Crimean texts
IN addition to the transference of the chief command from Simpson to Codrington, certain changes in the organisation of the British force in the Crimea were at about this time decided on.
Thus the entire Army was divided into two Army Corps — to be under the command, respectively, of Generals Sir Colin Campbell and Markham, or, in the absence of the latter, who had been summoned from India, of General Sir William Eyre.
At the same time the existing relations of the offices of Chief of the Staff, Quartermaster-General, and Adjutant-General were modified, by the recognition of the two last-named officials as heads of departments under the former; whilst the Military Secretary became, in a sense, the chief of a Chancellérie, designed to lighten the pressure of correspondence upon the General commanding.
In the appointment of Codrington, the principle of selection for high command (as against succession by seniority) had been put in practice — his comparative youth having probably quite as much to do with his preferment as had his distinguished services at Inkerman and the Alma; and, at this juncture, Generals Barnard and Lord Rokeby supplied a valuable precedent by the readiness with which they agreed to subordinate amour propre to higher considerations by serving under a junior.
On the rumour of Codrington’s promotion, Sir Colin Campbell had returned impulsively to England; and his consent, at the personal request of his Sovereign, at once to resume his duties at the seat of war is certainly not the least chivalrous episode in the career of that gallant veteran.
‘I leave this with every kind feeling towards yourself. . . . ,’ writes Simpson to Lord Panmure on November 10th, ‘but I have found many matters too much for me. This is not at all like the command of an Army! It is a huge chaos of civil government, of extreme difficulty of management.’
These words, together with the dislike of newspapers and the electric telegraph which the writer shared with Pélissier, may be considered as summing up the sentiments of a General who, though gallant and distinguished, and not yet old as age is now reckoned — he had been born in 1792 — had certainly failed to keep pace with the times in which he lived.
Meantime, whilst adapting itself to these new arrangements, the Army was resigning itself to the enforced truce of winter, though it maintained its state of preparation against offensive movements by the enemy.
‘We no longer look for daring deeds and successful enterprises, which covered any little omissions,’ writes Panmure to Codrington on November 16th, ‘and we must therefore be circumspect in our acts, and ready, as far as we can, to anticipate the public in everything conducive to the comfort of the Army.’
So, for the present, active operations in the field ceased to be contemplated, a proposed expedition to Kaffa and Arabat being abandoned, and the interior economy of the Camp engrossed attention.
Until near the end of the month this was favoured by fine weather, and the health of the Army continued good. But, besides the care and labour devoted to the moving up of supplies by the railway and Land Transport Corps, and to the proper clothing, feeding, and drilling of the troops, it also became necessary to cope with an outbreak of drunkenness which had followed relaxation of strain and comparative abundance of pocket-money.
Short of more drastic measures, Lord Panmure suggests social entertainment as the best means of curing this evil.
The leave of absence granted to officers was regulated, and an exchange of prisoners carried out.
On November 15th there occurred a disastrous explosion in a windmill which had been utilised as a magazine.
At home, regiments of the Foreign Legion were being handed over to the Commander-in-Chief as soon as they were fit for service; whilst a new Military Hospital on Southampton Water was being planned, the Queen showing special interest in its progress.
Both Lord Clarendon and Colonel Claremont note a diminution of cordiality in the relations of the Allies.
November 1, 1855.
Lord Panmure presents his humble duty to Your Majesty, and has the honour to forward to Your Majesty the despatches which he found on his return from Windsor.
Satisfactory reports of provision for Army.
Your Majesty will perceive with pleasure the satisfactory reports of the provision for the Army, and likewise the statements of Colonel M’Murdo. 1 The Floating Factory which Lord Panmure sent out seems to be highly prized. The reason why whips, harness, etc., were not sent with the railway horses was simply because no demand was made for them. The only part of the despatches which gives Lord Panmure any annoyance is what General Simpson says in reference to Sir Colin Campbell. It shows a clinging to seniority, not unnatural, but still not in accordance with the views held here.
The General has hit upon the true reason for the confusion of the huts, as Admiral Stafford at Malta and Grey at Constantinople took upon themselves to trans-ship some cargoes, because in their wisdom they thought it useless to send on to the Crimea the shot and shell in the holds of the vessels, as if these could not have easily been returned. The moment Lord Panmure heard of this he complained to Sir C. Wood, and warned him of what might be the results. Orders were instantly sent to stop their proceedings, but mischief has evidently been done, though, Lord Panmure trusts, of no serious consequence.
Lord Panmure has sent to the papers —
- General Simpson’s despatch relative to the capture of Kinburn.
- Brigadier-General Spencer’s report to General Simpson.
- Return of wounded men on the 8th September — a curious and satisfactory document.
- Dr. Hall’s report, omitting the passage on brain-fever arising from drunkenness.
- Colonel M’Murdo’s report.
Lord Panmure has just heard of the arrival of Sir Harry Jones at Farrance’s Hotel. He sent his A.D.C. to report his arrival and his inability to come in person. Lord Panmure will call on Sir Harry this evening, and inform Your Majesty of his condition.
Lord Panmure begs to apologise to Your Majesty for the haste of this letter.
Private.
CRIMEA, November 3, 1855.
There has been no mail since my last note to your Lordship, dated 30th ultimo.
Nothing whatever has occurred since that note, nor can I see any good reason to believe the enemy intend leaving the Crimea. It is so decidedly their duty to remain that they will do so if supplies are possible.
Impracticability of operations from Eupatoria.
In urging me to carry on operations from Eupatoria, I have only to say that General D’Allonville has represented the propriety, or rather the necessity, of withdrawing the troops as soon as possible. No operations can be undertaken there for want of water. We have lost some horses from that reason, and I am going to withdraw the Cavalry Brigade as soon as the Admiral can manage the transport. Sir Edmund Lyons will be here to-day, but too late for post. I confess I was surprised with the message of an expected movement from Eupatoria at this season of the year! As to Kaffa and Arabat, I can say nothing till Sir Edmund Lyons comes here. The Kinburn Brigade is still on board ship. . . .
I regret the departure of Sir Colin Campbell, whom I have given leave to go home on urgent business. He is a great loss to this Army. . . .
Enemy reported to be contemplating an attack.
The enemy is said to hold his intention of attacking our whole line some day next week. I do not expect he will so commit himself.
[Writing on November 3rd, and referring to despatches received from General Rose and Colonel Claremont, Lord Clarendon says:—]
I think Rose shows clearly that, with a little more dash, good things might be done, and I cannot agree with Claremont that Pélissier is disposed to advance if he could. No one in the Crimea now thinks that the inactivity of the last two months has been necessary or justifiable, and yet nothing has been done but the Kinburn affair, the orders for which were sent from Paris and London.
Writer’s instinct as to ‘diminished cordiality’ between Allies.
I must say that I have the same instinct as Claremont about diminished cordiality, and I am not easy about all the intrigues that are at work against us, and that come in aid of the altered views of the Emperor, caused by the multiplying embarrassments of his own position at home.
I enclose a memorandum upon the officers serving with Williams, who ought to be rewarded without loss of time.
There are not two better men in the Queen’s service than W. Churchill and Dr. Sandwith, 2 but unless they get a civil C.B. I don’t know what can be done for them.
I am glad Zamoyski has got the command. A word to Harvey 3 to expedite matters might be useful, for they ought not to take much time.
Private.
WAR DEPARTMENT, November 3, 1855.
Long ere this reaches you, you will have had the official letters arranging the future command of the Army, and those consequent on it.
I see by your last note that you are wedded to the principle of seniority, and I am quite prepared for your disagreeing to the course we have pursued.
Possible effects of disregard of seniority in Codrington’s appointment.
