Crimean texts
Early in February 1855, following the fall of Lord Aberdeen’s Ministry, Lord Panmure succeeded the Duke of Newcastle as Secretary of State for War. Previous to this the offices of Secretary for War and Secretary-at-War had been distinct, the functions of the latter, who, by the way, did not rank as one of the principal Secretaries of State, being mainly financial, so that no expenditure from Army funds was held legal without his authority.1 In the person of Lord Panmure the two offices were, however, for the first time combined, great benefit to the national Army system being looked for from the change.2 And it may be worth while here to recall to the reader that the War Department and Colonial Office, which had heretofore been associated, had been separated in the preceding June.
The circumstances in which Lord Panmure succeeded to office were certainly among the most trying which a Minister of the Crown had ever been called to face, for the troubles arising out of the Crimean War were just then at their worst. Those troubles are too well known to require here more than the briefest recapitulation. Upon the cyclone of November 14, 1854, with its disastrous wreckage of British supply-ships and ruin of British camps, there had followed a period of three months of true ‘Crimean winter’ — that is, of severe frosts and bitter winds, and of snow-storms alternating with drenching rains. On the unprotected heights fronting Sebastopol, the British Army lay exposed to the full brunt of the weather, whilst at the same time enduring the utmost privation in respect of food, fuel, clothing, and shelter. For these latter misfortunes the breakdown of the transport system must be held mainly accountable; whilst this in its turn is attributable alike to the condition of the road communicating between Balaclava and the camp, and to the culpable neglect of the Treasury to supply the forage so necessary to the support of overworked draft-horses. Add to these hardships the fact that the soldiers were meantime undergoing the crushing fatigue of passing often as many as five out of six nights in the trying duty of the trenches, with the consequent neglect of sanitary and scavenger work, and there will remain small room for wonder that the Army fell a prey in an unprecedented degree to scurvy, cholera, frost-bites and other maladies. With this outbreak of disease the existing hospital resources were wholly powerless to cope. But, in proof of this particular, the figures cited by Kinglake are more eloquent than any general statement These inform us that, on February 28, 1855, out of an army whose mean strength is computed at 30,919, no less than 13,608 men were in hospital; whilst in the four months terminating at that date, no fewer that 8898 men had died there.3 It is indeed a lamentable record of suffering and mismanagement. But no plea of brevity must be allowed to divorce from that record of suffering a parallel record of the noble fortitude with which that suffering was endured.
‘Without extraneous aid,’ says the historian of the war, ‘men found strength, it would seem, in their own heroic qualities, found strength in that soldierly pride which forbids outward signs disclosing self-pity or despair.’ And again, ‘All their hardships — too often fatal — our officers and men endured with a heroism, as the Sebastopol Committee declared, “unsurpassed in the annals of war”; and, in truth, the contented devotion of the men under these cruel trials was such as to appear almost preternatural in the eyes of one who measures self-sacrifice by a merely civilian standard.’
But, though the soldiers endured all things without murmuring, the British public was rightly and naturally moved by the reports of their sufferings which were brought home. And it so happened that to these reports a new development of journalistic enterprise had at that time contributed a peculiar force and vividness.4
The result was a storm of public indignation, accompanied, as is always the case, by the desire of imputing blame. Righteous enough in its origin, this manifestation of public feeling could scarcely be characterised as judicial; indeed, it soon showed signs of degenerating into mere clamour for a victim. At whose door the blame of the Army’s misfortunes really lay, history has not yet finally decided. We ourselves have inclined to attribute a principal share of it to neglect on the part of the Treasury to send out adequate supplies of forage. Mr. Kinglake, writing with characteristic dispassion, would carry the blame back to that original vicious strategy of the Allied Armies which had culminated in the tardy resolve to winter on the heights before Sebastopol. But the British public of the time was inclined to fasten it upon Generals Estcourt and Airey, Lord Raglan’s Adjutant-General and Quartermaster-General, and, perhaps in a somewhat lesser degree, on the Commanding Officer himself.
Though undiscriminating, the public emotion was much too strong to be disregarded. Constituting himself the mouthpiece of the country at large, Mr. Roebuck therefore brought before the House of Commons a motion for a Select Committee to inquire into the condition of the Army before Sebastopol, and into the conduct of those departments of the Government whose business it had been to minister to its wants. Though strenuously resisted by Lord Palmerston and Mr. Gladstone, this motion was carried by a majority of no less than 157, and thus was sealed the fate of the Aberdeen Ministry. After others had essayed the task in vain, Lord Palmerston then took Lord Aberdeen’s place at the helm of State and set to work to form a Government.5
These, then, were the circumstances in which Lord Panmure was summoned to the administration of the War Department. The moment was one, as has been shown, of great national stress; the position to which he was called was one of supreme difficulty. His health, too, was by this time impaired, so that, in the event of his accepting office, he would have to face the prospect of being hampered in the execution of arduous duties by the inroads of a peculiarly painful and irksome malady. And no doubt he took full account of all these things. But he belonged essentially to that fortunately large class of Britons who are never prone to draw back from taking their share in the day’s work, and who derive the pride and satisfaction of their lives from the contemplation of work well done. To these the voice of duty does not often speak in vain. Panmure recognised that his experience, first as an officer in the Army, and secondly as an administrator of Army affairs, gave him special advantages for dealing with the present national crisis. And accordingly, without hesitation, he placed his services at his country’s disposal. The courage which he showed in doing so has not yet perhaps received the full appreciation which is due to it. And it may here be said that it is doubtful indeed if any man better qualified to fill the difficult post of War Minister could have been found at that moment in the country. For, without claiming for Panmure any very exceptional gifts or talents, it may be argued that his strength of character, energy, workmanlike spirit, breadth of view, and sound common-sense were qualities of perhaps greater value at the moment than, say, the enthusiasm, charm, and lofty-mindedness of such a statesman as Sidney Herbert. Morally speaking, too, he had a pair of good broad shoulders on which to lay burdens; whilst a certain salutary toughness of hide — a very serviceable attribute — guarded him, from excessive sensitiveness to criticism.
Once in office, he was not long — as the papers immediately following will show — in plunging into the midst of his duties. In a couple of sentences, dated February 1855, he notes the strong points and the defects of the Army system then in force, viz.: ‘The regimental system is as nearly perfect as it can be. The system by which an army should be provisioned, moved, brought to act in the field and the trenches, taught to attack or defend, is nonexistent.’ And again, ‘We have no means of making General Officers or of forming an efficient Staff.’ And, this done, he proceeds forthwith to devise ‘measures to be taken to establish a better order of things in the Crimea,’ special attention being devoted to land-transport, scavenging, sanitation, commissariat, and the medical department. He also creates the appointment of Chief of the Staff,6 which has continued in use since then. At the same time he declared war on the ‘old-fashioned departmentalism’ which at that time still pervaded the whole administration of military affairs. In addition to the above, matters dealt with in the correspondence of his early days in office included the problem of providing an army for the ensuing campaign, the passing of a Limited Enlistment Bill, and questions relating to clothing of troops and cavalry reorganisation. Furthermore, it can scarcely fail to be noticed that the effect of the letters addressed by Lord Panmure to Lord Raglan is greatly to soften the view of the relations between the correspondents which was presented by Mr. Kinglake.
February 1855.
I have carefully perused His RH.’s memorandum, and would humbly offer the following observations upon the subject to which it refers.
The causes which have led to the maintenance in this country of so small an army are manifold. First, ever since the Commons of England have made their voice heard in its Government, they have evinced a deep jealousy of a standing army, which looks to the Sovereign, as its head, for all promotion, discipline and orders, though paid by annual vote of Parliament.
Secondly, the people of this country have always been in the habit of looking to their insular position as a reason why they should depend more on a navy than an army for their protection, and have looked to the former only as necessary to afford protection to our colonies, and to maintain order and respect for the law at home.
They have never looked on the Army as a force which was to be kept available for foreign aggression.
Thirdly, every Ministry for the last forty years has striven, one after another, who shall gain most popularity by reducing our Army to the lowest possible amount with which the colonial reliefs could be carried on without subjecting our soldiers to absolute exile from their native country.
The first of these causes, whatever grounds may have formerly existed for it, can no longer be regarded as reasonable — for all experience has proved that the Sovereign of this country has neither the desire nor the power to use the Army save against the enemies of the country. The chimerical dread therefore of a ‘standing army’ is absurd, and in the altered circumstances of the times I am of opinion that this country will not maintain its place among the intelligent nations of the world unless she exhibits her disposition to show a respectable front, even in time of peace, as regards her Army.
Secondly, I trust our present experience will prove to our countrymen that our Army must be something more than a mere colonial guard or home police; that it must be the means of maintaining our name abroad, and causing it to be respected in peace as well as admired and dreaded in war. We know that British troops can fight better than any others, can endure longer, and obey with more alacrity and less of question. These are qualities which will always give them a vast superiority, if we are only on a par with other nations in our training, military habits, drill, and tactics. This can only be accomplished by courage and resolution on the part of all future Cabinets to prefer the honour of their Sovereign and country to all considerations of personal ambition, and to demand boldly from Parliament means sufficient to maintain, as economically as is consistent with perfect efficiency, an Army and Navy such as England ought to possess.
I firmly believe that, if Parliament is boldly asked to provide the means, though there may be always an opposition, the true spirit of patriotism will prevail, and the great political parties will soon come to an understanding that it is not on the question of the Military Establishments of the country that their party warfare is to be carried on.
