Crimean texts
At the seat of war the month of July was characterised by a lull, following the unsuccessful attempt on the Redan; whilst at home the nomination of a successor to Lord Raglan engrossed attention.
On the death of the latter, a telegraphic despatch from the Government had appointed Major-General Simpson, then serving as Chief of the Staff, to the command of the British Forces in the Crimea — an appointment in which he was confirmed on July 18th.
But, though a brave soldier, Simpson had not the qualities of a leader, and it soon became evident that the demands of the position were in excess of his abilities — a fact to which his own excessive modesty, not to say diffidence, was the chief means of attracting attention.
His position, indeed, was one which might well have daunted a stronger man.
Advanced in years and of infirm health, he found the mere correspondence which now devolved on him almost beyond his powers, for he had none of Raglan’s aptitude for that branch of his duties.
But this was by no means the worst.
During his latter days, Lord Raglan had come in for much adverse criticism, but no sooner was he gone than his loss began to be severely felt, for there was none left who could compare with him — in the words of the Queen — in ‘name, experience, position, rank, prestige.’ And, whatever might have been his shortcomings as a general in the field, his tact and the universal respect which he inspired had been of almost incalculable value in minimising friction and composing dissensions among the Allied Commanders.
Of authority of this kind Simpson possessed nothing, and the result was quickly seen.
From the outset there had been apparent at the Military Councils a disposition to treat Omar with scant ceremony, and the native bluffness of Pélissier’s manners had not tended to lessen this.
Accordingly the Turkish Commander now proposed, or threatened, to withdraw his troops from the Crimea, where they could ill be spared, to the relief of Kars — a threat, which, though in the meantime averted, revealed the existence of a real danger.
Hence, in a private letter to Lord Panmure, Rear-Admiral Houston Stewart, an acute observer, expresses his fears of ‘divided Councils’; whilst, as early as July 14th, Simpson himself writes as follows: ‘The more I see and reflect upon the condition of things here, the more I am struck with the conviction that these four armies never can carry on any joint or united operation in their present condition. We want one great man to direct the whole.’
To add to the difficulties of the writer’s position, the cholera at this juncture deprived him of two able coadjutors, whose places were by no means easy to fill — namely, of Mr. Calvert, alias Cattley, the Chief of the Intelligence Department, and Colonel Vico, French Commissioner with the British Army.
In these adverse circumstances, Lord Panmure did all that could be done to support his friend, the British Commander, by sympathy, exhortation, and advice; and it was only when he saw that these things had failed that he made up his mind to the inevitable.
Already on July 14th, the appointment of a successor to Simpson had been discussed in the Cabinet, with the result that, before the end of the month, a Dormant Commission had been made out in favour of General Codrington.
Meantime the British works had been advancing very close to the enemy’s position, the number of casualties among the British troops increasing in proportion.
BUCKINGHAM PALACE, July 1, 1855.
The Queen is glad that Sir G. Brown is not likely to add to those who have fallen victims to the trying climate of the Crimea, and is coming home.
She feels much for General Simpson — though she confidently trusts that Lord Panmure’s expectations of him will be realised.
As the Queen goes out of town at the beginning of next week, the Investiture of the Bath must be held this week; she therefore wishes Lord Panmure would at once send her the lists, in order that she may see the proposed names, which she can then talk over with him and Lord Hardinge.
The Queen is the more anxious to do this soon, as she thinks it will help to cheer the Army.
She sees that the mail with the details of the affair of the 18th will be here to-morrow.
The enclosed Memorandum is most humbly submitted in duplicate to Your Majesty, as containing Lord Panmure’s views as to the conduct of military affairs in the War Department, by Your Majesty’s most devoted and most obedient servant,
(Signed) PANMURE.
WAR DEPARTMENT, July 2, 1855.
(Signed) V.R.
Memorandum for the guidance of the Secretary of State on the mode of dealing with certain military subjects in relation to the discipline, appointments, and promotion in the Army, the planning and construction of fortresses and barracks, and the arming, equipping, and clothing the troops.
A copy of this paper has been placed in Her Majesty’s hands.
Appointments and promotions.
1. The Queen is the fountain of all appointments to, and promotions in, the Army, the list being submitted to Her Majesty by the Commander-in-Chief.Appointments to military commands at home and abroad ought to be concurred in by the Secretary of State before they are formally submitted for Her Majesty’s approval.WORKS
2. The sum to be expended in works will be fixed by the Cabinet.The localities and character of the works must be determined by the War Minister in consultation with the Commander-in-Chief and Inspector-General of Fortifications.The result of their deliberations will in the first place, when properly put into shape, be submitted by the Secretary of State to his colleagues, and probably discussed with them and the professional authorities.These plans, when agreed to by the Cabinet, will be formally submitted to the Queen for her approval, accompanied by an explanatory memorandum by the Secretary of State, who will certify therein that they have been adopted in concert with the Commander-in-Chief and Inspector-General of Fortifications.When the Queen has affixed her signature to any such plans, they will be deposited in the War Department, after copies have been made of them for the execution of the works, and no deviation or alteration can be made without their being re-submitted to Her Majesty.A Quarterly Return of the progress of all works will be made in duplicate from the Office of the Inspector-General of Fortifications for the information of Her Majesty and the Secretary of State.BARRACKS
3. All plans of important barracks should be transmitted to Her Majesty for approval, and the same course observed in their construction as in fortifications.ARMS
4. The Commander-in-Chief is responsible for the description of arms used in the Service. He will communicate from time to time with the Secretary of State, and the patterns being fixed upon, they will be by him submitted for the Queen’s approval, which being signified to the War Department, the Secretary of State will submit a Warrant for each pattern being sealed as the service pattern of that particular arm.No alteration should be admitted on the sealed pattern without the Royal consent.CLOTHING AND EQUIPMENTS
5. On all questions of clothing, equipments, and accoutrements, the Commander-in-Chief will ascertain Her Majesty’s pleasure, and inform the Secretary of State, when, should he see no reason to tender advice to Her Majesty upon the subject, Warrants under the Sign Manual will be obtained by him to seal the approved patterns, and no change can be made except by Her Majesty’s sanction.All questions, even of detail, in the dress of the Militia, Yeomanry, Foreign Corps, or any bodies in the service of the Crown, should be submitted to the Queen.MILITARY LANDS
6. No land should be acquired or disposed of which is intended for military purposes without due information being given to Her Majesty in the first instance, in order that her pleasure may be known and recorded.PENSIONS
7. All pensions emanate from the bounty of the Crown and the liberality of Parliament, and all Warrants will be proposed to Her Majesty on these subjects by the Secretary of State.RETURNS
8. When the Civil Departments are in working order, Quarterly Returns will be made to the Secretary of State in duplicate, one of which will be transmitted to Her Majesty from the following Departmental Officers:—
- The Director-General of Stores, showing the condition of the military stores.
- Director of Artillery, showing a brief summary of the proceedings of the Scientific Committee, and the armaments furnished during the preceding quarter.
- The Inspector of Artillery, showing the state of his department.
- Inspector of Small Arms, showing the state of his department.
- Inspector of Gunpowder, showing the state of his department.
- Inspector of Royal Carriage Department, showing the different carriages under construction.
9. Monthly Reports of all corps not at present under the Commander-in-Chief should be required when practicable, and transmitted to the Queen,
Viz.:—The Ambulance Corps.
The Land Transport Corps.
The Medical Staff Corps.
The Army Works Corps.
BUCKINGHAM PALACE, July 2, 1855.
Her Majesty desires daily information from the seat of war.
The Queen returns the Lists of the Officers who it is proposed should receive the Order of the Bath, which she entirely approves.
She hopes all the necessary forms and preliminaries may be sufficiently hastened to enable the Queen to have the Investiture on Friday next.
The Queen wishes much that Lord Panmure would repeat the injunction to General Simpson to let us hear every day regularly how the military operations are proceeding. It is now three or four days since we have heard a word upon that subject from General Simpson.
Private.WAR DEPARTMENT, July 2, 1855.
I find that I cannot send you by this mail the official despatch which I was anxious to write you, and I must therefore delay until next mail, when you may expect a large bag and your Letter of Service confirming you in command of the Army. You have come rapidly into a post of immense responsibility, and you will now be able to make yourself a name. Do, I implore you, use the best tools you have, and keep your people, I mean your officers, well in hand. I have assured the Government that you have talent and energy to do the thing, and I fix my faith on you without hesitation. I will support you in your position, and you can render this an easy task by avoiding the rocks on which poor Raglan split, and applying to many an evil your own good sound Scotch common-sense.
Panmure’s advice and directions to Simpson.
Routine is excellent, nay absolutely necessary, but there are times when you must set it aside and act for the moment as the moment requires. I say nothing to you as to Staff, but I think you will do wrong to cumber yourself with any of your predecessors out of feelings of mere kindness. If you are satisfied they are the best you can get, then employ them by all means; if not, let them come home with all speed, or join their regiments if on the spot.
I hope you will study to maintain the cordial relations with the French which poor Raglan so eminently succeeded in doing, and although they seem to have gone wrong in the business of the 18th, 1 still we must not quarrel with them. I shall look for full despatches from you, and I wish you distinctly to understand that it is the Queen’s wish, as well as that of the Government, that you should let us know every day by telegraph the condition of the health of the Army, the progress in siege-work, referring to the last plan sent by General Jones, and anything extraordinary. Before you receive this you will hear of the officer who is to be at the head of your Staff. I am not quite sure, but I think it will be General Knollys, whom you know. He is a good Frenchman, 2 and knows all the field operations well. You must and may place great confidence in General Rose, whom I look upon as a first-rate man. You will have received a message from me to complete your Divisions by selecting officers to their command, and your Brigades in same manner. It will afford you the opportunity of rewarding some meritorious young officers in command of Corps, and I entreat of you use none but good men. Let them complain if they will, I repeat I will support you.
Attention to health of troops enjoined.
Another thing you must look to is the strictest attention to the health of your troops — compel it, and you will have the satisfaction of saving many a valuable life. Adieu, my dear friend, and believe me to watch with sincere anxiety the success of your career.
PICCADILLY, July 4, 1855.
Sufferings of our troops from heat; alleviations proposed.
I met this evening at the Palace Colonel Reynardson of the Grenadier Guards, just come home from the Crimea; he says the Army suffers greatly from heat, and that the kindest thing that could be done by them would be to send them out good-sized peaks to be put to their foraging-caps, white covers such as are worn in India for the caps of officers and men, small white parasols for the officers, and boots for the men big enough for the human foot, instead of things like the boot of torture formerly used in Scotland. He says that he was advised when he went out to take an umbrella with him to protect him from the sun; that, though not believing much in its use, he took one, and that it has been worn to tatters by use by himself and his friends, to the great saving of their health.
I don’t see why the men should not be ordered to rig up a kind of gipsy-tent awning in the trenches, where he says they suffer awfully from the heat of the sun.
BUCKINGHAM PALACE, July 4, 1855.
. . . The Queen cannot comprehend our having heard nothing from Sebastopol. We have had no telegraph since Saturday night! The French hear every day. Lord Panmure should really insist upon our hearing also daily. More than ever now we wish to know what is going on.
Private.July 5, 1855.
Though this will not go before Saturday, yet I may not be able to command so much time as to write so fully as I wish if I delay till nearer the departure of the mail. You will receive an official despatch from me in which I have addressed you as the Minister, in this I do so as your friend.
