Crimean texts
WE have seen that Omar Pasha's desire to withdraw from the Crimea to the relief of Kars had at first been regarded with disfavour by the British authorities.
By degrees, however, the importance of checking the Russian advance in Asia Minor came to be recognised — on the grounds, to quote Lord Panmure, that the possession of the Asiatic territories of the Porte would ‘give to Russia a material guarantee for peace — something which she had captured with her bow and spear, and which she would be able to offer as a quid pro quo when the period for negotiation came.’
Accordingly, on August 4th, after a Cabinet Council, Lord Stratford was empowered to consent to Omar's withdrawal, conditionally on his not reducing the number of Turkish troops before Sebastopol, or disturbing the garrison at Yenikale. At the same time General Vivian, commanding the Turkish Contingent, was ordered to hold himself in readiness to proceed to Eupatoria with the Contingent, which, however, still required much shaping. Meantime it was recognised that, should Vivian succeed to the command of any portion of Omar's troops, our position in the Councils of War would be thereby improved.
Nevertheless, General Simpson deplored the departure of Omar, whilst Louis Napoleon disapproved of it.
With the bitter memory of the past winter present to their minds, as summer declined, the British authorities at home and at the seat of war began to look ahead and to form plans and take timely precautions.
Lord Raglan had distinctly declared that the hardships of a second winter in the trenches would be more than the Army could endure.
It was necessary, then, to face the distasteful prospect of abandoning the trenches, supposing that Sebastopol should remain, at no distant date, uncaptured, whether by sapping or bombardment.
And supposing that the trenches were abandoned, General Simpson emphatically declared that it would be impossible that the siege should be resumed (August 7th).
Signs were not wanting, however, that a crisis was at hand.
Throughout July the daily losses sustained by the Russians from the ordinary fire of the Allies had averaged 250; whilst in the bombardment of the preceding month the enemy had lost from 1500 to 2000 a day.
A desperate effort to raise the siege might therefore be expected.
Accordingly, on August 15th it became known to the Home Government that Prince Gortschakoff had received orders from St. Petersburg to take the offensive at all costs, and on the following morning was fought the battle of the Tchernaya, in which French and Sardinian forces brilliantly repulsed the attack of a powerful Russian field army.
Owing to the failure of this attack, the sortie which was to have accompanied it did not take place. Still the end was not yet, and on August 25th Simpson writes that a further attack is daily expected. In the meantime our advanced works before Sebastopol were being strengthened and improved under the greatest difficulties, and at a cost of on an average sixty casualties to the twenty-four hours. At the same time deaths from cholera in Camp averaged from twenty to thirty a-day. Foreign levies and an Army Works Corps were on their way from England to the seat of the war.
August 1, 1855.
I return herewith the plans of the new barracks, which the Queen has signed. All the alterations appear judicious, and I hope that the plans for Cavalry and Artillery will follow soon.
August 1, 1855.
The Queen wishes me to acknowledge the receipt of your letter enclosing the mails of the 17th from the Crimea, and to answer that received this morning, which conveys an account of your last meeting with your colleagues, and transmits a copy of your letter to General Torrens written in consequence thereof.
Suggested arrangements in view of Omar Pasha's withdrawal from before Sebastopol.
It had also struck the Queen that, however inconvenient and even dangerous to our position in the Crimea Omar Pasha's proposed withdrawal might be, there is much weight in what he says with regard to Asia Minor. He is very likely the only person who could arrest the progress of the Russian Army in that quarter, and his landing in the rear of it with 25-30,000 men seems the most likely mode to succeed. The importance of checking the Russians in Asia Minor neither can be overrated, whether we contemplate the state of the war or future peace.
The Queen was therefore pleased with the result of your deliberations and the decision that General Vivian should relieve Omar Pasha. This will have the further advantage of diminishing the number of commanders, as General Vivian can be ordered to do what Omar Pasha had to be begged to consider.
The Queen wishes it to be considered, however, who is to command the 15,000 or 18,000 Turks to be left before Sebastopol? There is great reason to fear that they will fall under the French command or belong to nobody, and will perish like the former Turkish auxiliaries from the same cause. Now, if General Vivian joined our Army before Sebastopol, and the Turks under a distinct commander of their own were concentrated at Eupatoria, we should have a united Army of 50,000 men under one head, and with the Sardinians, 65,000. The position of our Commander, both towards the Sardinians and the French, would be much improved, as well as our military prospects. He need then not be afraid of being left in the lurch by anybody, and would be more considerately treated by General Pélissier.
The Queen considers this as of the greatest importance. The 6000 men (Turks) at Kertch would remain, of course, as suggested.
The second question of vital importance is that about the position of the siege. General Simpson's report comes after the ominous words of Lord Raglan: ‘The Army cannot pass through a second winter in the trenches!’
Contemplates the prospect of having to abandon the trenches.
That a certain military disgrace attaches to leaving the trenches cannot be denied, but this lies merely in the public acknowledgment of the fact that you cannot take the fortress; the fact itself will, however, not be altered by not being acknowledged, and probably the sacrifice of a whole army merely in order not to acknowledge the fact, that the trenches have become useless, would be both folly and wickedness. What is the state of the case?
The French have sapped up to the Bastion du Mât and the Bastion Central, the two salients of the right line of defence, and are within 60 and 80 yards respectively of these two points since three months, therefore have got as far as trenches will carry them, but think it inexpedient (some say impossible) to storm! We have approached the Redan so near with our trenches that every night costs us some twenty men killed and wounded, and Sir H. Jones declares that it will be unsafe to renew the assault on that work! The French must ere this have got as near to the Malakoff as sapping can be carried, and every day's delay in the assault will diminish the chance.
Urges costliness and futility of holding trenches through the winter.
When all this is done, which we may suppose is the case now, and the works are not taken, what possible hope of success can we attach to our holding the trenches? Will their being held weaken the place? Will it not get stronger rather every day, whilst we have got to the utmost limit of our means of attack. Suppose we held them the whole winter at the expense of another 20,000 lives, how would that better our position for war or peace next spring?
Bombardment considered as an alternative.
It is clear, then, that some other measure must be resorted to, to reduce the place. Possibly bombarding it may be the way. It is not likely (in my opinion) that it will do more than destroy houses and lives, which latter the Russians will replace as they have the means of doing, but we must consider it as a possible way to success.
Now, you say, the 200 mortars will leave England at the end of August. It is not probable therefore that the bombardment can begin before October, always supposing everything to go on smoothly with us in the meantime. If at the end of October we find the bombardment not to have answered, in what a helpless condition shall we be! Exactly where we were last year at the same period.
Anxiety for coming winter.
It must be argued therefore that the next few days will decide whether trenches will take Sebastopol, and if it be proved that they do not, immediate steps will have to be taken to change the plan of campaign, to place our troops in safety for the coming winter.
What plan next to be resorted to.
WHAT is to be done is another question, which cannot be solved until the first decision is come to, and the Queen thinks the Cabinet will do well not to come to the first decision without some professional advice.
Lord Hardinge ought to be heard, and together with him Sir John Burgoyne, Sir George Brown, and Sir John Pennefather, all three perfectly conversant with every inch of the ground, and every military consideration.
The Queen wishes you to circulate this letter amongst those of your colleagues who assembled for the late discussion. 1
OSBORNE, August 1, 1855.
