Crimean texts
THE most notable military events of the month of May were the two expeditions to Kertch, on the straits leading to the Sea of Azof — a most important depôt of supplies for the Russian Army. The first expeditionary force had set sail on the 3rd of the month. But, in deference to the wishes of his Imperial master, transmitted with unfortunate celerity by the newly-established telegraph, General Canrobert promptly recalled the French portion of it, thus compelling the return of the whole.
Lord Panmure’s indignation on hearing of this is forcibly expressed in his letter of May 7th to Lord Raglan. ‘Well may the Army and Fleet be disgusted,’ he writes. ‘I only wonder Bruat obeyed so degrading an order. I will never believe that the Emperor’s instructions were such so as to leave General Canrobert no discretion.’ These words expressed the feeling, not only of the British Army in the field, but of the country at large. With our present knowledge of the restrictions by which Canrobert’s freedom of action was hampered, they seem undoubtedly a little hard. But Panmure’s letter of May 21st, following on the French Commander’s resignation, does full justice to his qualities as a soldier. The defect of ‘moral courage in counsel,’ there ascribed to him, was one from which his successor was, at any rate, conspicuously free. After an interval of three weeks, a second expedition victoriously accomplished what the first had not been permitted to attempt — its success, which went far to restore British spirits and confidence at home and at the seat of war, being referred to with unfeigned delight by the Queen in her letter of May 28th.
A substantial success to the allied arms was, indeed, sorely wanted at the time. For the practical breakdown of the Vienna Negotiations, over the clause limiting the Russian fleet in the Black Sea, had shown that peace must be sought through war; whilst Canrobert’s unwillingness to follow up the April bombardment by assault, coupled with his withdrawal of the Kertch expedition, had done much to foster the discontent already existing. It is true that Raglan speaks of the French Commander and himself as ‘on the best of terms.’ But Raglan’s amiability was exceptional, and the letters of this month are not wanting in indications, not only of impatience for decisive action, but of distrust of Canrobert and Niel. Of this latter feeling, it is shown in Clarendon’s letter of May 15th, that Napoleon himself was aware.
The state of feeling prevalent in the country was taken full advantage of by enemies of the war, or friends of peace at any price, represented by Lords Ellenborough and Grey and Mr. Disraeli, to bring forward, in both Houses of Parliament, motions hostile to the Government. The results were identical — the motion in each case being negatived by a large majority, and the position of the Government strengthened.
Besides the above matters, Lord Panmure was occupied during this month with the Consolidation of the Military Departments. Unity of control, and greater speed in the transaction of business were the advantages aimed at in this change. The grounds on which it was opposed will be found stated in Lord Raglan’s letter of May 21st. The changes introduced by it have been thus recorded: 1
‘In May 1855, the Letters Patent for the Board of Ordnance were revoked, and its duties were vested thenceforth in the Secretary of State for War; at the same time, by Her Majesty’s command, the Secretary of State transferred the command and discipline of the Royal Artillery and Royal Engineers to the Commander-in-Chief, who was thus charged with the administration of all the combatant branches of the Army.
The clothing of the Infantry and Cavalry was now undertaken directly by the War Department, which also absorbed the Army Medical Department. At the same time a definite distribution was made of the duties of the several classes of clerks, and they were rendered available for any branch of the War Department.
The Consolidated Department thus included the duties of the Secretary of State, the Militia business of the Home Office, 2 the War Office (Secretary-at-War), the Ordnance Office, the Commissariat and Medical Departments, the duties of the Board of General Officers relating to clothing, also the examination of cash and store accounts, and of the payments made for non-effective services.
The Commander-in-Chief’s office alone maintained its separate existence; the military command and discipline of the Army, as likewise the appointments to and promotions in the same, being vested in the General Commanding-in-Chief, subject to the responsibility of the Secretary of State for the exercise of the Royal Prerogative, and subject to any powers formerly exercised by the Secretary-at-War. Although under the supreme control of the Secretary of State, it was a perfectly distinct department, communicating by letter with the War Department.
The Clerk of the Ordnance was continued as the executive Officer of the Secretary of State, directing all the business of the Supply Departments, viz.:— Inspector-General of Fortifications, Director-General of Artillery, Naval Director-General of Artillery, Director-General of Stores, Director-General of Contracts, Director-General of Army Clothing, the Accountant-General charged with the financial duties and with the control and audit of all expenditure on account of supply services and works.’
By the 21st of the month, about half of the Sardinian Contingent had arrived in the Crimea. It had been arranged that this force should consist of 15,000 men, 2000 horses, 36 guns, and 250 waggons.
BEFORE SEBASTOPOL, May 1, 1855.
. . . I can hardly agree in your definition (divided counsels) of the state of things between the French and English.
Good understanding with Canrobert. Expedition to Kertch decided on.
General Canrobert and myself are on the best terms, and he has to-day yielded to my earnest recommendation that the Kertch enterprise should go forward.
Trenches cannot be abandoned, even in event of a change in plan of campaign.
As you state your intention of communicating to me on Friday the result of the discussion which was to take place at Windsor on Wednesday the 18th April, 3 I will merely say now that, if the attempt to take Sebastopol by assault be abandoned, not only the trenches mustn’t be evacuated, but they must be preserved for the sake of the material, and to prevent an inroad on our position here and in front of Balaclava. In short, the 40,000 men composing the garrison must be closely shut in, so that the communications from the French and English posts (Kamiesh and Balaclava) may be liable to no interruption, and those depôts secured from assault.
The offensive movement should in my opinion be from Eupatoria, where it should, in my view of the matter, be undertaken by Omar Pasha, aided by French troops. The British Army is too small to be divided. It should act in one body.
May 1, 1855.
A substitute for Filder.
I have found you a first-rate man for the Head of the Commissaries in the Crimea instead of Filder — Mr. Watkins, now Manager of the Manchester and Sheffield Railway, strongly recommended by Paxton and Robert Stevenson as one of the cleverest men going, and peculiarly fit for the duty in question. . . . M’Neill, having an important office in Scotland, ought not to be kept too long in the Crimea, and we cannot consign our troops to the tender mercies of Filder.
Indictment of the ‘knot of incapables.’
If, in addition to this arrangement, you would appoint Markham to be Quartermaster-General instead of Airey, and if you would send out from hence an active intelligent man to be Adjutant-General instead of Estcourt, we should be able to make a good defence in Parliament against the attacks which are coming upon us for want of energy and resolution in regard to our military arrangements; but I, for one, cannot undertake to stand up in my place in Parliament and defend an inactivity which would leave our Army to be, in the ensuing campaign, the victim of that knot of incapables, who, in the last eight months, have been the direct cause of the disability and death of thousands of our brave men.
It is not enough for us to reorganise Departments at home, we must absolutely place fitter men in important situations abroad. I will myself write to Raglan and explain to him the inevitable necessity of such improved arrangements.
Markham may not perhaps reach the Army for a month or six weeks to come, but as he seems to be the best man, that delay will not be of material consequence.
BUCKINGHAM PALACE, May 4, 1855.
The Queen returns this Draft which she approves, and of which she would wish to have a copy. The news conveyed by telegraph from Lord Raglan, the Queen is delighted to hear of. 4 She trusts that the secret will be well kept.
May 4, 1855.
I have just received your telegraph of yesterday. It gives me the greatest satisfaction, and I am sure we owe it to you and Lyons, that our expedition against Kertch has sailed. You will reap the fruits of this right early, and, moreover, you will, I am sure, succeed in gaining a success, which is becoming every day more and more necessary.