I have endeavoured to soften it as much as I can to Sir Colin and the others senior to Codrington, but it may be that my persuasion may be vain and the Army may lose the value of their services. None will regret this more than I shall, and I live in hopes of a better turn to our affairs. I find that the Caradoc has been returned to the Black Sea, and is refitting to carry Canning to Alexandria, but I have asked Sir Charles Wood to telegraph to Lyons to give you a boat to yourself, and I again advise you, ‘consentu doctoris Gairdner,’ to land at Marseilles. I shall write you on Monday, but not after that; or, if I do, I shall write privately to Codrington. As to his former commission, I wish you to send it home to me on receipt of this, unless you prefer taking it with you.
Irregularities of Admirals at Malta.
You are quite right about the huts! Those infernal Admirals at Malta and Bosphorus have been meddling with them and bedevilling them; and not content with that, they have been unpacking a general cargo vessel into the bargain. I have set up my back at this, and I hope they will catch it. I will not be responsible for their delinquencies, and I only wish you would ascertain the fact and write a smart official on the subject. I don’t like difficulties made, but such irregularities as these, even though at my own door, ought to be officially stated.
When I was at Windsor the Queen asked particularly for you.
I have seen Sir Harry Jones, who is much better since he came home.
Private.
WAR DEPARTMENT, November 5, 1855.
Sir Colin Campbell.
This is the last private letter which I shall probably address you as Commander of the Eastern Army, and as I see you have let Sir Colin Campbell come home on private affairs, I presume either that some words have passed between you, and a rupture occurred, or that the old Highlander has smelt a rat and determined to be off before any change takes place. Be that as it may, his absence will make the change easier, and I have every hope it will do well.
I wish you could have finished off with Kaffa and Arabat.
Result of publication of one of Simpson’s despatches.
I have got into hot water by publishing your despatch in which you say that Sir C. Campbell was recalled from [the] Eupatorian expedition on account of the chance of an attack from the Russians intimated by me.
You did quite right to word your despatch as you did, and it was because it was so worded, and that the public should see that Government, and not you, was responsible for the recall, that I published it. The Court doubted the prudence, as it would tempt Russia to mislead us by false information. As if she had not warred with the weapon too long to require any lessons in the use.
Hardinge has been ill and is now much better. The Duke of Cambridge and Brown are very angry, or pretend to be so, with the promotions in the Army, but the plunge is taken, and the wave must be breasted however high it may rise.
I am run very short by a Cabinet, and have some more letters to write.
THE GROVE, November 7, 1855.
Criticism of Pélissier.
I send you the despatch of Rose and Claremont which arrived this morning. I suppose Pélissier knows what he is about, but he seems to have scattered his army a good deal for winter quarters, and [so] that the Russians, if they don’t keep winter, might make an attack upon some of his points. I hope his arrangements have some reference to ours and the Sardinians’. Pélissier determined from the first to make no great operation, and he has had his way, and we can’t help ourselves. Cowley suggests that, when the winter is set in, the Generals and Admirals should return for ten days and hold a Grand Council of War for spring operations. What do you say to that?
Exchange of prisoners of war.
As to the prisoners, I think our course should be to set aside the Paris Commission, and to get our own people as we can and as soon as we can. We should know exactly from the Admiralty how many Russian prisoners have been sent to Liebau, and require through the Danish Minister at St. Petersburg that a similar number (they have not so many) should be handed over to us at Odessa — the lists of both Russian prisoners sent away and English remaining in Russia should be transmitted to Lyons, and he should communicate about them with the Governor of Odessa. . . .
We have got nine thousand medals sent exactly at the time you said they should. One thousand more will be wanted, Cowley says, for the Imperial Guard, which is coming home. . . .
WINDSOR CASTLE, November 8, 1855.
Suppression of drunkenness in Crimea.
The Queen returns the enclosed draft to Sir William Codrington, and quite approves his special attention being drawn to the suppression of the vice of drunkenness; she doubts, however, the propriety of the introduction of Mr. ——’s name, whose position as reporter to the —— would thus be officially recognised, and his reports be acknowledged as public ground for the Government to act upon. The injury this would inflict in the discipline and government of the Army need not be pointed out.
The Queen has also made some corrections, which are intended to maintain the proper position of the Crown in the official documents emanating from her Secretary of State.
It is very inconvenient that General Simpson should have given leave to Sir Colin Campbell to come home.
WAR DEPARTMENT, November 9 1855.
It has been my custom to write every mail a private letter on different subjects as they occur, and though I have not the pleasure of your acquaintance, you must permit me to continue with you the practice which I have pursued with your predecessors.
As to Codrington’s possible difficulties with his seniors.
You know so fully my views on your appointment that I conceive it to be unnecessary to revert to them in this letter. I confess that I am not without anxiety as to the course which may be followed by your seniors, and I only trust that, if they are so foolish as to resist your appointment by refusal to serve under you, you will not permit such an event to disturb your mind. We have the information by telegraph that Sir Colin Campbell’s home affairs have assumed an urgency at this peculiar juncture which is much to be regretted. I cannot gather from Simpson’s message whether Sir C. has had any reason to suspect the arrangements going on at home or not, but I cannot help thinking that his return before he had ascertained the decision of Government was premature, and had I been in Simpson’s place I would not have allowed it. However, it is scarcely fair my speculating on the course of this brave old officer in ignorance of the motives which dictated it.
Suggests arrangements for regulating leave of absence.
While referring to the leave on private affairs granted to him, I take the opportunity of drawing your attention to the impression which exists that many officers are leaving the Crimea, who have neither the excuse of illness, promotion, or long service, and as we may now suppose that active operations are at an end for the winter, some regular system of leave should be arranged. You might let so many go home, so many to Constantinople, so many to Malta, according to your ability to spare them, and I would give them free passages to and from their destination. These leaves should be given equitably between Staff and regiments, and the longest out should have prior claim to return.
Intemperance in Camp.
I am very sorry to have had to write you an official letter on the intemperance of the soldier. There is no remedy for this, in reality, but by amusement and work closely interwoven. You must have some bad ones, but a little energy and inventive genius in the regimental officers will do much to turn men’s minds from the canteen. I will meet any outlay which you may sanction for getting up theatres. I will send you lecturers or conjurers for nightly exhibitions if you desire me. Football for the day; in short, anything to drive away ennui. I have telegraphed to Simpson as to a library, and, if none can be found, it shall be sent. I hope you put down all grog-shops within the lines, and allow no interlopers to supply the men with spirits when they wander into Balaclava. I hope your huts are arriving in better order than at first. I cannot say how extremely provoked I was to learn that they had been so wantonly meddled with by the Admirals at Malta and the Bosphorus. I had it put a stop to as soon as I could, but I am not sorry to learn that Simpson has addressed me officially on the subject, though the despatch has not reached me. I think that, as soon as the first difficulties of your new position wear off, you will find it more easy than your predecessor, whose diffidence and modesty, which may be carried to a fault in a public man, interfered with his authority and rigour of command. Again I repeat to you that I have every reason to believe that you will justify the choice of the Government, and repay, by a successful discharge of your duty, the trust reposed in you.
WINDSOR CASTLE, November 9, 1855.
The Queen returns this despatch of Sir J. Simpson’s, which is quite satisfactory. This ought to have been written the day after the event took place, and then it would have been unnecessary for him to have sent the enclosures 4 — which it seems is unusual.
The telegraphic message is again most unsatisfactory.
CRIMEA, November 10, 1855.
Yours of 22nd and 27th have arrived together by the same mail.
This note replies to the first of these letters. I herewith return the letter to Sir Colin Campbell, who sailed for England a week ago, and will not in all probability return to this Army.
Appointment of Codrington to command.
I likewise transmit to you the cover containing Codrington’s commission, which has been in my writing-desk these three months; and your Lordship may rely upon it that neither Codrington nor any other soul has the smallest idea that such a document is in existence.
The Russian field-pieces will be found in the Bucephalus — marked with my name; they are the only trophies that I appropriated, in order to send them to you. Codrington is much gratified by his appointment. There is no choice — he is the best man here — and as I have just told him, no one can wish him more success than I do. I shall at once give over charge to him.
Private.
CRIMEA, November 10, 1855.