Reasons of the repulse and lessons from it.
It is in vain for me to attempt to conceal from myself that the failure of the 18th resulted from Pélissier having refused to adopt Raglan’s advice to attack the whole town in the first place, and, in the next, in having made his attack without a preliminary bombardment to drive the enemy from the guns. Lord Raglan seems to me to have surrendered his opinion as to the general attack too easily. He should have informed Pélissier that unless his plan, approved as it was, not only by his own engineer but also by General Niel, was acted upon, he would not expose his men to slaughter and probable defeat. No one could have suspected him of over-caution, and he would have carried his point, and I’ll be bound to say he would have succeeded in some point in getting into the town and turning the flank of the Redan and Malakoff; but unfortunately he yielded his opinion, and see the results. Then again Pélissier had agreed to the preliminary cannonade, which he most rashly abandoned, and left the enemy snug in his nest and able to give you such a reception as I do not suppose any troops ever met with since war was known and practised.
These events would teach me, and I have no doubt will teach you, two lessons, the first of which is never to make an attack so as to permit the enemy to concentrate their whole force within a short space, and the next is to have your plan reduced to writing and signed by the Chiefs of both, or all, armies, if more than two are engaged, and then it will be for him who swerves from it to show good and substantial reason for the departure. Had this been done, I scarcely think Pélissier would have ventured to forego the bombardment, and to rush recklessly on, two hours before the time arranged.
Character of Pélissier.
You will have an awkward game to play with him, as I hear he is a rough sort of fellow and very obstinate. I only hope you can be so too, when you feel assured that you are in the right.
The Times seems disposed to give you a good start, but the Daily News has discovered a fatal objection to you, that you are connected with me! I am not ashamed of the impeachment, are you? In a telegraphic despatch poor Raglan recommended Lieut.-Colonel Pakenham as successor to Estcourt, and coupled your name with the recommendation. He will be accepted by the Government at once, and I trust you will find him active and sharp. He comes of a good stock.
Reinforcements.
I am sending you the 56th, which will leave this 800 strong and in very good condition. I hope ere long to send you two fine German battalions, and a Swiss Corps which is composed of some fine men. Your Cavalry will soon be reinforced, and I have desired a reserve of 1000 Artillery to be sent to the Mediterranean as soon as possible. You will hear that I have made Fergusson 3 at Malta Governor at Gibraltar. Markham will have reached you before this or very soon after it, and I trust you will give him a Division, for he is a fine and zealous soldier, and knows something of siege-work, as witness Moultan. I shall have apprised you of my wish in this respect by telegraph. There is one thing I wish you to understand: that if I ever press anything against your serious conviction that I am in error, I shall never take it amiss that you differ from me, and defer action till you can telegraph to me. . . .
Sir R. England.
[Here follow some questions as to the qualifications of General Sir Richard England 4 for succeeding to the chief command. Sir Richard’s conduct in the first Afghan war had been adversely criticised, but Panmure had never given ear to his detractors.]
Look well to your sanitary condition, and keep your doctors on the qui vive, and indoctrinate your C.O. with the necessity of taking due care of the men in their quarters. The Bath comes out on Saturday, and is a long list. I hope soon to see G.C.B. attached to your name, though you do not appear in the present batch. I rejoice to see that Dowbiggin has been doing well in the front, and got κυδος from General Barnard.
Army Works Corps.
Now I have only one word more. Give my Army Works Corps fair play when they arrive. They will come very complete and work well. I think Mr. Romaine 5 is wrong in his law. You are the law-maker in your Army, and if these devils misbehave, set the Provost-Marshal at them without hesitation.
Now farewell, send us frequent accounts of you, however brief.
PS. — The enemy 6 is nibbling me, but Gardiner is keeping him in check.
OSBORNE, July 6, 1855.
Would Lord Panmure inquire by telegraph of General Simpson how the general state of health of the Army was, and whether the cholera was abating? The Queen sees no mention in the papers of poor Lord Raglan’s remains having sailed; is it not to be mentioned?
ST. JAMES’S PALACE, July 6, 1855.
Recommends appointment of a General now in the field as Chief of the Staff.
I feel so strongly on the subject of the appointment as Chief of the Staff for the Army in the East that I cannot help naming to you whether you would not make use of the telegraph, before coming to a decided opinion. My own feeling is that, both as regards the Service and the Army, as also as regards the personal comfort and advantage of the General commanding in the East, there can be no doubt that one of the Generals on the spot, and who has seen the working of the system out there and the numerous details of duties required, would be far preferable to any other man that would be sent out from home, however competent to fill one of the most important positions, if not the most important position, in the Army. I should, therefore, if I were you, telegraph to Simpson to ask him whether he had anybody to recommend for the post in question, and you might suggest an officer or not as you thought fit, but still let him have the option of naming a man of his own. Rest assured he will name one, for he will appreciate the advantage of having a man at hand thoroughly alive to what is now required to an army in the field. . . .
As to employment for the writer.
There follows a letter from the Duke of Cambridge, dated July 6th, in which the writer expresses his earnest desire for active employment, and suggests that this should be either with the Foreign Legion or in superintending the camps of Shorncliffe and Aldershot.
F.O., July 7, 1855.
Effect on the French of field allowance to British soldiers.
Persigny 7 is just gone from here, and he says the French Government are frightened out of their senses at the consequences that our double pay may produce in the French Army — spirit of discontent, insubordination, etc. I told him the pay was not going to be doubled, but that the soldier would have a small sum given to him for field allowance, as his officer had now, and that this act of justice was in lieu of an additional bounty, but that you intended to send proper military explanations of the measure to General Torrens for communication to General Vaillant. 8 He said, if it could only be stated that it was an extra allowance for campaigning, it would remove all their difficulties, because the French soldier has a solde de guerre, and he might then be told that the English soldier had only been put upon the same footing as himself.
Nothing could be more friendly or reasonable than Persigny’s communication. He disclaimed all right of inquiry, and still less of interference, but he said he was sure we would not wish to do them an injury that a little explanation, or possibly some change of form, might save them from.
July 7, 1855.
Difficulties as to foreign enlistment.
Pray read this from Buchanan. 9 It is written in a moderate tone, but it is rather a poser, on account of the proclamation of the Governor of Nova Scotia, which really does amount to a violation of the Nova Scotia law of neutrality. We may say that all recruiting is put a stop to, but what shall we say about the past and about having disapproved our agents? The proclamation was imprudent, and not, I presume, in consequence of any instructions from home; but we can’t throw over our Governors.
Private.CRIMEA, July 7, 1855.
I understand it was Lord Raglan’s custom to send Mr. Calvert’s Reports to you with a ‘private’ note.
Enclosed is his last. I do not think there is anything new in it. Lüders 10 is certainly in Sebastopol. We saw a carriage with outriders, etc., arrive some ten days ago, which was probably him.
Attack by Russians in the open unlikely.
He is a clever, enterprising man, not likely to remain long quiet; but I hardly expect he will attack us outside, as they know full well that it would be to their disadvantage to come out into the open plain. I send home to your Lordship this day several official letters. To those on the railway I beg your particular notice. Nothing managed by Civil workmen is likely to thrive here. I also dread those so-called military corps that are sent to this country with enormous pay — like the Mounted Staff Corps — as such a system is most unpleasing to our regular troops, who are doing the same duties on a soldier’s pay.
As to myself, my Lord, I await further orders, and have not made any change, or added to my Staff, until I know for certain what is to be ordered. . . .
Pressure of correspondence.
The ‘paper-work’ and the correspondence that demand my time and attention here are beyond all belief, and interfere sadly with my military duties. In fact I am at my desk from four in the morning throughout the whole day, while I ought to be outside attending to more important matters. What with the two mails a-week, and the electric telegraph, the writing is incessant, and much interferes with more urgent duties. This I find is my great difficulty.
Difficulty of dealing with Allies.
The next to it is the difficulty I experience in dealing with my Allies — Pélissier, Omar Pasha, and Marmora. They are all equally with myself independent, and it is very embarrassing at times to get on as we ought in our great cause. I have no complaint of Pélissier. I find him frank and well disposed. I like Omar Pasha, who is very willing and soldier-like in all my dealings with him. I think Marmora, too, is very anxious to get on well with us, but he is not very easily satisfied. As yet, however, we are all going on well together.
I know no man but Lord Raglan who was capable of managing these conflicting materials.
Cholera is much on the decline. I rather dread the return of hot weather. The air has been so cool lately that sickness of all sorts has diminished.
Telegram from Pélissier.
The Emperor has just sent me without comment a telegraphic despatch from General Pélissier dated the 6th at 6 P.M. of which the following is a translation:—
‘Intelligence from Lord Panmure inspires General Simpson with apprehension for the safety of Balaclava, and makes him desirous of a concentration. I do not share these apprehensions, but you will appreciate the difference between these preoccupations of a purely defensive nature and the project of forcing the mountains and attacking the Russians on their summit.’I presume that His Majesty means to convey the inference that we are opposed at home to a forward movement, and as I shall have an opportunity of seeing him to-morrow, I shall be obliged by your Lordship giving me such information in the matter as you deem proper.
July 8, 1855.
Against suppositions of discord between Allies.
I don’t understand the despatch from Cowley of which a copy has been sent to you, as I don’t know what are the apprehensions about Balaclava to which General Simpson alludes, but I should like, if you see no objection, to enable Cowley to give some explanation to the Emperor of Pélissier’s despatch, and some assurance that we don’t object to external operations, or to any other course which appears most expedient to the two Commanders-in-Chief. Also that no instructions have been sent of which the French Government has not cognisance.
BUCKINGHAM PALACE, July 8, 1855.
Lord Panmure has of course seen the telegraph just come from Lord Cowley, with a message from General Pélissier which is very strange. What news can there be which General Simpson is said to have received from Lord Panmure which would prevent any forward movement? 12
Private.
BUCKINGHAM PALACE, July 8, 1855.
The Queen has received Lord Panmure’s letter of yesterday. She approves of his proposition of Lord Stratford’s being directed to invest all the officers in the Crimea who are to receive that distinction with the Order of the Bath, and of dispensations being opened to enable General J. Fergusson, Vice-Admiral M. Seymour, and Major-General Torrens to wear their decorations. At the same time, as the Queen knows that the dispensations are expensive to those who receive the distinction, she will be ready to have another Investiture — should there be any here to invest who were unable to attend on Saturday on account of the short notice — when we come up to town for the Prorogation of Parliament, should it be advisable to do so, or at Windsor in October.
Her Majesty desires news of the progress of the war.
Has Lord Panmure received no letters whatever from General Torrens? The Queen wishes to see whatever he does receive, even if the letters do not convey much intelligence; but surely there must be something to report. The Queen sees that the mail is come, and despatches, she concludes, will be here to-night, and they would be up to the 26th or 27th.
July 9, 1855.
The post-days are most inconveniently arranged; between Saturday and Monday I can have but little to communicate to you. I understand that the feeling between Pélissier and Omar Pasha is anything but friendly, and you will have to exert yourself in keeping the peace as far as you can for the general good.
‘Hold your head high.’
I hope you hold your head high among these dons, and maintain the position of your country, even though its land forces are weaker than those of the Allies. You will remember that the Sardinian Contingent is attached to your Army, and is not to be disposed of without your consent. . . .