If we should happily arrive at this state of things, then comes the consideration of the numbers and organisation of our Army in all its branches.
The lamentable results which have attended our present expedition, as far as the waste of human life has been concerned, are solely to be attributed to the want of proper control by a single Minister of every department of the Army. The confusion, delays, and disappointments may be traced to this source to a very considerable extent, and as the nation is now alive to this fact, it is quite possible that it may rush into some extreme course which may entirely overthrow the present system, which by prudence and a little foresight might have been preserved in all its better parts.
I concur in H.R.H.’s remarks that our Army is ‘a mere aggregate of battalions’ — each of these perfect in itself and admirably formed, governed, and drilled, but only pieces in the entire structure of an army, as the wheels, etc., are in the mechanism of a clock.
The regimental system is as nearly perfect as it can be. The system by which an army should be provisioned, moved, brought to act in the field and in the trenches, taught to attack or defend, is non-existent.
All that was done in the Peninsula by the Duke of Wellington was frittered away and lost by a false economy forced upon successive Governments, and which [we] never have had the courage to resist.
We have no means of making General Officers or of forming an efficient Staff, as it has been the practice, even with our limited capacity, to keep the same officers constantly in employment, till they have either become worn out, or so wedded to old ways as to be useless when called to the field.
Had the report of the Commission of 1837 been followed out, this would not have occurred. It will not, I trust, occur in future.
It is owing to our regimental system and the intrinsic worth of our officers that we have succeeded in the little wars in which we have been engaged from time to time. For great operations we are inadequate, as the result has proved.
I concur in H.R.H.’s views that what we require is —
- A Staff of competent General Officers.
- A Staff Corps to train subordinate officers to the duties of the field.
- Masses of troops to be provisioned, moved, and accustomed to life of a camp, by which a combination of all arms may be secured.
- A proper system for the conveyance of material and baggage.
- The means of easy and immediate transport for sick and wounded.
- Well-arranged means of communication between our Army abroad and the authorities at home.
- An efficient Commissariat, which shall have a certain number of its officers employed in India with the large bodies of troops there, and where alone they can learn the science of collecting supplies of all sorts.
- A well-appointed corps of Artillery.
- A siege-train suited to an army of 30,000 men, and which can be increased as occasion may require.
- A good corps of Engineers.
In addition to the above, we should know at all times what means of transport we can command on any emergency either by means of the Royal or Mercantile Navy of the country. This may be all accomplished efficiently in time of peace at no great expense, certainly at none which a nation such as ours should grudge.
I now come to our force in time of peace. This should never be under 100,000 bayonets, of which 25,000 will probably be in India, 12,000 should be in Gibraltar and the Mediterranean. This would dispose of 37,000 out of 100,000, leaving 63,000 for home service and the colonies. Canada should not require more than 1000 in addition to the Canadian Rifles; the West Indies say 2000, in addition to the Black Corps; Nova Scotia, 1000; Australia, New Zealand, and Van Dieman’s Land, 2000; and for the Cape of Good Hope and Ceylon, 4000, with a full corps of 1500 for the Mauritius. This would reduce the home force to 51,500. Of these, three divisions of 10,000 each should be formed to be placed in permanent cantonments and occasionally encamped in such localities in England Scotland, and Ireland as afford sufficient space for training and exercise, and easy access by railway.
To each division there should be attached a proper proportion of Cavalry and Artillery, a Medical Staff and Commissariat Department, and a Pontoon Brigade, and every man should be trained to work with the spade and practised in throwing up works. The officers would learn thoroughly all their duties and become practical professional men. These corps would occupy 30,000 men and leave 21,500 for duty throughout the country and for reliefs abroad. Of course the different regiments comprising the corps would be changed from time to time, and permission might be given to officers from other regiments to join the divisions temporarily for instruction.
I think that H.R.H. lays a good foundation for such a system as this in his Memorandum.
The divisions at Gibraltar and Malta would be smaller, say 6000 at Gibraltar and 5000 at Malta, giving 1000 to Corfu.
At Gibraltar much might be learned, and to our shame be it said that for many years there has never been one single instance, I am informed, of the garrison having been brigaded, and why? Because We have had incompetent officers placed in that most important command.
It is satisfactory to find that H.R.H. is so keenly alive to what is required for the organisation and efficiency of our Army, and with such materials as we have, though we can never compete in numbers with the Continental Powers, still we may easily beat them in alertness. We may make as good generals, I think better, out of the gentlemen of which our corps of officers are composed, and have what we never yet have seen in the British Army, an efficient Field Staff, who, both in the Adjutant-General’s and Quartermaster-General’s Departments, shall not have to learn their ABC when a full knowledge of their profession is demanded of them.
All that I have pointed out may be achieved under even the present system of command, but I would be wanting in candour did I not state my opinion, that I believe it can only be done by vesting in a Minister of the Crown the sole control of and responsibility for the co-operation of all the branches of the Military Service.
(Signed) Panmure.
Piccadilly, February 7, 1855.
Composition of the cabinet
If I did not mention to you this morning that I had offered to Lord Canning to take him into the Cabinet, it was that it went out of my head while talking of other matters. I had mentioned it to the other House of Lords members of the Cabinet, who had expressed no objections. I have not made any such proposal to Cardwell, but told Gladstone, who wished me to do so, that we had not room for him. Canning I do not consider as a Peelite, for he would have felt himself at liberty (at least as I understood him) to have joined the Government when the Peelites had declined to do so. I have altered your Statement of the Composition of the Cabinet. Granville is a Whig if ever there was one, and if you do not reckon Molesworth as one it must be because you think him something more: you omitted Cranworth, who is clearly a Whig, and with these corrections your list shows nine of one kind to five of the other — very nearly two to one, even if you count Canning as a Peelite, which I do not, and which I should think he would hardly do himself. Surely if we are to be a Coalition Government, which it has been felt to be so important that we should be, the foregoing proportions cannot be deemed to give an unfair preponderance to those who have joined us.
As to Canning, my belief is that you will find him very useful in the House of Lords.
War Department, February 9, 1853.
Warning of a supposed intended attack by the Russians
I have been so entirely occupied since my appointment to office that I have had no time to acquaint myself sufficiently with the details of former correspondence, so as to enable me to write you officially by this mail. I seize, however, these few minutes which remain to me to inform you of that which may reach you previously by telegraph, that the Government have information on which they think they can implicitly rely that the Czar has sent Prince [Nicholas or Michael8] to the Crimea for the purpose of making a continued attack from without and within on the Allied Army. The signal for this is to be the first occasion of a snow-storm setting in from the direction in which the Russian Army will advance from without, and blowing consequently in the faces of the allies; in fact, they intend to use a snow-storm to answer the purpose of the mist at Inkerman. I hope it is unnecessary for me to impress on you every vigilance on the part of your outposts, and should the weather prove coarse, the most frequent intercommunication between your main bodies and their advanced pickets.
St. James’s Palace, February 9, 1855.
Offering to communicate his impressions of things at the seat of war
I know how fully your time must at this moment be occupied, but I shall venture to write to you, as I am exceedingly anxious to see you. I have the vanity to suppose that there are many little matters in which I might be of use to you, as having come so recently from the seat of war and seen all that our poor fellows there have to go through, and so much that ought to be differently arranged and managed from what it is at present.
Your appointment has given me great satisfaction, but your task is not a light one. It must be the duty of all to assist as far as possible in carrying out your arduous undertaking, and, believe me, if in anything I can be of use, my services are at all times at your command. If you would let me know where and at what time I may call on you, I will come to see you, or if you prefer it, I shall be happy to receive you here; but your time is precious, and you had therefore better let me call on you.
The following Memorandum, of which the original is in Lord Palmerston’s handwriting, incorporates the decision of the Cabinet held on the 12th February as to measures to be taken for improving the Military Administration at home and in the Crimea.
MEMORANDUM OF MEASURES TAKEN TO ESTABLISH A BETTER ORDER OF THINGS IN THE CRIMEA
- A Land-Transport Corps has been formed under the orders of Colonel M’Murdo: the duties of this Corps will be to undertake the whole of the transport for the Army, and will be carried out on a much greater scale than the Royal Waggon train was under the Duke of Wellington. Agents will be sent to all parts of Asia Minor to purchase animals of burden.
- Instructions have been sent to Lord Raglan to procure immediately from Constantinople a Corps of Scavengers to remove all the filth which exists in the camp.
- Sanitary Commissions are to be sent out to suggest to Lord Raglan the measures necessary for keeping the camp in a good state, and their attention will also be directed to the sanitary conditions of our hospitals.
- A Commission, of which Sir J. M’Neill is to be the head, is to be sent out to inquire into the working of the Commissariat in all its branches of supply and issue, and every other detail.
- Civil medical men are to be sent out to the East, and a hospital at Smyrna is to be formed entirely under their direction.
- Major-General Simpson is to proceed to the Crimea as Chief of the Staff. His duty will be to convey Lord Raglan’s orders to the Staff, and through them to the Army, and see their orders quickly and implicitly obeyed; to inquire into the manner in which the Staff Officers perform their duties, and to report fully thereon to Lord Raglan and otherwise to the Secretary of State.
He will recommend to Lord Raglan any change which the result of his inspection may prove to be necessary.- A Sea-Transport Board is to be formed at the Admiralty, which will, so far as regards Military Transport, communicate duly with the War Office.