Your success in the rifle-pits will have a good effect morally on your own people and the enemy, though we all regret the loss of so fine a fellow as Egerton. What a tragical end my poor Sanitary Commissioner has met with. 5
The Emperor abandons his plan of going to the Crimea.
I send you by to-day’s mail a letter, or rather copy of a letter, addressed to Canrobert by the Emperor. He entirely gives up his visit, and proposes the plan of campaign which he would have followed. I am not sure how far you will adopt any of the plans, but I consider that all the French Generals will now have no excuse for not taking the field and completing the investment of the place.
The scheme by the Aloushta I hold to be visionary, but I shall have full confidence in your decision.
The shells and powder will be embarked in ten days, and, I hope, in fast ships.
I am getting well again, and if we could only get some warm weather we might be all the better for it.
I have got your ‘bâton.’ It is much too handsome to send to your hut, so I shall consign it till I hear from you to Lady Raglan’s safe keeping.
Private.BEFORE SEBASTOPOL, May 5, 1855.
The first (abortive) expedition to Kertch.
I am afraid that the result of the Kertch expedition will annoy the Government. I did all I could to prevent it, as I had previously done to persuade the General-in-Chief to undertake it. He never, however, liked the enterprise, and he availed himself of the inopportune arrival of the Emperor’s telegraphic message to call Admiral Bruat and the French troops back. I wish there were grounds for the hope that the combined fleets would arrive at their destination before the order for the return of the ships to Kamiesh shall reach them. I have sent for the 31st from Corfu, and I am inclined to request Sir Robert Gardiner to let me have a regiment from Gibraltar; but I do not yet know that a steamer is available for its conveyance. Perhaps the Alasca may be disposable.
The 10th Hussars.
What I have seen of the 10th Hussars and Colonel Parlby I like, and it appears a most efficient regiment. Two squadrons were employed on the occasion of Omar Pasha’s reconnaissance, with some of the heavy Cavalry, and with a troop of Horse Artillery, and Colonel Parlby seemed to have his wits about him and to be equal to the direction of a body of troops. The horses of the 10th excited the admiration of Omar Pasha. The men are very fine. . . .
From something that dropped from General Niel this morning, I think he must have heard a report that the Sardinians are not coming. Admiral Grey and Major Wetherall are keeping a sharp look-out for them at Constantinople.
I hope there are no more cholera cases. There is a good deal at Constantinople.
Lord Stratford took leave of us the night before last.
May 7, 1855.
On recall of first expedition against Kertch
I have just received your bag, but the good accounts of the renovation of General Canrobert’s energies are completely swamped by the intelligence of the recall of the expedition to Kertch. If he had refused his consent to the embarkation of the troops, he might have been forgiven, but to recall an expedition after it has sailed, and to expose your game to the enemy, shows him to be utterly incapable of high command, or of weighing the results of so false a move as he has made.
Well may the Army and Fleet be disgusted. I only wonder Bruat obeyed so degrading an order. I never will believe that the Emperor’s instructions were such as to leave General C—— no discretion.
I hope you have got the Sardinian Contingent with you, at least so much of it as has arrived. I am glad that you have got your regiments, and when you get your detachments and your 1000 Guards you will present a better front.
On Consolidation of the Civil Department of the Army.
Next Monday I am to propose the Consolidation of the Civil Department of the Army, and it will have the effect of relieving you of your duties and responsibilities of Master-General. The whole Board is to be abolished, the Military Command to be transferred to the Commander-in-Chief, and the Civil departments placed under the Minister for War.
I fancy the change is not very palatable to the Ordnance, especially the Board, but it is a matter of necessity and must be done.
Now that your expedition to Kertch has been blown, I presume that we may turn our eyes to Sebastopol, unless General C—— considers his Master’s orders to prepare for the field as imperative against retaking the Mamelon!!!
I cannot help being alarmed lest the indecision of the French should cause some serious outbreak here. Hitherto our press has behaved better in that respect than we were warranted in expecting, but there is a limit to patience and we are approaching to it.
May 7, 1855.
Canrobert and Niel a drag on the British.
After criticising Canrobert and Niel, the writer adds:
. . . I believe that Omar Pasha and Raglan together would do good things, and it is rather hard to see all glory given to the French and all blame to the British by ourselves.
G.C., May 7, 1855.
Suggests sending a British Commissioner to Paris.
Don’t you think it would be useful for us to have an intelligent General Officer at Paris, who should be the medium of communication of such information for Raglan as we wish the French Govt. to possess, and who should apprise us of the plans forming and orders sent by the Minister of War? If we had had such a man, the orders for spoiling the Kertch expedition would probably not have gone without our knowledge. I hear that Ashburnham 6 is come home, and he would, I should think, do well for the job if you have no one better qualified. I knew him very well ages ago. He is an agreeable man, and, I believe, a good officer.
It has answered uncommonly well to the French to send Admiral Chabannes here, and to us also, as he has smoothed away difficulties.
Private.‘HANNIBAL,’ OFF KAZATCH, Monday, May 7, 1855.
Abortive expedition to Kertch.
Old Laws have always some truth in them, and never was the ‘slip twixt cup and lip’ more strikingly illustrated than it has been with us, who started on Thursday last at sunset on one of the most promising expeditions imaginable. Long, long has Sir E. Lyons been urging and praying for 10,000 or 12,000 troops to be embarked for the purpose of taking possession of the Straits of Kertch, and opening the way for vessels of suitable draught of water into the Sea of Azof, by means of which the enemy derive so many of their supplies.
Lord Raglan’s small Force did not admit of his detaching a number of English sufficient for the purpose, but, yielding his assent to the force of Sir E. Lyons’ arguments, his Lordship did all he could to overcome General Canrobert’s strong repugnance to spare even a regiment for this service, but without success, until, taking advantage of General Canrobert’s irresolution in the matter of the Assault (which, I doubt not you are aware, it was on the 23rd ulto. agreed should be given on the 28th ulto. at 2 P.M., immediately after 60 hours of hard bombardment, but which the French General on the morning of the 25th declared must be postponed and reinforcements waited for), we urged the evident expediency of striking, in the interval, this important blow, by which possession of the Sea of Azof would be obtained. In the advocacy of this measure, Admiral Bruat cordially joined.
Reluctantly, Canrobert yielded, and promised to give triple the Force that we should do. Canrobert undertook to embark 8500 troops and three batteries of Artillery; but he only sent 7000 and two batteries — a fact which we were not aware of until on the point of sailing. The English Force, including the Marines of the squadron, was fully 3000. At sunset on Thursday last, and within 48 hours from the time the expedition was determined on, the squadrons started.
The voyage.
Everything was propitious and the weather beautiful for steaming. We had 2500 French troops in four of our screw line-of-battle ships. Hannibal had Brigader [sic]-General Duval and 620. One French battery, complete with horses, etc., and above 600 men on board the Terrible. At daylight on Saturday we were within 12 miles of the entrance of the Straits of Kertch, and there Captain Spratt of Spitfire met us with the most admirable survey of the scene of our intended operations — a work which he had performed at very considerable risk to himself, as he was able to show the position and range of every one of the enemy’s guns, in addition to the exact depth of water (ascertaining that there was 24 feet water within less than 500 yards of their strongest battery), heights of cliffs, etc.
Captain Moore, of Highflyer, who has been for some time stationed there, gave also excellent information, and there could not be one single reasonable doubt entertained of our complete success!
The recall.