The Queen returns this most interesting letter with her best thanks.
Admiral H. Stewart 2 must be a most able man, with great good sense and sound judgment.
Medals.
The neglect about the medals is very annoying.
Her Majesty's impression of her visit to the Military Hospital at Portsmouth.
The Queen saw many, many sad cases in the Military Hospital at Portsmouth yesterday, almost all sufferers from that cruel trench-work — consumption, dysentery, rheumatism, paralysis, frost-bites of the most awful kind — many whose future lives will be those of cripples and wretched sufferers — some whose prospects must be those of another and a better world, where their devotion to their Queen and country will meet with its everlasting reward! It was a deeply affecting sight. The Queen was truly gratified to see them so comfortable, the wards, etc., airy and so well attended to, though the space is small.
Discomforts of transport ships.
The Queen would wish Lord Panmure to mention to Sir C. Wood that she heard with deep regret that the officers and men who came home in the Hansa transport on Saturday, several of whom she saw yesterday, say that they met with great discomfort and ill-usage on board, and she hears that this has been the case with several of the transports, the captains being so unfeeling and regardless of all comfort to the poor sick and wounded, to whom, under all circumstances, a long voyage must be very trying.
OSBORNE, August 2, 1855.
The Queen finds that the unsigned letter was by mistake left out of the box in which Admiral H. Stewart's letter was sent.
She takes this opportunity of saying that she thinks Admiral Stewart's suggestion, of a regiment or two being made over to the Admiral for diversions, of the greatest importance, and hopes it will receive the attention of the Government.
HOUSE OF COMMONS, August 2, 1855.
Suggests representations to the Emperor regarding proposed movements of Turkish troops at seat of war.
As Walewski 3 and the Emperor both object, we cannot well telegraph to Stratford and Simpson without further communication with the French Government. I think we might explain to them that the effect of our proposal would be to allow Omar to go to Asia, taking with him such portion of his force as would leave at Yenikale and at Balaclava the same amount of Turks as at present are there; for we might send Vivian to Balaclava, and his force and what Omar would leave there would, when put together, make up the same amount of Turkish force as that which is now there. We might press on the French Government the calamitous effect of a successful occupation of Asia Minor by the Russians, and the consideration that, after all, the Turkish Government have a full right to send their own General and their own troops to defend any part of their territory which may be in danger.
WAR DEPARTMENT, August 2, 1855.
I have sent my opinion to Clarendon with your paper on the Prince's letter — that we should immediately telegraph to Constantinople to give Omar his head, on the terms of Stratford's despatch read to us yesterday. We cannot wait for the French, with whom the arrangement in no ways interferes as [ ] 4 from before Sebastopol.
You have on a separate sheet some notes as to the Army. A compliment to Peto 5 will do good.
Read the enclosed, and, if you agree with Palmerston, as I do, you will telegraph as he proposes.
As to desirability of working smoothly with the French Government in regard to Asia Minor.
. . . We should be very careful how we give the French Government a ground for complaint that we give orders without their knowledge, or rather against their opinion, and particularly in a matter concerning Asia Minor, where they think we have an interest totally apart from theirs. . . .
PICCADILLY, August 3, 1855.
Remarks on the share of siege-labours borne by the Allies respectively.
Your answer is excellent. You might perhaps add that when the two armies landed, their numbers being equal, the siege line was equally divided between them. That this equal division lasted during the severest part of the winter, although in the meantime the French numbers had greatly increased. That the effect of this disproportion was great distress and suffering among our troops, and thus, so far from our not having borne our share of the siege labour, we had for many of the worst months an undue proportion.
Torrens might confidentially say to Vaillant that our Camp has, by the good regulations and great exertions of our Civil Sanitary Commissioners, been brought to an exemplary state of cleanliness, order, and health, that we are told the French Camp is in a very different condition, and that probably the great sickness in it arises in great degree for want of such arrangements.
OSBORNE, August 3, 1855.
Secretarial assistance for Simpson.
The Queen has this morning received Lord Panmure's letter enclosing the copy of General Simpson's, which is much more cheerful. But he must have assistance in his correspondence; it is that which he complains of in every letter, and he will break down if he is not assisted. Lord Panmure has not answered the Queen with respect to the Chef de Chancellerie Diplomatique. She again strongly urges the expediency of adopting some such plan. It is not the military part of his office which seems to depress and oppress General Simpson, but the writing. The Queen hopes that Major Claremont will return to the Crimea as soon as possible. When is he expected here? The Queen would wish much to see him when he comes.
The Queen rejoices to hear that 12,000 medals have sailed. She wishes that those for the poor sick at Portsmouth should be sent soon, as she fears else many will never receive them, and she is certain many a death-bed would be cheered by this reward for all their sufferings!
If the Queen's visit to Shorncliffe is to take place at all, it must be next week, about Wednesday or Thursday.
Private.
CRIMEA, August 4, 1855.
I now reply to your letter of the 20th ultimo. I must first thank your Lordship for the kind and frank manner in which you write to me, and I beg to assure you that to whatever points you require my attention, whether or not they may have been overlooked by me, I shall always value your remarks upon them, and will receive them in the same kindly spirit as that by which they are dictated.
Simpson on his own position and its difficulties.
I am glad that at length all doubts are ended as to my being confirmed in the command, because I have now only one fixed object before me — that of carrying it on to the best of my ability, and I cannot be otherwise but proud and gratified with the high position I hold, and with the confidence reposed in me. But I am equally sensible and deeply impressed at the difficulties surrounding me. They are of no small magnitude! I am also much grieved by the daily diminution of my best officers — this last week England has gone; Dacres and Warde of the Artillery also gone, both so shaken that I hardly expect them to return. In my own family, too, Stephenson will not be able to take up his appointment; Vico's successor, a very nice fellow, Colonel de Luslian, also gone to sea very ill; the Sardinian Attaché ditto — in short, I am much crippled, and my head servant, Keddie, whom your lordship must recollect, is ill with fever, and does not recover. These things are not agreeable around one who requires much aid in the daily business; and but for Colonel Steele, 6 who is come back quite well, I should break down altogether. He remains until I can judge whether Stephenson will ever be able to assume the duty. I have my doubts, for when a man becomes sick here, he rarely gets well without leaving the country.
You have sent a very useful man to me as Interpreter, Mr. Lauder; and I hope Mr. Jackson will prove equal to the chief management of that department. 7
Russian spies in Camp.
The Russian system I believe to be very perfect, and that they have spies all through our Camp, and even in our regiments.
I have considered the subject of our mails twice a-week and recommend no change, for if there should be only one a-week, it would be in my opinion worse than at present. Either the writing or the outdoor duty must be neglected, and I must just manage to act as is best.
Looking ahead to next winter.
I am glad you are forecasting for our winter residence. I look on it with anxiety, because I foresee not only difficulty but danger, because the conformation of the ground we now occupy renders it difficult of defence when our trenches shall no longer be occupied. Our Cavalry is already close to Balaclava, our Artillery horses are with their Divisions all over the Camp. Three months only are now before us! The Army Works Corps has not yet been announced in our waters. I am well pleased to learn for certain that the extra sixpence is to be granted, though I fear it will not tend to diminish the prevalent drunkenness, which I am sorry to say is much on the increase. I am not afraid of our water failing, being persuaded that there is plenty of water under our feet in various localities not yet examined or tapped. There is also at intervals very heavy rain, which replenishes our springs. I am very glad to hear that Sir George Brown and Pennefather are better. Both are losses to us. . . .