Reform of Civil Departments.
February 10, 1855.
No power to purchase (much needed) vegetables
A fact which has been brought to my knowledge yesterday ought to be known to you, and therefore I write a line notwithstanding my reluctance to trouble you, when such a heavy press of business must already be on your hands. It is admitted by all medical men that the greatest danger to our Army arises from scorbutic diseases and a corrupt state of blood, caused chiefly by the use of salt provisions. Vegetables are of the utmost importance to the poor men. It so happens that one of the Crimean Relief Societies sent out a whole shipful of vegetables. On its arrival at Constantinople, the man in charge of it reported himself to the Commissary (I believe Smith, reported to be our best), who was delighted to hear of the arrival of provisions; when he saw the list, however, and found they were vegetables, he declined purchasing ‘as the Commissariat had no power to purchase vegetables’!! You will know that such is the ordinary rule, but surely in these moments they ought to have full powers to exercise their own discretion.
My authority is Lord Blantyre, on the Committee of the Fund, whom I saw yesterday, and who could tell you many strange stories connected with the state of our Army in the East.
February 11, 1855.
Old-fashioned departmentalism to be overset
The narrative with which your Royal Highness has favoured me is of a piece with the old-fashioned departmentalism throughout the whole administration of military. affairs, which must be entirely overset. … I am quite certain that every officer has received ample discretionary powers, and, if they are either too timid or too slow to act upon them, they must at once be removed.
We expect the messenger at midnight, and I have just received from the Secretary of the Peninsular and Oriental Steam Navigation Company a notice that they have been informed of the arrival to-day of the first detachment of the 10th Hussars.
I trust that your Royal Highness will acquaint the Queen with this fact. I will not lose a moment in transmitting to Her Majesty all the information contained in the bag which reaches me.
February 12, 1855.
No improvement in health of the Army
Lord Panmure presents his humble duty to your Majesty, and hastens to forward for your Majesty’s perusal the despatches which arrived from Lord Raglan shortly before midnight last night.
Your Majesty will observe, probably with as much surprise as Lord Panmure, that Lord Raglan takes no notice whatever of the Duke of Newcastle’s despatch of the 6th January, although in his private letter received by last messenger he acknowledged its receipt and complained generally of its contents. This omission seems to be so unaccountable that Lord Panmure still hopes that in some confusion it may have got into another bag, and that it will come to his hand this morning.
Lord Panmure has ventured to transmit to your Majesty copies of Lord Raglan’s letters, as the originals are difficult to read.
Lord Panmure cannot congratulate your Majesty on any marked improvement in the physical condition of the Army. By the Morning State of 28th January, there appears to have been on that day present and fit for duty — Artillery, 2562 rank and file; Cavalry and Infantry, 14,511 + 4075 batmen; making 18,586 rank and file fit for duty. There were also 2251 on command.9 Colonel M’Murdo leaves England to-night to organise at Balaclava the land transport of the Army.
Lord Panmure abstains from sending to your Majesty, from day to day as they sit, the resolutions of the Cabinet upon military affairs solely because he presumes that all the resolutions of the Cabinet are communicated to your Majesty by Viscount Palmerston.
Lord Panmure will forward to your Majesty this evening a copy of the despatch that he writes to Lord Raglan by the mail.
February 12, 1855.
Lord Panmure presents his humble duty to your Majesty and begs to forward to your Majesty a further communication which arrived through the Post Office this morning from Lord Raglan.
Lord Panmure likewise transmits the Morning State of the 26th and 28th January, together with an extract of a private letter which has been sent to him, and which gives a more cheerful view of the state of the Army.
Recall of Sir John Burgoyne
Lord Panmure begs to acquaint your Majesty that the Cabinet have resolved to recall Sir John Burgoyne,10 whose presence is no longer necessary with the Army since General Jones’ arrival. It has also been thought expedient that Sir George Brown should be officially recognised as second in command.
Simpson to inquire into fitness of officers at seat of war.
In the absence of any reply on the part of Lord Raglan to the despatch of the 6th January, but in consequence of the deep conviction which rests upon his mind of the inefficiency of both Major-General Airey and Major-General Estcourt for the important duties imposed upon them, Lord Panmure has suggested to his colleagues, who have concurred in his views, that Major-General Simpson should proceed at once to the Crimea as Chief of the Staff, and in that capacity make a searching inquiry into the fitness of every officer for his duties, and report his opinion and recommendations to Lord Raglan.
Lord Panmure transmits to your Majesty a copy of the despatch which he has sent to-night to Lord Raglan.
Lord Panmure has received a box from your Majesty containing a letter to Prince Edward of Saxe-Weimar, and your Majesty’s commands that it should be forwarded by to-night’s mail, which have been obeyed.
Private.
War Department, February 12, 1855.
Exhortation as to management of hospital department
I think you will like to have a few lines from me, on assuming the direction of the War Department, to assure you of the deep anxiety with which I look to every officer in command to meet the exigencies of the times and carry on with vigour the war in which we are engaged. On no one can devolve more important duties than yourself, and I am sure that I may rely on your zeal and ability in discharging them. You are charged with making the arrangements for the accommodation of the sick and wounded. In so doing you must not be afraid of taking upon yourself considerable responsibility, and whenever you see it to be beneficial to depart from ordinary and established rules to improvements, or meet cases of emergency, pray do so and rely on me for support. Above all, you will, I trust, co-operate heartily with Admiral Grey, who is a friend of mine, and will, I am sure, by his quickness and talent be of great service to you in your arduous duties. Remember that the eyes of all England are on Scutari, and a victory over disease and death is as great as over a living foe.
Private.War Department, February 12, 1855.
Regretting the necessity of forwarding an unpalatable despatch
I am sorry to be obliged to send you a despatch to-day embodying my view of the grievances in your camp, their cause and the remedy, or rather my strong advice that you should try and get a more energetic and efficient officer than Airey seems to be. The public are roused, and the House of Commons has already sacrificed two victims to their disappointment in the persons of Lord Aberdeen and the Duke of Newcastle. I have most reluctantly come here — not that I expect to do any better than my predecessor, but because I wish to protect, as far as possible, the interests of the Army, and to stand between you and those who are so angry at all that has happened. I know well the chivalrous feeling that will induce you to protect your subordinates, but I hope that you will not push this too far, because it is impossible for you or any man to see all that is going on with one pair of eyes, and you have not been informed of the state of your different Divisions by those whose business it was to be continually on the outlook and to tell you. I can never excuse General Airey for not looking to his communication with Balaclava. With plenty of stone, he might have laid a thick bottoming first, and a causeway on the top of this; but no pains seems to have been taken to do anything, nor do I believe, from all I hear, that either he or his people have even been at Balaclava at all until we had the storm burst on us here.
Critical position of the Government
We are in a curious position. Parliament is adjourned till Friday. Mr. Roebuck’s Motion for a Committee is carried, and almost all the new Government were members of the old. The House of Commons will name that Committee, unless some change is made, or some step undertaken by Government which would be painful to you. I think it impossible to submit to carry on the Government unless the House of Commons put down Mr. Roebuck’s Committee. This they will not do unless we move on our part. Some think a Committee should be appointed to inquire into the whole management of the Army. This I wish to avoid for your sake, as you have done great and gallant deeds, and I should be sorry to be compelled to put such a slight upon you. But your Staff must be changed at the least; that will satisfy the public, and that radically, and I would strongly advise both Airey and Estcourt to go either to Divisions or come home; for be assured that, if they do not, they will be swept away by Ellenborough, who will succeed me as War Minister should Lord Derby come in. If I had Markham13 at home, so high is my opinion of him as a soldier that I would have sent him at once to your aid; as it is, I have ordered him from India, and on his arrival you must use him as your Quartermaster-General, whoever you employ in the meantime.
Raglan’s merits commended
You have done us great service, nobody could have done better in keeping up friendly relations with our allies, and the quiet way in which you have effected your relief in the trenches, though not to the extent you could desire, is most gratifying to the Government and myself. I hope you may gradually effect more. I don’t wish to place my views too much or too conspicuously before you, but it occurs to me that we ought to know your opinions upon every point of strategical detail without loss of time.
Interrogated as to his plans
- Your opinion upon the expediency of an assault.
- Your arrangements should it succeed.
- Your calculations of what might happen on its failure.
- If it should be necessary to withdraw, have you in consultation with General Canrobert thought or forecast any plan for so doing ?
All these are matters of deep interest to me and all of us here, and we shall look for your views with what you may call too great impatience.
General Simpson sent out as Chief of Staff
Since I wrote the above I have returned from the Cabinet, and we have resolved on two things which it is of importance for you to know. The first is to issue a Commission of Second in Command of the Army to Brown,14 and the next is to send out to you General Simpson to act as Chief of the Staff, as referred to in my public despatch. He will inquire into and report upon the efficiency of your Staff Officers, especially those in the inferior grades, but General Airey and Estcourt will not escape from his review.
You must support him, or be assured that we shall have greater difficulties arise. Do for pity’s sake get something done for the road, as it will be absolutely necessary, as well as the train road now making.
I have not time for more but will write fully as I can every mail.
Windsor Castle, February 13, 1855.
The Queen has to thank Lord Panmure for two letters, one received yesterday, and the other this morning.