Judge then of my amazement, on going on board Royal Albert by signal about 5 A.M., to find that Admiral Bruat had received, by an express steamer, the letter from General Canrobert of which I enclose a copy. No argument could prevail with him to go on. He took it as an order from the Emperor, and his resolution to obey it was, as he declared, ‘inébranlable.’ I found him, and his Chef d’État Major, the French General commanding the troops, Sir G. Brown, and Sir. E. Lyons all in the cabin together. Sir E. Lyons gave me Canrobert’s letter, and desired me to state my opinion. Without any hesitation I said that, ‘Were I in Bruat’s place, I would certainly go on. That an officer in command was bound to exercise his judgment and discretion, to place himself in the position of the Emperor or Authority sending the instruction from Paris, and consider what would be his desire did he know this expedition was within two hours’ sail of the landing-place, with every prospect of complete success, and I felt confident the order would be to advance — impossible that it could be to retire, and exhibit such an instance of inconsistency and irresolution to our enemy and to the world. That I felt convinced the order from Paris related to the general determination which had been taken, when the Emperor was in England, to concentrate the Allied Forces; but this expedition could not in any way delay or interfere with that being done, as Kertch could be taken and the troops returned to Kamiesh before the reinforcements from the Bosphorus and Genoa could possibly reach the Crimea.’ I found that Sir E. Lyons had made use of the very same arguments and taken the precise view which I did, and had, previous to my arrival, exhausted every possible effort of reason and persuasion to induce Admiral Bruat to go on. It was all in vain. I thought Lyons would have gone mad almost. Indeed it was heart-breaking to us all, but to him in particular, who had laboured night and day for many weeks past, as I well knew, to bring about this expedition, now arrested within sight of its object. The French squadron departed. We had no alternative. We had a large portion, nearly one-half, of their troops on board. The information we had received from French and English Engineer officers previously sent to examine, and from Captain Moore, advised that the Force should not be less than 10,000; and moreover, had we been able to do a little business on our own account, it would probably have made mischief between the Allied Forces. I trouble you with all this because without it my sad story is not complete, but I cannot doubt you are already aware of most of the details I have given.
Resulting mortification.
Here we are again in perfect inaction, and mortified beyond expression in thus finding that, not only the French, but also the English Fleet is virtually under the control of a French General, whose dread of responsibility and indecision of conduct are the theme of complaint throughout the Allied Land and Sea Forces. Indeed it is becoming very serious. Canrobert seems utterly unfit to be a Commander-in-Chief, and all confidence in his abilities has faded away in this quarter of the world. Only one of two things could justify him in recalling the expedition to Kertch. Either that an armistice had been agreed to (in which case ha should have notified it to the Admiral), or that the Emperor had been apprised of the expedition and expressly ordered it to be stopped or recalled. I write to you, as I know you like me to do, frankly and freely, but you are quite at liberty to ‘show me up’ wherever your doing so can afford the slightest aid towards procuring an immediate telegraphic order to take and occupy the Straits of Kertch — or, at any rate, the recall of Canrobert! I put a score under ‘occupy,’ because I think the occupation most desirable.
What might have been.
But Canrobert insisted that his troops were all to be brought back to Kamiesh on or before the 15th inst, and therefore ‘occupation’ was impracticable; but we should have destroyed all the fortifications, opened the passages which they are industriously labouring to block up with piles and vessels sunk laden with stones, taken or destroyed all their gun and steam vessels, passed a strong force of vessels of light draught into the Sea of Azof, and by vigilance and bold activity have kept the passage free, and a satisfactory blockade of all the coasts of the Sea of Azof. And this must be done sooner or later, if success in the Crimea is to be achieved. We have several vessels of light draught, and especially the Miranda, whose legs are short and her arms powerful, and is commanded by one of our most sagacious and determined young officers, Captain Lyons, whose conduct last year in the White Sea showed he was no degenerate offshoot from the parent stock; and who, I am certain, would do the work in the Sea of Azof most satisfactorily. I do not say this of him because he is my friend’s son. He was lieutenant with me in the Benbow, and I know pretty well what is in him.
I blush to think of what is likely to be thought of our consistency or firmness of purpose by the Russians after this display! Nor dare we indulge in the hope of a better state of matters whilst Canrobert directs. Lord Raglan’s position is most painful and difficult, and no man but himself could have kept things so well together; but ere long there must be a split in the Camp if Canrobert be not removed, for, if he displays the same incapacity and want of energy in the field which he undeniably has hitherto done on all occasions since St. Arnaud’s death, nothing will be well done, and the safety and character of the troops of both nations, but especially of England, compromised.
Suspected deterioration of French troops.
All our officers seem to agree in thinking that the service in Algeria has occasioned a deterioration in the French troops, officers and men, and has not proved the source of military aptitude and experience which it was expected to afford. You hear from our lads on all sides this sort of sentiment, ‘Well! whatever else comes of this war, of one thing we may assure ourselves, that old England is quite safe from any attempt at invasion for some generations to come.’
And now fare thee well, my dear old friend. I have given you an unconscionable yarn, but I wished you to know what I really believe to be true and what is the conviction of my own mind. Take that for whatever you think it worth — put it into your pipe or your pocket-but never doubt the sincere esteem and regard of
HOUSTON STEWART.
I am quite well, never better. The Squadron powerful, healthy, united, and fit for anything practicable. I only wish the French Army were well commanded, and then let the Rooshans look out!
BEFORE SEBASTOPOL, May 8, 1855.
I have nothing to send you to-day from Mr. Cattley. He accompanied the expedition to Kertch and returned on Sunday.
Reports by Tartars.
No important intelligence was received during his absence; but some Tartars have come in this afternoon, the substance of whose information is to the effect that powder and ammunition are on their way to Sebastopol from Simpheropol, and a body of Cavalry are on the march from Perekop. They confirm the arrival of the two Divisions which I have already announced to you. He has not yet been able to examine these men in detail.
Abortive expedition to Kertch.
The result of the expedition occasions much conversation, and to those who composed the expedition vast disappointment.
May 8, 1855.
Removal of unfit men.
I send you confidentially a letter from Granville, and I can assure you that the general feeling among our colleagues is that sufficient energy has not been shown in removing unfit men and in putting more capable and active men in their places.
It is not that victims are wanted; these changes are desired in order to prevent our officers and men from becoming victims to incompetence and incapacity.
Raglan’s dislike of changes.
Raglan will never of his own accord make any change; he is a creature of habit, and is himself wanting in that energy which would be required for the making of changes.
Besides, it is hardly fair to throw the task upon him. We cannot expect him to turn round upon men who have been acting with him for eight months, and to find out all of a sudden that they are incapable. We must cut the knot for him, and make the requisite changes from hence, and he is too sensible a man not to acquiesce if the matter is properly and civilly explained to him.
Private.
LONDON, May 7, 1855.
Lord Ellenborough’s motion on the mismanagement of the war.
I hear that Lord Ellenborough is to give notice of a motion for this day week on the mismanagement of the war. He will divide the House, which at all events will secure a great debate.
Lord Granville’s recommendation of further removals.
You have, I believe, decided that Airey, Estcourt, and Filder should be recalled. England 7 is another who ought to be brought away. The justification on paper of his conduct in India seemed complete, but there are no two opinions in the Crimean army as to his present insufficiency. He is over the head of Eyre, who is one of the younger men who have studied their profession, and seen some service. Evelyn Denison read, about two months ago, a letter from Eyre, in which he said that he had pointed out to Burgoyne a very dangerous piece of ground, and had suggested that they should make a dash for it, and connect it backwards with the English works.