Lord William Paulet does not return. I regret his leaving Scutari, where he has done so much. He goes home on leave. Sir George Maclean seems a clever Commissary, with more enlarged views than Filder. There is much to be attended to in that way. Our stores are far from what they ought to be.
Apprehensions as to the railroad.
I have ordered General Jones and a Board to examine the railroad, because I have my own opinion about it, and am certain that much of it will in winter sink in the mud. No one who has not seen this country in the winter can form the smallest idea of it.
The Emperor's 15,000 men will fill up the enormous losses of our Allies, and his mortars, were they now here, would do good service. Our 13-inch shells are very low — a constant and large supply should be sent continually.
His own pay.
I am very much obliged to your Lordship for making me a General. . . . Now, I am amply paid, and have, in fact, more pay than I care about or deserve. A sketch-plan of the whole attack shall be sent to you without delay, or rather as changes occur, as the plans sent last Saturday contain everything up to the present moment.
Private.
August 4, 1855.
MY DEAR SIMPSON, — Since I last wrote you many important matters have presented themselves, and in them I have much pleasure in recognising your prudence and forethought for the Army and for the mutual character of its Commander and the Minister of War. Whether we winter in the lines or not, for such an event I have been making all due preparation, and I think I have got huts, stores, forage, and warm clothing well advanced. Your last telegraph for tents surprised me, and I have asked for an explanation, as you surely do not calculate upon the hutting you have already, or you have burnt it to boil your porridge!
Abandonment of direct attack on Redan.
I shall notice officially your abandonment of the direct attack on the Redan, and Sir Harry Jones' proposal to enter by the valley. This is quite right even to an unmilitary eye, and I am glad you have boldly adopted it, and that the French engineers have come into the view of ours. The key to the outer town is Malakoff, and as soon as it falls things will go far smoother. You were all right in refusing to permit Omar Pasha to leave your lines with the forces, and to carry with him to Kars the garrison of Kertch. I cannot conceive how, with his soldier's eye, he could have expected for a moment that you and Pélissier could concur in such a proposition.
Difficulties brought about by Pélissier's treatment of Omar.
My notion is that both he and his Commissioner, Colonel Simmons, are anxious for independent action somewhere, and perhaps somewhat impatient of the hauteur and marked indifference with which Pélissier treats him. This I have endeavoured to remedy by a private hint to Paris, as well as to secure more openness on Pélissier's part to yourself. Omar's visit to Constantinople has had good effect, because the Government there have proposed a plan by which Kars may be relieved, while no troops are taken from before Sebastopol or from Yenikale. They wish now to detach a force from Eupatoria, which we should replace by Vivian's Contingent, and perhaps Beatson's Horse, if they can be trusted. You seem to have the same pious horror of them as your predecessor, and as I entirely sympathise in your feelings, I will stand between you and them.
Necessary to preserve Turkey's Asiatic territory from Russia.
It is absolutely necessary to preserve the Asiatic territories of the Porte from Russian hands, because their possession would give to Russia a material guarantee for peace — something which she had captured with her bow and spear, and which she would be able to offer as a quid pro quo when the period for negotiating returns.
Reinforcements being sent out.
I am sending you a large bombarding establishment to sweep the town from the face of the earth. The Emperor's plan of a bombardment on a gigantic scale sounds well, and if we have only ammunition and cannoniers to work it, we may shell them out. You have done quite right in reconnoitring the heights of Balaclava in case of the worst. I am assured from Paris that no inducement will make the French raise the siege for a day! You will have a fine brigade of 2000 Germans under Brigadier-General Woolridge leave this [country?] in a fortnight. The Queen inspects them on Thursday. In ten days after, the Swiss regiment goes to you 1200 strong. The 56th, 800 strong, has sailed. You had better add the German Brigade to your Light Division, but keep them and the Swiss separate. The latter perhaps might fraternise with the Highlanders. . . . I hope the gout is keeping off. Our Session closes in a few days, and though I shall get no holiday, still I shall have more time to look about me and to see to your winter comforts.
August 4, 1855.
Suggests hiring German drivers.
Hearing that the chief difficulty met with by the Land Transport Service is the want of good drivers, I cannot help suggesting that an attempt should be made to get them from Germany, where the pay you offer would give you an abundant supply, and of the best description. As these people would not be enlisted as soldiers, but merely hired for their labour, none of the laws against foreign enlistment would apply to them. They might be got by the intervention of our Consuls, and ought not to be mixed up with the recruiting, in order to meet with no obstruction on the part of the Government.
OSBORNE, August 5, 1855.
Visit to Shorncliffe.
The Queen has received Lord Panmure's letter of last night respecting Shorncliffe. She finds that it will be quite impossible for her to go both there and to Dover (as she returns the same evening to Osborne), and she thinks, therefore, that it would be best for her to go to Shorncliffe, and to arrange that the Swiss should march there for the Queen to inspect them there also. The Queen would go by railroad to Folkestone, and from thence drive to Shorncliffe. Thursday would do quite well.
The Swiss troops could be moved by railway easily, the Queen concludes.
Private.
CRIMEA, August 7, 1855.
I have your private note of July 23rd. It is short, and so must mine be now, having nothing new to report.
We are to have a Council of Generals and Admirals to-morrow, and I fully expect some immediate measures will be determined upon, which I will report by telegraph to-morrow. . . .
We are by no means idle as regards the destruction of the buildings in the town, but I am nervous about our shells running short. There ought to be a continued supply; and of 13-inch mortars, too, as far as 150 beyond the 50 now expected. This is most essential.
Regret at prospect of Omar's departure.
I regret to see by telegraphic message that Omar Pasha is to leave us. This may give cause of regret some day. Any troops of his that may remain with us will not be of much use, for I know no other Pasha worth his salt.
General Barnard has not been with a Division since I put him in Orders on the 2nd ultimo as Chief of the Staff. This distribution into six Divisions has caused much vexation and trouble, and we have not men enough to form Divisions to satisfy the Generals, or the daily duty done by Divisions.
PS. — I wish it were possible to have a fourth battalion of the Guards here — one of the battalions of the Grenadier regiment. This would make a second Brigade to the Division of Guards, which I cannot at this moment make up from the Line, and it would put an end to all difficulty in making this new distribution with twelve Brigades.
As to winter plans.
I wish, my Lord, that you would consult Sir John Burgoyne, who knows our ground so well, as to his ideas of the best line if we fall back for the winter.
The writer's unreserved expression of his feelings.
I do not consider this Plateau defensible, and it will be for the two Governments at home to decide on the best mode of occupation for the winter. One thing must not be lost sight of, viz. if Sebastopol holds out, and we abandon our trenches, the siege never can be resumed, and our occupation here is gone.
HOUSE OF COMMONS, August 7, 1855.
Lord Dundonald's scheme.
I agree with you that if Dundonald will go out himself to superintend and direct the execution of his scheme, we ought to accept his offer and try his plan. If it succeeds, it will, as you say, save a great number of English and French lives; if it fails in his hands, we shall be exempt from blame, and if we come in for a small share of the ridicule, we can bear it, and the greater part will fall on him. You had best, therefore, make arrangements with him without delay, and with as much secrecy as the nature of things will admit of.