Meagreness of Raglan’s letters
She has been as much surprised as Lord Panmure can have been to find that Lord Raglan made no answer to the Duke of Newcastle’s despatch of the 6th ult.; his letters are as usual not very full of information, and the Morning State shows an unfavourable condition of the Army.
Organisation of Land Transport
It is to be hoped that Colonel M’Murdo will succeed with the organisation of the Land Transport, which the Queen apprehends, however, will be more easily prepared at Constantinople than at Balaclava itself.
Recall of Burgoyne and appointment of Sir G. Brown and General Simpson
The Queen approves of the recall of Sir John Burgoyne, which may be effected without wounding his feelings, as he is in fact wanted at his post at home.
She likewise approves the appointment of Sir George Brown as Second in Command, and the appointment of General Simpson as Chief of the Staff; he is a very experienced officer, and it is to be hoped not yet too old for the duties. His task will not be an enviable one, particularly that of inquiring into and reporting on the efficiency of the officers now composing the Staff of Lord Raglan.
Panmure’s despatch to Raglan
The Queen was much pleased with the despatch which Lord Panmure has addressed to Lord Raglan — painful as it must be to have to write or to receive it; the truth of everything stated therein is undeniable, and the directions given, if attended to, can only produce an improvement.15
The Queen keeps both the letters from Lord Raglan and the despatch, presuming that they were copied for her.
She understands that Mr. Frederic Peel is to be Lord Panmure’s Parliamentary Under-Secretary; whom will he propose as his Military Under-Secretary? This will be an appointment of much importance.
February 13, 1855.
Lord Panmure presents his humble duty to your Majesty and begs to assure your Majesty of the great encouragement which he receives from your Majesty’s approbation of his proceedings.
All copied papers are intended for your Majesty’s retention, and whenever time will permit Lord Panmure will have Lord Raglan’s despatches copied for your Majesty’s use.
Lord Panmure feels that he has erred in not acquainting your Majesty with Mr. Peel’s appointment,16 but he understood that Lord Palmerston had undertaken to do so. The selection of a Military Under-Secretary is a matter of more importance, as it is permanent, and no step shall be taken in that direction without your Majesty’s full cognisance.
February 13, 1855.
10th Hussars not to be sent to Crimea till spring
The Queen was very much pleased to hear that a portion of the 10th Hussars have already arrived at Suez. It will be of the greatest importance that this fine regiment should not be sent to the Crimea before the spring, where in the present inclement season, and under present bad arrangements, it would be sure to be destroyed without any likelihood of being able to render any service.
Cavalry to be reorganised in Turkey against spring
It strikes me that it would be much the best plan to reorganise our Cavalry at once in Turkey in order to have it ready in the spring. The Duke of Cambridge tells me that, after so long a voyage as some 1000 miles, the horses will at least require six weeks’ rest, standing, and that those which went out last year, amongst which the fine Artillery horses, having to march soon after their arrival, got fever in their feet and were rendered useless.
February 13, 1855.
I received your Royal Highness’ suggestions as to the mode of disposing of the 10th Hussars, while Lord Hardinge was with me, and we both concur in the force of your Royal Highness’ remarks. The same applies to the remount of our Cavalry in Turkey, and instructions on this point will be sent to Lord Raglan.
February 13, 1855.
Improvement of war hospitals
It is clear that, quite independently of the medical treatment of the sick and wounded, there is an urgent necessity for improved sanitary arrangements in our hospitals at Constantinople, Scutari, and elsewhere. Proper ventilation has been neglected, and various other sanitary arrangements have been either not thought of, or not carried into effect.
There are two very able and active men who have been connected with the Board of Health and whom I have much employed about sanitary matters — Dr. Sutherland and Dr. Grainger. I wish very much that you would send them out at once to Constantinople, and one afterwards to Scutari and Balaclava and the Camp, not to interfere at all with the medical treatment of the sick and wounded, but with full powers to carry into immediate effect such sanitary improvements and arrangements in regard to the hospital buildings and to the Camp as their experience may suggest. I am convinced that this will save a great many lives, and restore to the service a great many men who would otherwise be permanently disabled.
Piccadilly, February 13, 1855.
Inquiry as to next campaign
I forgot to say that the Queen asked me in a note yesterday what steps are taking with a view to the next campaign, and you may as well give her an outline of your arrangements.
Would it not be well to send out with General Simpson the living Despatch who is to come back again ?
Colonel Malcolm, son of Sir John Malcolm who was in Persia, wishes for employment. I believe him to be an intelligent man. He was with his father in Persia, and went with Sir Henry Pottinger to China when I sent Pottinger to arrange matters with the Chinese. He did very well there.
War Department, February 15, 1855.
Affairs at home and at the seat of war.
I commence my private letter to you before the mail comes in, as I fear that we shall have hurry and confusion to-morrow, with the mail arriving in the morning, departing in the evening, and Parliament reassembling in the interval. I suspect that heavy fire will be opened in both Houses, but we will do our best to allay angry feeling and conduct affairs coolly. I send you, under the same cover with this, a paper of Lord Hardinge’s, confidentially printed for the Cabinet, which it will be useful for you to see. It will show you the resources to which you have to look in spring, and I hope inspire confidence in your mind as to any scheme of operations which you may be forming. I have every reason to believe that your supplies of hay are now arriving regularly, and I shall send your Artillery horses as soon as I can get conveyance for them. I am very anxious to have your batteries completed, and that important arm fit to move for any purpose.
In regard to your Cavalry remounts, I make that the subject, or rather one of the subjects, of my public despatch. I hope you are in some better order at Balaclava, and that you are by degrees getting that confusion brought into order. As soon as this is done, and your stores cleared out, let me suggest to you to have no depots of any size — not more than a fortnight’s consumption at that place, but to draw by regular steam communication every three days for supplies from the Bosphorus, where your great magazines of everything should be. I cannot see any difficulty in arriving at this arrangement.
As to supplying and clothing the Army now on active service
I am contemplating the issue of an order to organise at Scutari a corps of shoemakers, who could be supplied with leather and materials and make and mend shoes and boots for your people. There is, of course, some necessity for our looking to the spring clothing immediately. I have a strong notion that the men ought not to leave off their woollen shirts even in the hot weather and when not on duty, that a pair of coarse canvas trousers, and a smock frock shirt [that] would go on even over their uniform jacket, would be a good fatigue dress. Let me hear from you on this point at your earliest convenience. We mean to send out a Commission to inquire into our Commissariat and the whole question of delivery and consignment of stores, also a sanitary Commission to aid you in clearing your camp, for if that be not efficiently done you will all die of fever.
As to future prospects
The Czar seems to be making frightful efforts, but I firmly believe that they will prove abortive, and my great ambition is to see you either give him battle in the field or force him out of the Crimea. Don’t look for peace or turn your eyes to Vienna.17 If we can make a bonâ fide honest peace it will be done, but this is for our diplomatists; our generals must fight as if no negotiations existed. Your operations must be so conducted as to leave not the slightest ground for suspicion that we pursue a Fabian policy till peace comes to our rescue. It is not so, and it must not appear to be so. The villainous Times has outdone itself in an article to-day on the 63rd Regiment. By the bye, when you send a regiment away in such circumstances as this has been sent, do not send it to Malta or Gibraltar, or any place where it can cast a damp on the spirits of your reserves, but send it home at once to have its ranks recruited. I shall keep this open till to-morrow, and finish it when I come from the House of Lords in case I have anything to add.
The mail is in and we have no answer to No. 202!18 I expect to be called over the coals for it, but I must promise it on Monday when I hope and trust it will arrive. I am going to bring in a Bill to enable us to enlist men for two or three years between 24 and 32 years of age, which will, I hope, help us.
February 15, 1855.
Lord Panmure presents his humble duty to your Majesty, and transmits for your Majesty’s approval and signature the increase to the Establishment of the Ordnance Corps.
Contemplated commissions at the seat of war
Lord Panmure begs to acquaint your Majesty that Major-General Simpson leaves England on Monday evening, and that it is in contemplation to send out a Commission to inquire into the condition and state of the Army.19
It is likewise intended to despatch a Sanitary Commission20 to follow up the instructions to Lord Raglan on the subject of the purification of the Camp.
Lord Panmure begs to acquaint your Majesty that the messenger is expected at 8 a.m. to-morrow, and he will endeavour to have the contents of the despatches in your Majesty’s hands as soon as possible.
Mischievous article in the Times
Lord Panmure is deeply concerned to observe the mischievous article in the Times of this morning, contrasting the condition of the officers and men of the Army. With such infamous articles as these it is not surprising to see recruiting fall off, and zeal, and even loyalty itself paralysed.
Piccadilly, February 15, 1855.
Deplorable state of war hospitals. Despatch of medical men to remedy defects
It is essential that I should be able to state to-morrow in the House of Commons that the two able civilian medical men whom I mentioned to you21 are going out to Constantinople and to the Crimea to establish sanitary regulations in our hospital departments. The condition of our hospitals is deplorable and disgraceful. Hundreds of men are dying there from mere neglect and bad arrangements, and it must be our first and immediate object to set these things to rights. Not only are our hospitals in this state, but the ships in which our sick and wounded are brought from place to place are worse than the hospitals, and the poor wretches who are crowded into them are left in a state of filth and misery which baffles description. The two men I mentioned to you will set all this right if they have full powers, and we must overrule all objections on the part of the Military Departments to accomplish these objects. The state of the Camp also requires immediate attention with reference to its sanitary condition, for depend upon it that, unless some active measures are taken, there will break out, as soon as the spring sun begins to shine, a pestilence worse than any disease which has hitherto afflicted our troops.