Burgoyne thought the remark worthy of consideration, but decided it was better to approach it in the usual way. A fortnight after the date of Eyre’s letter, the Russians did exactly what he had suggested, seized the ground, the now famous Mamelon, and connected it backwards with their own works. Eyre may not turn out to be a great General, but there is a fair chance of his being so, which he will have no occasion of showing while he is under the command of an incapable like England. I may be wrong in the particular case, but some of the changes ought to have been actually made before the matter is seriously discussed in Parliament. Dr. Smith was sent away four months after Newcastle had promised the Cabinet that the Doctor should go the next day. Such an example will not suffice for us, when the question comes to be debated as Ellenborough, Grey, and Derby can debate it. In the discussion, two or three dismissals, or changes effected, will be worth a dozen projected.
I hear from different quarters that General Markham (the best of all), General Ashburnham, Colonel Lindsay, and Colonel Mansfield are good officers.
PICCADILLY, May 8, 1855.
Lord Ellenborough’s motion. 8
I see by the wording of Ellenborough’s motion that his attack will probably turn upon your having continued a number of incapable men in important situations connected with the military service at home and abroad,
Forecast of debate on Lord Ellenborough’s motion.
and I clearly foresee that, unless you should be able to say that more efficient men than Andrew Smith, Filder, Airey, and Estcourt are appointed, or about immediately to be appointed, to the offices which they respectively hold, the debate will be as damaging to yourself and to the Government as the continuance of those men in their several places is detrimental to the welfare of the Army and the best interests of the Country.
It is in vain to say that Smith has resigned; the answer will be, why has not a better man been put at once into an office which every day requires efficient administration?
It will be in vain to say that M’Neill has made good arrangements for the commissariat; the answer will be, what business has a Scotch Poor-Law Commissioner to be buying bullocks and hay in Asia Minor for the use of an army in the Crimea? Let him come home and do his own business, and let a proper man be sent out to the Crimea to take charge of the business to be done there.
It will be in vain to say that Simpson has been put over Airey and Estcourt; the answer will be, that Simpson may any day be disabled, and the Army will then be left to [become] victims of the proved incapacity of Airey and Estcourt, and it will be said that, even if Simpson continues in life and health, it is inexpedient that he should have two incompetent men to act under him.
I have often urged these things upon you without effect; we shall now see what our opponents will make of them.
BUCKINGHAM PALACE, May 9, 1855.
Intended Consolidation of the Army.
The Queen wishes to remind Lord Panmure that he has not yet sent her the printed copy of the Intended Consolidation of the Army which he promised her the other day.
She also wishes to know whether he thinks it would be possible for her to distribute the medals any day next week except the 19th, which being the Birthday Drawing-Room day, and the day devoted to her birthday, she could not naturally have the distribution.
May 9, 1855.
Suggests attaching part of Land Transport Corps to Camp at Aldershot.
Happening to have met General Knollys yesterday, I asked him whether any body of men of the Land Transport Corps would be given him for the Camp at Aldershot, His answer was, that he did not know. I take the liberty of expressing my opinion that it would be of the greatest importance to attach a complete troop, with horses, carts, etc., etc., to the Camp, not only in order to test its efficiency, but also in order to accustom our Army at home to the use of it. In point of expense it can be of no consideration, as the corps would do all the work which would otherwise have to be done with hired horse labour. If this should be your opinion also, I would only add that the Transport Corps ought to be on the spot from the beginning, else another system must be arranged at first, which has afterwards again to give way to the Transport Service.
May 10, 1855.
Distribution of medals.
Lord Panmure presents his humble duty to Your Majesty, and in obedience to Your Majesty’s wishes he has communicated with the Commander-in-Chief, and finds that he can have his men ready by Friday the 18th inst., on which day Lord Panmure would propose to Your Majesty to confer the Crimean medal on Your Majesty’s brave soldiers.
Lord Panmure would humbly suggest to Your Majesty the hour of 11 A.M., unless Your Majesty prefers to honour the parade at guard-mounting with your presence and afterwards to confer the medals.
Lord Panmure presumes that Your Majesty will issue your orders to the Commander-in-Chief upon these points.
It will be Lord Panmure’s duty to attend Your Majesty on the occasion and to hand to Your Majesty the medals for presentation. 9
Lord Panmure has the honour of transmitting for Your Majesty’s use and information the printed papers connected with the changes in the Civil Departments of the Ordnance and Army, which would have been done earlier had not Lord Panmure expected some changes to be made by the suggestions of his colleagues.
May 11, 1855.
Lord Ellenborough’s criticisms of the Army.
I have been so pressed by business that I have written you no public or secret despatch by this mail, and even in my private letter I have little to communicate. Ellenborough is to give us a regular field-day on Monday, and you will see his resolutions in the papers. He will fall foul of you and all of us for certain, and we must try and meet him with an effective fire. We do not anticipate any defeat.
I am very glad to see you availing yourself of your power to call up fresh regiments, and I really hope ere long to hear of some blow.
Ellenborough, in a conversation with me, let out that he had letters from Sir C. Campbell describing the positions about M’Kenzie’s Farm to be so fortified as to be impregnable, and every means used to fortify every road and track by which troops could advance into the Crimea.
These letters do the Army infinitely more harm than I can tell, and it is provoking to hear them read.
Injudicious letters from the seat of war.
Vivian 10 is full of them. I know it is a delicate matter to deal with, but it shall be checked if possible, for every complaint, no matter how paltry, as soon as it comes here, works itself out in public.
I am delighted to hear that Marmora is cordial. We do not make out all your telegraph, but are suspicious that you are still sweet on Kertch. So much the better.
Lady Raglan has your bâton. The Queen delivers the first Crimean medals to the men and officers here on the 18th inst, in public. I’ll send you a programme as soon as it is settled.
I must now go to the House of Lords.
WAR DEPARTMENT, May 14, 1855.
I have no time to write you to-day as I am just going down to face Lord Ellenborough, who opens his bombardment at a quarter past five.
I hear we are to have a strong support from the Bishops! So you see we are in odour with the Church.
‘Ellenborough will not yet be Minister for War.’
All the military men are opposed, and, I hear, will either not vote, or, if they stay, will vote against — so I presume that the move will be defeated and that Ellenborough will not yet be Minister for War.
I am sure I would readily yield my post so far as I am personally concerned. 11
You must accept this as an apology for an empty bag so far as I am concerned.
[Undated.]
I have this moment received your telegraphic message announcing the resumption of the expedition to Kertch, and I sincerely hope it may be attended with success. This denotes more vigorous counsels in the new Chief of the French Army, and will, I think, lead to results at once creditable to you all and satisfactory to people at home.
Resolution to abolish the Ordnance as a separate Department of State.
I have proclaimed in the House of Lords the resolution of the Government to abolish the Ordnance as a separate Department of the State, 12 and I shall send you an official letter announcing the fact to you as Master-General, and also thanking you for past services. I am quite sure that, if I am spared to bring the new proposals into smooth working order, much time will be saved and great simplicity obtained in the transaction of public business in the War Department. I suspect that little or no hopes now remain of peace until Russia is forced, by some decided success on our part, to listen to the proposals to bind her fleet in the Euxine to a small number, and give us some commercial accommodation not yet accorded. So your task is not yet accomplished. If you succeed in getting command of the Sea of Azof, that will be one blow. A victory in the Crimea will be another.