As I may possibly have the pleasure to see you before this letter reaches you, I shall not write many lines. Two mails, 22nd and 27th, arrived together yesterday. I have your private letter of the latter date, and am much gratified by its contents.
I could say a good deal on the new distribution of the Army, 5 but will wait till I can talk the matter over with you, which the welfare of the Army may induce me to wish to do, if you will allow me.
I am perfectly well pleased with the manner you have taken to release me. The doctors would have soon stepped in to do it in their way.
Two great enemies: the telegraph and newspapers.
I will not now trouble you with opinions on telegrams, nor attempt any further justification of my views of them. But Pélissier and myself are both of one opinion that the electric telegraph is our greatest enemy! worse even than the newspapers, which publish to the enemy everything we are doing.
The message that hurt me so much came after a succession of very taunting remarks both in the public prints and in your own private letters; and I confess I was very much hurt with it. But it is of no use dwelling on this just now, when time presses for the mail. I leave this with every kind feeling towards yourself. You took me from my retraite with the kindest intentions; but I have found many matters too much for me.
A huge chaos of Civil Government.
This is not at all like the command of an Army! It is a huge chaos of Civil Government, of extreme difficulty of management. I saw much of this in Lord Raglan’s lifetime, and it has increased tenfold.
I see no reason to think the Russians will evacuate the Crimea. Their duty is to prevent our occupation of the harbour. Some great man reviewed some 10,000 of them, two days ago, in full-dress, opposite Inkerman. Our spies give us all manner of reports, while the enemy never spends a farthing for information. He gets it all for 5d. from a London paper. If they retire, it will be after a few days’ rain. The weather has been very fine as yet. . . .
I must close this rambling letter, written under many interruptions.
November 10, 1855.
I trust you will find me willing to give you all information, and, as I say in my public despatch, to let you be present in mind with the Army as much as possible. I thank you most truly for the kind expressions and feelings towards myself. I had no thought of being selected for command of such a high and honourable nature, but I have no hesitation in saying that I do not mean to be frightened by all its responsibilities, its delicate situations or difficulties, for I have put myself in the path with, I trust, a soldier’s feeling, and I do not mean to hesitate on the hill on which that path is now cut.
Codrington’s relations with Sir Colin Campbell.
Sir Colin Campbell having left the Army removes what I think would have been an impossibility on his part — serving under me. I can know nothing of the causes; but I thought you would not object to my public reference to his character of service and distinction. I have seen General Barnard, who, with kindly feelings towards myself, though with some hesitation as to his being put in a lower position perhaps by leaving the Chief of the Staff for a Division, accepts the proposed arrangement. But he would not have objected to his own continuance as Chief of the Staff had your arrangements, which I consider settled, admitted of it. I have seen General Windham, an old and intimate friend of mine. I have no hesitation in saying that he will carry on the duties of Chief of the Staff with the utmost efficiency; but there must be a total change in the duties, as at present carried on, of that situation.
New arrangements consequent upon a new command.
When the changes take place, it will be necessary that, instead of the Adjutant-General[’s] and the Quartermaster-General[’s] being two separate and independent departments and offices, they must be merged into one, of subordination to, and dependence on the Chief of the Staff. The situation has had no fair trial as yet; if it is the intention of Government to continue the appointment, it must have it, and be made the head, the union of the other two and of the communications of the Army.
Recommends correspondence of the Army to be addressed henceforth to the Chief of the Staff.
In the correspondence of the Army, I should therefore say that all is to be addressed to the Chief of the Staff — as the organ of the public service between the Commander-in-Chief and the English Army — with the department named in the corner to which the question refers. The Chief of the Staff will thus be made aware of everything, divide everything to the proper departments, and receive the decision of the Commander-in-Chief on any one of them. He may require the assistance of another officer for this purpose.
Duties of Military Secretary.
In case of this being thus carried out, I should look upon the situation of Military Secretary as one to receive all the despatches addressed to the Commander of the Forces from home or elsewhere, and transfer to the Chief of the Staff what concerns the English Army, exclusive of the finance and promotions, peculiarly his own.
I cannot at present say more, except thanking you and any members of the Government for their kindness towards me.
Quartermaster-General.
I must add that, in the arrangement of the Quartermaster-General’s Department in future, both General Windham and myself are strongly of opinion that Lieut-Colonel W. C. Wetherall is the officer most fitted for it.
WINDSOR CASTLE, November 11, 1855.
The Queen has received Lord Panmure’s letter and the telegram with much satisfaction. It shows the true loyalty and devotion of her gallant officers, but is no more than she hoped for from them.
Appeal to Sir Colin Campbell.
Should Sir Colin Campbell have left, she trusts that, on being acquainted with what has occurred, and with the Queen’s wishes and confidence in his known devotion to her service, he will consent to take the command of one of the Corps d’Armée.
The Queen entirely approves of Lord Panmure’s signifying her great satisfaction at the conduct of the Senior Officers.
FOREIGN OFFICE, November 12, 1855.
I send Claremont’s despatch just arrived.
Urges caution in publishing information derived from the F.O.
While it is on my mind, pray let me suggest great caution in publishing anything that comes from this office. I regretted, as you know, that that part of Simpson’s despatch should have been in the Gazette, which referred to news from Berlin of an intended general attack by the Russians, and this has got Loftus into a scrape — people have been arrested who were supposed to give him information, etc. 6
Differences of opinion as to destroying enemy’s works.
I have a letter from Cowley from which I extract the following:—
‘Vaillant has accounts that everything is ready for blowing up the docks at Sebastopol, but, in addition to this, Niel wishes to destroy the aqueducts from the Tchernaya and Fort Nicholas. The Emperor is against both, as also against another project of the same officer for destroying Kinburn.’Let me know the opinion of the Government. I think these are not questions to be answered in a hurry. . . .
WAR DEPARTMENT, November 12, 1855.
Disinterested conduct of certain Generals.
I have nothing to say to you in the shape of a public despatch on the subject of the general administration or the conduct of the Army. I have noticed the disinterested conduct of Rokeby and Barnard, in waiving all scruples and accepting your appointment so readily. It has given great satisfaction to the Queen, and has been hailed by the Government as an example to the Army at large of infinite value. To yourself it must be very gratifying.
I see that Simpson, in his private letter, is complaining very much of his health, and I begin to be uneasy lest the excitement of departure should prey too heavily upon him. Your difficulty seems to lie with the interior economy of your Camp, and my belief is that you will have to look for the cure of drunkenness, and the preservation of health, more in the personal exertion of officers in command of regiments than in anything else.
I am sorry to learn by your telegram that the weather is broken, and I succumb at once to your decision as to Kaffa and Arabat, though I confess that with a little enterprise earlier you might have had the former as excellent wintering for your troops.
If Vivian gets his force well in hand at Kertch, he may do something by-and-by. I shall send you no more troops to the Crimea, and I think you will do well to leave the depôt at Malta undrawn upon till the spring, and I will desire Lord Hardinge to impress on Pennefather the necessity of strict attention to drill. The same will be done here in our depôts, and I will send some 6000 or 7000 foreign troops to Smyrna and Scutari, which will be of good service to you in the next campaign.
You might probably run down and look at the Germans at Scutari when you can leave your own Camp with satisfaction. . . .
November 13, 1855.‘Information’ mentions that the Emperor was expected about the 13th or 14th inst. at Korales, to review the troops stationed in that neighbourhood: the Staff of Prince Gortschakoff to be removed from Bakshi Serai to Korales, where a Council of War is to be held.
Information received as to plans of the army.
A rumour that troops are to be concentrated at Korales, whence an offensive movement will take place against the Allied positions; and, in case of non-success, that the Russians will evacuate the Crimea.
There are other details given, and the account is that of a ‘correspondent.’
Such an attack is scarcely probable after what has happened; but I think it would be welcomed on the part of all the Allied troops, and would bring matters to a more decisive issue with regard to the winter occupation of the Crimea.
November 13, 1855.
Abandonment of expedition to Kaffa and Arabat.
I have written to you an official letter on the subject of the abandonment of the expedition to Kaffa and Arabat.