I send out by next mail an order to Lord Stratford to repair to your Camp and invest the officers who have won the honours of the Bath. You will have to receive him with proper state, as the Queen’s representative, and give the affair all the éclat you can.
I shall write you officially on the subject, but this will prepare you for it.
Pélissier’s game of cross-purposes with the Emperor.
The Emperor of the French uses his telegraph too much; he gets answers from Pélissier which we do not comprehend. For instance, yesterday Cowley writes that the Emperor had sent him the enclosed. 13
Will you let me know what intelligence you received from me that ‘inspired you with apprehension for the safety of Balaclava’ — surely not my allusion to Lüders’ corps? My only reason for mentioning this is to show you how small matters excite our Allies, and to caution you against any demonstration of feeling which can create uneasiness where none ought to exist.
If possible, you and Pélissier should agree in all the telegraphs you send. We at home have agreed to send no orders to the Army which are not previously known to both Governments; we have left to you Generals full discretion, and I do not think either of you will have cause to complain that your hands are fettered.
I am lame in a foot just now, but quite able for business.
July 1855. 14
Lord Panmure presents his humble duty to Your Majesty, and has the honour to forward to Your Majesty copies of despatches which have arrived by this mail. Lord Panmure cannot conceal from Your Majesty that in General Simpson’s letter there are grounds for anxiety as to the present state of things with the Army. It is quite evident that General Simpson thinks himself unequal to the task of commanding the Army, and is anxious to be relieved from so weighty a responsibility. With this feeling so strongly expressed, Lord Panmure is of opinion that it would be unjust to the Army to leave it in trembling hands, and unfair to tax General Simpson’s powers of mind and body beyond what he states himself able to endure. Under these circumstances Lord Panmure asked Lord Palmerston to hold a conference with Lord Hardinge at the War Department on this momentous crisis.
Qualifications of suggested successors to Simpson.
They went over the list carefully and discussed the following selections as being possible.
1st. Lord Seaton. His age is seventy-six, and though his frame is robust for that period of life, he is unfit for exposure to such a climate as the Crimea, and to the anxieties incident to the command of the Army; on these grounds he was set aside.
2nd. Lord Hardinge. He stated that, if ordered by Your Majesty, he would obey, but he represented that he was physically unfit for the task. That his legs swelled and that he could not walk, and that his riding was reduced to a very limited duration. He was therefore thought to be more useful to Your Majesty in the Government and Military Councils than in the field.
3rd. The Duke of Cambridge. Your Majesty will, I trust, forgive me when I state that, admitting all His Royal Highness’s hereditary courage, he (sic) thought he might fail in self-control in situations where the safety of the Army might depend on coolness and self-possession.
4th. Passing our eyes down the list of Lieutenant-Generals and obtaining an opinion from Lord Hardinge on the respective merits of each, we discussed those of Sir Harry Smith, but set him aside from the circumstances of impaired health and liability to excitement.
5th. No other Lieutenant-General presented himself whom we could see the least chance of fixing on, except Lieutenant-General James Fergusson, now in Malta, and whose appointment to be Governor at Gibraltar Your Majesty lately sanctioned. We have reserved this officer’s eligibility for discussion in Cabinet on Saturday.
6th. Failing him, we then proceeded to review the Major-Generals, both unemployed and employed. We agreed that, except Major-General Markham, the cream of these officers were already in the field, or incapacitated from further action by wounds or sickness.
Claims of Codrington.
We then reviewed the list of those with the Army and have now resolved to place Major-General Codrington’s claims first of all in point of merit, and of his possessing the qualifications necessary for the situation. Major-General Markham would ably support him.
Lord Panmure has informed Your Majesty of all that has passed, and will be in a position to submit a definite arrangement to Your Majesty after the Cabinet on Saturday. In the meanwhile he may probably be honoured by a communication of Your Majesty’s views on the question.
The accounts of the health of the Army are favourable, but General Simpson’s description of the reduced state of the men is far from satisfactory.
The railroad will ere long be in operation again, as the new Army Works Corps are all at sea, and the first division of six officers and four hundred and six men sailed on the 1st.
Lord Panmure has already taken measures for the Army wintering in the Crimea, though he hopes it may be unnecessary. Lord Panmure feels that he ought to apologise for writing at such length to Your Majesty.
Private.
CRIMEA, July 10, 1855.
Deaths of Colonel Vico and Mr. Calvert.
Cholera broke in upon my family yesterday, and seized two valuable members of it — Colonel Vico, the French officer attached to our Army, and Mr. Calvert, the Chief of our Intelligence Department. Vico is still alive, but fast sinking; Calvert died this morning. Both are cases of decided spasmodic cholera.
The loss of Colonel Vico will be deeply felt, as he was singularly well adapted for the situation he held, liked and respected by all of us, and extremely useful in his position. I do not think the French will be able to give us his equal, but I know Pélissier will do his best.
As for Mr. Calvert — his loss is irreparable! I have not a chance or any hope of finding a successor, and the want of such an officer in our Army will produce many evils. I sincerely trust your Lordship may be able to send some trustworthy man in his place.
The sudden removal of two such men from the midst of the Household Staff is a severe blow. They were in perfect health when suddenly seized with this pestilence.
PS. — Colonel Vico died at 3 P.M.
Private.
CRIMEA, July 10, 1855.
Contemplated withdrawal of Omar Pasha’s Army.
Things do not improve with us here! I send you the copy of a despatch from Lieut.-Colonel Simmons, 15 Her Majesty’s Commissioner with Omar Pasha, addressed to Lord Clarendon, in which his Highness is stated to contemplate a withdrawal of his Army to Eupatoria. The result of this would probably be the loss of Balaclava, as the force left in the Tchernaya position and plain would not be sufficient for the security of that place. I need not point out to you its importance!
Want of ‘one great Chief.’
The difficulty of those four armies going on successfully together without one great Chief has been manifest to me from the first. The French and ourselves have but one great object in the siege of Sebastopol; but the French detachment on the Tchernaya, with the Sardinian and Turkish forces, are not likely to be well handled in any combined movement where there is no Chief. The safety of Balaclava depends on this force, and if Omar Pasha withdraws I leave you to judge of the consequences!
I have only this forenoon received this copy of Colonel Simmon’s despatch, and deem it right to forward it without delay.
July 11, 1855.
General Simpson to be recommended not to assault till a breach has been made.
This is from General Cannon; 16 there is nothing in it very new, but all in it is very true. I think it would not be amiss to desire Simpson not to sacrifice lives in an assault until a practicable breach is made, and the fire of the enemy bearing upon the point to be assaulted has been duly silenced. Simpson may require such an instruction to protect him against the urgencies of Pélissier.
July 11, 1855.
Palmerston’s opinion of Raglan.
Thanks for this letter, which is very interesting. Raglan seldom gave opinion and never stated plans, because, with all his merits, he was not much of a hand at forming opinions or inventing plans. A man who has opinions cannot help bringing them out when he is consulting with others on the matters to which those opinions relate. I saw a good deal of Raglan at the military meetings we used to have at the Home Office, and I was well satisfied that Hardinge was a superior man to him.
If they want to have roads made, preparatory to winter, they should no doubt be able to get a thousand stout labourers from Constantinople, either Turks or Albanians, who would do the work.
If we take the town on the southern side of the harbour, we must bombard the northern fort from the southern side, and for that purpose the large mortars by the two Irish engineers would come into play, and 18-inch mortars would also be very useful. For a fort so strengthened, common shells would make little impression. It is probably casemated, and you want shells heavy enough to break through the casemates.
Prospect of another winter in the Crimea.
You are quite right in beginning already to take measures for another winter in the Crimea.
Whether we take Sebastopol or not, it is clear that our troops must winter there.
Advantage of more powerful mortars.
I have just been reading General Rose’s despatches of the 23rd June, which strongly show the advantage that would be derived from a more powerful vertical fire than our present mortars are able to give.
OSBORNE, July 12, 1855.
General Simpson’s depression.
Lord Panmure will have anticipated that his letter enclosing General Simpson’s despatches must have caused the Queen a good deal of uneasiness. General Simpson’s own account leaves no doubt as to his inability to carry on the command, should his letter not be the result of the first feelings of depression, consequent on Lord Raglan’s death, which manifested itself throughout the Army. It might be as well therefore, in the first instance, to ask him by telegraph whether he still holds to his opinion expressed in his letters of the 30th? Should this be so, it will have to be considered that the appointment of a Junior Major-General over General Simpson’s head is not what he contemplates, but rather the appointment of a Commander of weight, both as a soldier and a gentleman of accepted position. Neither of which, the Queen is grieved to admit, have we available.
The difficulty of finding a successor to him.
Lord Panmure’s opinion, given upon those who at first sight might appear so, entirely coincides with the Queen’s own. She would accordingly give the preference to Lieut.-General Fergusson, and, in case of his failing, to one of the M.-G.s on the spot, of whom she also thinks General Codrington the most promising. He is junior, however, to England, Bentinck, Colin Campbell, and Barnard, and his elevation over their heads will be grievously felt, as his personal superiority is not so marked as to be generally admitted. But this is a difficulty which must give way to the necessities of the case.
OSBORNE, July 13, 1855.
The Queen sees from the telegraph sent to her this morning that General Simpson appears ready to carry on the command for the present, and presumes that this is in answer to some question from home, and that for the moment he will be left undisturbed.
Victims claimed by the cholera at headquarters.
She wishes to bring under Lord Panmure’s notice the singular coincidence that, while the cholera is generally diminishing to such an extent in the Camp that the last number of deaths was only 3 to 30,000 men, one victim after another falls at head-quarters: General Estcourt, Lord Raglan, Mr. Calvert, and Colonel Vico. Should they have all lived at the same spot, which is more than probable, an immediate change of location for the headquarters should at once be recommended, as it is a peculiar characteristic of that malignant disease to attach itself to a particular spot, and kill all who inhabit it.
July 14, 1855.
Lord Panmure presents his humble duty to Your Majesty, and has the honour to transmit to Your Majesty five despatches from General Torrens, to the last of which Lord Panmure invites Your Majesty’s attention.
General Torrens very clearly describes what had passed, and in this despatch perfectly justifies the selection which has been made of him for his present position. 17 The Emperor’s mode of dealing with the officers of his Army is much to be lamented, and must always engender jealousy and distrust among them. 18
Difference with the French.
Lord Panmure regrets to observe for the first time any charge on the part of our Allies against our Army. 19 It will not be difficult to refute it, and this Lord Panmure will make a point of doing when he receives the despatch back from Your Majesty.
Question of the command in the Crimea.
The question of the command in the Crimea was fully discussed in the Cabinet to-day, and the general impression, in which Lord Panmure concurs, is not to confirm, at least for the present, General Simpson in command; but to make inquiries as to the condition of General Codrington’s health, as he seems to be the man to whom universal opinion points as most likely to do justice to the Army and to preserve and to add to its renown.
Lord Panmure has been advised by Lord Hardinge not to sanction the Guards being formed either into a Division or an independent Brigade, even though Lord Rokeby take offence and resign.
Lord Panmure cannot but feel very anxious in these important changes, and is deeply grateful to Your Majesty for the patience and grace with which his communications are received.
WAR OFFICE, July 14, 1855.
I have scarcely a moment to write you, so much has my time been occupied all day with public matters. Your despatch by the last mail has given me great uneasiness in many respects, and makes me fear that the Army is desponding upon the result of the 18th, and the subsequent loss of their brave and gallant Chief. Your private letter is as forcible as a public despatch, and I am turning over in my mind what is to be done.