BRIEF PRELIMINARY OBSERVATIONS
Scheme for utilising the properties of sulphur in warfare.
It was observed when viewing the Sulphur Kilns, in July in 1811, that the fumes which escaped in the rude process of extracting the material, though first elevated by heat, soon fell to the ground, destroying all vegetation, and endangering animal life to a great distance, as it was asserted that an ordinance existed prohibiting persons from sleeping within the distance of three miles during the melting season.
An application of these facts was immediately made to Military and Naval purposes, and after mature consideration, a Memorial was presented on the subject to His Royal Highness the Prince Regent on the 12th of April 1812, who was graciously pleased to lay it before a Commission, consisting of Lord Keith, Lord Exmouth, and General and Colonel Congreve (afterwards Sir William), by whom a favourable report having been given, His Royal Highness was pleased to order that secrecy should be maintained by all parties.
(Signed) DUNDONALD.
August 7, 1855.
MEMORANDUM
Materials required for putting said scheme into practice.
Materials required for the expulsion of the Russians from Sebastopol:—
Experimental trials have shown that about five parts of coke effectually vaporise one part of sulphur.
Mixtures for land service, where weight is of importance, may, however, probably be suggested by Professor Faraday, as to operations on shore I have paid little attention.
Four or five hundred tons of sulphur and two thousand tons of coke would be sufficient.
Besides these materials, it would be necessary to have, say, as much bituminous coal, and a couple of thousand barrels of gas or other tar, for the purpose of masking fortifications to be attacked, or others that flank the assailing positions.
A quantity of dry firewood, chips, shavings, straw, hay, or other such combustible materials, would also be requisite quickly to kindle the fires, which ought to be kept in readiness for the first favourable and steady breeze.
DUNDONALD.
August 7, 1855.
Note. — The objects to be accomplished being specially stated, the responsibility of their accomplishment ought to rest on those who direct their execution.
Smoking out the Russians.
Suppose that the Malakoff and Redan are the objects to be assailed, it might be judicious merely to obscure the Redan (by the smoke of coal and tar kindled in ‘The Quarries’), so that it could not annoy the Mamelon, where the sulphur fire would be placed to expel the garrison from the Malakoff, which ought to have all the cannon that can be turned towards its ramparts employed in overthrowing its undefended ramparts.
There is no doubt but that the fumes will envelop all the defences from the Malakoff to the Barracks, and even to the line-of-battleship, The Twelve Apostles, at anchor in the harbour.
The two outer batteries, on each side of the Port, ought to be smoked, sulphured, and blown down by explosion-vessels, and their destruction completed by a few ships of war anchored under cover of the smoke. 8
(Signed) DUNDONALD.
August 7, 1855.
OSBORNE, August 8, 1855.
Housing of Cavalry horses.
The Queen is very anxious to know what measures have been taken for providing cover for our Cavalry horses in the Crimea?
It was the exposure to the wet and cold which caused us to lose them almost all, and immediate steps should be taken to provide against the recurrence of such a misfortune — as the bad weather commences in October. Should we lose them again, we could not replace them.
The Queen is deeply grieved to see the increase of cholera.
August 4, 1855.
Omar Pasha can go to relieve Kars, provided he does not diminish the Turkish troops before Sebastopol or disturb the garrison at Yenikale.
Desire Vivian to hold himself in readiness to go to Eupatoria with his Turkish Contingent.
OSBORNE, August 10, 1855.
Secret map of military situation.
In the report of siege proceedings which Lord Panmure gave the Queen yesterday morning, Sir H. Jones mentions a map which he says is the only one existing which shows the French attitude as well as ours — we should wish much to see this, but should take care to let no one else see it, or take any tracing of it.
Our journey back yesterday was very rapid and prosperous, and we return much gratified with our visit to Shorncliffe and the fine troops we saw there.
Sir J. Pennefather is with us; the Queen is grieved to see him so infirm in health, but we are both struck with his sound and able views, and deeply regret his being lost to the Army in the Crimea. He will, however, the Queen is sure, be of great use to his country, though no longer in the field.
August 10, 1855.
Promotion of half-pay officers of the Guards.
I send you a copy of a letter I wrote to-day to Lord Hardinge, relative to the promotion of officers on half-pay to be Generals, in conformity with our conversation yesterday.
August 10, 1855.
I return you now the papers you were so good as to send to me. I think that, if the Guards promoted from half-pay are to be considered as entirely put upon the shelf by their promotion, your plan of promoting all who may stand in the way of a Colonel fit to become one of the 234, and this under Lord Panmure's condition, ‘that they shall never receive General's pay,’ quite right. Without such an understanding, however, we would expose the Service to two evils. First, to go beyond the 234 in employing these Generals, if they are to be properly paid when employed; or, secondly, to have General Officers employed, and this (possibly) only on Captain's or Major's half-pay, which would be disgraceful. A plan of employing them, giving them General's pay when employed, and throwing them back upon their old half-pay when their service is completed, would only combine both evils. I don't think they could have regiments even, as the 234 are calculated with reference to the number of regiments available. The arrangement would, in fact, be analogous to the Yellow Admirals in the Navy, with the difference that they would be promoted in a time to full Generals. The regulations of the Warrant would be acted upon, not taking into account at all the Generals with a X before their names. I have sent a copy of this letter also to Lord Panmure.
Private.
CRIMEA, August 11, 1855.
It certainly is possible that, not anticipating my private letters being seen by others than yourself, I may have expressed myself with less reserve than was proper, but I believe that every word I have written to you expressed my real and true feelings at the moment, and I assure you at times there has been sufficient cause of depression here during the last month. . . .
[The body of the letter deals with the circumstances under which certain officers hold their appointments.]
I have not been well lately, and am so weakened by diarrhoea this morning that the doctors have sent me on board ship, and I go to Sir Edmund Lyons in the Royal Albert for a few days' change of air, which it is hoped will put me all to rights again.
PICCADILLY, August 11, 1855.
Inquiry as to M'Neill's report on affairs in the East.
Lord Hotham asks me whether you will have any objection to lay before Parliament the whole or part of the report and evidence received from M'Neill 9 and others as to the matters in the Crimea and at Constantinople which they were sent to inquire into. He thinks it probable that those documents would go to remove part of the bad impressions produced by the evidence and reports of the Sebastopol Committee.
Could you let me know to-day before one o'clock, when the House meets, whether you can do what he wishes?
If so, we might present what are called dummies to the two Houses, and have the papers printed and distributed after prorogation.
PICCADILLY, August 12, 1855.
Character of Beatson's Horse.
I have just been reading Stratford's despatch of the 30th July, with its enclosures about Beatson's Horse, 10 copies of which have been sent to you.
It seems evident from those papers that the great bulk of that Cavalry force is obedient and submissive, that arrests and punishments have been enforced by the officers and men upon delinquent comrades. Consequently it would be unwise to disband them, and to throw away a good Cavalry force which it has cost us much time, trouble, and money to get together. But they are useless at the Dardanelles, and it would be better to remove them from the scene of their partial disorder.
Suggests measures to be adopted in regard to Beatson's Horse.