Justification of its abandonment.
I was suddenly called upon to inquire and decide; and I had no hesitation that, unless with a much larger force — even up to two-thirds of this Army — such an operation, requiring siege artillery, should not be risked at this season of the year, nor indeed at any season of the year. With a large force, sufficient to maintain itself, I quite feel its value.
You will have been aware, before my entering on command, that the French had no intention of sharing it; and there could be no doubt that such a diminution of our force on this plateau as I should have considered commonly prudent for the purpose of increasing that to Kaffa would have required fair communication with, and the liability of adverse opinion from, the French.
I do not think that less than ten days would have been requisite for the arrangement and embarkation of additional force; and it was then the 10th of November.
My part of it was a military question, about which I had no doubt; and I believe that, after the time that had elapsed since the return from Kinburn, the opinion of Sir Edmund Lyons was in accordance with mine. . . .
Drunkenness.
I shall have to enter on other subjects in your private letter to me. The drunkenness was serious, particularly at the first issue of the accumulation of the field allowance, which, with working pay, gave the men a quantity of money; but I think that the deprivation of that field allowance when a court-martial convicts for habitual drunkenness has already checked it.
WINDSOR CASTLE, November 16, 1855.
The Queen wishes to bring the following points under Lord Panmure’s notice:—
War Office Departmental Reports.
1. She has never yet received any of the Quarterly Reports from the different departments under the new War Office which were to be sent to her. She can fully believe that this may be difficult with some of them, but there can be no reason why the Barrack and Fortification Departments should not report; and as to the others, the Queen would prefer incomplete reports to none at all, feeling convinced that the impossibility to report is caused by present confusion, and that the necessity for drawing up a report showing system and order is the surest way to produce it.
Hospital.
2. The Queen hopes that Lord Panmure will soon take steps to have the plans for the new Military Hospital on the Southampton River considered. It will take time to prepare them, and we have none to lose. The appointment of a Commission of competent persons to advise on the subject appears to the Queen as the best step.
Foreign troops.
3. The regiments of the Foreign Legions, when their organisation is sufficiently advanced, ought to be transferred to the Horse Guards.
The Queen understands that there are Swiss troops doing garrison duty at Dover, of whom the Commander-in-Chief has no official knowledge, and over whom he has no command!
Militia.
4. A new regulation about the Militia, reducing the officers where the number of men has not reached a certain amount, has the tendency of stopping volunteering from the Militia, as it in fact punishes with reduction of officers those regiments which give their men to the Line. Such a regulation ought not by rights to have been introduced without the Queen’s pleasure having been previously taken.
WAR DEPARTMENT, November 16, 1855.
Since the Army have apparently ceased from contemplating active operations in the field, the interest has considerably subsided and turns into a different channel. We now no longer look for daring deeds and successful enterprises, which covered any little omissions, and we must therefore be circumspect in our acts, and ready, as far as we can, to anticipate the public in everything conducive to the comfort of the Army.
Urges attention to health on Codrington.
To secure vigilant care of the troops, we must keep their commander in sound health, and therefore I must entreat of you to allow nothing to induce you to treat health as a trifle. I know how much our officers are apt from the best of motives to do so, and they refuse to go for a few days to sea, which might set them right, and like the stitch in time save nine. Now I mean to give you no excuse for this by telling you that I expect you, at your own leisure, to visit your Army at Kertch, Scutari, and even Smyrna, should you think it advisable. You will have a vessel at your service, and you must judge for yourself when you can most comfortably leave your charge on the plateau.
Wintering of troops.
Having noticed your health, I now pass to the wintering of the troops. So long as the enemy is so near, you know him too well to leave anything to chance, and I presume you have already arranged with Pélissier to hold a proper occupation of a line of defence from the former French right to Balaclava, so as to secure yourselves from any surprise by the Russians during the winter. Having looked to your security, I suppose the quartering of the Army is engaging your attention. It was an egregious error in the Navy people meddling with our hut vessels, and I fear much confusion has arisen from their so doing, but I trust this has ceased, and that huts are arriving daily and going up speedily to their positions. I have various accounts of the Land Transport Corps, but all concur in saying that it is not as it should be. I fear Colonel M’Murdo undertook a work too heavy for him, and that he has broken down under it, but I am glad to see that danger was past. The officers who come home tell me that his animals are ill cared for, ill-treated, and allowed to stray everywhere. There can be no excuse that money has not been spent on that force. I am now sending out a large number of drivers, and I hope with these Colonel M’Murdo will be able to do better.
To him and the railway I look for the welfare of your people in the winter, and I trust supplies will always be moving to the front as fast as weather and roads will allow, and that every precaution will be taken to give the men fresh meat and onions, or potatoes, four times a-week, and good salt provisions and split peas the other three. The ration of spirits seems to me to admit of consideration, and if it could be stopped I am sure it would tend to good, at all events it might be reduced. I have already written you an official letter on this point, and I will give you another to-day, as I wish to relieve you from personal responsibility in this matter.
Clothing, feeding, amusement of soldiers.
After the quarters of the men, I consider their clothing to stand next in order. I believe that you have ample supplies of under warm clothing, but unless you make punishments for neglect in putting it on, and cause inspections to be made to secure its being worn, you will be surprised to find how it is shirked. You must impress on every grade of officer that much, nay everything, depends on warmth, and on their resorting to all expedients to keep the men’s spirits in activity. No man should be allowed to leave his hut for work or duty without something warm to start with, such as soup, and the same waiting him on return.
I dare say many will say all this is coddling the soldier; my answer is, unless you care for the men, they will not care for themselves, and neglected soldiers will neither march so well, work so well, or fight so well as men thoroughly well fed and housed, and kept in condition and wind, free from constant and vexatious drills.
Don’t suppose, however, by this that I look down on drill. Far from it. Now is your time for drill, re-organising drill. Officers and men require it, and it comes more palatably to the men when they see officers at it as well as themselves. You must let me know by telegraph your wants and wishes, and I will meet them as far as I am able. Excuse this long letter, but I feel so anxious on our troops being well wintered that I think of it every hour.
November 17, 1855.
Lord Panmure presents his humble duty to Your Majesty, and has the honour to acknowledge Your Majesty’s letter of yesterday, which he regrets that Your Majesty should have had the trouble of writing.
1. Lord Panmure transmits such of the reports as he has received, in original, and has the honour to request that Your Majesty will return them when convenient.
In the schedule accompanying them, Lord Panmure has written in red ink those which are not yet made, but he has ordered them to be furnished forthwith.
2. The purchase of the ground for the new Military Hospital on Southampton Water is not yet completed, as a question has arisen as to the supply of water, and the engineer officers are examining the ground, and boring to ascertain whether a sufficient supply can be obtained. Lord Panmure will immediately appoint a committee of competent persons to consider plans. In talking upon the subject with Captain Laffan, 7 it appears to him and Lord Panmure advisable to build the hospital by degrees, so that it may be occupied as each wing or ward is finished.
Giving over of foreign regiments to the Commander-in-Chief.
3. The regiments of the Foreign Legion which have embarked for foreign service have been given over to the Commander-in-Chief, and the Swiss regiment, which embarked this morning in the Great Britain, has been under the Commander-in-Chief for six weeks.
Lord Panmure would be too glad to hand over the different regiments much sooner, but experience has proved that there are many things which require correction and conforming to British practice, which a Secretary of State can do at once and quietly, but which the Commander-in-Chief would find great trouble in carrying out, as he can only act within Your Majesty’s regulations and by following established etiquette. Lord Panmure fully admits to Your Majesty that the system of organisation has been in many respects loose, but the necessity of the case required it, and the results will not disappoint Your Majesty’s expectations.
The foreign regiments.
Lord Panmure has desired the Inspector-General of Foreign Legions to hand over two more regiments of Germans to the Commander-in-Chief in a few days.
The extreme difficulty of finding accommodation for troops has caused Dover to be given up to the Swiss, but Lord Panmure hopes soon to be able to give over more of the Legion to Lord Hardinge.