Simpson desires to be relieved of his command.
I had hoped to see you remain as Commander of the Army, but the grave doubts which you have expressed as to your health, and the pressing nature of your demand for some one to be appointed, leaves me no hope in that direction. I shall do nothing hastily, for it is a serious step which I am called on to take to determine in whose hands I will vest our Chief Command abroad.
I will write you fully on Monday.
Private.
HEAD-QUARTERS, CRIMEA, July 14, 1855.
There is nothing to report since my last letter. Cholera continues decreasing, and our general health is good.
More despondency. Loss sustained by Raglan’s death.
The two deaths in this house during the week, of Mr. Calvert (or Cattley) 20 and Colonel Vico, have been very melancholy events, coming so immediately after the great, irreparable loss of Lord Raglan. There has been unusual gloom in consequence.
There is to be a Conference this evening of the Generals Commanding-in-Chief and the French and English Admirals on a proposition of Omar Pasha, who wishes to withdraw his troops from the Crimea to endeavour to relieve Kars. The result shall be made known to you by next post. I do not see how we can sanction such a proceeding.
The more I see, and reflect upon, the condition of things here, my Lord, the more I am struck with the conviction that these four armies never can carry on any joint and united operations in their present condition. We want one great man to direct the whole.
My second reflection is my own position! for surely I am an unworthy successor to Lord Raglan, who not only guided the Army, but from his high rank, his great experience and talents, he really guided the whole combined armies, for all the Commanders had faith and confidence in him. I write these ideas without reserve to you, for they are worthy of serious consideration.
Illness of Simpson and others.
Of course I continue to do the work as well as I can until you decide what is to be done. I have been ill this last week with gout in my ankle and foot, as well as by the vexatious events that have occurred in the family of our Staff in this house. The correspondence here is sufficient to break down any man. I labour at it from four in the morning till six in the evening,, and every mail seems to bring an increase of it. My outdoor military duties are therefore much neglected, and I feel that my work is unsatisfactory, because not properly done. Every one around me is sick more or less — Colonel Steele is on board ship for change of air; Colonel Stephenson, whom I appointed to succeed him, is also on board ship, seriously unwell. Mr. Filder will, I expect, have to call for a Medical Board. Under these circumstances I have the temporary aid of Colonel Brownrigg 21 and Major Claremont, who are of great service to me. The complaint which seems to visit every one is diarrhœa, which I apprehend is premonitory of cholera. Colonel Stephenson has been very ill from it.
I have appointed no Staff until I see what will be determined upon, but I have taken over Lord Raglan’s Establishment, so as to carry on the ordinary routine for the Head-quarters’ Establishment, for the Staff, etc.
OSBORNE, July 15, 1855.
The Queen acknowledges Lord Panmure’s letter received this morning. He need never fear to try the Queen’s patience by writing to her too often or at too great length; on the contrary, it is an immense satisfaction and comfort to her that he keeps her so regularly and so constantly informed of everything that he hears of what is going on.
General Torrens’s despatches are very interesting and very able; of two the Queen would wish to have copies.
The Queen agrees with Lord Hardinge with regard to Lord Rokeby. She has had the opportunity of knowing a good deal of General Codrington’s own feelings, from having seen copies of many of his letters, or rather more of his journal, which his sisters have kindly allowed the Queen to see. They are admirably written, and show the greatest devotion to his service, as well as great energy and activity of mind and body.
Quotes from private journal of Sir W. Codrington referring to Lord Raglan.
In his last, written after poor Lord Raglan’s death, he says:
‘His (Lord Raglan’s) personal kindness and consideration towards me put me in the military position for which I was so anxious, but it probably never would have taken place without that personal consideration for which he had, and will always have, my most grateful feelings of remembrance. We shall indeed find it difficult to replace him, from his knowledge of the Army — so many of its officers personally and by character — his prestige of the great Duke, his cheerfulness and kindness of manner, his habits of business, his being a gentleman, and his having been our leader in victory during the early and spirit-stirring times of the campaign.’Further on he says, speaking of Sir G. Brown’s illness and departure:
‘It is possible, therefore, that I may be named permanently to command the Light Division. It would be a high command for me to have!
Lord Raglan’s name and experience, his invariable good-humour with the French under many provocations, have been most valuable in keeping well with our Allies, who must be ticklish people to deal with. Who can be his successor, we all wonder?’
The Queen thinks that at this moment these extracts may be interesting to Lord Panmure, though she wishes them to be considered confidential. Speaking of his own health on the 30th, he says that two days more rest on board would quite restore him.
PICCADILLY, July 15, 1855,
An officer to superintend formation of Italian Legion.
There are two things which I very much wish you would do without further delay.
The one is to appoint an officer to undertake the formation of the Italian Levy; I asked Hudson 22 a few days ago what progress had been made in raising that Levy, and he said that no steps whatever had been taken, and that nothing could be done till you had appointed some officer to take charge. An officer who speaks Italian would no doubt be the best, but an acquaintance with French would be quite enough, and it is very important that no more time should be lost.
Desirability of appointing new men to the heads of the Commissariat and Medical Departments.
The other thing is the selection of a good man to take charge of the Commissariat in the Crimea instead of Filder, who, I am quite satisfied, is not fit to remain in command, He is narrow-minded, prejudiced, opposed to every new resource and improved practice, wedded to routine, and refusing every improved arrangement.
You cannot well have a worse man, and, if you were to spin a teetotum over a page full of names written down at random, and choose the one at which the teetotum fell, you would probably get a better. We are not justified in sacrificing the interests of the Army and endangering the success of our operations out of delicacy for the feelings of individuals.
If anybody should moot this topic in the House of Commons, I should be quite unable to say one word in your defence.
Pray also put your new man into Andrew Smith’s place without further delay.
The only way to meet the cry raised by these administrative reformers is to show to the country that we are bestirring ourselves to put the best men we can find into places, the duties of which have an important bearing upon the interests of the public service.
July 16, 1855.
Omar Pasha’s unwillingness to remain longer before Sebastopol.
The Queen wishes me to thank you for your very interesting letter of yesterday. Omar Pasha’s dislike to stay before Sebastopol is probably owing to Lord Raglan’s death and General Pélissier’s rudeness towards him. He is a proud man, who consented to act with Lord Raglan, but would not probably act a subordinate part to a new and untried English General, nor submit to being slightingly treated by the French General; and considering his position, this is quite natural.
Suggests that General Vivian join the Crimean Army.
Will it not be right on every account to let General Vivian join the Crimean Army? This would bring the English force, independent of French interference, to 60,000 men, counting the English at 25,000, the Sardinians at 15,000, and the Turkish Contingent at 20,000 — unless our General has an independent command, he will have as much difficulty as Omar Pasha finds to keep his ground. This would also be the best answer to the Emperor’s exhortation that we should increase our Army.
The Queen wishes to know what is the final opinion about the command, as an early decision will be advantageous on every account. General Codrington seems to be quite well again.
Private.
WAR OFFICE, July 16, 1855.
The mail of this morning with despatches up to the 2nd July brought no private letter from you. I am not much surprised at it amidst the many calls on your time and attention. I hope you ride about among the people and show yourself to the soldiers, as that was one of the points which they complained of Lord Raglan’s leaving undone.
‘We cannot have all our Generals Guardsmen.’
I am sorry to see that Lord Rokeby is aggrieved in respect of juniors being named to Divisions over his head, but I cannot help it. We cannot have all our Generals Guardsmen, and out of five Divisions they have two, and a Chief of Staff besides.
Commissary-General Filder recalled.
I have by an official letter recalled Commissary-General Filder. . . . and as I do not wish to hurt the old man’s feelings, perhaps you would have something done to break the announcement to him. I have long looked on him as an obstruction, but Raglan threw over him his shield to such an extent that, without a rupture with him, I could not reach Filder.
I am sorry to say that your private letter by last mail, in which you urged the absolute necessity of a successor to Raglan being appointed, and pressed your own weak health, has had a strong effect on my mind as well as those of my colleagues, and made us nervous as to your remaining in command. I have come to no decision yet, but you will hear from me as soon as I do, by telegraph.
Private.CRIMEA, July 17, 1855.
I enclose a letter to Her Majesty, which I will be very much obliged by your causing to reach her. I have given out Her Majesty’s sentiments on the lamented loss we have sustained by Lord Raglan’s death, in General Orders to the Army.
Omar Pasha’s threatened departure from the Crimea.
I send home to-day all the documents explanatory of Omar Pasha’s desire to leave the Crimea. He is gone to see his Government at Constantinople, and I have sent copies of all these papers to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe. The departure of Omar Pasha’s troops from the Crimea will have many bad effects. It will be a serious diminution of our force, and as the Turks are now in position on the Tchernaya, the enemy will see by their departure that not only is our guard over Balaclava weakened, but that we have no longer any intention of a forward movement on that side. What may be the result of this desire of Omar to leave us I cannot say. It is true the Russians’ gaining possession of Kars, which seems not improbable, will be very dangerous for Constantinople; but the Crimea seems to me of greater moment still, as the battle must be fought here in preference to Kars.
The French progress towards the Malakoff is very steady, but Pélissier has made no communication to me of his intentions. He is very close, but I could wish a little less secrecy with me, as no doubt he will call upon me to help in his attack.
Early prospect of a general attack.
We are too weak to form any plans of our own, but may give valuable aid in a general attack. There must be a serious one soon, for our casualties are great from being so close to the enemy.
This is a serious business, the guns of the Naval Brigade being so worn out! Indeed all the heavy guns are nearly in the same condition, at least those which have had long continuous firing and have been hushed more than once.
Troublesome use made of the telegraph.
I think, my Lord, that some telegraphic messages reach us that cannot be sent under due authority and are perhaps unknown to you, although under protection of your Lordship’s name, and not in cipher. For instance, I was called up last night, a dragoon having come express from St. George’s Monastery with a telegraphic message in these words, ‘Lord Panmure to General Simpson — Captain Jarvis has been bitten by a centipede. How is he now?’ This seems rather too trifling an affair to call for a dragoon to ride a couple of miles in the dark, that he may knock up the Commander of the Army out of the very small allowance of sleep permitted him! Then, upon sending in the morning another mounted dragoon to inquire after Captain Jarvis, four miles off, it is found that he never has been bitten at all, but has had a boil, from which he is fast recovering. I venture to mention this message because there have been two others equally trifling, causing inconvenience, and worse may come out of such practices with the wires.
Staff appointments.
Since writing the above, the mail of the 2nd has reached us. I await your Lordship’s next despatches with much anxiety. I fill up no Staff appointments until further instructions. General Barnard is, however, in Orders as Head of the Staff, and is acting, and very useful to me as such. Lieut.-Colonel Stephenson, whom I had named as Military Secretary, has not been able to join me in consequence of illness, but I sincerely trust he is recovering. The sickness among officers certainly increases, while with the men it diminishes. . . .
There is far more writing for me for the mail than I can manage to-day, so I will conclude this private letter.
Private and Confidential.
‘HANNIBAL,’ OFF SEBASTOPOL, Tuesday, July 17, 1855.
Whilst attending a Conference at the French headquarters on Saturday last, your telegraphic message was delivered to me, and although very much gratified to find that my last letter was acceptable to you, and that you wished me to repeat the infliction upon yourself of another yarn, I feel that I have now very little to say which can be interesting or even worth your reading.