February 15, 1855.
That Dr. Sutherland of the Board of Health,
Mr. Simon, Health Officer of the City of London,
Dr. Gavin, for three years Government Commissioner to West Indies in prevention and cure of the Cholera, be appointed — Dr. Sutherland to be the chief.
One thus may be at Scutari,
One at Balaclava,
One either stationary or employed on inspections.That in case of their finding certain structural works to be necessary, such as jetties to embark and disembark the sick and wounded, shafts for ventilation, and many other important things well known to the practitioners in Sanitary Science, they have full power to avail themselves of the aid and services of Mr. Barron and his body of five-and-twenty workmen already engaged by the Government, and sent out under the recommendation of Mr. Peto.22
Mr. Barron is receiving a salary of five hundred pounds for one year; and is, as Mr. Peto stated to-day, an intelligent, experienced builder, full of knowledge and skill, and zealous to be useful in the highest degree.
He and his men would, of course, move as required from Scutari to Balaclava and back again.
These gentlemen should have power to order better sanitary arrangements for the hospital-ships taking sick and wounded to Balaclava.
Piccadilly, February 16, 1855.
Will you have the goodness to let me have in the course of the day, and before the House meets, a short statement of the various measures taken or about to be taken to establish a better system of order in our arrangements at Constantinople, Scutari, and the Crimea.
I send you a memorandum which Shaftesbury gave me last night. I believe the three medical men he mentions would be the best for the purpose. But they ought to have power to make arrangements for sanitary purposes in the transport-ships for sick and wounded.
Deplorable condition of the sick on board transport-ships
I was told by a person who came from the East that the condition in which the sick are put on board at Balaclava and landed at Scutari is too disgusting to be described, and too filthy for human beings.
Is not Seaton too old for active duty even in Ireland, and would not De Lacy Evans be a better man? His being an Irishman, moreover, would be a recommendation, considering how scantily Ireland is represented in our Government.
I suppose I may say, if asked in the House, that Dr. Smith of the Medical Board here at home is to retire, and that some changes are about to be made in the Heads of the Medical Department in the Levant.
Buckingham Palace, February 16, 1855.
The Queen has been much interested with Lord Hardinge’s Memorandum giving account of all that has been done up to the present time with reference to the Army.
Urges introduction of a Bill for short enlistments.
If recruiting is to be improved it will be necessary to lose no time with the introduction of a Bill enabling short enlistments, for one, two, or three years, for men between 25 and 30 years of age.
February 16, 1855.
Lord Panmure presents his humble duty to your Majesty, and begs to forward for your Majesty’s information the despatches from Lord Raglan which have been brought by the messenger. The official reply to No. 202 of the 6th January is still not forthcoming, and Lord Panmure is sorry to observe that the return of casualties referred to in Lord Raglan’s official despatch has been omitted to be sent.
Lord Panmure humbly requests that your Majesty will be graciously pleased to return by the messenger the Morning State which accompanies this note.
Buckingham Palace, February 16, 1855.
Meagreness of Raglan’s despatches
The Queen returns the Morning State of the Army in the Crimea, and must express astonishment at the meagre and unsatisfactory reports from Lord Raglan, which contain next to nothing, and certainly nothing for the guidance of the Home Government. How different are General Rose’s23 despatches reporting on the State of the French Army! Should not the 63rd Regiment be brought home to be reorganised? It has got 33 officers present to 62 men, including batmen!
War Department, February 19, 1855.
I have scarcely any time to write you, nor indeed much to say. General Simpson goes to-day and will reach you soon after this. You will, I trust, appreciate the spirit in which I have sent him. Such a course is the only possible mode left to me of acting, unless I had at once written to you to remove Airey and Estcourt. This I was unwilling to do on your account, but I must do something to satisfy the House of Commons, and if you can, as I hope you will, give way to the current of public opinion in some degree, I look forward to better times ere long.
Roebuck’s Committee and how its operations are to be limited.
Roebuck’s Committee will sit — no power can stay it. I will prevent its dealing with the Army and its discipline, or I shall resign my office. However, I do not expect I shall be driven to this, though God knows that it would be an escape from one of the greatest toils I ever undertook.
I have got you a very good man to command our Turkish Contingent — General Vivian. He is in the E. I. Company’s service. The officers will be mostly, if not all, from the E.I.C. service.
Mind that both the Sardinian Contingent and the 10th Hussars at Cairo await your orders. Arrangements will be made to send the ships for them to Genoa to wait till you send for them. Send an officer whenever you require them. I hope by the aid of my sanitary gentlemen your camp may be cleansed and good suggestions made for getting rid of offal and ordure.
I fancy the weather has detained our messenger. It is bitter cold, and the river is full of ice before my windows and fast above bridges.
G. C., February 19, 1855.
As to a Jewish spy
The writer of the enclosed is, I understand, a respectable man. A few days ago he informed me that he had fallen in with one Kransz, a Jew, who seemed able and willing to do us some service. I asked for further information and got the letter I now send.
He is the sort of a man that has been long wanted in the Crimea, and if he has a mind to get himself hung by the Russians, why shouldn’t he?
Would you like to send him out if he can furnish any testimonials of respectability? I have no recollection of his bringing me a letter from the Duke of Cambridge, but he may have done so.
Command of Turkish contingent
Ellenborough24 told me this evening that the best man longo intervallo for the command of our Turkish Army is Sir Hugh Wheeler, of the Bengal Army. He spoke of him in the very highest terms.
I asked him if he knew Vivian, but he had never heard his name. I have had a note from him since, to say that a Colonel Vivian belonged to the Madras Army and can therefore have no military experience, as the Madras Army has had nothing to do for many years. This may be worth inquiring about. Ellenborough is good reference for Indian officers.
War Department, February 19, 1855.
Instructions to General Simpson on his appointment as Chief of the Staff.
Sir, — Her Majesty having been graciously pleased to appoint you to be Chief of the Staff of the Army in the Crimea, and as your position is novel in the British Army, I think it necessary to state to you in distinct terms the chief of the nature of the duties which you will have to perform.
- On arriving at the headquarters of the Army, you will report yourself to Field-Marshal Lord Raglan, to whom a copy of these Instructions will be forwarded by the next mail.
- As Chief of the Staff you will receive from the Field-Marshal, and promulgate in his name, all orders to the Army.
- You will convey the Field-Marshal’s special instructions to the Departments of the Adjutant-General and Quartermaster-General, and it will be your business not only to convey to these officers the orders referred to, but to see that those orders are speedily and implicitly carried into effect.
- It will be your duty to look into the composition of the General Staff of the Army, and report your opinion and any changes which it may occur to you to think necessary to Field-Marshal Lord Raglan. This Report you will make in duplicate, and instructions will be given to the Field-Marshal to forward one of them for the information of the Secretary of State for War.
- All Reports from the Adjutant and Quartermaster-General’s Departments will, as a general rule, pass through your hands.
- All appointments and removal of officers from the General Staff of the Army will rest with the officer in Supreme Command, but you will not fail if you find any officer in your opinion unfit, on trial, for the duties intrusted to him, to report the same without fear or affection to the Commander-in-Chief.
- From the above instructions you will perceive that great responsibility attaches itself to your situation, which, however, I feel quite confident of your ability to undertake.
February 20, 1855.
Still no reply from Lord Raglan to Newcastle’s despatch of Jan 6th.
Lord Panmure presents his humble duty to your Majesty, and transmits herewith, in original, all the despatches which the messenger who arrived last night about midnight has brought from Lord Raglan. Your Majesty will observe that no reply has come to the Duke of Newcastle’s despatch of the 6th Jan., nor is any allusion made to it further than the complaint made by Lord Raglan in his private letter.
Lord Panmure cannot understand how the Commissary has allowed his stock of hay and straw to run so low as Lord Raglan represents, but he has every reason to feel confident that, from the arrangements now made from hence, regular supplies of hay will flow into Balaclava.
Referring to plan of attack on Sebastopol
Your Majesty will perceive that these despatches are of more than ordinary interest, especially that marked No. 1, which communicates the plan of attack on Sebastopol. Unanimity of opinion and concert of action between the Commanders of the Allied Armies is gratifying, and gives strong assurance of a successful issue, though Lord Panmure does not anticipate that any assault will have taken place as yet, but most probably a very few days will elapse before it is made.
Lord Panmure humbly requests that your Majesty will be graciously pleased to return the despatches by the messenger when read, as there is to be a Cabinet at two precisely, at which Lord Panmure will be expected to submit them to his colleagues.
Lord Panmure has the honour to transmit a letter addressed to your Majesty which came in this bag.
Buckingham Palace, February 20, 1855.
The Queen acknowledges Lord Panmure’s letters and the interesting despatches, which she asks him to let her have again after the Cabinet.
Prospects of an assault.
She feels very anxious at the accounts of the prospects of an assault.
War Department, February 23, 1855.
The storm must be faced.