Your despatches of the 7th acknowledge my letter of the 20th April, and I am not surprised at your objection to the complicated operations of the Emperor in the direction of Aloushta. You must act with discretion now we have got over our first brush as to the old confusion, and start on a new campaign; you shall find me strictly honest in taking all my own responsibility, etc., backing you and your Army with all the esprit of a quondam soldado.
As to difficulty of protecting the siege-works in case of a new plan of campaign being adopted.
Your telegraphic message expressing the difficulties of protecting the siege-works is unpleasant. I confess that I thought 60,000 Turks and French could have been trusted, and that you would have been free; but I admit at once the extreme importance of feeling perfectly secure as to both Balaclava and Kamiesh before any outward movement is made.
I do not like to write about it officially, but it appears to me that, if you are to assault, a reconnaissance on a quiet day, by means of a balloon let up a certain height and retained in position, would be a means of ascertaining the inner defences and the obstacles which you may have to encounter. 13 I shall have all ready, so that if you telegraph for one it shall instantly go to you. I am sending out some machines for making fresh water, as I think it of great importance to keep the Army secure of this essential necessary of life. I am getting a Foreign Legion for you, and hope soon to have some thousands at disposal of seasoned soldiers, not mere adventurers. Do not place any confidence of peace in what you may see in the debates in both Houses of Parliament during the week. The resolve of the country is for war or an honourable peace, not such an one as Lord Grey and Milner Gibson advocate, 14 and for which I regret to hear that James Graham and Mr. Gladstone are to speak and vote.
G.C., May 15, 1855.
On an important letter from General Niel.
While Walewski 15 was at the P.O. this evening, he received his letters from Paris, and among them was a remarkable letter from General Niel transmitted in one from the Emperor.
Walewski left it with me and I took a copy of it. The danger of an assault and the importance of immediately attacking the Russians in the field are shown with great clearness, and Walewski is anxious that we should send a telegraphic despatch to Raglan ordering immediate action. He says that, if we will tell him what we write and when, corresponding orders shall be sent to Canrobert, and that then there will be a chance of something being done. If you approve, perhaps you will tell Panmure what to write, and send him Niel’s letter, as no time should be lost.
As to moving rejection of Grey’s motion.
Shaftesbury in the most friendly manner this evening offered to move the rejection of Grey’s paix à tout prix motion on Monday next, and I said I could give no answer without consulting you, but it appears to me that we ought not to delegate to any one the rejection of such a motion, and that, if we did so, Derby would not fail to say that we were afraid of doing it, and that we were hesitating in our policy.
I have promised Shaftesbury to let him have an answer soon. 16
The Emperor complained in his letter to Walewski that the English were so angry at the failure of the Kertch expedition that no concert with them could be expected unless positive orders were sent by the Government. For his satisfaction, therefore, as well as for the common cause, Raglan should be fully informed of our wishes and expectations.
BUCKINGHAM PALACE, May 16, 1855.
The Queen has received with much pleasure Lord Panmure’s letter and the telegraphic message.
Importance of leaving command of different troops independent.
She thinks it quite right to wait till we hear from France; is very sorry at the prospect of the English force being again divided, but hopes that, whatever may be done, the commands of the different troops will be left independent of each other, else their movements will be hampered as they were during the siege.
May 16, 1855.
Abolition of Board of General Officers.
Lord Panmure presents his humble duty to Your Majesty, and has the honour to acknowledge Your Majesty’s note upon the subject of the two Warrants, one of which abolishes the Board of General Officers, 17 and the other confers upon the new Board the duties which the former one discharged.Lord Panmure begs to transmit to Your Majesty the Order in Council in which the duties of the Director-General of Army Clothing are set forth.
The Board of General Officers discharged the greater part of these duties formerly. They were the custodians of the sealed patterns, and were responsible that the clothing was conformable to them.
The Director-General of Army Clothing will now come in the place of the Colonels as regards the provision of clothing, and [of the] Board of General Officers as regards the custody of the sealed patterns.
Lord Panmure begs to forward to Your Majesty a copy of the last clothing warrant, and to point out that that which is now submitted for Your Majesty’s signature is simply a repetition, with the exception of the sentence underlined, for which is substituted the following:—
‘The clothing, accoutrements, and appointments of our Army will in future be provided in such manner and under such regulations as shall be determined upon by us, under our authority, signified by one of our Principal Secretaries of State.’
Not a word is said, either in the Order in Council or in the Warrant, about the origin of the patterns, and this has been purposely done.
The Commander-in-Chief will have the power of assembling Boards of Officers on all occasions when he may require their advice, but he cannot establish a permanent Board, which can only be done upon the recommendation of the Secretary of State.
Clothing and arms of the army.
In regard to the origin of all patterns for the arms, clothing, and accoutrements and equipments of the Army, Lord Panmure recognises, and has carefully avoided infringing, Your Majesty’s sole right to determine them.
The present patterns of clothing and accoutrements will be deposited with the Director-General as already sealed. Should any change be determined upon, the course to be pursued will be for the Commander-in-Chief to ascertain the expense and obtain the sanction of the Secretary of State to this being incurred, he will then submit any new patterns to Your Majesty, and having taken Your Majesty’s pleasure upon their adoption, he will inform the Secretary of State of the same, who will submit for Your Majesty’s signature an order to seal the patterns as adopted or altered.
In regard to arms, the Commander-in-Chief is responsible for the description of the arm which is put into the hands of the troops. He will at all times, as part of his duty, communicate any changes which are desirable to the Secretary of State for his concurrence, as it will frequently happen that a change from one kind of arm to another, as, for instance, from the smooth-barrel musket to the Minie rifle, 18 may be productive of great expense. With these explanations Lord Panmure humbly trusts that Your Majesty will have no difficulty in signing the Warrant. 19
May 16, 1855.
I send you the accompanying papers from Clarendon.
Recommends doing what the Emperor proposes.
I think we ought to do what the Emperor proposes, and that we should therefore by telegraph desire Raglan to make arrangements with Canrobert for carrying into execution the scheme of operations contemplated in the Memorandum signed by yourself and Vaillant, 20 as soon as the two armies have received the reinforcements necessary to make them strong enough for the purposes. And Raglan might be told that every day’s delay beyond the time when the armies shall be fit for the purpose will be extremely injurious, and will render the operation more and more difficult; and yet such an operation is the only way to get the armies out of the embarrassing position in which they are now placed. Such an instruction might go to-day and be communicated at the same time to Clarendon. . . .
I am afraid, from all I hear, —— is not a fit man to be placed at the head of the Commissariat in the Black Sea, and it would never do for us to recall one incapable man and to put another in his place who was not decidedly fit for it.
Everything we do about the Army in the Crimea will be narrowly scrutinised, and we must not risk our own reputations and the welfare of the Army for what may be represented as personal partialities.
BUCKINGHAM PALACE, May 21, 1855.
The Queen sends to Lord Panmure the substance of such Minutes as she explained to him it was her wish should be drawn up to place her intercourse with the War Department on a permanent footing. He will consider them and then submit them to her in the final shape in which they might receive her sanction.
Private.
BEFORE SEBASTOPOL, May 21, 1855.
I received last night your letter, marked Private, of the 7th instant.
Canrobert replaced by Pélissier; New expedition to Kertch.
My telegraphic message of the 19th, which crossed yours of the 18th, will have informed you that I became acquainted on Saturday morning with the resignation of General Canrobert and the appointment of General Pélissier to the Chief Command of the French Army; and that which I despatched last night will communicate to you the fact that the expedition to Kertch has again been determined upon, and that it will consist of 3000 English, 7000 French, and 5500 Turks, the first and last being accompanied by one battery each, the French by three.