Omar proposes to go to the relief of Kars.
The Conference to which the Admirals were summoned was to take into consideration Omar Pasha’s proposal to go off himself immediately, with 25,000 Infantry and 3000 Cavalry, to the relief of the Turkish Army at Kars; and to make up a portion of this force, he desired to withdraw the garrison at Kertch, or rather at Yenikale and St. Paul’s, which I was glad to hear Pélissier declare was in his opinion the last place from which the Turkish troops should be taken. The fact is that Omar Pasha is strongly suspected of being tired of playing a subordinate part here, as well as his friend Colonel Simmons, who, I doubt not, is anxious to have freer and more independent action. And certainly the want of consideration and courtesy, or at least polite attention, evinced by Canrobert and Pélissier towards the Ottoman Generalissimo has been the subject of regret and remarked by us all. It is so foolish, too, because Lord Raglan and Sir E. Lyons have always found the Pasha very sensible to a little friendly attention, and with that not difficult to manage. He may or may not be honest, but many people look upon him as possessing more military talent and good sense than most of those do who affect to hold him cheap. However, I need not bother you on this point, as, of course, you will have all the necessary information from the Military Authorities, and by telegraph long before this reaches you.
Simpson’s physical unfitness to command.
With respect to the Military Authorities, I ventured to tell you what General Simpson said himself of his own unfitness for the Command-in-Chief, and certainly the three or four times we have since met have in no degree tended to make me think he had estimated his own physical powers too lowly. On the contrary. He has already grown to look half-a-score years older, and to carry a more anxious, chirpit 23 countenance. Indeed it is evident to the most careless observer who sees and talks to him for five minutes that he is completely over-weighted and much oppressed. I have attended two conferences with him, and in neither of them has he addressed one single word or remark. In short, it appears to me, and I may add to Sir E[dmund] L[yons], that it is quite impossible the good General and worthy old soldier has enough in him to enable him to maintain either the interest, or the honour and credit, of the English Army under the present most trying circumstances, and I ardently hope that you may have taken him at his word, and believing his own representation of inability, have appointed some younger, more accomplished, and energetic officer. An honester or more cautious, I do not think you could find. But this matter you will have determined on ere now, and so the telegraph forestalls all epistolary interest and information, and spoils correspondence, as Dundas M’Queen said conversation did drinking.
There is a good deal of diarrhœa on shore, and in the Fleet too, but generally a few days of change of air on board our ships puts the soldiers to rights again. I am happy to say that General Codrington has completely recovered his health, although he left the Hannibal four or five days sooner than the doctors at all approved of — his anxiety to be at his post, after Lord Raglan’s death, and the arrival of General Lüders’ reinforcements to the enemy, not permitting him on any account to remain longer away from it.
Character of Codrington.
As I have already told you, I firmly believe Codrington to be one of the very best and ablest officers in the Army, and, if he is spared, I am confident will do good service. Fond of his profession, taking great pains about it, zealous yet cautious, decisive yet judicious, and not by any means over-impulsive, with excellent nerves and a courteous, soldier-like bearing, is the character that most of those who know him will concur in assigning to Codrington. Sir E. Lyons has recovered his spirits greatly. The Queen’s most beautiful letter to himself acted like magic, and never, I think, has her most amiable and gracious consideration been more beneficially bestowed. You will not misunderstand me when I say that my gallant Chief and dear Friend, with some of the genius of Nelson, possesses also portions of the minor characteristics of our great Naval Hero, and his love of praise and notoriety is very great, although to his credit be it said that he bestows it on others with no niggard hand. That was the secret of Nelson’s great popularity with his officers, and so it is with Lyons. On the other hand, Charlie Napier is most unpopular, because a glutton for himself, a miser to all his fellow-workmen!!!
Close proximity of attackers and attacked.
Our works advance — slowly — but I hope pretty surely, and it is really nervous to observe the close proximity of the opposing parties, which we can see very well from the ships. I had General Jones down here the other evening to observe from the Hannibal with a powerful telescope, and he was much edified. Too much praise for indefatigable exertion and wonderful resources cannot be given to our enemy, neither is it possible to withhold admiration of the persevering, bold, and arduous labours of the Allies; but the adoption of earthworks makes repair so rapid that the damage of the day is often made good during the succeeding night. That we shall fight our way into the South Side I do believe, and certainly even an extensive cost of life doing so will be preferable to the nightly drain from sorties and the strenuous and incessant exertions of the Russians to harass and impede our operations.
My chief anxiety is on account of the probability of divided councils and command. The moment for improving and following up anything like success has been repeatedly missed on this very account, and I really believe it is true that one indifferent commander is better than two good ones, a saying, I think, of Napoleon’s.
Statement of a Russian prisoner.
A Russian officer who was wounded and taken on the 7th June (Corporal Quin’s of the 47th Manchester, I believe) has just arrived here from Constantinople, and goes to Odessa to be there exchanged with Captain Montagu, R.E. He is an intelligent young man, and apparently speaks fairly, although, of course, he is to be supposed as rather wishing to mislead than otherwise. Yet he says that 200,000 men cannot be fed in the Crimea, and that the whole force now in it does not exceed 150,000. That the Imperial Guards have been sent for, 50,000 strong, but that they will on arrival exchange with the weakest of the troops here, the latter retiring from the Crimea. He says that 28,000 Minié rifles were furnished by Prussia, and reached Sebastopol before he was taken prisoner. This is handsome conduct on the part of Frederick William, but, I presume, not unexpected. He says (of course) that we never can take Sebastopol now - that we missed our chance after Alma, when ‘none but sailors were left to fight the batteries.’
He says the Redan is more difficult than the Malakoff, because the advance to it is much more exposed. That Osten-Sacken will fight to the last man, and that, even were the Malakoff taken, we could not take the lower town, and that, so long as the passage across the harbour is practicable, fresh troops can be thrown in; that the garrison is only 30,000, but that there are 60,000 on the North Side of Reserve. He says the fire of Russian ships sweeps the Malakoff. (However, the latter once ours, the tables could be turned.) He says they have plenty of guns in Sebastopol for two years’ work, but acknowledges they are short of shot and shell, of which all they are now using is being brought up by land carriage. He says there is no absolute scarcity of the necessaries of life, but that everything is very dear, although shops are open and trading going on. The town has suffered much, he says, especially from shells. He talks hugely of the interior lines of defence, and, in truth, I fancy we shall have to fight for the ground; but once in the Malakoff, and the mines there exploded, or wires cut off, it seems generally believed that we should soon drive all out of the South Side. The North Side is covered with redoubts and batteries, and will be very difficult to take, except by investment. It is stronger than Brest or Toulon to the sea, and therefore impregnable to ships.
The fleets little better than spectators.
It is very vexing to be obliged to acknowledge this, but in spite of Admiral Bruat’s ingenious despatch of the 19th June, it is undeniably the case, and the fine fleets are, comparatively speaking, little better than spectators. Nor can Sir E. Lyons well absent himself just now, and especially since Lord Raglan’s death. The Sea of Azof, the mouth of the Don, the factory of Lugar, and the stores of Rostof are, according to my view, the assailable points, where most serious damage might be effected; but neither there nor elsewhere can anything be effectively and safely done without a certain number of troops.
What might be accomplished by a small force in the Sea of Azof.
I have long thought that, with even one good regiment and the marines of the Fleet — say 1500 men, commanded by an intelligent, active soldier, embarked on board all the light draught vessels and supported by the gunboats and mortar-boats of light draught and launches, much might be effected; because I should never doubt the capability of such a force, aided by the vessel guns, maintaining itself on shore, against Cossacks or other assailants, for a sufficient space of time to enable the most complete destruction to be carried out. The factory of Lugar supplies all the guns and ammunition for the Crimea. Were that destroyed, the Czar would be sorely puzzled — besides all the grain and other stores which would be found there and thereabout — and the blow which it would give to the Russian ascendency and presumed invincibility would be invaluable.
I was most anxious that such an expedition should be undertaken the moment the Straits of Kertch were open; but it was altogether impossible to persuade the Generals to spare even one regiment — in fact, as you will know, we could with difficulty get the French to assent to go as far as Yenikale. Not one step beyond would they have budged. Still it is not too late — although I have little doubt but the garrisons of Anapa and Soujouk Kalé have gone thither to protect such valuable property. Pray keep this in mind, my dear Lord Panmure, and the moment you feel that 1000 men can be spared — in short, a good smart English regiment, let it be placed at the disposal of the Admiral and quietly despatched into the Sea of Azof. The nature of the country, the ubiquity of the Cossacks, render it hazardous to land seamen and marines only, unless retained completely within cover of the fire of the vessels; but 1200 or 1500 Englishmen would maintain themselves with confidence for the time necessary to destroy, and Lugar would require a short land march.
Recommends action against works on the Don.
From all I have heard, and from all I can judge, no blow, short of the capture of the Crimea, would be more sorely felt by the Emperor of Russia than would the destruction of his very important works and stores and manufactories on the Don. And most emphatically would I recommend to the Government to cause it to be undertaken as speedily as circumstances will permit. On this side the Crimea I cannot think there is much to be done. Odessa may be bombarded, but cui bono? Unless you are prepared to land and destroy the town, the ships must at length withdraw, all the damage they may have suffered quite apparent, while that of the enemy will most probably be very questionable, and easily concealed or denied. I do not believe that, without a large land force, Nicolaieff could be effectively assailed. The Perekop is unapproachable by water on this side; and even if it were not, little or nothing could be done without that most useful and valuable being — a British red-coat! The bridge at the Chongar or Tchongar will prove also beyond our present means for destroying it.
You will wish me at Jericho for inflicting this long prose upon you, and imagine that I am indulging in some dreamy plan by which I may attain a laurel or two for myself. But such is not the case, and all that I can ever hope for, in my present position, is to be allowed to ‘follow my Leader.’ Besides, no large ship could get into the Sea of Azof, although the Buntine might, and probably would be easily shifted into a smaller craft. However, this is by the bye, and addressed only to mine old and familiar friend, not to Her Majesty’s Minister for War!! There is some diarrhœa, but very little cholera, in the Camp — here and there a case, and even Balaclava is free. . . . And now farewell. These are unka kittle times, but I hope we may yet be spared to have a keen and merry bonspiel together on our ain side the Forth, or Tweed at all events. Let me just add that Sir E. Lyons felt much gratified by the terms of your despatch to General Simpson, and which has just been promulgated to the Fleet.
As to securing peninsula of Kertch for the winter.
PS. — Should we have to winter again in the Crimea, the peninsula of Kertch, I presume, could be secured — the whole of it from Kaffa to Arabat — and thus afford room for our troops and safety for the Straits when frozen over. But, at the hazard of being thought impertinent, I would repeat, that the possibility of the troops remaining in the Crimea for the winter should be manfully faced, and preparations made in good time. Last winter was not esteemed a severe one as to weather. . . .
Difficulties with Commissariat transports.
The Commissariat transports are, I hear, about to be put under naval control. The sooner the better. The Commissary officers cannot manage the masters, who humbug them and remain idle and doing as they please. Yet the Commissariat resents indignantly the smallest attempt on the part of a naval officer to make these masters do their duty. Any cock-and-bull story about hindrance of a nautical nature is sufficient to satisfy or silence a commissary, whilst the master of the contract steamer laughs in his sleeve. No vessels in Her Majesty’s pay have done so little for the public service as those which have been assigned to the Commissariat, although I dare say Sir C. Trevelyan or Mr. Filder would strongly deny this. The French are erecting a battery on the east of the Careening Bay, from which they expect to destroy, or damage greatly, the Russian ships. I am not sanguine of its success — I fear it is too distant.