The best thing to be done, therefore, would be to send them immediately to Eupatoria, to be attached to Vivian's Contingent, and to be there fully armed, equipped, formed, and drilled. They would soon become efficient there, and might at once be employed, in conjunction with the other Cavalry, in intercepting or harassing convoys. I am glad Stratford gave up the intention of disarming the Albanians. To have done so would have required a battle, and it would have been unwise to have attempted it, unless it had been intended to send the survivors to their homes.
August 13, 1855.
Amateurs at the front.
I have not much to write you in a private note. I rejoice to say that our Session rises to-morrow, and we shall have time to look round us undistracted by the thought of what some busybody in the House of Commons will say. You will be inundated doubtless by many amateurs. Be civil to them, but give them no facilities for remaining, and if you could entice them within the reach of shot and shell you might do the State some service.
We are working hard at your hutting, but with the immense quantity of scantling you seem to have at command, I expect you will cover most of your stores and some of your horses. I shall be a close prisoner here till you take the Malakoff! So I hope you will do so before the end of September, and let me away to kill a deer.
I have weathered gout very well, and so far I don't think official life has done me any harm. . . .
Swiss and German Legions.
We sent the foreign levies on Thursday last, and I anticipate that you will get good service from them. The Jägers and 1st German Light Infantry will form a brigade under Colonel Woolridge, who I trust will be attached to the Light Division. You must not put the Germans and Swiss together, but keep them separate. The Swiss are a queer set to handle, but they are true and faithful. They will probably dovetail in with your Highland troops.
Whenever they are ready to sail, which will I trust be soon, I will write you fully as to them and send you returns of their strength.
I am anxious to hear how your investiture came off, and I hope you received Lord Stratford with every honour.
You will rejoice, I have no doubt, that Omar is set at liberty to relieve Kars.
I think that Eupatoria is the best place for Vivian, and as soon as he is ready I will add him to your army, and so we shall be on a more equal footing with the French.
PS. — I find that I have not referred to yours of the 24th July. I am glad that you understand about the Sardinian Contingent, and will not let the French appropriate it in any way.
We are quite satisfied with the explanation of your movement to cover Balaclava, which showed judgment and foresight. How thankful you must be that I don't play on the wires of the telegraph as they do from Paris!
‘Treasonable breaches of discipline.’
You cannot be more disgusted than I with the treasonable breaches of discipline that come from Camp to this country, betraying to the enemy our numbers, position and power, and even sometimes our very purposes and intentions.
It is impossible to check it, I fear. I sent on your letter to the Queen.
Private.
CRIMEA, August 14, 1855.
Your letter of July 13th was left here by Mr. Doyne of the Army Work Corps, but I have not yet seen him, he having only come three days ago. Jones is attending to them, but I am sorry to see him unwell to-day. Airey too has fever — a dead loss to me at this moment — and M'Murdo and Napier are both very ill.
Simpson's commission received.
I received your letter of the 31st July this morning, with my commission, together with a secret packet, containing a commission for my successor should circumstances oblige me to give up the command, but which at present I do not anticipate.
General attack expected.
I could not go on board the Royal Albert last Saturday, as medically ordered, because we had reason to expect a general attack yesterday. It did not take place, but there seems every probability of the enemy attempting to force the Tchernaya, and he will probably make a sortie from Sebastopol at the same moment. Fresh troops have evidently arrived, and a large portion relieved the garrison, or a part of it, yesterday. The consequence is I cannot be absent on board ship, and fortunately my complaint has abated, for I have been comparatively in capital health these three days.
I considered Shumla the best and quietest place for the organisation of the Turkish Contingent, especially as the force was there to be augmented by 10,000 men. That force, go where it may, will be of no use this year, for it takes some time to make soldiers of Turks under our officers. If it comes here, nothing that can possibly be done shall be wanting to assist General Vivian. There is such a press of work by to-day's mail that I must close this letter.
Confidential.
CRIMEA, August 14, 1855.
Simpson's opinion of Codrington, and of the results of his succeeding him.
Since you mentioned that my private notes were read by the Queen and by your colleagues, I am very averse to offer opinions on men and things around me; but your Lordship positively desires my unreserved opinion on the matter of Codrington's selection as my successor. He is, in my belief, the best General here; but I am in full hopes not to be compelled by illness to act on your instructions at the present time of very imminent chance of our being attacked; for you must be aware of the very great disgust that will be occasioned to Bentinck, Campbell, Barnard, and Rokeby, if Codrington is called to the chief command. They will, of course, take the most immediate measures to quit the Army. Codrington's commission is safe in my desk. No human being shall ever see it, so long as I am alive and well, and I promise you, my Lord, to do my work to the best of my ability. I have been very poorly with diarrhoea for these three weeks, and was nearly being condemned to go away last week, but I am all right again, and hope to keep so. . . .
Defends himself against suspicion of despondency.
I would like to add to this confidential note that I am truly sensible of the kind and frank manner in which you give me your sentiments on all points, more especially as regards myself. I think I perceive, however, that any opinion of mine that is not on the bright side is unfavourably looked upon? Now, with the greatest respect, I would merely wish to remark, that, however sanguine a Commander may be of the success of any operation, it is incumbent on him to take every precaution for the safety of his army in case of failure; and if I have to recur to the shifting of our ground from where we now are to a more defensible position for the winter, I really hope your Lordship will look fairly at the case, as myself and every old officer here views it, and not consider me to write despondingly. If Sebastopol beats us, depend upon it, my Lord, everything here must be well weighed and considered beforehand!
A sortie desired.
I only hope, if this expected general attack takes place, the garrison will make a strong sortie, and you may rely upon it we shall be very close on their tails in driving them in, and getting in with them. It was a great disappointment to us all yesterday morning, for we had intimation of an intended attack very worthy of belief. It will happen in my opinion.
I cannot close this without thanking you very sincerely for all your kindness to me, and assuring you of my determination to do justice to your expressions of good opinion of me.
Time is up! and this dreadful writing kills me!
BERLIN, August 15, 1855.
Prince Gortschakoff reported to have been ordered to take the offensive.
I am informed confidentially that a telegraph has been received this day from St. Petersburg stating that orders have been sent to Prince Gortschakoff to take the offensive against the Allies at all cost.
August 16, 1855.
Enclosing Lord Augustus Loftus's telegram.
I send this in case it has not been sent from F.O. You should telegraph it to Simpson, I think.
Old Vaillant 12 is very stout, and says the place must be taken, no matter how many armies are sent.
PY., August 16, 1855.
Recommends sending out a sanitary expert.
This letter from F. O. Ward 13 is worth your reading. The practical conclusion is that it is very desirable that you should send out to the Crimea, in Rawlinson's place, some Civil Engineer who has turned his thoughts to sanitary considerations. Rawlinson himself would probably be able to find one for you.
I cannot but think that health arrangements are not enough attended to in the Camp, as every day's report brings us from twenty to thirty deaths by cholera. This ought not to be if twice a-day visitations of the men in huts, tents, and trenches were practised, and I should strongly recommend that you should write officially to Simpson, first telling him so by telegraph, to inquire whether such visitations are made, and to insist upon their being so. It is also very likely that some regiments are encamped or hutted upon ground known to be unhealthy, and, if so, they ought to be removed without listening to the ‘military considerations’ which officers commanding brigades or divisions may urge.