While upon this point, Lord Panmure has the satisfaction to inform Your Majesty that the 1st Regiment of Germans has disembarked at Scutari in perfect order, and is admired by all the officers out there.
Lord Panmure has the honour to transmit to your Majesty a letter which he has just received from Colonel Kinloch, 8 notifying the embarkation of the Swiss in a manner which must be gratifying to Your Majesty.
4. With reference to this paragraph of Your Majesty’s letter, Lord Panmure has, in dealing with the Militia, not departed from former practice. In none of the circulars issued to its commanding officers is the name of the ‘Queen’ invoked, though Lord Panmure is not prepared to doubt the propriety of submitting to Your Majesty such changes as those to which Your Majesty has drawn attention.
Reduction of officers of Militia.
The reduction of officers was loudly called for, as in many regiments they vastly exceeded reasonable bounds. In one regiment the saving to the public amounted to £2000 a-year.
There can be no doubt that the circular intended to meet the difficulty of too many officers was objectionable on the grounds stated by Your Majesty, but as soon as this was made known to Lord Panmure, he issued the circular of which he has the honour to enclose a copy for Your Majesty’s use, which he hopes will meet the difficulty that has arisen.
November 17, 1855.
A terrific explosion.
The explosion 9 on the 15th was indeed heavy; it must have been terrific in its immediate neighbourhood — a sort of triangular or circular bouleversement of everything flat within about fifty yards of its centre, and all huts and roofs exposed to its first blast within three hundred yards damaged by, either falling, or the sides and planks of roofs being blown in. And beyond this, in a large circle, shells and splinters of burst shells were sent half a mile in some places, and in the quantities to cause many of the casualties I have recorded in an official letter to yourself.
You will get officially the summary sheet of information about the Russian Army opposite: there seems but little change in their dispositions; they crowded all the batteries on the North Side in the explosion (I was told), and they opened a considerable fire from them, which caused loss to the French in the town and their batteries.
I suspended for the next morning all duties, except that of preparation before daylight to meet any possible attack which the enemy might be disposed to make. On seeing that all was quiet, the Divisions were dismissed; and, though later than usual, resumed the now smaller parties on the roads.
The new roads.
The main road to the Camp is nearly completed — the Division roads from it to their own and to regimental camps are progressing, some being complete. I wish more huts were up and established, but all exertion is being made to remedy our misfortune in the Light Division huts, as well as to distribute the cargoes to others as they arrive.
Chief of the Staff.
I do not know how the system of Chief of the Staff will work. I think it will do — it must do — we must make it do. But the men are new to it, and it is also new to us and the Army; we must therefore trust to our attention and energy to overcome any difficulties.
WAR DEPARTMENT, November 19, 1855.
I really only write for the sake of not interrupting the usual course, for I have nothing of moment to say.
Sir Colin Campbell.
Sir Colin Campbell arrived on Saturday and called on me. I put into his hands a copy of the letter which I addressed to him by the bag which conveyed your appointment. He seemed then to be in very good tone, and though I asked him no questions, he appeared to me to be not indisposed to resume his duties as commander of one of your Corps d’Armée.
I have since seen Lord Hardinge, who reports Sir Colin to have changed his key, and he thinks that some of the old officers at the club have been tampering with his sensitiveness.
However, he is going to visit the Queen, and if Her Majesty, as I doubt not, expresses a hope that he will return, I am convinced he will do so. Both I and Lord Hardinge think it is desirable he should do so, as such an example will quell the grumbling at home and be of much support to you in your arduous duties.
I feel you are right as to Kaffa and Arabat, but it is to be regretted that winter should find them in the enemy’s possession.
The account of the terrible explosion in the Artillery quarter reached me yesterday and has occasioned me much pain.
I am glad to find we had no powder there. I suppose we shall have a full account of the accident officially. I long for your sentiments on the means of stopping drunkenness. Sir Colin was clean for putting down all the booths at both old and new Kadikoi.
WINDSOR CASTLE, November 19, 1855.
The Queen to speak to Sir Colin Campbell.
The Queen is glad to hear of Sir Colin Campbell’s arrival in good health and spirits. It is the opinion of those that know him that, on reflection, he would be ready to return to the Crimea and take command of one of the Corps d’Armée. As the Queen has asked him down to Windsor for two nights to-morrow, she is anxious to know how matters stand in this respect, in order that she may be prepared how to broach the subject towards him.
We deeply deplore the sad explosion in the Camp in the Crimea, and the melancholy loss of life, as well as injury, sustained.
How is Sir Harry Jones? Does Lord Panmure think that he would shortly be able to come down to Windsor — perhaps only of a morning, to enable us to see him — or would he be unequal even to that for some time to come? Perhaps Lord Panmure will ascertain this for the Queen.
WINDSOR CASTLE, November 19, 1855.
The Queen has received Lord Panmure’s letter of the 17th, and thanks him for the immediate attendance to her questions.
1. She returns the reports as Lord Panmure desired, but hopes that she will receive her copy to keep, when it can be got ready.
Obsolete arms.
The mass of old ‘flint-lock’ muskets in store is very extraordinary. The amount of new muskets (1853 pattern) would enable the Army in the Crimea to be supplied entirely with that weapon — of which the Queen understands several Divisions are still armed with the Minié of 1851. This subject is important.
The Queen sees from the reports that the new fort at Harwich has been armed with 24-pounders!! The experience of this war has shown that nothing but the heaviest armaments can withstand the fire of modern shipping; 24-pounders would therefore prove quite useless. The Queen would ask Lord Panmure to draw Lord Hardinge’s and Sir John Burgoyne’s attention to the subject, in order to arrive, in concurrence with them, at a decision upon the proposed armament of our sea-defences in general, in order that no useless expense may be incurred, nor a delusive security be established with regard to the strength of them.
2. The Queen is glad to hear that Lord Panmure will take immediate steps for the appointment of a Committee to advise on the construction of the new Military Hospital.
3. The report of Colonel Kinloch about the two regiments of Swiss just embarked is very satisfactory, and the Queen is glad to observe that Lord Panmure concurs with her in the propriety of turning the foreign regiments over to the Horse Guards as soon as practicable.
4. The new regulation about the Militia, of which Lord Panmure has sent a copy, will to a certain degree remedy the evil apprehended from the former one, but still holds out punishment if, after three months, the deficiencies caused by volunteering are not filled up.
November 19, 1855.
Lord Panmure presents his humble duty to Your Majesty, and has the honour to forward to Your Majesty the despatches which have just arrived. There is no private letter from General Simpson, which arises from the fact of the General having embarked in person.
Your Majesty cannot fail to perceive with satisfaction the good health of the Army.
Lord Panmure has spoken to Lord Hardinge on the subjects of the temporary appointment to the Land Transport Corps referred to in the enclosed telegram, subject to Your Majesty’s approval, for which Lord Hardinge will apply. Colonel Wetherall is well fitted for the important position.
Lord Panmure has had the honour to receive the two boxes from Your Majesty. He has had a conversation this morning with Lord Hardinge on the subject of Sir Colin Campbell’s return. Lord Hardinge did not find Sir Colin in such good-humour as Lord Panmure found him, and it was evident that he had visited the ‘United Service Club.’ 10
Sir Colin Campbell’s reasons for his return.
Sir Colin very candidly informed Lord Hardinge that he had resolved to come home some time ago, in consequence of the combined effect of a rumour which reached him of the selection of General Markham for command of the Army, and the offer of the command at Malta to himself. He considered this as indicating a wish for his absence from the Army, and resolved to leave as soon as the fighting was over and he saw his Division with prospects of comfort for the winter.
Sir Colin’s loyalty.
