Dⁿ. Guards to attack Russians in flank.

g. firmly & solemnly adheres to former statement undertaking to absolutely negative [?] upon his positive knowledge the supposition of the Royals having taken any part. Says he was only the breadth of their (Bayswaters) road from them, also he shouted & signalled to them to come on. Conveyed sense [?] through Scarlett to Yorke, & ordered that the reg^t. sh^d. always be kept in front as punishment. Says Yorke was only a poor cavalry officer & expressed his distress excusing himself by saying I always understood it to be your wish that the reg^t. sh^d. be kept well in hand; & L^d. L. rejoined "but not kept out of action Sir."

(h) He now says he didn't charge with the 5^th. Dragoon Guards, & that he knows nothing of their movements.

(i) Scarlett not immediately charging, Ld. L. gave signals [?] & more [?] time [?] ???? made his trumpeter sound the charge.

(j) L. knows nothing. I read him the passage in his speech in w^h. he spoke of the charge he effected with the 5^th. Dragoon Guards & he did not try to extricate himself.

(k) It did, coming out on the proper left flank of the Russian column where Ld. Lucan met Hodge.

(l) Little or no noise till the column broke. Then, great cheering from the English.

(m) did not ask

(n) in great coats.

CUL Add.9554/5/1

1.
The circumstances under which the forces advancing from the Baidar direction were suffered to occupy Kamara & establish batteries on the neighbouring heights.

2.
The grounds on which it was judged right for our Cavalry to avoid attacking the forces which assailed the Turkish redoubts.

3.
The circumstances under which it happened that the advance of the Russian Cavalry to the ground where it turned to engage our Heavy Dragoons was a surprise.

4.
The grounds on which it was thought necessary for the Heavy Brigade to desist from supporting the Light Brigade in the charge.

5.
The purport of the order given to Lord Cardigan after the receipt of the order brought by Nolan.

6.
Lord Bingham's statements as to the message carried by him to Lord Cardigan.

CUL Add.9554/5/2

1.
It was not possible for Sir Colin Campbell to prevent the enemy establishing themselves on the heights comm^g. Camara, it was very far from his base & would have required a strong force of infantry & artillery. We had been obliged to discontinue patrolling this pass a full week before the 25^th October & the enemy were occupying Tchorgoun village & heights between that village & Camara.

2.
Lord Raglan not having acted on the communication sent to him the day previous by Sir Colin Campbell & myself informing him of the approach of a considerable Russian army & leaving us altogether without support, we considered it our first duty to defend the approach to the Town of Balaclava, & as this defence would depend chiefly upon the Cavalry it was necessary to reserve them for this purpose. I therefore confined myself to cannonading the enemy so long as my ammunition lasted & to threatening demonstrations, we only left the neighbourhood of the forts after they were already captured — my opinion was that the advance upon Balaclava could only be resisted by the cavalry on the plain & I placed them in order of battle for that purpose until removed by Lord Raglan, the soundness of my opinion was established by the check & retreat of the enemy immediately on the repulse of their cavalry & be it observed that their cavalry were attacked & repulsed on the very site I had prepared to meet them —

3.
The advance of the Russian cavalry was no surprise, nor did I ever hear it so described — From the time that they descended into the valley they moved very slow & should have been seen by General Scarlett during when still one mile of their approach distant — I saw them before they crowned the heights & found time to travel over double the extent of ground & to halt form & dress the attacking line before it had traversed more than ½ the breadth of the valley —

4.
Be it remembered that I had carefully divided the Light Brigade into 3 lines to expose as few men as possible in the 1^st. Line & that the first line should be efficiently supported. So soon as they had moved off I instructed my aide de camp to have me followed by the Heavy Brigade formed in the same order 3 lines — I then galloped on & when very far up the valley I observed that the Heavy Brigade in my rear were suffering severely from flanking batteries & with the remark that they were already sufficiently close to protect the Light Cavalry should they be pursued by the enemy & that I could not allow them to be sacrificed as had been the Light Brigade I caused them to be halted. Had not the Chasseurs d'Afrique at this time silenced one of these batteries it is my opinion that the Heavy Cavalry would have been destroyed —

When the Heavy Brigade was halted no possible object existed for further exposing them, they could only be useful in protecting the retreat of the Light Brigade & I am confident that from their position they materially did so —

5.
With General Airey's order in my hand, I trotted up to L^d. Cardigan, & gave him distinctly its contents so far as they concerned him. I would not on my oath say that I did not read the order to him, he at once objected on the ground that he would be exposed to a flanking battery, when ordered to take up his then position he had expressed through his aide de Camp the same objections apprehensions — I told him that I was aware of it "I know it" but that "Lord Raglan would have it," & that we had no choice but to obey. I then said that I wished him to advance very steadily & quietly & that I would narrow his front by removing the 11^th. Hussars from the 1^st. to the 2^nd. Line, this he strenuously opposed - but I moved across his front & directed Colonel Douglas not to advance with the rest of the Line, but to form a second line with the 4^th. Light Dragoons.