‘The most important military consideration.’
The most important military consideration is to keep soldiers alive and in good health. As to two fires in each hut, I am afraid that would be carrying sound theory further into practice than means would be found for doing.
It would be a good thing for us to have Pennefather on Tuesday morning and Sir G. Brown, one after the other.
PY., August 16, 1855.
Report of an intended attack by the Russians.
I conclude you have telegraphed to Simpson the report from Petersburg, through Berlin, of an intended attack by the Russians on the Allies.
Recommends vigorous measures to meet the occasion.
Under the probability of such a move, it becomes of urgent importance to get to the Crimea all the transport animals you have in depots in various quarters, and I wish you would take steps for having them sent forthwith to the Crimea, with drivers or without them. At least let the animals be there ready, and the drivers may be coming at the same time or even afterwards. The Commissariat should be told that they must provide adequate supplies of forage, and without delay.
It would also be important to send immediately to Eupatoria Beatson's Cavalry, just as it is, together with all reinforcements coming to it, without waiting to ask and to know who likes or dislikes to have it there; if actions take place and the Russians are worsted, it may become a matter of first-rate importance to have a large Cavalry force at Eupatoria to harass and interrupt communications. Clarendon will send you a despatch from Colonel Neale, 14 showing that several hundred more Cavalry may be had at once from Bulgaria if the objection of the Pasha of the district is overruled, and it seems to me that this reinforcement ought to be insisted upon, and immediately. . . .
Labourers required for the Crimea.
A fresh supply of labourers is urgently required for the Crimea, and orders to Simpson should be sent immediately to set to work to make the necessary roads while the weather is fine.
Suggestion regarding employment of convict labour.
The Prince wrote to me to suggest the employment of convict labour. I have sent his letter to George Grey, 15 with a suggestion, which I also have made to the Prince, that the legal difficulty, arising from our having no lawful power of controlling them out of the Queen's dominions, might perhaps be got over by asking a number of those who have not committed serious offences to volunteer to serve as labourers with the Army, wherever it may be, for one or for two years, on the condition that at the end of that time, if their conduct shall have been good, they should have a free pardon, and a free passage home, with some gratuity to maintain them till they would find employment. Many would no doubt enlist into the Army rather than take their chance of getting employed at home.
August 17, 1855.
The Queen has read the letter and despatches from General Simpson with much interest. He is evidently in better spirits and heart, but the illness of those around him, and of so many of our best officers, is really very serious.
Against granting any but sick leave.
The Queen sees in the papers that several officers — for instance, Lord William Paulet — have received leave to go home ‘on urgent private affairs.’ She must say she thinks that nothing but ill health ought to obtain permission to return home at a moment when every officer who is well is of such paramount importance. Lord Panmure would perhaps observe this to General Simpson.
The telegraphic despatch from Berlin which Lord Panmure will have seen yesterday evening 16 is very important. Nothing could be better than if the Russians took the offensive. They would get a nice reception.
The Queen wishes Lord Panmure to thank General Simpson for his two letters to her. She will write to him shortly.
Private.
CRIMEA, August 18, 1855.
I have heard nothing of Mr. Jackson 17 yet, and will attend to what you tell me on his arriving.
Omar Pasha has not yet returned. Lord Stratford will be here on Tuesday or Wednesday next, and Omar may perhaps come in the same steamer.
Battle of the Tchernaya.
The attempt made by the Russians on the Tchernaya last Thursday 18 was a signal failure. Both French and Sardinians behaved admirably well. I do not think the Russian force could be much under 50,000 men, of which 7000 were Cavalry of very good appearance. Their loss must have been about 5000. The ground was covered with their killed and wounded, and their defeat and flight so rapid that they left their bridges lying by the river-side, as well as the tools, etc., with which they intended to have entrenched themselves.
We were prepared for a strong sortie, which would undoubtedly have taken place had matters gone on favourably with the enemy on the Tchernaya.
I fully expect, from the tenor of your telegraphic information, that another attempt will soon be made by the enemy, and have no doubt of the result.
The Army Works Corps has arrived, but I can give no opinion of them yet.
August 18, 1855.
I have received yours of the 31st, and the same day brought us intelligence of your defeat of Liprandi. 19 It seems to have been a vigorous effort on the part of the enemy, and made evidently in consequence of the instructions, the rumour of which I sent you by telegraph.
I am amazingly pleased to find that both French and Sardinians have done so well, and you will find more confidence now in the safety of your rear while conducting your arduous duties in front. I hope my telegraph to Marmora and the French commander was distinctly passed, as I fear we are liable to blunders. You should make your A.D.C. prove every message before sent, by deciphering it after it is put in cipher, but you need not use the cipher except when you refer to supplies or measurements, as the enemy know facts as well as ourselves. I think you should have one of your Staff devoted to the telegraph, and make him look out for you, and in the night use a discretionary power of rousing you or not. It is better for an A.D.C. to lose a little sleep than that you should be unnecessarily disturbed. . . .
A kindly letter.
Let me now refer to yours of the 4th. I very much appreciate the way in which you receive my letters, for the longer I live the more I feel convinced that half-confidences are detestable, and do more harm than perfect distrust. All I write to you is in a spirit of kindness, and you will never offend me in any way by your replies. Moreover, we are old friends, and have had the advantage of mutual intercourse for a long time now.
Whatever may ensue, it has given me the greatest pleasure to have confirmed you in your position. Our health and strength we none of us here command, and I implicitly rely on your letting your command pass from you whenever you feel incompetent to grapple with its responsibilities. These you do not underrate, and I sympathise with you in the pain which must daily harass you in seeing your officers put hors de combat by disease and worn out by constant toil. You have no idea how a sea-voyage and home revives many, and let me encourage you with the hope of yet seeing not a few of your old friends blooming in England. Brown and Pennefather are on their legs again. . . . I sincerely hope that Stephenson 20 will rally and join you; though I never saw him, I have a high opinion of him. I will send you Claremont again in some capacity or other. I mean to give him a C. B. I am glad you like Mr. Lauder, and I hope Mr. Jackson will suit you.
Secret service money.
I have not mentioned it to you, but I may do so now, that you have my full authority for expending money for useful intelligence; it shall be reimbursed to you for ‘secret service.’
Those infernal Russians are adepts at the system of espionage. I only wish you could lay hold of one of them and hang him up in sight of Sebastopol. I think you decide rightly as to the mail. I merely threw it out as a means of diminishing your work by bringing it to a one day point.
Supplies being sent out.
I am getting on with huts and clothing, and shall have an official at you soon, detailing all preparations and their departure for the seat of war. I don't believe that one-half will be required, but that is not safe ground to work upon. The Army Works Corps has had a long passage, but I trust will soon appear.
I am glad to hear that your supply of water is so secure. Nobody seems to grudge Pakenham his promotion, and his merits are fully admitted. You have no doubt grumblers in Camp, perhaps more than we have here. You are all right about Horn. 21 You need not regret Lord William Paulet leaving Scutari, as you have a much better man in his place. Sir G. M'Lean is a fine jolly fellow in appearance, and I hope you will not spare him till he puts your supplies beyond fear of failure. The railway must be looked to. I am sending you material for another line, and will try and keep it going as far as we can.
The Queen has desired me to thank you for your letters, to which Her Majesty will reply at her leisure. I expect every moment to hear of your bombardment.