PICCADILLY, July 19, 1855.
I am told there was a statement in the Times some days ago, which I did not happen to see, that on the 18th of June, when that unfortunate attack on the Redan was made, no proper preparations had been made by the Medical Department of the Army for the care of the officers and men who might be wounded, and that great and unnecessary suffering was the consequence.
Inquiry as to a report that no proper medical preparations had been made before the assault on the Redan.
I think it would be well if you were to send a copy of that letter to General Simpson, desiring him to appoint a Court of Inquiry to investigate and report upon those allegations. If such statements are true, they imply great blame on the Medical Staff, and if they are false, it would be useful that their falsehood should be established and made known.
OSBORNE, July 19, 1855.
The Queen has received Lord Panmure’s communication of yesterday.
The Queen approves confirmation of General Simpson in Command, with contingent commission to Codrington.
She approves the confirmation of General Simpson in the Command. His communications are clear and simple, and show much foresight. Every assistance ought to be given to him at once to diminish the labour at the desk of which he complains, and which is performed at the expense of time and mental energy which will be more useful to us in the field. General Codrington’s contingent commission is also approved by the Queen, as well as the offer of Malta to Sir Rd. England. Care should be taken not to offend Sir Colin Campbell, who is a great favourite with the Army.
It will be quite essential to have the road between the Camp and Balaclava made, and no cost ought to be spared in that work, nor in the erection of a sufficient number of additional huts and barracks to house the new corps, the horses and animals. . . .
[The Queen] cannot conclude without congratulating Lord Panmure on the gallant conduct of his nephew — his ‘son.’
OSBORNE, July 20, 1855.
The Queen wishes to remind Lord Panmure of the plans for the Aldershot Barracks, which have not yet been submitted to her. It does not the least signify if the original ones are dirty; to make a copy will cause great delay, and it is of the greatest importance that they should be begun as speedily as possible. She therefore hopes that Lord Panmure will direct them to be sent to her at once.
Every assistance and support possible to be given to General Simpson.
In a letter of Admiral H. Stewart’s to Sir C. Wood, the Queen sees that General Simpson’s want of rank is a serious inconvenience, and that General La Marmora, in consequence, is not under his orders (as he ought to be) — being a full General and rather tenacious of his rank — while General Simpson is only a Major-General. Would Lord Panmure speak to Lord Hardinge on the subject — whether he could not be made a Lieutenant-General with the local rank of General? If this can be arranged, it should be done immediately, as the Queen thinks we ought to give General Simpson every assistance and support we can.
She is happy to see that Sir Ed. Lyons (and he says General Jones does also) takes a favourable and cheerful view of our prospects in the Crimea.
July 20, 1855.
I am sure that you will forgive me if I make a suggestion to you which has occurred to me. You will treat it as will seem best to you.
Suggests appointment of General Pennefather as Permanent Under-Secretary to the War Department.
General Pennefather 24 is returned, and I am told in very good health and spirits, except the stamina to stand ‘campaign’ work and exposure. It struck me that you could not get a better man for your Permanent Under-Secretary! He is said to be excellent at the desk, and has long been employed in the Adjutant-General’s Department at home and abroad, and of most conciliatory manner, well versed in all our military affairs, and his experience of the Crimea, its Army, its wants and difficulties, ought to make his service in your office invaluable to you.
I feel sure there could not be a more popular appointment, both with the Army and with the public.
Private.
WAR OFFICE, July 20, 1855.
As this mail will convey to you your formal recognition of Commander of the Army, I wish to write to you at some length upon the different points which occur to me as requiring attention on your part.
Instructions to Simpson.
I must observe, however, that you are to understand that when I touch on any particular topic, or urge any special point, I do not mean to assume that you have overlooked it, and I hope you will not view any remarks made in my private letters as offered in any but a kindly spirit. I confess I was much shaken in my resolution to confirm you from the desponding tone of your private letter written on the occurrence of Raglan’s death, and it was not till I received your counteracting telegraphic message that I took courage and brought your name formally before my colleagues in the first instance, and subsequently before the Queen.
Grounds of Simpson’s appointment.
You have been accepted by all, and we look to you to justify, as I have no doubt you will, the confidence we have reposed in you. The grounds on which I have selected you for this important command are your knowledge of your profession, your sense and discretion, and the determination which I believe you possess of making your subordinates work up to you. One more qualification is necessary, and it is firmness in maintaining your opinion and position and the prestige of the English Army.
You may find some trouble in this, but let your bearing be firm and your tone resolute and conciliatory, and you will make your way. Your first care must be to gain the confidence of your men. To accomplish this you must be much among them, see to their comforts in all situations, and especially when wounded or sick.
Instructions to him, and arrangements for his convenience.
You tell me you have no time to spare from your desk. Now let us see how I can give you more. Now that the telegraph is set up, why should there be two mails in one week? Suppose we make one only a short mail, and write fully only once a week! You have only to suggest to me any means of diminishing your desk labours, and behold I will do it forthwith. I see you have begun by selecting one of the most popular and efficient men in the Camp for your Military Secretary. Who are you to have instead of Colonel Vico? I hope some good man. You have had a great loss in Calvert, but I will send you another man in a few days, a Mr. Jackson, who understands Russian and has been in the country before. I have been seeing about your warm clothing, and am forecasting for a winter residence for the Army. Now I have one or two things to say on that point as they occur to me. First, as to your Cavalry and all your great herds of animals.
Instructions in anticipation of winter, etc.
They must be brought, in my opinion, as near to Balaclava, where the forage is landed, as possible, as it is easier to bring the horse to his food than to carry the food to the horse. You must have nose-bags for your horses, and an early supply of these should be demanded. With regard to your Infantry, you must calculate your hutting required, and let me know the materials you want.
The Army Works Corps will erect you houses of any description — mud, or wood, as you require, and you will find a lot of very handy fellows among them. Your Army will be none the worse pleased by getting the extra field allowance of 6d. per day while fighting, and as it has been resolved on, you need make no secret of it, though of course you cannot officially publish it till it has been sanctioned in a warrant.
Your water has still some dangerous months to encounter, and I beseech you to see to your springs and wells. Store the former by means of tanks, and wall round and protect the latter from pollution as well as waste. Sir George Brown has arrived, in perfect health apparently, and I hear Pennefather is greatly better. . . . I have also seen M’Neill, who gives a poor account of ——, and a cheering one of the supplies which are within the reach of the Army.
Roads to be made, etc.
You should set your Army Works Corps to make your roads, and make good drains by their side, and a lot of brush-wood as their substruction. I believe your rails will do you good service. Your waggons and drivers will appear soon. I wish you would send me home a sketch-plan of the whole attack, both English and French, distinctly marked and up to the latest moment.
The Emperor talks of sending 15,000 more men. He also purposes an addition of 400 mortars, of which he is to find half and we half. If all these get there and open, it will be a hail shower indeed. What would you say to try Dundonald’s scheme 25 on the Malakoff? It might answer. Let me know by telegraphic message what Jones thinks of it.
I mean to make you a Lieutenant-General, and give you local rank of General-Commanding the forces in the Crimea. One word as to your health — if you find it beginning to fail, give up at once. You shall have instructions by Monday’s mail how to do so. Hoping you will take in good part my freedom, etc.
PICCADILLY, July 20, 1855.
Reverts to the Times’ report as to lack of medical preparations for the assault on the Redan.
. . . It is very likely, as you say, that the statement in the Times may be untrue or much exaggerated; but it is always best not to neglect such things, and there is no knowing when they may be brought up as grounds of attack against a Government. I therefore strongly recommend you to send the Times letter out to Simpson (not to the head of the Medical Staff), and to call upon him for full inquiry and particular report.
The probability is that there was some foundation for what was asserted, and your inquiry will prevent any such omissions in future, if any took place at the time mentioned.
Considers the possibility of General Simpson’s being compelled to resign his command.
The awkwardness of our arrangement about Simpson and Codrington is that, if Simpson should suddenly fall ill or be put hors de combat, Codrington would suddenly and without notice be put into chief command; and, in that case, the general officers who are senior to him would not have been prepared for their supersession. This inconvenience is to a certain degree inseparable from our determination to keep Simpson in command, but it makes it more necessary to set to work to remove obstacles beforehand, and as soon as we can, and I should doubt whether it would not be best to appoint England to Malta instead of asking him whether he would like to go. If that was done, and if Colin Campbell were told that he would have a high command in India, matters would be prepared for the event of Simpson being forced by ill health to retire.
Private.
CRIMEA, July 21, 1855.
We could not decipher your telegraphic despatch dated 18th July, 2.30 P.M. At least not the whole of it, but it is so far clear in it that it has been decided to confirm me in the chief command of this Army.
A personal explanation.
I only hope, my Lord, that my letter to you dated 30th ult. did not lead you to suppose that I was insensible to the high and splendid career that seemed open to me, or that I was devoid of that anxiety to seize the opportunity which you might have expected from me. The fact is that on the 30th, when that letter was written, we were all of us much cast down by Lord Raglan’s sudden death, and by various cases of cholera that were raging at that time; and I much regret that the contents or tone of my letter may have given you any cause of embarrassment. The telegraphic despatch of the 18th seems to set matters all right, and I have given out an Order, of which a copy accompanies this letter, announcing to the Army my confirmation as its Commander. I have only to hope for health, and freedom from gout.
Pakenham is duly installed as Adjutant-General, and a better could not be found. Markham arrived two days ago, and is posted to the command of the 2nd Division.
I fully appreciate your kindness in authorising me to defer action on any of your orders, if any of them press against my serious convictions. I do not think this likely to happen. . . .
A good word for Sir Richard England.
You ask my opinion of Sir Richard England. It is good. He has gone on steadily and quietly in the honest execution of his duty ever since he joined this Army, and in spite of all the Cabal against him, I have perfect confidence in England, and should be content to trust him with any order to execute. He does not want sense nor talent, and I have no reason to think him otherwise than quite capable of command. He has had experience too — such as it is — but men learn from experience, be it what it may. England has been shamefully ill-used, and some injudicious friends have made matters worse.
‘All is going on favourably.’
It may be imagined that our siege operations are languid; but all is going on favourably, and if the French can succeed in taking the Malakoff, everything will assume a new shape.
Recommends Canrobert for G.C.B.
I venture to call your Lordship’s attention to General Canrobert, should it happen that he is overlooked in the Honours of the Bath now awarded. I believe it was promised him, and it would be gratifying to our Army, and would enrapture the French, if Canrobert was made G.C.B. It should not be forgotten that he was by Lord Raglan’s side whenever danger pressed, and he is a worthy fellow as can be, and much attached to the English troops.
I must not omit to mention that the Times newspaper reaches Sebastopol before we get it in our Camp; so what with the electric wires and the Times, our enemy has many advantages over us.
I will do my best endeavours to give a good start to the Corps of Army Works.
The correspondence here is beyond me! but I will endeavour to keep your Lordship au courant of everything going on.
WAR DEPARTMENT, July 23, 1855.
Brevity is commendable where there is nothing to say, and I am glad to find you do not extend your last private letters beyond a note sheet.