The messenger brought us your answer to the Duke of Newcastle’s despatch, but I cannot comment on it officially by this mail. We are in another ministerial crisis on the subject of Roebuck’s Committee. The House of Commons and the country are resolved on inquiry; no Government can resist it, and it has been ascertained that Lord Derby would yield to it were he to come in. It is useless therefore to resist the storm; we must try and guide it, if, as I presume will be the case, three such defalcations as Graham, Gladstone, and Sidney Herbert can be made up.25
Comments on plan of attack on Sebastopol
We were all much pleased with your secret despatch in which you send us home the plan of attack on Sebastopol, and it appears to be feasible so far as you know the difficulties with which you will have to contend. But my notion is that you will find barrier on barrier prepared to resist you within, and mines ready for you in all directions. If it should come to an assault, God send you well through it. In publishing your despatch to-day, I have put in your paragraph about the hay as just to yourself, and I have caused a most searching inquiry to be made into the cause of delay. I hope you will give all facilities for our inquiry into the Commissariat Stores by Sir John M’Neill and Tulloch; it will enable us to do much to improve.
I must now go to the House of Lords, and if I can get back to add any more, I will.
G. C., February 23, 1855.
Turkish contingent.
The ratifications of the Turkish Convention go to-day. I wrote by the last mail urging Stratford to use his utmost exertions to have the Contingent got together and ready for the officers.
What shall I tell him about their arrival ?
February 23, 1855.
How to provide an army for next campaign.
Amongst all the difficulties of the moment, which, however great they may be, I trust we shall successfully pull through, the consideration how we are to provide an army for the next campaign is the one which gives me most anxiety.
We shall have nothing except the ten Battalions preparing in the Mediterranean, the Drafts organising at Malta, and the remnant of Lord Raglan’s present force.
The first will not be completed and fit for service for some time; the second cannot be ready much before the summer, and will then be very young and quite inexperienced; the last will be found, after all, what we shall have chiefly to depend upon.
Our chief endeavour therefore must be to save as many men of that Army as possible, putting them in a condition to be able to meet further hardships and fatigues.
They have between 17,000 and 18,000 sick at this moment, and from all I can hear, recoveries are very rare and slow in the crowded hospitals, nor will the new hospital at Smyrna do more than relieve Scutari and Kulali of their increasing numbers. When men are considered convalescent and sent back to the Crimea, they are so little able, with their shattered constitutions, to stand the fatigues and privations of the siege, that in a very few days they have to be sent back to hospital, and thereby not only add considerably to Lord Raglan’s present difficulties, but also diminish our prospect of seeing them again in the ranks as efficient men, as relapses are generally more fatal than the original disease.
Suggests ‘convalescent depots’.
In my opinion, therefore, we ought not to delay a moment in selecting a distinct place for convalescent depots26 removed from the immediate contact of the hospitals and sick, in a different locality and climate, and leaving the men free from all hard duty and exposure, but keeping them under military organisation and strict discipline. I should say that Corfu or the Ionian Islands generally would be the best place for this. The convalescents might there be organised in Provisional Battalions, similarly to the Drafts at Malta, and, as at the latter place the principal object is to form recruits into efficient soldiers, here it should be, to devise every possible means of restoring the convalescents to health and strength.
In the weakened state of many of the regiments before Sebastopol, there seems to be an overplus of officers, and as many as are required might easily be detached for this service. There is a good General there who might be assisted by two Brigadiers, and any want of barrack room might be supplied by sending for huts, perhaps from Trieste, where they could be quickly and cheaply procured.
I send you this suggestion as it has occurred to me, without any further comment.
February 23, 1855.
Referring to a delicate matter.
Lord Panmure presents his humble duty to your Majesty, and regrets very much to have to acquaint your Majesty that, after conferring with his colleagues on the subject of sending Major-General Grey27 to the headquarters of the Army, he feels himself constrained to yield to their opinion that such a step would not in the present temper of the country be expedient.
Lord Panmure would not on that account shrink from responsibility when he thought that the interests of your Majesty’s service were involved, but in the present case the question turns upon the extent to which His Royal Highness the Prince’s name might be associated with General Grey’s mission.
Lord Panmure represented to his colleagues that he had suggested General Grey’s name to your Majesty, and that laying aside all considerations of private convenience, both your Majesty and His Royal Highness cheerfully placed the General at the disposal of the Government.
Lord Panmure’s colleagues were deeply sensible of your Majesty’s readiness, as well as that of His Royal Highness, to sacrifice on this as on other occasions personal considerations to the public good, but they feared to raise again those most unjust and false prejudices which have been entertained against His Royal Highness, and thereby to cause pain to your Majesty in your most tender feelings.
Under these circumstances Lord Panmure, most humbly thanking your Majesty for your gracious reception of his proposal, requests to withdraw it from your Majesty’s further attention.
Private.
Before Sebastopol, February 24, 1855.
Position of affairs in Crimea.
The mail of the 9th arrived yesterday and brought me the announcement of your appointment to be War Minister, and your private letter of that date. The renewal of our official intercourse is very agreeable to me, and I shall be happy to correspond with you without reserve, and in terms of the utmost confidence. You will have learnt by my despatch to Lord Clarendon, of the 17th, that I received on the 15th his telegraphic despatch of the 9th, apprising me of the Govt. having acquired information, on which they can rely, of the intention of the Russians to make a combined attack on the Allied Army from within and without Sebastopol, and that they are in possession of submarine explosive machines, and that I communicated the message to General Canrobert and Sir Edmund Lyons.
The Princes28 are certainly here, and it is said that one of them was at Eupatoria, and we had on Tuesday an awful snow-storm, but the attack has not yet been made.29
I send you copies of two further letters from Colonel Simmons,30 containing a good deal of interesting matter. I have every reason to hope that the repulse of the Russians from Eupatoria31 is calculated to make a very favourable impression, and to inflict considerable discredit on the enemy.
Importance of retaining Turkish troops at Eupatoria.
I consider the presence of a Turkish force little short of 30,000 men at Eupatoria in the highest degree important, but General Canrobert is anxious to have a great portion of it here. I shall endeavour to prevent this, and as Sir Edmund Lyons alone has the means of moving these Turkish troops by sea, and he agrees in my opinion, I hope we shall succeed in keeping Omar Pasha where he is. I am afraid that the French sustained a more considerable loss in the affair of this morning than they are prepared to avow.32 This I say quite confidentially.
I enclose a report from Mr. Cattley33 of the amount of the Russian Army according to the latest advices. I am inclined to think that the 8th Division has arrived.
I enclose the last Morning State.
The deaths at Scutari are numerous, but the returns do not show, in the present state, the period during which they occurred. Our communications with the Bosphorus are uncertain.
There is certainly an improvement in the sick, and if the weather becomes moderate, I expect further amendment.
Return of General Niel to the seat of war.
General Niel,34 the officer of Engineers lately sent from Paris, who had left this after a short visit, met an order at Constantinople for him to return here, and he arrived at General Canrobert’s yesterday morning.
War Department, February 26, 1855.
I have not much to form the subject of either a public or private letter, but I am unwilling to let the mail go empty-handed in either respect.
Writer’s impression as to how the town will fall.
The accounts which are prevalent here of your operations do not convey to us the idea that you will be in the position to assault the town for a month to come. I hope you will not attempt it unless pretty certain of success, as even a very partial failure will open the flood-gates of wrath upon every one. I am not alarmed at this. My own impression is that you will have to fight a battle before you have a chance of the town, and I would not very much wonder if it became the prize of the Allied Armies without an assault at all, by the defeat of the enemy in the field.
I cannot see that the fleet can aid you in any assault on Sebastopol unless you can previously get possession of the forts on the north side, though barrier and booms are so set as to be almost impassable to our screws.
As to operations in the Sea of Azof.
It seems to be pretty clear that we shall do something with the Sea of Azof as soon as the ice breaks up, and we shall require a land force to co-operate in the reduction of Kertch and the forts guarding its entrance. You had better consider this event, and arrange in your own mind in what manner you will meet it, in case the co-operating force is to be detached from your Army. Had this been done last year, what a host of supplies would have been cut off from the Russian Army!
The new Limited Enlistment Bill will receive the Royal assent to-morrow, and I hope under it to get you some stout and able-bodied men; they tell me, but I can only receive it as a report, that I may get 1500 or 2000 men for the Guards from the Irish Constabulary force. If this be so, your brigade of Guards will rise Phoenix-like from its ashes. I expect, however, great things from the measure.
I hear Lord Cardigan talks of leaving about the middle of March. I am very busy with the Bath and the medals, both of which I find had made no progress. The new Order of Merit will take time, I fear.
February 26, 1855.
Second Lieut.-Colonel to Crimean regiments.
The Queen received a few days ago a box from the Horse Guards, with a document for her signature, appointing, to each of the Crimean regiments, a second Lieut.-Colonel, instead of a third Major now on their establishment. Before doing so, she would wish to know what position he is intended to hold? If it is for the command of the depôt at Malta, it appears to her that, as these depôts are to be collected into provisional Battalions corresponding with the Divisions in the Crimea, it will scarcely be necessary to have an officer of that rank for each separate depôt, but rather an encumbrance.
The Queen would also draw attention to the fact, that the list of Lieut-Colonels who obtain their Colonelcy under the new warrant after three years’ service, which we have every reason to fear will already get very heavy, will thereby be still further increased. This must contribute to the prospect of our General Officers after the conclusion of Peace being eventually still older than they are at present.
I have sent a copy of this letter to Lord Hardinge.
PS.—The Queen has not yet received Lord Raglan’s despatch which you had printed.
February 26, 1855.
Answers objections to appointment of a second Lieutenant-Colonel to each of the regiments in Crimea.