SCUTARI HOSPITAL, August 19, 1855.
I am very grateful for your kind letter. That you should think of me and my health in the midst of this painful and pressing war must, indeed, surprise and please me.
I am well enough now, thank you a thousand times for your kind thought, to remain at my duties for another winter, if the war keep us here so long and my attentive medical adviser, Dr. Sutherland, sanctions my doing so. I have no one now to leave in my place, and could hardly therefore desert it, except I were compelled.
You will, I am sure, be glad to hear that these hospitals, in what regards material and all that depends on the War Office, are worthy of England. As to the personnel, I will not venture to intrude my opinion upon Lord Panmure, whom I know only from his kindness.
I may perhaps venture to say that I hope our Purveyor-in-Chief, Mr. Robertson, will be supported from home, and have his supply of men and things continued to him. Efficient clerks and plentiful stores. He has already done much for us. The physically deteriorating effect of Scutari air has been much discussed. The morally deteriorating influence exercised by the atmosphere is much more remarkable. The first may be doubted. The men sent down in the winter died because they were not sent down till half dead — the men sent down now live and recover, because they are sent in time. But the second, the mental exhaustion of our officials here, is beyond any doubt, nor does it appear to vary with the season of the year.
Would it be too much presuming on Lord Panmure's patience to mention the disproportionate number of patients, especially from pulmonary disease, which comes to us from the Artillery — inevitable perhaps during a siege, where practised men must be upon severe duty? But it has been said by officers who may be esteemed authority in the matter, that the duty is unnecessarily severe; that some inferior functions might be discharged by other men now less hardly worked; that men of the Horse Artillery might now assist, and that it is bad economy to kill men with hard duty, whom every day makes more valuable, because they cannot be replaced.
May I add that, had our troops had a dress for working in the trenches last winter, and had they been hutted, much of the destruction which we have witnessed would not have taken place? Doubtless ample preparations have already been made by Government for supplying both these wants next winter, should we remain the winter before Sebastopol. But I am told that, though there are huts at Balaclava, they take forty horses to take each up to Sebastopol, the railroad being preoccupied by the Commissariat necessities, and the huts therefore remain at Balaclava. A light waterproof dress would be desirable for the trenches. The men's boots, though waterproof, are heavy. And the hands should be guaranteed like the feet. It is not the cold but the wet which kills.
Again entreating Lord Panmure's pardon for taking up his attention with affairs not strictly belonging to the department of a Nurse, but upon which he can obtain information from those really competent to give it, and again thanking him for his kindness, etc.
Private.
August 20, 1855.
I have not much to say to you, but will not let the mail go without a few lines.
The action on the Tchernaya has been most severe for the Russians, and I strongly suspect that they are hard up when they come out and fight at such disadvantage.
You are to have a Council of War, and I hope to hear some definite [plan] is adopted. I trust you assert your proper place in these Councils, and do not let Pélissier have all his own way.
Sir E. Lyons.
You cannot have better advice than from Lyons, and I advise you, between ourselves, to rely much on him. His knowledge of the French language, character, and feeling is undeniable, and his talent for diplomacy is such as to render him a safe counsellor. I am glad to hear that you have been destroying the buildings in the town, and will do my best to supply you with ‘bonbons’ to pelt them with.
Omar going to Asia.
Omar is bent on going to Asia, and you cannot be surprised at it. It is of vital importance to Turkey to preserve that portion of her dominions from the enemy's clutches, and he could be of no use to you where his army is now, unless you contemplate a movement into the field. . . . You will have the 56th and 82nd to add to your force and some 3000 foreign levies immediately. I have sent for Hardinge, and I see no difficulty in giving you a fourth battalion of Guards. I will consult Sir J. Burgoyne, as you wish, tomorrow when we hold our Council of War.
I anticipate considerable changes in three weeks after this battle. Do not spare your ‘Intelligence’ 22 for lack of a little money.
Private.
CRIMEA, August 21, 1855.
Your note of the 4th inst. was delivered to me the other day by Mr. Jackson. . . .
Protest against employing Beatson's Horse.
This morning I have your short note of the 6th inst. I am very sorry to learn that, in spite of what is stated in your letter of the 4th instant of your intention to stand between me and Beatson's Horse, they are actually to be sent to Eupatoria! It will be considered a disgrace to us to have such ruffians in our pay, and I can only protest against having anything to do with them. They will be found a set of marauders, setting all order and discipline at defiance, and Beatson will be an independent leader so long as his band will abstain from murdering him. I feel truly ashamed of our retaining such plunderers in British pay, and have already stated my decided wish to have nothing whatever to do with them, certain as I am that they will bring disgrace upon us. General Vivian's people will be good for little or nothing till next year, and if Eupatoria is to be left to theirs and the Bashi-bazouk's care, something unfortunate will assuredly be the consequence.
I begin to be very uneasy about thirteen-inch shells; all we have left could be fired away to-night. The consequences of such a dearth may prove most serious.
Excuse such a hasty note, but I have been up all night, and on horseback since three in the morning, in hopes of a large sortie, the town being crowded with troops last night.
ST. CLOUD, August 22, 1855.
The Queen has to thank for two letters of Lord Panmure's.
She quite coincides in the propriety of withholding a 4th battalion of the Guards from General Simpson. She does not think that a monument at home would at all be the same thing as one erected on the spot where those brave men lie interred.
PICCADILLY, August 25, 1855.
It was late when I received back the box with your answer about the Polish Corps, and I sent it at once to Hammond, 23 that he might forward our Memorandum to Paris; but, on thinking the matter over, I would wish to suggest to you the following considerations.
Vivian's Contingent is not to be looked at as a separate army, but as a part of the British Army, intended to act in conjunction with the rest of the British forces, though for the moment placed separately at Eupatoria.
British inferiority to Russians in Cavalry.
Now the British Army, including in that term the purely British troops, the Turkish Contingent, the Germans, Swiss, and Italians, is and will be miserably deficient in Cavalry — an arm, be it remembered, in which the Russians are peculiarly strong, not only by means of their regular Cavalry, which is very numerous, but by means of their swarms of Cossacks, and the twenty or thirty Cavalry regiments in their military colonies in the south. If, after Sebastopol is taken, we have to act in the open country either in the Crimea or in Georgia, we shall sensibly feel our inferiority in Cavalry. Our British Horse do not exceed the wretchedly small number of about 2300, and we cannot greatly increase the number of that force without great expense and much time.
Considerations in favour of accepting services of Polish Cavalry.
The Cavalry of the Contingent and Beatson's Irregulars are so much gained, but of materials the value of which is yet to be tested. Surely if we have the offer of 2000 or 3000 good Polish Cavalry, it would be very unwise to refuse such an offer. To reinforce our Cavalry by an equal amount from home would hardly be done in any moderate time, and would cost us infinitely more money.
So strong, if you remember, was our sense of the importance of adding greatly and rapidly and locally to our Cavalry force that the people we have sent to Circassia were to try to get 10,000 of the Circassians as Cavalry; but these Poles are surely worth two or three times their number of Circassians whom we have not got, and may never get. I am therefore strongly for accepting the offer, and if, on thinking these considerations over, you should concur, I would telegraph to Clarendon to-morrow to authorise him to accept.