Sir Edmund Lyons and Admiral Bruat hope to get the troops on board to-morrow morning, and to sail in the evening.
They attended the conference here yesterday, as did Admiral Stewart; and Omar, to whom I wrote the night before, arrived just before General Pélissier. The Pasha would have liked to have undertaken the job by himself, but this we felt would not satisfy either England or France. The chief object in having the Turks was that, if permanent occupation was considered necessary, the garrison might be furnished by them. It is desirable that the English detachment should be back here as soon as the service is accomplished.
General Pélissier talks a good deal and is very anxious to be doing; but all his troops are not yet arrived from Constantinople.
General La Marmora.
About half the Sardinians are here. I like what I have seen of General La Marmora exceedingly. He is very anxious to be of use in the way I may think best, and if any effort be made towards Sebastopol, he will be quite ready to furnish his quota for the operation.
Neither the 31st from Corfu nor the 72nd from Malta has arrived. I have been expecting them for several days. It may be some time before the regiment from Gibraltar gets here. I must endeavour to make a good brigade for Sir John Campbell when he is superseded by Bentinck in the command of the 4th Division. Sir John, with whose conduct I have every reason to be highly satisfied, would be glad to have a brigade of Highlanders, if a second brigade should be formed, which, however, is a matter of doubt.
I am much obliged to you for having mentioned that you had sent my bâton de Maréchal to Lady Raglan. I doubt, however, her having received it, for I have a letter from her of the 7th in which she makes no allusion to it. . . .
Opinion on Government proposal to consolidate the Military Departments.
I am much concerned to hear that the Government have determined to propose the consolidation of the Military Departments, and to break up the Ordnance Office, at the head of which the Queen was graciously pleased to place me in 1852. I will not disguise from you the deep regret I feel at the prospect of being deprived of an appointment of which the duties were of a most interesting character, and where I may say without vanity my labours were advantageous to the service; but, putting aside all personal considerations, I conscientiously believe that the change will be the reverse of beneficial to the public.
From the number of hours I was obliged to devote daily to the public business of the department, I am quite satisfied that a Minister of War could not efficiently discharge it and at the same time perform the higher duties which devolve upon him as Secretary of State, and, if this be so, of which I entertain no doubt, much of the work will fall upon subordinates, and hence confusion and dissatisfaction may be expected to arise. The transfer of the Ordnance Military Corps to the Commander-in-Chief must be an imperfect measure, and the officers will be in the disagreeable position of having two masters.
The General Commanding-in-Chief’s power will be extremely limited, and the employment of the officers apart from their purely military duties will depend not upon him but upon the Minister of War. He may appear on parade at Woolwich, but the equipment of the batteries, the armament, etc., will rest with others, and he will have nothing to do but to ascertain that the drill has been attended to.
His command over the Engineers will be merely nominal, and the officers will not be able to look to him for anything. I could go into great detail on this question if I had time, but I should not have troubled you with any observations on the subject had you not yourself alluded to it.
Cholera.
The breaking out of the cholera is a sad grief to me. I would fain hope that its ravages will not be very extensive, but I cannot feel very confident. The loss of the French at Constantinople has been very great.
Balaclava.
I send you a sketch of Balaclava, which you will see is a small village instead of being, as seems to have been generally supposed, a considerable town. In the house in which I lived I had two rooms, one in which I slept and transacted my business, the other where I had my meals and the Military Secretary did his work. All my Aides-de-Camp were encamped outside. . . .
WAR DEPARTMENT, May 21, 1855.
I have to acknowledge your Lordship’s secret and confidential despatch of the 4th inst.
I had learnt previously, by the electric telegraph, of the abortive character of the expedition to Kertch, which has caused as much disappointment to H.M.’s Government as it appears to have done in the Camp.
The circumstances under which General Canrobert appears to have entirely consented to the expedition exhibit so much vacillation and indecision of character that I am not sorry he no longer fills a position to the responsibility of which he appears to have been quite unequal.
Canrobert characterised.
Possessing in the most eminent degree all the qualities of courage and zeal which constitute the brave soldier, he did not possess those comprehensive views, nor that moral courage in counsel, which mark the sagacious and resolute General.
I have perused the instructions issued by you to Sir George Brown, and I entirely approve of them.
They correspond in all respects with the views which H.M.’s Government have entertained of the object of the expedition, viz.: that it was not advisable to do more than to destroy all the enemy’s means of preventing the free passage of our ships into the Sea of Azof, and, having accomplished that end, that the troops should again be reconveyed to the Camp.
Abortive expedition to Kertch.
I have read with great interest Major Gordon’s 21 able report of the obstacles to be encountered as far as he could detect them, and the manner in which he and Colonel Desaint proposed to overcome them; and when I find that the conduct of this expedition had been intrusted to an officer of the acknowledged skill, courage, and discretion which Sir George Brown is known to possess, I have no doubt that its success would have been complete. All this only aggravates the regret that General Canrobert should have deemed himself to be so entirely concussed by his Imperial Master’s orders as to recall his portion of the force, and so, in spite of all your Lordship’s remonstrances, to put an end to this promising project for defeating and weakening the enemy, not only on a most vulnerable, but most important point.
Since I received your Lordship’s despatch, a telegraphic message has reached me this morning, informing me of the renewal of this expedition to Kertch, which gives me very great pleasure.
I understand from the message that, for the original French force, there has been substituted 3000 French and 5000 Turks, but that the British contingent remains the same, and that the command is, as formerly, under Sir George Brown.
I trust that every success may attend the expedition, which I hail as a prelude to more active operations than have for some time past marked the progress of the war.
The presence of cholera has given me great uneasiness, but I fully rely on your Lordship’s availing yourself of all human means to prevent its ravages in your Army.
Secret.
BEFORE SEBASTOPOL, May 22, 1855.
Conference as to a second expedition to Kertch.
In my secret despatch of the 19th instant, I mentioned to your Lordship that General Pélissier was desirous of having a conference upon the expediency of attacking Kertch.
Composition of the force.
A meeting was in consequence held here on the following day, at which the two British Admirals, Admiral Bruat, General Pélissier, who had with him General Niel and General Martimprez, Omar Pasha, and myself were present, and after a discussion of some length it was decided that the enterprise should be resumed, and that the force to be sent to Kertch should consist of 3000 English, 7000 French, and 5000 Turks.
It was thought advisable that the Turks should be added, in order that they should form the garrison, if, after the capture of Kertch, it should be considered necessary to hold the place.
Nobody appeared opposed to the expedition except General Niel, who, upon the invitation of General Pélissier, stated the objections he entertained to it, but which produced no effect upon those to whom it was addressed.
Lieutenant-General Sir George Brown will command the force, as he did that previously sent.
Upon the breaking up of the conference, preparations were set on foot for the embarkation of the troops, and it is probable that they will sail this evening.
General Pélissier contemplates immediately approaching nearer the Tchernaya, but the object of this movement he has not yet explained to me.
OSBORNE, May 23, 1855.
The Queen inquires as to medals earned by her soldiers in the war, etc:.
The Queen is anxious to have information on the following points:—
- What has been done with respect to the monument in the churchyard where so many of our brave men lie buried at Scutari?
- When will the medals for the Army in the Crimea be sent out?
- What has been done with respect to the medals given on the 18th being engraved, and when will the clasps be added?