Sir Colin will probably decline to return at Lord Hardinge’s suggestion, but he used the following expression which denotes his devotion to Your Majesty, and his readiness to obey any wish or advice or hope expressed by Your Majesty. He said, ‘I do not return in pique at being passed over, for had the Queen appointed a corporal to command the Army and intimated to me her desire that my services should be continued, I would never have come away.’ Both Lord Hardinge and Lord Panmure concur in opinion that Sir Colin’s return will be attended with good effect to Your Majesty’s Army both at home and abroad, and should Your Majesty in conversation with Sir Colin Campbell be graciously pleased to intimate that it would afford satisfaction to Your Majesty were he to return to assume command of the 1st Corps d’Armée, your Majesty would establish the authority of your Royal Warrant and save a fine old soldier from lapsing into a retired grumbler.
Lord Panmure has the honour to transmit to Your Majesty a report from ‘The Royal Gun Foundry,’ and to state that he has given orders for the others to be immediately copied for Your Majesty’s use.
In obedience to Your Majesty’s commands, Lord Panmure will present himself at Windsor early on Wednesday morning, so as to be in readiness to attend Your Majesty before the Council. Lord Panmure will confer with Lord Hardinge and Sir John Burgoyne as to the points in Your Majesty’s note and be prepared to explain them on Wednesday to Your Majesty.
November 19, 1855.
Re-adjustment of Staff appointments.
. . . You may imagine that the complete commencement of a new system of offices and correspondence would of itself require much attention and occupation by details; still more so when there is the additional circumstance of change of men.
But I think it will work: even starting in the midst of all the different and somewhat independent departments — Army Works Corps, Land Transport Corps, and the many departments, Commissariat, Medical and Military — we have not yet got into scrape or difficulty.
[November] 20.
Arrival of Cavalry of Turkish Contingents.
General Shirley 11 arrived just now, having with him, in three steamers and some sailing-vessels, the Cavalry of the Turkish Contingents, which had, at General Vivian’s request, been ordered from the Bosphorus to Kertch. . . .
Some felt and some tow arrived in a vessel yesterday; but I understand that these essential things just now are at the lower part, and many water-carts at the upper part of the vessel.
We have last night and this morning the first rain — not in violence at all; on the contrary, it is fine and not cold. . . .
WINDSOR CASTLE, November 20, 1855.
The Queen thanks Lord Panmure for his letter received to-day, and will gladly express to the brave and chivalrous old Highlander, Sir Colin Campbell, her earnest hope that he will again devote himself to her service as he has hitherto so nobly done. His loyalty towards herself is very gratifying to her.
If it suited Lord Panmure, we should be very glad if he would dine and sleep here to-morrow; we have a performance in the evening in honour of the Princess Royal’s fifteenth birthday.
Will Lord Panmure be so good as to make the inquiries relative to the health of Sir Harry Jones which she begged him to do in her letter of yesterday.
WINDSOR CASTLE, November 22, 1855.
Sir Colin Campbell consents to return to the Crimea.
The Queen has this day written to Lord Hardinge, informing him of Sir Colin Campbell’s very handsome conduct in consenting instantly to return to the Crimea to take command of the 1st Corps d’Armée.
She has at the same time, however, stated what she wishes now to repeat to Lord Panmure (though she knows he feels it as strongly as herself), that, as by his and Lord Hardinge’s advice she has obtained from Sir Colin the sacrifice of his own feelings to her wishes, she feels herself personally bound not to permit him to be passed over a second time, should the command again fall vacant. Lord Panmure will be so good as to communicate this to Lord Palmerston.
We deeply regret the death of General Markham, who is a serious loss. The 2nd Corps d’Armée will thus become vacant. The Queen would wish, before he appoints his successor, to consider with Lord Hardinge whether Sir William Eyre should be permanently confirmed in the position he now holds temporarily. . . .
Sir C. Campbell spoke in the very highest terms of General Mansfield, 12 as one of the most promising officers in the Army; useful as he may be where he is, it strikes the Queen that he would be far more useful in the field.
November 24, 1855.
General Vivian at Kertch.
There is nothing of consequence to refer to in a private letter; the Cavalry being returned in such a hurry from Kertch, after having been at General Vivian’s express wish sent up in such a hurry, was provoking. 13 I have written, of course, to General Vivian with my mention of it in that tone: he had treated the idea of a want of forage there (expressed by the Admiral) as ‘fallacious.’ And thus a waste of transport has ensued at a time when it was wanted for our own people. There are no movements of the enemy to indicate an attack, or advance in force towards Kertch. General Vivian is entrenching the heights above the town, and I have desired him to ask for Artillery from the Turkish Government, for we have not what he demands for the armament of various redoubts, viz. thirty guns — 32-pounders — and some large howitzers.
Suggestion as to best defence of Kertch.
I have also said that he, having a considerable force, viz. 13,000 or 14,000 Infantry and forty-two field-guns — the whole good troops as I am assured — might make the best defence of Kertch by an attack upon a force that should venture on so long a line of communication as one from Kara Su; it does not seem likely that such an attempt would be made.
The cold at Kinburn has been severe — ice on the boats and on the shores; but all well defensible. I hear this from a Naval officer just arrived.
Progress of hutting.
The hutting is going on fairly, as you will have learnt by my telegraph, and the damages of so many huts by the explosion l4 are being quickly remedied.
I have put on men night and day for the destruction of the docks; perhaps it will be worth while taking the gates away, as they are all in pieces riveted together; they might either be useful or as ‘trophies.’ In this varying climate here we are again in fine, clear, dry weather — a great advantage to our transport of huts and commissariat.
November 24, 1855.
Lord Panmure presents his humble duty to Your Majesty, and has the honour to acknowledge Your Majesty’s note of the 22nd inst., which he would have done sooner, but a visit to the Speaker prevented his reception of it.
Sir Colin’s return to the Crimea settled.
Lord Panmure is happy to inform Your Majesty that his telegram reached the Crimea in time to stop the sale of Sir Colin Campbell’s horses and chattels, so that he will very shortly depart to resume his duties. It will be impossible to pass over Sir Colin again, unless, indeed, he exhibits, in command of the 1st Corps, such apparent incapacity as to render his appointment to the command of the Army dangerous to its safety. This Lord Panmure does not anticipate. Lord Palmerston shall immediately be informed of Your Majesty’s views.
Lord Panmure has the honour of forwarding to Your Majesty the despatches which arrived yesterday and contain most satisfactory intelligence of the changes in the Army. Sir William Codrington assumes his duties with a very proper spirit, which bids fair for the future.
Codrington’s criticism of the Press endorsed.
Lord Panmure agrees in every word he says about the Press, and would publish the despatch, 15 but he thinks it more prudent not to bring a hornet’s nest about Sir William’s ears at first starting. Lord Panmure has fully made up his mind that, if the Army takes the field, the Press shall form no portion of the line of march.
New appointment consequent on death of General Markham.
Lord Panmure unites with Your Majesty in deeply deploring the death of General Markham. Sir William Eyre, being appointed to command the 2nd Corps pending General Markham’s illness, should, with all deference to Your Majesty’s decision, in the opinion of Lord Panmure be allowed to retain the command.
General Mansfield’s services in the front will be required, but he is too junior an officer to aspire to so high a command with no Crimean service to record.
Lord Panmure ventures to address Your Majesty on a different subject on another sheet.
WINDSOR CASTLE, November 25, 1855.
The Queen has received Lord Panmure’s letter with the very satisfactory and excellent despatches from Sir William Codrington.
The Queen will write to him herself to-morrow, and send her letter to the War Office.
The return of Sir Colin Campbell will be very gratifying to Sir William.
The Queen most readily grants Lord Panmure an absence for the pious and melancholy duty of consigning to their last resting-place the remains of his gallant and much-lamented brother; 16 she trusts the rapid journey will not be too much for Lord Panmure.
He will be so good as to leave directions that the telegrams and despatches are transmitted to her during his absence from the War Office.
Sir William Eyre.
Upon the whole, the Queen thinks that it would be well that Sir William Eyre should be confirmed in the command of the 2nd Corps d’Armée.
November 25, 1855.
Startling statements as to purchase of Commissariat supplies.