I had the honour to receive your Royal Highness’ note, conveying to me Her Majesty’s views on the subject of the appointment of a second Lieut-Colonel to each of the regiments in the Crimea. I fully understood that Lord Hardinge had explained his views to Her Majesty in submitting to Her Majesty the document which was to enable him to carry them into effect.
The present establishment is one Lieut.-Colonel and three Majors for 16 Companies of 2000 men. This gives the chance of regimental promotion to the rank of Lieut.-Colonel in no greater proportion in these regiments than it was before this increase, which certainly appears to be a ground of great complaint to the line, when they contrast. their position with that of the Guards, in which so many additional Lieut.-Colonels are immediately created, and for this reason I agreed with Lord Hardinge that an alteration was proper.
The 2nd Lieut.-Colonel is to be stationed at home, to command the Depôt to be formed in this country, and be ready to assume the command of the regiment should any casualty occur to the senior officer. I admit that such an arrangement will increase the number of General Officers, but as those who receive extra pay are limited by the Royal Warrant, they will not entail any greater expense upon the country.
I think that your Royal Highness will see the justice of the case for the line at all events. I shall trust to your Royal Highness to convey my views most humbly to Her Majesty.
February 27, 1855.
Proposal as to second Lieut.-Colonels agreed to after explanation.
I have to acknowledge the receipt of your letter. Lord Hardinge has also since explained the object of the appointment of 2nd Lieut.-Colonels to the regiments in the Crimea. He reckons upon their being employed in the Crimea itself. The regimental service does not seem to require them either there or at home, where there will remain only two companies eventually; it appears, however, that, for the due proportion of Ranks, and as a boon to the officers of the fighting regiments, the Army looks to it.
The Queen has consequently signed the submission.
February 27, 1855.
Insufficiency of Raglan’s despatch.
Lord Panmure presents his humble duty to your Majesty, and has the honour to transmit to your Majesty a copy of the only despatch which has arrived from Lord Raglan by this mail. There is no ‘private’ letter, nor is the usual Morning State up to the latest date forwarded in any shape, at which neglect Lord Panmure feels some surprise.
Buckingham Palace, February 27, 1855.
General Vivian to command Turkish contingent.
The Queen acknowledges Lord Panmure’s letter of yesterday evening, and approves that General Vivian should be appointed to command the Turkish Force which is about to be organised, and to be attached to the Army in the Crimea. The Queen would wish Lord Panmure to bring him and to present him to her on Thursday. She will let Lord Panmure know the hour to-morrow.
Private
Before Sebastopol, February 27, 1855.
Lord Raglan’s visit to General Monet after the attack on the Selinghinsk Redoubt.
In my private letter of the 24th I mentioned to you confidentially that I was afraid that the French sustained in the attack of that morning a more considerable loss than they were prepared to avow. The account I gave you in my official despatch of that day was precisely what Major Claremont had communicated to me by General Canrobert’s desire.
After the post was gone, I saw the General, who assured me that he had received no further report, and I rode on to see General Monet, whom I found suffering under five wounds. One finger and one thumb had been amputated. The remaining thumb had been struck by a ball, but the surgeon hoped to save it, and the poor General had two balls in his arms. It appears that the Russians allowed the Zouaves to come close to them and then fired a volley at them, and it was at this one discharge that the poor General was struck in five places. The Colonel who commands the Regiment of Zouaves engaged on the occasion, Colonel Cler, who is very well known to and esteemed by our officers, was sitting with him when I was admitted. They both spoke of the great loss the regiment had sustained, but they made no allusion to any other troops, nor did they mention having inflicted any injury upon the Russian work which it was the object of their mission to destroy. The general belief is, however, that they did it no harm whatever, and that they were not supported by some other battalions whose assistance they were entitled to reckon upon.
Russians propose a truce to bury the dead.
The expression of the French officers, I hear, is C’est un coup manqué, and General Rose and Major Claremont have both assured me that the French headquarters were much dispirited as the real facts transpired. General Osten-Sacken35 sent in last night a letter addressed to General Canrobert, and urgently proposing an armistice for one hour to-day to bury the dead killed on the 24th. The officer who brought it to me from General Canrobert took it away with him, promising to send me a copy. If I get it in time, I will enclose it with this. It contains some flattering expressions towards our Allies, which may mean nothing but still are curious, and I observe that the French attach no little value to them.36 Firing is to cease for one hour to-day.
I received this morning the letter of which the accompanying is a copy, from General Canrobert, and I will send my answer for your information on Saturday. I cannot prepare it with any satisfaction to myself without having previously ascertained what I can really do, and I have set on foot the most diligent inquiries. You will observe that my colleague requires a good deal of assistance from us, both in the way of material and of transport, and at the same time presses for the immediate conveyance by us of ammunition.
Everything that the British Army can effect shall be done. I doubt, however, that the French are as ready as they profess to be.
I enclose the Morning State of yesterday.
PS.— I have waited to the last moment, but the copy of Osten-Sacken’s letter has not been received. The officer sent to General Canrobert for it is this instant returned without it, the General having sent it to General Bosquet. I asked for it many hours ago.
Au Quartier Général devant Sebastopol, 26 Février 1855.
Relating to the construction by the enemy of the ‘White Works’ and accepting offer of the loan of artillery.
My Lord,— Je m’empresse de remercier Votre Seigneurie de l’offre qu’elle m’a fait transmettre ce matin par M. le Colonel Dairer, de mettre a ma disposition les 19 pièces de 32 qui sont encore à Balaklava. J’accepte cette offre avec d’autant plus de reconnaissance qu’une partie de ces pièces m’est dès à present indispensable, par suite de l’obligation où je suis d’établir une seconde batterie dans la parallele avancée d’Inkermann, pour contrebattre l’ouvrage que l’ennemi construit à 950 mètres de cette parallèle, sur la berge droite du ravin du carénage. Je me résigne à faire ce nouvel effort en priant Votre Seigneurie d’aider, autant qu’il lui sera possible, au transport des canons, tant au moyen du chemin de fer de Balaklava que de ses chevaux d’attelage.
Mais la crainte de voir augmenter les complications apportées déjà à notre projet d’attaque sur la tour Malakoff par l’ouvrage avancée des Russes me fait désirer vivement de sortir de cette période de travaux préparatoires, que chaque jour de retard nous oblige à développer d’avantage.
Le Général commandant mon artillerie me fait espérer que dans huit jours il sera en mesure d’ouvrir le feu de toutes ses batteries, et je viens vous prier, my lord, de vouloir bien examiner si toutes les batteries que l’artillerie anglaise doit servir seront dans les mêmes conditions.
Arrangements regarding artillery in anticipation of an assault.
Je sais, d’après les renseignements que vous avez autorisé le Colonel Dairer à me communiquer, que les canons sont moyennement approvisionnés à 110 coups, soit dans les batteries mêmes, soit aux parcs, et qu’il suffira d’apporter de Balaklava neuf à dix mille boulets, pour compléter cet approvisionnement au nombre jugé nécessaire de 500 coups au moins par pièce. Je pense, votre chemin de fer aidant, pouvoir contribuer à ce transport de manière à ce qu’il soit terminé à la fin de cette semaine. Quant aux bombes, dont il paratt vous manquer environ 3500 pour atteindre le chiffre de 300 coups par mortier, je ne puis pas vous offrir un concours aussi efficace, puisque l’on ne peut pas les transporter à bras. Il serait bien désirable que Votre Seigneurie pût affecter à ce travail, d’ici à la fin de la semaine, une bonne partie de ses chevaux de trait. Je ne vous parle pas des poudres, qui seront sans doute réunies sans difficulté.
Là un mot, je voudrais pouvoir espérer que les deux armées seront en mesure, dès les premiers jours de Mars, de protéger par leur Artillerie les travaux d’attaque qu’il nous faut encore faire pour aborder la place.
Je viens vous prier d’ailleurs, my lord, de donner des ordres pour que la nouvelle batterie de 8 pièces, établie dans la deuxième parallèle de votre attaque de droite, soit armée sans délai, afin d’empêcher, ce que je crains chaque jour de voir se réaliser, que l’ennemi ne vienne surprendre la construction d’un ouvrage avancé sur la Mamelon au sud de la tour Malakoff.
Je prie Votre Seigneurie d’agréer l’expression de mon respectueux dévouement.—
Le Général en Chef de l’armée francaise.
(Signé) Général Canrobert.
Devant Sebastopol, 28 Février 1855.
Places Balaclava railway, but not draft-horses, at service of French.
Monsieur le Général en Chef,— J’ai reçu la lettre que Votre Excellence m’a fait l’honneur de m’écrire, le 26 de ce mois, par laquelle elle m’informe qu’elle accepte les 19 canons de 32 que j’avais mis à sa disposition.
Le chemin de fer de Balaklava pourra être utilisé pour le transport de ces canons sur tous le parcours en service; mais je crains qu’il ne soit pas possible de faire concourir à ce transport les chevaux de trait de l’artillerie anglaise, en raison de l’emploi qui doit en être fait, pour transporter les bombes de 13 pouces, destinées à completer l’approvisionnement à 500 bombes par mortier, et les canons qui doivent être places dans la nouvelle batterie établie dans la deuxième parallèle de notre attaque de droite. Tous les efforts possibles vont etre faits pour l’armement de cette batterie sans le plus bref délai.