- The Queen hopes that no time will be lost in sending the medals to all those officers and men who could not and did not appear on the 18th, but who are in this country. She knows that many such ones could not appear. Of course those who are in England will feel very anxious to get their medals when they see their companions wearing them. There are naturally many privates of the Line and Cavalry who have a right to the medals, but who did not attend, as only three of each regiment appeared.
Lastly, the Queen wishes to know what progress has been made with respect to the new Hospital, whether a site has been found, and whether it can be purchased?
Inquiry as to the second expedition to Kertch.
The Queen is in the greatest anxiety (though very confident) to hear the result of the new Kertch expedition, and also very anxious and impatient to hear what active operations are decided on, as she feels that everything depends on that. She can really think of nothing else!
May 24, 1855.
Minutes regarding intercourse of the Sovereign with the War Department.
Lord Panmure presents his humble duty to Your Majesty, and has the honour to acknowledge two communications with which Your Majesty has honoured him.
In reference to the first, in which Your Majesty refers to the Minutes which are to be recorded in the War Department upon the subject of Your Majesty’s intercourse with that Department, Lord Panmure will lose no time in preparing and submitting such a memorandum for Your Majesty’s approval.
With regard to Your Majesty’s second note, Lord Panmure will reply more fully to it to-morrow. In the meantime, with respect to the monument at Scutari, in which Your Majesty takes so deep and natural an interest, Lord Panmure hopes at an early day to submit to Your Majesty a design for that object.
Lord Panmure has this morning seen Captain Laffan, the officer of Engineers sent down to look out for a site for the Military Hospital, and learns that he has discovered a most eligible site on Southampton Water, and Lord Panmure begs to enclose for Your Majesty’s perusal a memorandum upon the subject.
Your Majesty’s orders with reference to the Crimean medals shall be strictly attended to, and Lord Panmure will to-morrow report fully on the subject.
The Queen’s anxiety.
Lord Panmure feels deeply for Your Majesty’s anxiety in reference to the movement of the Army in the East.
Lord Panmure earnestly hopes that Your Majesty’s known calmness and courage may sustain you in this time of impending action, and Your Majesty may rest assured that the very earliest intelligence of any kind which reaches Lord Panmure shall be transmitted to Your Majesty.
The expedition to Kertch had not all embarked yesterday.
Lord Panmure does not expect any movement in the field before the end of June; it may be a little sooner, but the preparations for transport will require some time to make.
Lord Panmure begs to apologise for the length of this note, but as it is written upon Your Majesty’s nativity, he ventures to lay at Your Majesty’s feet his humble, but most cordial congratulations upon so happy an occasion.
May 24, 1855.
What answer shall I give to-day to Headlam about his proposal that the value of commissions shall be given to the families and representatives of officers dying on active service? I think the general feeling of the House of Commons is for such an arrangement, and against the general principle of sale and purchase of commissions, and I own that my opinions go very much in the same direction.
Suggests a move in the direction of ‘abolition of purchase.’
Might we not say that the regulated value of commissions which have been bought by officers killed in action, or dying of wounds in active service, will be given to their families and representatives, and that their commissions will be filled up without purchase, and that henceforth officers who have received commissions without purchase will not be allowed to sell those commissions so received? We may say that, in regard to death by disease, it would be difficult to draw a distinct line between deaths so happening in the Crimea and deaths so happening in other stations, and it would, moreover, be difficult to draw a satisfactory line between diseases directly brought on by climate and exposure and diseases which might have affected the officer even if he had been at home, and we should thus gradually slide into a regulation which would apply to almost all deaths of officers on full pay.
Also suggests hastening Lord Raglan.
Would it not be well to desire the Commissariat in the Crimea to make arrangements for a more frequent supply of fresh meat than that which was mentioned yesterday, and would it not be well to desire Raglan by telegraph to lose no time in concerting with Pélissier the arrangements necessary for the field operation, whether from Eupatoria, or from any other basis of operations which may be fixed upon between them?
Time is precious, and the hot weather and the Russian reinforcements are coming on.
WAR DEPARTMENT, May 25, 1855.
New spirit infused into French Army.
Your telegraphs for the last some days have been very satisfactory, and show that a new spirit has been infused into your French Allies. We all look forward to news from Kertch, and the second expedition is as yet a profound secret, so we hope to announce it and its results at once. I regret very much not having been able to send you more Cavalry remounts for want of shipping, but they will drop in by degrees, and the two additional Regiments, 1st and 6th, will swell your force.
I have nearly ready for you my corps of navvies, and I am sure they will spare your troops greatly, and save much time in all matters of earthworks and entrenchments. I propose also shortly to send you out a floating factory for repair of arms, and all kinds of material which you will find of great use to you.
I think the public mind is more calm than it was, and they are looking forward to some news. D’Israeli is trying an attack on Government, but he will not succeed, and has contrived, by patronising Mr. Layard, to alienate from him such men as Granby, who votes against him to-night.
I send you by this mail official notice of your ceasing to be M.-G. 22 We are proceeding with the amalgamation, and I am convinced it will lead to far more celerity of action in all matters touching the war. I am glad to see you have got your summer clothing. How do you like it?
Character of Sir G. Brown.
I dare say Brown will abuse it as he does everything. I had a long letter from him a few days since, most amusing and characteristic of him. I never knew a man who so cordially hated all change, whether good or bad. However, he is a fine old soldier, and may fire off his wrath against me if he like. You none of you know the difficulties I have to fight against, or how I fight, till you fall into Ellenborough’s hands.
OSBORNE, May 25, 1855.
The Queen thanks Lord Panmure for his letter with the telegraphic message just received. She is very glad to see that there is activity and energy to be seen amongst the French, which promises well.
Regret for French losses.
We regret the loss they sustained on the night of the 21st. 23
PICCADILLY, May 26, 1855.
Suggests sending Vivian’s Turkish Contingent to Kars.
. . . It seems to me that the best appropriation of Vivian’s Turkish Contingent would be to send it to form an addition to the Turkish army at Kars in Asia Minor, getting the Porte to give the command of the whole to General Vivian.
Omar’s force not to be diminished.
Vivian does not seem likely to get more than 10,000 Turks in Europe, unless by detaching men from Omar Pasha’s army, and to take any men from him would surely be a great mistake, and would only be to gratify the personal hatred borne to Omar Pasha by the Siraskier. We should be taking troops away from an army going at once to commence important, and we hope, decisive operations, in order to transfer them to a reserve which will not be completely formed for some time to come. It would be as if we were to take regiments from Raglan and send them to Malta to be added to the depôts in that island.
Advantage of recruiting Vivian’s force from Christians of Armenia.
But if Vivian were sent with 10,000 men, or even with a less number, to Erzeroum and Kars, he might complete his 20,000 from the Turkish force now in that quarter, or, what would be infinitely better, by voluntary enlistment from the Christian population of Armenia.
If there was an army of 30,000 men in that quarter, it would sweep the Russians out of Georgia, unite itself with the Circassians, and make a successful and brilliant campaign.
But the Georgians would look with fear at the advance of a purely Mussulman army in their country, as they are all Christians, and religious fanaticism combining with imperfect discipline might lead to excesses.
But if a good portion of the troops were Christians, and if the Mahometans were controlled by British Commanders, the Georgians would feel secure, would join us by thousands, for they hate the Russians, and our success would be assured.
Such an arrangement would, perhaps, be better than the sending European troops for a Georgian campaign, for I am informed that the climate of Georgia is unhealthy for Europeans during the heat of summer and in the autumn.
We might, perhaps, after we have taken Sebastopol, occupy Anapa, and some of the ports on the coast, if we did not think it best to destroy them, or hand them over to the Turks or to the natives.