There can be no doubt that politically the taking this corps into our service would be very advantageous.
Private.
WAR DEPARTMENT, August 25, 1855.
I have only a moment to write you a few lines and no more.
You will find 24 a better man to organise anything than Paulet, but he may not be equally good to command. He is yet to be tried. I hope all your Brigadiers are to your mind now, and your machinery working sweetly.
Sir Colin Campbell.
I hear that Sir C. Campbell has had some hot words with Barnard. I have an idea that Sir C. is a fiery-tempered fellow. I wish you would sound him as to accepting the command at Malta. This will clear the way for Codrington. I have an idea that Barnard will by-and-by do better with a Division than as Head of the Staff. To show that I have no personal feeling whatever against Sir R. Airey, I would willingly see him Chief of the Staff if Barnard went to a Division. In such a case, you would require a new Q.M.-General, and you should have a young one. You would find such a one in Wetherall, now with Vivian's Contingent.
These are changes over which you can think. Take care of yourself, and only aid in reducing Malakoff and I shall put you in your place among the Cordons Rouges.
I will write you again on Monday.
Private.
CRIMEA, August 25, 1855.
Your private letter of the 11th is now before me, but there is nothing calling for observation or reply in it.
Anticipates an attempt to raise the siege.
We expect an attack every day, as our information all confirms the design of the enemy to attempt to raise the siege. It is rather embarrassing with our small force to determine how to employ it to the best account, having our trenches at one end of the line and Balaclava at the other, some five or six miles between. I felt so sure that the enemy would advance on the Balaclava side this morning that I sent Sir Colin Campbell and a Highland Brigade away from trench duty last night, in order to take up a position in second line to the Turks covering Balaclava.
Apprehensions for safety of Balaclava.
I am somewhat nervous as to the safety of that place! and it is not possible for me to take more from our trenches than these four regiments under Sir Colin. We may always expect a sortie, especially when attacked on the Balaclava side. The enemy has very nearly completed his bridge across the harbour — a splendid work — portending mischief.
The sickness of the officers is very annoying to me. Airey is on board ship, Jones has fever and is in bed, M'Murdo still ill and on board ship.
Lord Stratford de Redcliffe arrived at Kamiesh last night, and we shall have the Investiture ceremony on Monday.
Regrets non-participation of French Generals in English honours.
I much regret the French Generals not participating in our honours! It would have been most pleasing to them, and would have increased and cemented the friendship arising between me and them. There are some remarkably nice fellows among them, and I cannot say how much I regret their exclusion from all participation in the honours bestowed on our Generals on this public occasion. 25
Private.
August 27, 1855.
Many thanks for your two letters this morning. I am glad to hear that you are recovered and so much in heart as your writing betokens. Your opinion of Codrington coincides exactly with what we hear of him from all quarters, and I feel considerably at ease in the knowledge that you are empowered to place him in command. I regret very much to hear of General Jones being unwell, as also Airey, M'Murdo, and Napier. From your not mentioning them in your telegraph, I trust they are all better. I think the ‘scent’ of the battle has proved excellent medicine to yourself, and I regret as much as you can do that they did not come out on the 16th, 26 when they came on against the position on the Tchernaya. I hear that it was a deserter from the 23rd that stopped them.
How deserters are to be dealt with.
By the way, you should send me regular returns of such scoundrels, and I'll post them up in their parishes to be execrated by all loyal men.
I must earnestly draw your attention to the importance of storehouses for the cargoes arriving in Balaclava harbour. Your comfort depends on it. No matter how rough they are, if only weather-proof for perishable stores.
I shall not send your confidential notes to any one, so that, when you have any wish to write for my own eye alone, you can do so, as you have very properly done by this mail.
My object is to act with you as a friend as well as to direct you as a Minister.
I think, if we can get Sir C. Campbell to Malta, that it would not very much injure your army if Bentinck and Rokeby should leave you. I should be sorry to see Barnard do so foolish an act as to take huff at Codrington's promotion. . . .
You will be sorry to see that poor Torrens 27 is dead. He has not long enjoyed his honours, poor fellow!
I am quite at one with you as to the necessity of a General looking to the worst in whatever situation he may be placed, so pray don't alter your tone now that I have the key to it.
In the event of a sortie.
If these fellows do make a sortie in force, and you can be so prepared as to follow them in force, it will be a most gallant mode of carrying the place. You must keep a sharp look-out in dark nights, especially when the rain drives in your face from the town. I hope you have plenty of white lights to burn on emergencies.
August 27, 1855.
Lord Panmure presents his humble duty to Your Majesty, and trusts that the enclosed despatches will reach Your Majesty after a safe and prosperous voyage from Boulogne.
General Simpson writes in better spirits as to himself, and Lord Panmure feels easy now that he has in his possession Your Majesty's commission to Major-General Sir W. Codrington.
Lord Panmure feels a strong conviction of General Simpson's conscientious integrity, and that he will retain the command of the Army no longer than he finds himself fully able for it.
Lord Panmure regrets to inform Your Majesty that cholera has invaded the camp at Shorncliffe. Immediate steps have been taken to arrest its progress, and with great success. Two thousand have been encamped about three miles distant, and exhibited on the occasion surprising aptitude in pitching their tents and in the duties of a camp.
Lord Panmure takes this opportunity of soliciting Your Majesty's permission to dispense with General Pennefather's attendance for investiture, his health being unequal to the task.
Recommends enrolment of two new regiments.
Lord Panmure has the honour likewise to inform Your Majesty that, subject to Your Majesty's gracious approval, the Cabinet have concurred with him in advising Your Majesty to permit an addition to the establishment of the Army of two new regiments, to be numbered 100 and 101 and designated ‘The British North American.’ Should Your Majesty approve of this proposal, Lord Panmure will intimate it to the Commander-in-Chief, who will submit to Your Majesty the details of organisation in the usual manner.
Private.
CRIMEA, August 28, 1855.
I reply to your note of the 13th instant. There is little going on since my last. We have had several disappointments of the enemy attacking us. I suspect they are waiting for the arrival of The Guard, the whole of it not yet having come down.
Completion of bridge over the harbour of Sebastopol.
The bridge was finished the night before last, and is now in full use. Our casualties are great, amounting now to an average of sixty every twenty-four hours.
I am glad to hear such good accounts of the Foreign Legion, and shall be glad to see them.
The Investiture.
The Investiture came off yesterday, and I don't think anything could have been better done. I have every hope that Lord Stratford de Redcliffe is well satisfied with all the honours done him, and in my opinion he performed his own part very well and with great dignity. My only regret, and it is very great, is that the occasion was lost in conferring these honours on our Allies along with our own Generals. Pélissier, Bosquet, Bruat, Martimprez, La Salle, Thierry, Niel, and several others were present at the ceremony, in which I sincerely wish they had taken a part. The thought of Omar Pasha having been invested, with all possible éclat, and these French Generals who have fought along with ours not so honoured, must have occurred to every one present. Omar has not made his appearance yet.
I trust there will be no hesitation in permitting this railway to the Sardinian position? It will be a great point for them and for the Service generally.
Illness of leading officers.
I have only to add to this note that all my leading officers are one after the other falling sick, and it is not easy to supply the places of some of them. Sir Harry Jones is ill in bed and cannot carry on his duties. His loss is irreparable.