I think in a short time I shall be able to find you a head of your Intelligence Department, and if you like it I could send you out a clerk from the Foreign Office, a gentleman and man of information, who could act as your private secretary, write and keep your foreign correspondence, and be of service to you in many ways in your transactions with the French. What say you to this?
Suggests destruction of buildings in Sebastopol.
Why don’t you set to work and destroy the buildings in the town?
Raglan spared them on some principle of mercy that I don’t comprehend.
Omar Pasha desires to be off.
I am sorry to see Omar Pasha’s desire to be off. If he would only hold on till I can send you General Vivian’s force and some foreign levies, then he might go on his own hook where he could do most good. I send you out your official letter to-day, and your commission will come as soon as it is prepared. Meanwhile, as you will date from 29th ultimo, make all your arrangements.
Why is Barnard at a Division? I thought you had made him Chief of the Staff? Use Markham actively in the field as a Divisional Officer.
PICCADILLY, July 23, 1855.
Suggests employment for Beatson’s Horse.
Beatson’s Horse are of no use at the Dardanelles (not being sea-horses), and they might be of much use at Eupatoria, from whence, in conjunction with the Turkish Cavalry there, they might intercept or harass the Russian convoys from Perekop to Simpheropol.
Would it not be advisable to send them to Eupatoria without delay? Whatever forming they want would be given them there as well as at Dardanelles, and probably better. I wish you would confer with Charles Wood 26 about this. Some orders would be necessary to Lyons.
Movements of Turkish troops at seat of war.
I conclude that Omar Pasha will go with some of his good troops to Trebizonde, to assist the Kars and Erzeroum Army; if that should be, it would seem to be best to send Vivian 27 and his men as soon as possible to the Crimea.
Private.
CRIMEA, July 24, 1855.
Your despatches up to the 9th arrived yesterday. I have before me your ‘private’ note of that date, to which these lines are my reply.
Relations between Pélissier and Omar.
I am not prepared to say that the feeling between Pélissier and Omar Pasha is of an unfriendly character, though it is evident there is not much mutual respect existing between them; and at these Conferences this is easy to be seen. I quite understand about the Sardinian Contingent — that it is attached to our Army. I shall be prepared for Lord Stratford de Redcliffe when he comes here. He has been here already, some few weeks ago, and knows his way amongst us quite well.
Explains his apprehensions for safety of Balaclava.
As to the inquiry your Lordship makes as to what intelligence I received that ‘inspired me with apprehension for the safety of Balaclava,’ 28 my explanation is that your mention of Lüders’ Corps, agreeing with information from Simpheropol of his actual arrival, knowing him to be a man of enterprise, and seeing the troops on the Tchernaya Plain not properly posted (to my mind at least), I did feel it very probable that Lüders might force the line and get to Balaclava. I accordingly asked for a Conference as to the position of the troops, and a new and satisfactory arrangement was fixed upon, and I was satisfied.
Upon this, it appears that Pélissier sent the message to the Emperor which Lord Cowley sends to you, and which I really do not understand. At the consultation alluded to by Pélissier, both he and Omar Pasha agreed with me that the troops might be better disposed in case of an attack, and they were moved into better position, and I was satisfied.
I had no idea such a small matter was to become so important as to demand all this from me. The French use the telegraph all day; Biddulph says eight or ten messages come and go between this and Paris in a day! and it is therefore impossible for me to agree with Pélissier in all the messages sent.
‘Closeness’ of Pélissier.
Besides this, I think Pélissier the closest fellow I ever met with, though I do hope to succeed in inducing him to trust me.
Indiscretion of the Morning Post.
There is a paragraph in the Morning Post giving the exact strength of our guards of the trenches, times of relief, etc. It is very disgusting to read these things, which are read in Sebastopol some days before they reach us here.
I enclose to your Lordship’s care a letter to Her Majesty, who has commanded me to write direct to herself from time to time.
July 26, 1855.
Movements of Turkish Contingent.
There is no doubt that Omar’s proposal would be the best for the Contingent, but it will require to be seriously considered, because, if Vivian once goes to Shumla, there he must remain till next spring, and I cannot but think that you will want the force at Sebastopol long before the winter is over. In two or three months from this time surely the officers and men will be sufficiently acquainted with each other for all duties not en rase campagne.
OSBORNE, July 27, 1855.
Consideration for General Simpson.
The Queen has observed with regret the very desponding tone of General Simpson’s letter to Lord Panmure. She thinks he should do all he can to cheer General Simpson and to afford him assistance in his very laborious work; civil assistance — even if not usual — should, and surely could easily, be afforded him, so that the fatigues of writing might be lessened, for this is just what General Simpson’s health never could bear. He was accustomed to walk nearly twenty miles a day to keep off gout, and a sedentary life always disagrees with him. The deaths of two very valuable men seem to have overset him very much. Major Claremont would be most useful to him, and the Queen hopes he will retain him. She is very sorry for Colonel Stephenson’s indisposition, as she has heard such a very high character of him.
Suggests the adoption of a Chancellerie Civile at the seat of war.
We were much interested and gratified and comforted by all Sir J. M’Neill told us — whose enthusiasm for, and admiration of, her dear, brave Army is delightful to hear! Could not something like the Chancellerie Civile in foreign armies be usefully adopted in ours in the Crimea, and if so, would not a person like Sir John M’Neill be very eligible for the head of it? Neither the Chief of the Staff nor the Military Secretary can supply this want. Lord Raglan united it all in his own person.
OSBORNE, July 28, 1855.
The Queen has received Lord Panmure’s letters of the 27th.
As to military appointments in the East.
With regard to the appointments in the East, the Queen would remark that Lord William Paulet is omitted from the list of Brigadiers, and that Colonel Storks can consequently not be moved to Scutari, a promotion he much deserves. The Duke of Newcastle speaks of him in the highest terms in a letter to Lord Clarendon, and this confirms all the Queen had heard of him.
Lord Panmure will since have seen a letter the Prince wrote to Lord Hardinge with reference to Lord Rokeby.
The Queen would be very sorry if his case could not be considered. He is in no way inferior to any of the officers out there, and by many placed higher than some who have received commands.
Proposal for forming a new Division.
Should it still be intended to remove Sir R. England to Malta, that Division might be given him, or two or three battalions brigaded and added to the Guards, making a 6th Division? Some of the Divisions now count eleven and twelve regiments, whereas six was the original organisation, making two Brigades of three each. The regiments are now, it is true, much reduced in strength, and therefore more may be brigaded together. Yet the disproportion has been allowed to become great.
The Queen is delighted to hear so good a report of the Swiss Foreign Legion, as well as of the Turkish Contingent, but laments that the accounts of Beatson’s Horse are so very bad.
OSBORNE, July 28, 1855.
Removal of head-quarters urged.
The Queen writes a line to Lord Panmure to repeat the warning respecting head-quarters. From what Prince Edward 29 tells us, she feels sure that they ought to be shifted or we shall lose every one. He says the moment he left the Guards and went there he felt unwell, having always been well before, and has had fever hanging about him ever since. We feel so strongly impressed with this that we wish Lord Panmure would telegraph it again; the position may be healthy and yet the house have been infected.
July 28, 1855.
Suggests employment of rafts and gunboats in harbour of Sebastopol.
Would it not be well to put the following question by telegraph to General Simpson:—
‘Have you and the Admiral thought of the use of rafts or gunboats in the harbour of Sebastopol, to destroy the fleet or to take the batteries in flank?’I feel sure that this ought to be considered as one of the means of harassing the enemy. A raft is very difficult to hit from a battery and difficult to sink. It might remain under the protection of our new batteries on Mount Sapoune and still take up a flanking position with regard to the Malakoff, [and] the new Russian defences. I hope your order to shell the town and for the fleet to do the same every night will be attended to. The Russians ought not to be left a quiet moment in the place.
July 28, 1855.
Lord Panmure presents his humble duty to Your Majesty, and has the honour to acknowledge the receipt of Your Majesty’s note of this morning.
Lord Panmure has observed the arrangements in the last to which Your Majesty refers, and has in his despatch to General Simpson to-day asked him to explain the grounds on which he has acted.
Lord Panmure is much gratified by Your Majesty’s good opinion of General Storks.
In reference to Lord Rokeby’s case, Lord Hardinge showed to Lord Panmure the two letters addressed by Lord Rokeby, one to H.R.H. the Prince, and the other to Colonel Phipps. Lord Panmure knows well the pain which it gives Your Majesty to do anything, even in matters of urgency, which can hurt the feelings of another, and has much satisfaction in meeting Your Majesty’s views by creating a 6th Division, the command of which will be given to Lord Rokeby. A telegraphic message to this effect has gone to-day to General Simpson. Lord Panmure will communicate with Your Majesty by a special messenger to-morrow, respecting the future command of the Army. Lord Panmure begs to enclose for Your Majesty a Crimean medal.
Private.
BELGRAVE SQUARE, July 28, 1855.
I have omitted to tell you that your private letters to me are seen by the Queen and my colleagues, whose thirst after everything coming from the seat of war is like that of the parched traveller in the desert.
I dare say that, not anticipating this, you have poured out your mind to me in all its gloom!
Exhortation to Simpson.
Your letters have certainly been most disheartening, and have in my opinion done yourself a great injustice. It is impossible for a man feeling as you do to face the difficulties of any position, or to cheer on others in the arduous task before them. If you are so weighted down by a sense of your own inability to bear the burden of the command, you must write me so officially and request to be relieved. It is neither fair to me nor to yourself to do otherwise. I have already told you, with all the sincerity of an old friend, that I believe you to have many qualities for the command of that Army which I cannot seek in others, and I have been most anxious to advance you to the distinction which lies at the end of the road on which you have been placed. But, my good friend, you must lead. You must not be oppressed by care nor daunted by difficulty. If your correspondence overwhelms you, call in scribes to your aid. I shall be quite content with one bag a week instead of two, as you can telegraph to me for all your immediate wants. Nothing on my part shall be left undone to make your position as easy as I can, and to help you to reap its honours. So shake off the black dog, and make yourself respected by the Allies and obeyed by your own people. I think you may with great advantage retain Major Claremont’s services about you.
In case of Simpson’s having to retire, Codrington to succeed him.
In the event of your being ill and feeling yourself compelled to give up your duties suddenly, it has been determined at once to place General Codrington at the head of the Army, as being, in the opinion of every one, the best among the younger officers for that position. I shall send you an official letter on this subject by this mail, but you will retain it in your possession, not even acquainting General Codrington with the fact, until you see cause to act on it. I dare say that this resolution, when it becomes known, will create some surprise and perhaps cause discontent among the senior officers, but still, as it is in my opinion the best thing to be done under the circumstances for the Army itself, I am ready to bear the responsibility. I hope Lord Rokeby’s mind is at ease by the arrangements made for a 6th Division.
I cannot understand why you did not give Lord W. Paulet a brigade. . . .
Private.
July 29, 1855.
Inquiries as to progress of the siege.
The Queen wishes me to let you know that she has not yet received General Jones’ plan of the advances made since the 7th. 30
I wish also to remind you that the Report of the Barrack Commission has not yet reached us.
The telegraph which you have just sent to the Queen mentions for the first time that we took some works on the 18th. 31 I cannot find the named fort in the directory on any plan; the Mamelon at the gorge of the Port du Sud is marked on the Admiralty map, and seems an important point from its position.