I wish you would think over and consult with Clarendon about this disposal of Vivian’s army, for if such an arrangement should seem advisable, no time should be lost in taking steps to carry it into effect.
I add a line about our recruiting. It does not thrive, I fear, and you will find that the Army wants at least 40,000. This is an awful figure, and some means ought to be devised for increasing the voids without loss of time.
Suggests disembodying Militia regiments with a view to helping recruiting for the Army.
Why not disembody those Militia regiments that have nothing but officers, and hardly any men? I fear there are but too many in this position. These men would no doubt join the Army, and might be asked to volunteer before being disembodied, so that we might keep our hands upon them. I fear there are but too many Militia regiments in which the officers are receiving full pay for doing nothing, they having 90, 100, or 150 men to command. Such corps only hamper us, and are worse than useless.
May 28, 1855.
Suggestions as to following up British success at Kertch.
The Queen wishes me to express to you her great joy at the news of the taking possession of the Straits of Kertch, which you have communicated by telegraph. 24 That this success should have been obtained, and without loss, exactly on the Queen’s birthday, enhances her satisfaction. The Queen hopes that immediate orders will be given to make the most of this advantage by seizing, or at least destroying, all stores and magazines which the Russians must doubtless have accumulated all along the Sea of Azof. For this it may be necessary to retain with the squadron employed in that sea a small force of troops, which may be landed on different points, and by their unexpected descents not only strike terror into the interior of the country, but oblige the Russians to divert large bodies of troops for the defence of their extended coast, and may further, by pushing into the country where it is possible for them to do so, obtain that information of which we have been hitherto entirely destitute.
I would detach at least a Brigade for this service (say 2500 men — English), which cannot be valued too highly. We must remember what annoyance our movable columns and small descents caused to Napoleon both in Italy and Spain during the former war.
Reasons for believing the Russian force to have been overestimated.
The fact of so small a force having been found at Kertch, after our expedition had become known, and we had been assured of the presence there of from 8 to 12,000 men, coupled with the other facts, that since the 5th of November the Russians have made no attempt to disturb our position before Sebastopol, nor that of the Turks at Eupatoria since the 17th of February, though they must have known that at one time a large portion of them had been removed to Sebastopol, must open the eyes of our Commanders to the delusions which have been practised upon them as to the enormous strength of the Russians, which even after Inkerman was put down as near 200,000 men! At least the Queen hopes that you will strongly impress upon them the probability of the Russians being only in strength where they know our troops to be immovably located, and of the accounts of their force in all parts of the Crimea having been purposely spread by themselves, and that there can be nothing more detrimental to enterprise and success than to overrate the enemy’s forces.
OSBORNE, May 28, 1855.
The Queen rejoices over success of second expedition to Kertch.
The Queen has just received Lord Panmure’s two boxes. The account from the Crimea becomes better and better, and the Queen cannot express what a happy day this has been to us! She feels sure Anapa will fall speedily, but she doubts that the victory will be as bloodless. We never have known exactly how large the English force despatched was.
The Queen is truly thankful that the cholera is decreasing, and that that excellent and valuable person, Miss Nightingale, is safe.
We have just returned from visiting a transport with 70 horses on board (for the 17th Lancers), which has interested us much. They sail to-day.
OSBORNE, May 28, 1855.
The Queen adds one line to the Prince’s letter to Lord Panmure, to say that she would wish him to telegraph in her name to Lord Raglan to express her great delight at the news of the taking of Kertch, and of this happening on her birthday, and without any loss, and that she hopes this is the commencement of successes of a decisive character in the Crimea.
May 28, 1855.
Success of second expedition to Kertch.
This has been a very jolly Whit-Monday for us, owing to your welcome intelligence of the expedition to Kertch having reached us. I think that Canrobert must repent his having recalled the first expedition, seeing how great a work has been effected. They say it was from Kertch that Cæsar wrote his first despatch. Brown might have adopted his very word from the same place.
I am glad to see that you have allowed the troops to go on to Anapa. These hornet nests had all better be extinguished at once. I have just received your despatch by messenger of the 15th inst. I am sorry that you have been obliged to keep the trenches, and I have no faith in only French and Turks in the field. I begin to incline to your opinion of the advance from Eupatoria; that from Aloushta I always held to be visionary.
I shall answer your secret and confidential despatch as soon as we have talked it over in Cabinet. You will see that we beat Disraeli by 100, and so we shall be left to carry on the war. 25
May 28, 1855.
Lord Panmure presents his humble duty to Your Majesty, and has the honour to transmit for Your Majesty’s use copies of despatches which arrived this forenoon from Lord Raglan.
Your Majesty will doubtless see with disappointment that it has not been found expedient so to carry out the plan of operations as hoped, in concert with the Emperor of the French, so as to leave Your Majesty’s troops free to advance as instructed; but Lord Raglan still hopes, when the movement on the right and against the enemy’s left is advanced, to be able to take part in the plan of operations, which is now evidently about to be put in execution. The large force of 90,000 men required to guard the trenches and depôts is far beyond our calculation.
Lord Panmure begs to draw Your Majesty’s attention to the report of Sir John M’Neill and Colonel Tulloch, which shows that no risk will again occur of Your Majesty’s troops being destitute of supplies.
May 28, 1855.
Second expedition to Kertch.
. . . I should like to have shaken hands with you today in re Kertch. Heaven grant it may be the forerunner of other successes; but if 90,000 men are required for the trenches, I can’t feel very hopeful respecting Sebastopol, or beating the Russians in the field. . . .
ST. JAMES’S PALACE, May 29, 1855.
I am extremely obliged to you for your kind note of yesterday’s date, and am delighted to hear of your decision to keep up to the Indian establishment 10th 26 and 12th. 27 I hope, of course, in horses as well as in men. . . .
As regards Airey, I really think he is an anxious and willing fellow, and I doubt not you will find a marked improvement in him for this campaign, therefore I hope you will give him another chance, though I admit he has been much to blame in many respects, but it was from want of experience, which he has now fully acquired.
The expedition against Kertch.
Of Filder I say nothing. I am enchanted at the success of our friend Brown at Kertch, and I do hope he will give us a further good report about Anapa, and I own I should like to see [them remain] (?) afterwards and settle themselves between Arabat and Kaffa. This would effectually bar that part of the Crimea, the Sea of Azof, and the communication with Circassia against the Russians, and I think we could spare a force for this detached position. It appears to me that the Russians are hardly in such force as before one thought they were in the Crimea. Another thing is very evident, and a great justification for Lord Raglan, that Canrobert was the man who always held back; for the very moment the command is taken out of his hands, the Allies are active and enterprising, a clear proof that it was he who would not take any responsibility of action upon himself. . . .
OSBORNE, May 30, 1855.
The Queen has just received Lord Panmure’s box, with the telegraphic account of Omar Pasha’s resignation. She hopes that the Government will do all they can to prevent this being accepted, and to cause the removal of those who have led to this step being taken by Omar Pasha. His loss would be most serious at this moment.
May 31, 1855.
As to Omar Pasha’s army.
Palmerston suggests that a message should go forthwith by telegram to Raglan, desiring him to send word immediately to Omar Pasha that we not only do not want his 5000 men for Vivian’s Contingent, but that we had refused them, thinking that his army, instead of being weakened, ought if possible to be reinforced. Raglan should add that we think Omar Pasha’s resignation would be an irreparable calamity for the common cause.
I will write in the same sense to Stratford. 28