L^d Lucan
Brought me by him
23^rd Oct^r 1866

CUL Add.9554/5/3

South S^t
Nov 4 67

My dear M^r Kinglake

I received your letter on my return from Paris–

Tomorrow if I am well enough I must go into the Country on business.– On Wednesday I will take my chance of finding you at home about 12 o'clock & hand you my reply to your Questions – if any other time would be more convenient to you pray say so.

You are quite at liberty to keep the copy you have of my narratives. I have never read it since it was first printed – You can therefore judge of the accuracy of my memory by comparing my present statements with what I wrote at the time.

Y^rs. very truly
Lucan

A W Kinglake E^sq

CUL Add.9554/5/4

1. At the time of the Heavy cavalry charge, did Ld. Lucan give any order to Ld. Cardigan which could have warranted him in moving down his brigade so as to place it in support to the Heavy Dragoons?	1. I gave no orders which could have warranted Ld. Cardigan in moving down from the position where I left him, on the contrary his doing so was in positive disobedience of my instructions, There are already Reserves to cover –
2. When Ld. Lucan gave Ld. Cardigan the order which resulted in the Heavy Light Cavalry charge, what was Ld. Lucan's idea as to the way in which that order ought to have been executed?	2. After giving to Lord Cardigan the order brought to me from Gnl. Airey by Captn. Nolan I urged his Lordship to advance steadily & to keep his men well in hand, my idea was that he was to use his discretion & act as circumstances might show themselves, my opinion is that keeping his 4 squadrons under perfect control he should have halted them so soon as he found that there was no useful object to be gained but great risk to be incurred – It was clearly his duty to have handled his Brigade as I did the Heavy Brigade & so saved them from most useless & unnecessary loss —
3. Observing that Capn. Walker is named in Ld. Lucan's Balaclava despatch, I wished to know whether he had rendered any special service, or was mentd. only as being the 1st. Aide de Camp? How was he employed at the time of the Heavy, & the Light cavalry charges?	3. Captain Walker rendered no special service whatever at the battle of Balaclava & was only recommended by me for promotion because he was my 1st aid de cam as I stated This officer had been on board a ship sick he only joined me after the Heavy Dragoon charge, during the advance of the Light Brigade he was employed in collecting the Heavy Cavalry & forming them as I desired – I do not recollect his returning to me till the business was over -
	Lucan Nov 5 - 1867

CUL Add.9554/5/28

Nov^r. 6 1867

"Now I am going to leave you &c"

Lord Lucan now says that this was after he had seen the advance of the Russians.

When L^d. Bingham carried the reprimand he found the Light Brigade in rear of the Heavy

Nov^r. 8. 67

Another interview with Ld. Lucan. He marched [?] ????? ????? at about 8.30.

Maude that day was withdrawn from his command.