L’approvisionnement des canons existant actuellement, soit dans les batteries mêmes, soit aux parcs, est inférieur au chiffre indiqué dans votre lettre précitée; il n’y a encore que de 300 à 400 coups par pièce.
Les poudres pourront être en effet réunies sans difficulté.
L’officier supérieur commandant l’artillerie anglaise espère qu’avec l’assistance que vous voulez bien nous offrir, et toute l’activité qui pourra être déployée de notre côté, les batteries anglaises seront à même d’ouvrir leur feu dans une dixaine de jours. Avant l’expiration de ce délai, j’aurai l’honneur de m’entretenir avec Votre Excellence à ce sujet. — Agréez, Monsieur le Général en Chef, l’assurance de ma haute considération et de mon affectueux dévouement.
(Signé) Raglan.
Buckingham Palace, February 28, 1855.
Approves Panmure’s proposal as to medals.
The Queen acknowledges Lord Panmure’s box which she received last night. She thinks his plan with respect to the medals to be given to the Army a very good one,37 and by this means she trusts that her noble, brave, and unequalled soldiers (whom she is so proud to call her own) will be able to receive them soon. When does Lord Panmure think a sufficient number can be ready ?
The Queen said to her wounded Guards when she saw them, she hoped that they would soon have their medals, which they had earned so well; it will therefore be additionally gratifying to her if her promise to them can soon be redeemed.
February 28, 1855.
Consideration of the Emperor’s plan for forthcoming campaign.
I have called a Cabinet for to-morrow that we may consider what answer should be given to the letter of the Emperor of the French as to his intention of going to the Crimea, that of course we must try to dissuade him from. But we must consider what should be said as to his plan of operations, his proposed distribution of Forces, and the means of transport which he asks us to furnish.
His plan of operations has been suggested by many persons; its expediency will probably depend upon the comparative amount of the allied and the Russian forces that would come into conflict in the interior of the Crimea.
The Queen and the Prince urged objections to letting the Sardinian 15,000 go with the French, as they consider that force as being part of our contingent, being paid out of money advanced by us. Still they might reckon as our contribution to the inland operation, and it might be better to contribute them than to lead away into the interior the whole or a part of our Army.
As to the means of transport, Charles Wood must tell us whether he can supply the ships required for that purpose.
1. The functions of the two Secretaries have been defined more particularly as follows:
‘The Secretary of State for War and the Colonies was responsible for the amount of force to be maintained. … He also allotted garrisons to colonial possessions. In time of war he was responsible for the selection of officers to command in chief, and to a considerable extent for the selection of officers to important commands under them. He had entire control over operations bearing on the war. The Secretary-at-War was a Minister of the Crown, holding a seat in Parliament, and sometimes in the Cabinet. His sanction and authority were required for everything relating to the finance of the Army, and to those matters which brought soldiers into contact with the inhabitants of the country, such as quartering, billeting, and marching of troops. He brought in the annual Mutiny Act in the House of Commons, and to that extent had a certain amount of control over the discipline of the Army. He controlled financially the pay and finances of the Staff, the infantry and the cavalry. He fixed the rates of pay, food, and clothing to be given to the Army (exclusive of the Royal Artillery and Royal Engineers). He issued pay and allowances at home, dealt with questions relating to recruiting, savings banks, issues of routes, and the grants of passages, and had the executive control over schools, chaplains, and military prisons. He dealt with all questions of half-pay, pensions to officers and their families, the payment of pensions to soldiers, and the control of the enrolled pensioners. He had no control over the Artillery and Engineers, nor over the material of the Army. The Secretary-at-War held direct communication with the Crown; but should any regulation introduced by him be objected to by the Commander-in-Chief, he had to communicate his views, together with the objections of the Commander-in-Chief, to the First Lord of the Treasury, or the Chancellor of the Exchequer, or to the Secretary of State for the Colonies, or to all of them, for them to obtain the Sovereign’s pleasure thereon.’
— Sir Robert Biddulph’s Lord Cardwell at the War Office, pp. 3 et seq.
2. ‘The lamentable results which have attended our present expedition, as far as the waste of human life has been concerned, are solely to be attributed to the want of proper control by a single Minister of every department of the Army. The confusion, delays, and disappointments may be traced to this source to a very considerable extent.…’ See infra. Lord Panmure’s Observations on the Prince Consort’s Memorandum.
3. History of the Invasion of the Crimea, vol. vi. p. 202.
4. Sir William Howard Russell, the Times correspondent with the British Army in the Crimea, whose death is announced whilst these papers are being prepared for publication, is described by the writers of obituary notices as the Father of War Correspondence. His communicativeness, as some of these pages will show, was at the time severely criticised. The truth is that the new branch of journalism had not yet found its proper working conditions. For, on the one hand, the war-correspondent was looked at askance by military officers — more especially by those of the older school, of whom Sir George Brown may be taken as a type; whilst, on the other hand, he on his part would sometimes fail to recognise the limits prescribed by expediency to his functions. It is perhaps needless to add that all this is now changed for the better: that the status of the war-correspondent receives official recognition, and that the correspondent on his part conforms to the opinion of authority as to the information which he imparts.
5. The principal places in his Cabinet were filled as follows:— First Lord of the Treasury, Viscount Palmerston; Lord Chancellor, Lord Cranworth; President of the Council, Earl Granville; Privy Seal, Duke of Argyle; Foreign Secretary, Earl of Clarendon; Colonial Secretary, Right Honourable Sidney Herbert; Secretary of State for War, Lord Panmure; Chancellor of the Exchequer, Right Honourable W. E. Gladstone; First Lord of the Admiralty, Sir James Graham; Minister of Public Works, Sir William Molesworth; President of the Board of Control, Sir Charles Wood; Irish Secretary, Mr. Horsman.
6. See the Instructions to General Simpson dated February 19th.
7. Suggested by a memorandum of Prince Albert’s.
8. See Raglan’s letter of February 24th.
9. i.e. on detachment.
10. Chief Engineer with the British Army in the Crimea. Born in 1782, he had been present at most of the great battles in the Peninsula.
11. In command at Scutari.
12. The first letter written by Lord Panmure after receiving the Seals. Its effect is greatly to soften the effect of the despatch which it accompanied — a stern indictment, the tone of which, as will be remembered, was severely censured by Kinglake in his History. See Correspondence relating to the Military Expedition to the East, pp. 370, 371. Printed for the use of the Cabinet; also Appendix to vol. ii. of this work.
13. General Markham had made a great military reputation in India, where he had commanded the 32nd Regiment.
14. General Sir George Brown. He had distinguished himself in the Peninsular War as an officer of the famous Light Division, and had been placed in command of the Light Division in the Crimea.
15. Compare Kinglake’s comment on this despatch, vol. vi. pp. 331 et seq.
16. As Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State.
17. Shortly before the fall of the Aberdeen Ministry, the acceptance by Russia of the four points held by the Allies to be the necessary basis of a treaty of peace called for negotiations to define the practical application of these points. A Conference at Vienna for that purpose was the result.
18. The Duke of Newcastle’s despatch of January 6th.
19.The Commission consisted of Sir J. M’Neill and Colonel Tulloch.
20. Sir Henry Rawlinson’s Commission.
21. See Palmerston’s first letter of date February 13th.
22. One of the contractors for the Balaclava railway.
23. Hew Rose, afterwards Lord Strathnairn, British Commissioner with the French Army.
24. Lord Ellenborough, formerly Governor-General of India.
25. On becoming Prime Minister, Lord Palmerston had endeavoured to persuade the House not to insist on the appointment of the Committee recommended in Mr. Roebuck’s motion. When it became plain that Parliament was inexorable, Sir James Graham, Mr. Gladstone, and Mr. Sidney Herbert declined to continue in office. Sir Charles Wood then became First Lord of the Admiralty, Lord John Russell Secretary of the Colonies, and Sir George Cornewall Lewis Chancellor of the Exchequer.
26. It was as a result of experience gained in the Crimean campaign that our later system of hospital-ships was introduced.
27. It had been proposed to send General Grey, Prince Albert’s Private Secretary, to the seat of war to institute a general inquiry.
28. Grand-Dukes Nicholas and Michael, whose return to the Crimea was correctly interpreted as portending an increase of warlike activity.
29. See Lord Panmure’s letter of date February 9.
30. Afterwards Sir Lintorn Simmons; with the Turkish Army in Asia Minor.
31. February 17. They made no further attempt on that place.
32. The French night attack on the Selinghinsk Redoubt. Bazancourt estimates the killed at 94, the wounded at about 150. Cinq mois au camp devant Sébastopol.
33. Head of Intelligence Department.
34. The French Emperor’s confidential agent at the seat of war.
It had been urged on Raglan, by the Queen, Prince, and Lord Panmure, to adopt, after the manner of foreign nations, a Chancellerie Militaire, or secretarial department, for the despatch of correspondence. But, averse to all innovations, he declined to do this.
35. Governor of Sebastopol.
35. ‘Je m’empresse de vous prévenir que vos braves soldats morts qui sont restés entre nos mains dans la nuit du 23 ont été inhumés avec tous les honneurs dus a leur intrépidité exemplaire.’ To this compliment Canrobert made the following allusion in his order of the day: ‘Le général en chef remercie, au nom de l’Empereur et de la France, les braves qui viennent de soutenir l’honneur de notre drapeau avec une si haute valeur, que nos ennemis eux-mêmes lui rendent hommage.’
37. A plan for distributing them more speedily.