. . . Here is a letter from Stratford which Clarendon sends me, as he does all from Stratford. The statements made at the latter part of it, as to the way in which our Commissariat supplies are purchased, is rather startling, and seems to need inquiry. Such assertions, if brought out in the House of Commons, would produce an impression.
Zamoyski came to me two days ago, saying that you had settled all his affairs except some small details. It would be a good thing to finish him off before you go to Scotland, and to be liberal with him in details. He can scarcely get on unless you give him here an advance of part of the money which he is authorised to draw at Constantinople.
Bearing upon Russia and Austria of the formation of a Polish Corps.
As Austria is bent upon drawing us into negotiations, the formation of a good Polish Corps would be a powerful instrument of negotiation, and be as good, as a demonstration coercitive upon Russia, as the occupation of Kinburn.
It would have a good effect also upon Austria. It would be a hint to all of those Eastern Powers that peace ought to be made soon, while at the same time it commits us to nothing and gives none of them the slightest ground for saying a word of remonstrance.
PS. — I doubt the expediency of having asked the Queen to request Campbell to go back. Sovereigns are best kept out of such matters.
Let us have the gates of Sebastopol sent home, as proposed by Codrington; they will be better than the gates of Somnauth. 17
WAR DEPARTMENT, November 26, 1855.
. . . I have received your public and private communications with great pleasure, and they have given equal satisfaction to the Queen and my colleagues. The manly yet modest tone inspires me with confidence for the future, and the ready acquiescence of the senior officers tells as much in your favour as it does in theirs. I only wish my old friend the Admiral had lived to see the day when his son was called to lead the Army of England, as he was to lead its Fleet.
Sir Colin Campbell to return to the Crimea.
I think you are right to make your changes by degrees, but an event which you did not and could not contemplate has occurred, which will of course expedite the formation of your two Corps d’Armée, I mean the resolution of Sir Colin Campbell to return immediately to the Crimea. He does this from perceiving the anxiety felt by the Queen and the Government that he should do so, and we have pressed it on him, as tending to give firmness to your position and prove to the Army that the principle of selection for high command, and not succession by seniority, is no farce but a present and future reality.
I do not mean to say, cæteris paribus, seniority ought not to have its fair weight, nor do I mean to say that selection is to be wantonly made, but I wish the Army to feel that professional merit is the true road to preferment, and that fools and idlers are no longer to look to it as a lounging refuge in which to kill time for a few years.
Judicious reticence of Sir Colin.
I must do Sir Colin the justice to say that he has behaved with great discretion as far as I can learn, and no expressions of disappointment have escaped him. He has been very close in all professional questions, and nobody seems to have been able to screw an opinion out of him; indeed I am told that when cross-questioned by the Prince on past events, H.R.H. failed in extracting any criticisms from him. From the moment he resolved to return, his shrewdness showed him that the least said soonest mended. You have done well to refer, as you have done, to his public character. You must judge for yourself as to Barnard and Windham. If you think one more fitted than the other for the Chief of the Staff, I do not mean to fetter you in any way; but with Lord Hardinge’s concurrence we fixed upon Windham for the Chief of the Staff, because, being in such close and intimate contact with you, we thought Barnard would prefer the change.
Duties of Chief of the Staff.
I entirely give in to your views as to the change of administration which must take place to give a fair trial to the Chief of the Staff. I intended what you propose to carry out, but neither Lord Raglan nor Simpson entered con amore into the changes, and they tolerated the individual out of deference to authority, but never attempted to place him in his proper position. The Quartermaster and Adjutant General are merely heads of branches under the Chief of the Staff. I perfectly enter into your views of having all the correspondence of the Army addressed to the Chief of the Staff, marked for what department it is meant, and to be by him separated, transmitted, and acted on, if he thinks right, on the instant. Whatever aid he may require, you have only to ask it for me to sanction the expense of it. Your Military Secretary by this means, as you say, is divested of much work which now encumbers him, and of course deprives you of the benefit of his full services. He will thus become what he ought to be, the chief of your Chancellérie, and you will be left to give your directions as to public correspondence, to write as much or as little as you please, and devote your physical exertions to the Army, unoppressed by labours of the desk which have, we think, weighed so heavily on your predecessors. You have by telegram since the date of your letter suggested Colonel Wetherall to succeed M’Murdo, and I therefore presume that you have selected Herbert for your Quartermaster-General.
Only one word more and I will release you from this long detail. The telegrams I send you are intentionally curt, not one word more than sufficient for the clear comprehension of their meaning. Simpson has, foolishly in my opinion, mistaken curtness for censure. Now, no censure will ever be meant in a telegram, and I hope you will not imagine for an instant that any such is even intended.
Sir James 18 has called to-day, and I learn he is looking well, though I have not seen him. I forward you a letter from the Queen. . . .
WINDSOR CASTLE, November 26, 1855.
Change of intention as to Eyre.
Upon further consideration, the Queen wishes to express her belief that there would be great advantage in not confirming Sir William Eyre in the command of the 2nd Corps at present, but leaving him merely in acting command. The confirmation can at any time be given. . . . His holding the acting command at first will also soothe the feelings of Lord Rokeby and General Barnard, who must feel the additional elevation of another junior officer very much.
November 27, 1855.
I received yesterday your official letter about drunkenness in the Army, and your private letter at the same time of the 9th.
I have your telegraphic message of the death of General Markham, 19 the account received with interest and regret by all.
Formation of the Army into Corps.
I have also the telegraph of Sir Colin Campbell returning to the Army to command a Corps. I have written to you by last mail, with my opinion on the formation of the Army into Corps; I cannot say I think it a good plan, I see many disadvantages in it, and serious ones; and I do not see the object aimed at, beyond a personal one towards the officers who are put in command of them.
Corps versus Divisions.
I hope you will settle with Lord Hardinge clearly the authority which they are to have. One of the foundations of the best military arrangement of all armies seems to be ‘the Division’ — that it would be a small army in itself, with Commissariat, Artillery, and Transport complete, and under the control of the General Officer commanding. I do not know if it is intended to continue that independent power with him, or whether you intend that the General Officer commanding the Corps is to enter into the arrangements, discipline, establishment, and full control of the detail. If so, we may have two totally different systems going on in the Army at the same time; and, if the Generals of Division are to retain that authority in their own hands, it leaves but little to the care of the General of the Corps.
I apprehend that the general principle of an officer commanding a Corps is that an army is large enough to detach almost an army in itself, say 20,000 or 25,000 men; and that it requires in such case a General Officer of unquestionably higher rank than those of his subordinate Divisions.
This is scarcely the case with the English Army, of which it will scarcely be the wish to separate half of it in any future operations. However, you will find me ready, and very willing, notwithstanding my opinion, to carry out in its spirit any directions for such a change.
As to leave granted for ‘urgent private affairs.’
As soon as I came into command, I laid down for myself and General Windham a general understanding — I will not say a positive rule, for that is impossible — that I would grant leave, where the state of the regiment permitted it, to officers who had been a long time out here and engaged in active work. And this independent of what is called ‘urgent private affairs.’ That term is a sort of acknowledged officiality, and is too much used. . . .
I think your suggestion of giving free passages will be a great boon, and will enable indulgence for short periods to be granted to many by keeping those periods short.
As to recent drunkenness in Camp.
Nobody in this Army, from the General to the Subaltern, and I think I may add to the drummer, was surprised at the drunkenness during the month of October.
There had been given to the soldier, not merely a prospective increase in his pay of sixpence a-day, but the accumulation of back pay to that amount for about three months; for the order to issue that allowance was the 21st September for the back period from the 1st July.
Indeed it was to be expected — would it have been otherwise in England, even amongst older soldiers, or even among many other classes?
Added to this, the work of the siege was over — the real bodily work and occupation — as well as the consequent mental excitement of service.
It was bad, no doubt; for I, and every one who looked about him at that time, saw people lying about as if after a skirmish with an enemy — that is, towards the evening.
Then, remember, there was pay for the roads to about 9000 or 10,000 men of the Army, at an additional eight-pence a-day to all this!