OSBORNE, July 29, 1855.
The Queen has received Lord Panmure’s letter of yesterday, and is much rejoiced at her wishes respecting Lord Rokeby having been carried out.
In the first place, six Divisions are a much better organisation, and often it is very important to prevent general dissatisfaction among the officers in the Crimea, which would do real mischief to the efficiency of the service there.
Hastening despatch of medals.
The medal was duly given to Prince Edward, who was much pleased to receive it from the Queen’s own hands. He tells her, however, that not one Crimean medal for the Army had arrived when he left on the 5th!! How is this? Lord Panmure told the Queen two months ago that they were going out at the rate of two thousand a week! Will he inquire and take care that the medals go out as speedily as possible?
OSBORNE, July 30, 1855.
Sympathy with trying position of Simpson.
The Queen has received Lord Panmure’s letter of yesterday evening, and has signed the Dormant Commission for Sir William Codrington. A similar course was pursued with regard to Sir George Cathcart. The Queen hopes that General Simpson may still rally. He must be in a state of great helplessness at this moment, knowing that he wants — as everybody out there — the advantages which Lord Raglan’s name, experience, position, rank, prestige, etc., gave him, having his Military Secretary ill on board, the head of the Intelligence Department dead, and no means left him thereby to gather information, or keep up secret correspondence with the Tartars; Colonel Vico dead, who, as Prince Edward told the Queen, had become a most important element in the good understanding with the French Army and its new Commanders, and not possessing military rank enough to make the Sardinian General consider him as his Chief. If all these difficulties are added to those inherent to the task imposed upon him, one cannot be surprised at his low tone of hopefulness. As most of these will, however, meet every Commander whom we now can appoint, the Queen trusts that means will be devised to assist him as much as possible, in relieving him from too much writing and in the diplomatic correspondence he has to carry on.
Proposal to appoint a ‘Chef de Chancellerie.’
The Queen repeats her opinion that a ‘Chef de Chancellerie Diplomatique,’ such as is customary in the Russian Army, ought to be placed at his command, and she wishes Lord Panmure to show this letter to Lords Palmerston and Clarendon, and to consult with them on the subject. 32 Neither the Chief of the Staff nor the Military Secretary can supply that want, and the General himself must feel unequal to it without any experience on the subject, and so will his successor. . . .
CRIMEA, July 31, 1855.
There is nothing for me to write to you by this mail, everything being unchanged since my last. The last mail we have from London is that of the 16th, and I now reply to your private letter of that date. It tells me that no private letter from me reached you in our mail of the 3rd. It was the day of Lord Raglan’s funeral procession, and we were all much occupied on that melancholy day. One or two other mails may have gone without a private letter, but I generally send one if there is anything worth communicating.
Lord Raglan’s rides in Camp.
I take my daily ride in Camp, as you desire, as soon as I get my day’s work over at the writing-table. Ever since my arrival here, it was Lord Raglan’s custom to ride about the Camp daily. I hardly ever knew him miss doing so, whatever the newspapers said to the contrary.
Private.
July 31, 1855.
I send you out by this bag a packet marked ‘most secret,’ which you must keep in your own custody and not mention even to him who is most interested in it. When I sent you out to assume the position of Head of the Staff under the late Lord Raglan, I had in view not simply your standing between him and his Staff and controlling the depots of the Army, but also that, in event of anything occurring to Lord Raglan, you should stand between the Army and Sir R. England. The contingency has unfortunately occurred, and you now occupy the chief command.
Simpson enjoined to do one thing or the other.
I imagine, however, that you will not do so long, and I have laid the ground for your retirement with the honours of war by having your commission executed, and yourself promoted to the rank of Lieutenant-General and the local rank of General. If you really feel unable to bear the weight of responsibility, which I am aware is not small, I advise you to give it up, and every one will give you credit, and on your retirement a still further mark of the Queen’s favour may be conferred; but I strongly recommend you not to hesitate in the matter. Either buckle up your reins vigorously for the work, or at once claim the consideration which your long and honourable services entitle you to receive. I have written to you plainly and as a friend, and you will, I know, accept what I write as such.
Dormant commission for Codrington.
Whether you stay or come away, the same risk of letting the command of the Army fall into Sir R. England’s hands stares me in the face, and as I am quite resolved to prevent this as far as I can, I send you the secret packet to which I have above referred. It contains a commission signed by the Queen, appointing Sir William Codrington (as I hope he will be ere you receive this) to the supreme command of the Army. It is not without much reflection and well weighing of every circumstance that I have made up my mind to put him over the heads of England, Bentinck, Campbell, and Rokeby. The only man among them whom I have any hesitation in superseding is Campbell; but I have been told that, though an excellent Brigadier, he is unfit for undivided responsibility. To England I have offered the solatium of Malta. Bentinck and Rokeby may, if they please, retire on their divisional honours. Campbell shall have the first profitable command I have to give, if he is unwilling to remain under Codrington.
Instruction as to dormant commission.
In the event of your illness or absence, you will present the commission to Codrington and have him put in orders. In case of a bullet having your billet marked on it doing its work, you had better enclose the commission in a packet to be immediately delivered to General Codrington. I believe, and so do the Government, that we have made the best selection which circumstances will permit, and I should like to have your own unreserved opinion on the matter. I shall be anxious till I hear from you in answer to this and Saturday’s mail, and in the interim I hope to see a blow struck which will signalise your tenure of the supreme command.
Omar Pasha’s wish to withdraw.
Let me now advert to your letters just received of the 17th. I have conveyed your letter to the Queen, who is at Osborne. Omar Pasha’s desire to leave the Crimea lies not so much in his desire to relieve Kars as to get clear of Pélissier, whose conduct to him is uncivil, impolitic, therefore offensive and foolish. I cannot see how we can let him go until we can bring some other force to replace that which he would withdraw. I quite agree with you in opinion as to the effect which the withdrawal of his force, if unrelieved, would have on the enemy, and the discouragement it would give to ourselves. You are, I think, mistaken in giving in to his plan of sending the Contingent 33 to Shumla. He would lock them up there, an idle and useless force. My idea, and indeed I may say my intention, is to send it, so soon as capable of moving, much nearer to you. As soon as it is a little organised, and the officers and men are accustomed to one another, I will send it to the Crimea. The English Army is, as compared with the French, a mere handful of men, and in consequence of this its commander, wherever he may be, has not the influence due to the nation in the operations of the siege.
Simpson’s force to be strengthened.
The remedy for this may be found in the increase of the force. I was in hopes that the Sardinian Army would have been able for this, but as they are not fit for trench-work, and set up rather as a separate army than as a portion of the English force, my expectations in that direction are not fulfilled. To do any good in this way we must have troops under our own orders, and I look forward to strengthening you by reserves from Malta, and to make up your present battalions, and the 56th, of 800 strong, now on its passage to join you. I reckon that by this means you should have at your disposal 27,000 Infantry, 3000 Cavalry, and 5000 Artillery — all English troops. I expect to send you by the middle of August 3000 Foreign Legion men. If by the end of August I could move Vivian’s Contingent to you, that would make an addition of 15,000 Infantry, 3000 Cavalry, and 2000 Artillery, all well appointed. This whole force, amalgamated and taking turn of duty alike, would amount to 45,000 Infantry, 6000 Cavalry, 7000 Artillery — in all 58,000 men, to which if you add the Sardinians, you may say at 13,000, you would have a force on which to rely of 71,000, without a single one of Omar’s Army present.
Difficulties with Pélissier.
This would give the English Commander a moral influence which the Allies would be compelled to respect. The absence of any communication from General Pélissier to you exhibits a want of confidence which is most disagreeable. You should call on him in writing for his plans, and if he does not render them in hearty co-operation, let me know quickly, Naval guns are coming to you, and you shall have as many more of large calibre as you require.
No telegraphic messages reach you which I do not sanction. The inquiry after Captain Jervis was made at the earnest request of his father, the Chief-Justice. I have sent no message which ought to arouse you at night, and in future, that you may not be disturbed, give orders that no ciphered message shall be brought to you before the hour of rising, unless it commence with the number 500. This will protect you from having your rest broken, for it is rarely that I shall find it necessary to put on the secret work. . . .
I must conclude this as the post closes.
Most Secret.
WAR DEPARTMENT, July 30, 1855.
The dormant commission.
SIR, — I have the honour to enclose to you under seal a commission nominating an officer to take command of the Army in the event of your being incapacitated from your duty by illness or absence. You will learn more particulars from my private letter of this date, and use your own discretion as to breaking the seal of this document and making its contents known to the individual therein named and the Army at large. —
I have the honour to be, etc.,
(Signed) PANMURE.GENERAL SIMPSON.
July 31, 1855,
Lord Panmure presents his humble duty to Your Majesty, and has the honour to inform Your Majesty that in discussion with his colleagues to-day the following conclusions were arrived at:—
No withdrawal from the heights before Sebastopol consistent with honour.
1st. With reference to General Simpson’s despatch in which he takes measure for the future and refers to the preparations which the French have apparently made in the event of the winter still finding the Allies in the trenches and the Russians in Sebastopol, — Lord Panmure and his colleagues are unanimously of opinion that, under no circumstances whatever, will it be consistent with the honour of England and France to withdraw from the heights before Sebastopol unless driven from them, which ought to be impossible. Lord Panmure was authorised to convey this strong opinion to General Torrens, in order that it might be impressed upon his Imperial Majesty and Marshal Vaillant. This has been done in a despatch of which a copy is now transmitted to Your Majesty.
2nd. On the subject of Omar Pasha’s proposal to repair in person to Kars, or such other part of Asia Minor as shall suit his purpose of relieving Kars, Lord Panmure and his colleagues are of opinion that the objections of the English and French Generals to that proposal were most proper, and more especially their resistance of the removal of the garrison of Kertch. After some consideration of the importance of not permitting Russia to gain a footing in the Turkish territory, and thereby giving her a quid pro quo wherewith to negotiate, it was agreed to offer by telegraph, should the Government of his Imperial Majesty concur, a scheme of the following nature:—
Omar Pasha states his Army in the Crimea to amount to 60,000 men.
He desires to go to Asia with
25,000 Infantry. 3,000 Cavalry. say 2,000 Artillery. 30,000 To this we agree, provided he will leave
In the Crimea, 18,000 At Kertch, 6,000 At Eupatoria, 6,000 30,000 Proposed redistribution of forces.
To reinforce Eupatoria we would send there immediately General Vivian’s force, now estimated at 8000 Infantry and 2000 Cavalry, but which would be increased by degrees to 16,000 Infantry and Artillery and 4000 Cavalry. To these would be added Beatson’s Horse, which may be calculated at 2000 at present.
This would give quite a sufficient force of Infantry to defend Eupatoria from any attack, and furnish a body of Cavalry whose employment would consist in interrupting the Russian convoys at Sebastopol.
Lord Panmure conveys these views to Sir A. Torrens by the mail or messenger of this evening, and has requested a telegraphic answer.
Lord Panmure begs to inform Your Majesty that the private letter of which he has sent Sir. A Torrens a copy was addressed by Sir R. Airey to Lord Hardinge.
3rd. The change of siege tactics was carefully considered at the meeting, and approved as tending to an easier penetration into the place, at less cost of valuable lives.
Lord Panmure is happy to be able to inform Your Majesty that more favourable intelligence has arrived of the irregularities of Beatson’s Horse. The next messenger will bring more particular details.