CUL Add.9554/5/6

1."Misconception of order" A general in command can always interpret his own order in any way he likes.	True but he must give some interpretation of his order & I have never yet heard the interpretation given by Lord Raglan to that in question, written to me within an hour of the affair or subsequently did he ever impute to me a "misconception of his order" what he charged me with was "You are a Lieutenant General of the army & whom from disapproval of the order you should not have acted upon it." When General Airey visited me in my tent on the morning but one after the action he never allowed me to suppose that I had acted under a misconception of the order, but tried to persuade me that the order left me some discretion which I altogether denied & in which opinion I was supported by Generals Burgoyne, Evans, England, Cathcart, Colin Campbell & all the French Generals & be it added that to no one of the General Officers did it appear that I had misconceived Lord Raglan's order - Captain Nolan may fairly be supposed to have understood the order he brought as from General Airey I heard that he at first had been dispatched with a verbal message, but to prevent the chance of a mistake he was recalled & his instructions were committed to paper – The interpretation of the order given by Captn Nolan can scarcely be disputed or why in certain ignorance of my Orders to Lord Cardigan did he place himself to lead a Squadron of the 13th Light Dragoons then in first line.
2.The redoubts were not fortifications, they were little more than potato gardens which cavalry could easily have ridden over.	No doubt some of the Redoubts were roughly constructed & of little account whilst Nos 3 & 2 were constructed with care and were good Field works – some [?] Italian Military Engineer Officers raised [?] them under the superintendence of Sir Colin Campbell himself & I was constantly with them Those were the redoubts which Sir George Cathcart proposed retaking from the enemy. At the time there were near them 2 Divisions of Infantry at hand with their Artillery & supported as they would have been by the whole of the Cavalry the operation could have proved successful but I was assured Sir Colin Campbell & other Staff Officers represented that from the impossibility of permanently retaining the redoubts the loss of life would be useless & Lord Raglan accordingly decided upon their abandonment. – I cannot believe that Ld. Raglan ever intended that the redoubts should be recovered by the Cavalry & unassisted, to my mind the idea was as preposterous as it certainly was impracticable – the works were not only armed with 2 or 3 12 Pd. field guns they were fully provisioned and supported by bodies of Infantry with a reserve [?] Artillery posted in their rear. —
3. There were Russian Infantry drawn up in front of or on the flanks of the redoubt.	There were no infantry to the East of No. 3 I can speak positively as I was myself close to this redoubt.
4.Lord Lucan had a great respect for Russian Infantry from his acquaintance with them at Varna in 1828.	I consider the Russian Infantry to be admirable, equal to any other, but I am certainly not aware that I ever showed this in any particular respect or ever showed myself slow or disinclined to encounter them. — My opinion & well formed conviction is that no Infantry unless in perfectly formed squares or very much favoured by ground and other circumstances can effectively resist a determined attack of Cavalry & less of English Cavalry than any other Such was my opinion in the Crimea & such is my opinion now
5. All Generals of celebrity in command of Cavalry have led their men into action.	No doubt Generals of celebrity & others have taken opportunities of leading their men into action but to suppose that the occasions have been many or that it is the rule or the practice would be a great mistake.– How often did Lord Anglesey lead attacks in the Peninsular or in the Netherlands in 1815? How often did Ld. Combermere lead in Spain? Did General Morris lead any attacks in the Crimea or in the wars in Italy in 1859? I might go on for ever — & recollect that they were all assisted by Brigadiers and Staff Officers well qualified to receive the instructions & to carry out the views of their Chief — Officers of experience before the enemy and capable of replacing him. — The practice is generally opposed to a general commanding a distinct arm of the service abdicating his functions of General to lead a few of his squadrons & for this reason that whereas it could only seldom prove advantageous, it might & would often prove mischievous & perhaps disastrous — The success of an attack generally depends upon the manner in which it is supported to whom in a moment of great excitement & hurry can the all important duty of bringing together scattered troops & arranging well combined attack be intrusted? Whilst I say the practice is opposed to Generals commg 2 or more Brigades leading attacks made by a part of his Troops, I consider that it is always their duty to place themselves at the head of their men on any occasion of difficulty. — In the case of the attack of the Heavy Dragoons at Ballaclava from their having been detached by Lord Raglan I had the greatest difficulty in overtaking even 4 squadrons of them & forming them for attack, their Brigadier very opportunely presented himself & I then ordered him to lead the attack — For the success of the movement & for the very safety of these four squadrons it was necessary to collect as many squadrons in support as possible and had it not been from the disobedience of the Royal Dragoons I should have led them myself either to join in the attack of [sic, meaning ‘or’] if too late to join in the pursuit. Is it reasonable to say that I should have led those 4 squadrons myself & left to General Scarlett all other necessary arrangements without having had the opportunity hearing my views or receiving my instructions. — The attack was perfectly successful & most honourable to all concerned & there I shall leave it. I did not place myself at the head of the Light Cavalry Brigade in the affair later in the day, because I thought by leading the Heavy Brigade to their support, I could best carry out Lord Raglan's instructions as I understood them, best cover a retreat and best save them from possible disaster. — It is to be recollected that Lord Cardigan after the battle of Alma formally complained to Lord Raglan of my interfering with & superseding him in the command of his Brigade, what would his Lordship have said if on this occasion I had put him aside & in the event of the movement proving successful had taken to myself all the credit —

CUL Add.9554/5/7

Wilton House, Taunton
April 17, 1868

My dear Elcho

Upon my return from Bridgwater where I had been staying a couple of days I found your letter with its enclosure from Lord Lucan.

With regard to the words I used both in speaking to Lord Lucan & to you what I wished to convey was that although I imagined myself to be in reality free from any distorting bias, yet that the circumstances of my having been entrusted with Lord Raglan's papers was one which
should & would be taken into consideration by others as a circumstance which might naturally have a tendency to incline me towards his view of disputed questions
most properly might be taken into cons by others,
when considering the question
when they undertake to determine how far
I can be considered as free from prejudice
I am likely to be prejudiced in favour of
Ld. Raglan's
the views upon disputed questions which were entertained at the English headquarters.

I am very willing to say to you that there is another circumstance which (even in spite of myself
may be still
& although I do not think it does so) may still have a tendency to incline me in the same direction -
I mean my gratitude towards Ld. Raglan
It was the passion of my life to see something of wars, & my power of doing
so
this depended so much upon Ld. Raglan that
to this hour
even now though so many years have passed I am still
grateful to Lord
under a sun of warm gratitude for the welcome which I received at Headquarters.

I will not fail to take good care of Lord Lucan's papers -
it will be a great comfort to me to speak to you upon these matters
I shall be most willing to discuss with you any matter connected with the subject of our conversation [?]. Indeed it will be a great comfort to me to be able to do so; & this the more, let me say, now that I see how
admirably well
carefully you seize the points.

Believe me

I return to Town Tues [?]

Believe me &c

April 68
Copy letter to Elcho