It is all very well to suppose about savings-banks and transfers to England; nobody doubts its being a very good thing; but the man who may be shot, or dead by disease, to-morrow or a week hence must be excused if he looks to himself more than to his very distant heirs and successors.
After all, your Lordship must remember one thing, that the evil of drunkenness when it happens saute aux yeux: the drunken man lying about is seen and remarked; the much greater proportion in their tents or huts is not remarked.
Drunkenness of the soldiers accounted for and to some extent palliated.
The majority of the Army, as I always found in a regiment, is good, are not drunkards; and this national vice, a misfortune, is not confined to soldiers. Then look at the recruits sent out to the Crimea: are they a ‘better’ class, an older class, a steadier class than recruits which formed the first army sent to Turkey? Certainly not, and they were as apt to learn the vices as I hope they will learn many virtues of a soldier’s profession.
The sale of spirits is not permitted in the regimental canteens, that is, in canteens of natives, or Maltese, or Greeks, or Germans, which commissioned officers of regiments have in their own lines and under their own regulations; but as to spirits not finding their way to Balaclava, to camp, to huts, to tents, as long as there is a quantity of money in a soldier’s pocket, and that Balaclava and Kamiesh are ports free to land for French, Sardinians, and all the heterogeneous supplying merchants and traders of the Levant — it is not likely to be.
November 27, 1855,
The mail just in brings me another private letter from you. The kind feeling [of] both General Barnard and Lord Rokeby I was sure of, when once they thought it right to remain; but I cannot say what their feelings may be if, by another junior officer being placed over them, they find themselves excluded from any position which they may look for from their seniority and service.
Duties of Generals and of Regimental Officers.
There is no doubt every military man must feel that the care and discipline of troops must depend on the attention to detail and interest shown by Regimental Commanding Officers. As the line-of-battle ship — so the battalion. The duty of General Officers must of necessity be more external, though those external efforts are necessary to keep Commanding Officers up to the mark. However, it has, I think, always been found in our Army that the exception is singular of Commanding Officers not taking an interest and doing their best for their men; and even if one, personally, does not, it generally is accompanied by an indolence that enables a junior to be of use; it is seldom that a man is actively obstinate for the neglect of men; and you will find, as Lord Hardinge must well know, that all those multifarious details for a Commanding Officer obtain generally attention and secure the comfort and efficiency for the men. Like drunkenness, referred to in my letter of to-day, we must not take the exception as the rule.
A report — I think a mere report — of the Russians advancing on Kertch; it was signalled as a report from the shore to a vessel just come in.
Wintry weather.
It is snowing, and is winter; we have had rain three days ago, making the roads on hillsides like glass; we had cold yesterday blowing through one, we had frost and ice on windows last night, we have snow to-day. And remember — and I remember with a conviction I did right — that this would have been just the time probably of disembarkation of troops, stoves, artillery, for siege at Kaffa and marching to Arabat!
What might have been done.
I do not enter on the question — oh! such an important one at the time — of whether an army, a real army, could not have been put on the then most vulnerable flank of the Russians by pretending for Odessa and landing at the Alma, or even at Old Fort again; not marching from Eupatoria over a country wanting water, but coming on the march of high recollections and crossing up to the Belbec plateau: such an expedition, however, must have been an army, not a detachment. It must have been strong enough to fight the Russian army of Mackenzie; 20 and why not, and what more to be wished?
It has been found out that the ridge of the Russians is too strong a position to be touched from our, the French, right; but it took time and means to do so.
Strength of British and of Russian positions.
The merit of Russian position at Simpheropol, etc., is its being central, and that you cannot safely put a detachment on one flank, and a detachment on another to hem in, without exposing each to a superior central force. So the merit of our plateau here is great — the attacking-party of such mutually strong positions is put at the disadvantage; and so the Russians found at the Tchernaya battle.
Looking ahead.
It will be a great point for the English and French Governments to come to some understanding as to the continuance of the war here (I mean including all Crimea), or elsewhere. The Russian object, I presume, will be to leave a force on the heights sufficient to be tolerably safe from winter and early spring direct attack, and yet not too large for their power of supply; and, if they mean to dispute the Crimea next year, to send so strong a force as to put us in the same difficulty there has been of a direct attack upon this 21 front, without our exposing Balaclava and the plateau.
Importance to the Russians of holding the harbour.
To say they have political and military hold of the harbour is a great point for them: possibly worth great efforts and sacrifice now and next year.
The Government must consider if it is their purpose, their determined purpose, to drive them from the South of the Crimea, and deprive Russia of that political and military advantage, as a preferable point to attacking elsewhere. . . .
The huts are not the least watertight, very bad roofs, leak at joints, thin wood, and defective.
WINDSOR CASTLE, November 29, 1855.
As to list of names to be recommended for the Légion d’Honneur.
The Queen has seen Sir William Codrington’s letters and despatches of the 13th. She would wish no decision to be made with regard to the list for the distribution of the Crosses of the Légion d’Honneur till she has seen and spoken to Lord Panmure on the subject.
It seems to her that Sir William has, in this list, only named those officers and men who are now in the Crimea, and has not included any of those who have come home, many of whom are amongst the most distinguished of the Army.
ERZEROUM, November 29, 1855.
Particulars of the fall of Kars and its results.
For some time past it has been in my thoughts to write to you, but I have put it off from post to post in the hope of being able to announce something definite with respect to the war in this country, and perhaps to send you favourable tidings of Kars. This hope, I am sorry to say, is now at an end. Within the last few days an event has occurred which for the present gives the Russians the upper hand, and which, so far as I can yet foresee, will enable them to carry on a long and obstinate war in these parts — in a word, Williams, with his brave garrison, has had to surrender. The intelligence was brought in here on the afternoon of the 27th by General Kimety, who, you may remember, took such a conspicuous part in the affair of the 29th September. He is a Hungarian refugee, and being afraid to fall into the hands of the Russians, lest they should deliver him up to the Austrian Government, he left Kars at sunset on the 24th, with General Williams’ permission, and, in company with General Kolman, another refugee, and a few Kurds, succeeded in getting through the Russian lines and making his escape. The account he has given me is to the following effect. On the 23rd inst., General Williams received a letter, dated the 12th inst, from our Consul here, informing him that no assistance could be afforded him from this quarter. I should tell you that for some time he had been anxiously looking in this direction, misled by a vaunting promise made to him by Selim Pasha, immediately after his arrival here, towards the end of last month. This promise was to the effect that he would march without delay to his relief, as he had brought with him strong and well-appointed reinforcements from Constantinople. Williams naturally believed him, and consequently was holding out from day to day, looking in vain for the aid that was not to come. I understand that he had been deceived at first in the same way by Omar Pasha, but latterly he saw that nothing was to be expected from him. Now, as regards Selim Pasha’s reinforcements, 1000 men arrived here about a week after himself, 1000 more are expected in eight or ten days, and I have learned that a third instalment has landed at Trebizond.
The Turks to blame for the fall of Kars.
Had Williams known how matters really stood, he might have marched out a fortnight ago, when his men were still in fighting condition. The fall of Kars must therefore be charged to the falsehood of Turkish Generals and to the dilatoriness of the Turkish Government. But to proceed. On the receipt of the letter above referred to, Williams saw at once his position, and early on the following morning he called together all the Pashas in Kars, explained to them how matters stood, and asked them severally if their men were equal to the attempt of cutting their way out. The answer of all was that it would be impossible owing to the state of the men, debilitated and emaciated as they were by long privations and severe work. Add to these the general demoralisation that had succeeded to their previous good discipline. Under these circumstances it was the unanimous opinion that no alternative remained but to surrender. Accordingly Teesdale was sent to Muravieff in the course of the day. He had not returned when Kimety left, so that here for the present I must stop. No intelligence has since arrived.
Privations during siege of Kars.
You can judge of the extremity to which they were reduced when I tell you that, on the 24th, there were in store but six days’ rations, at the rate of half a pound of bread a-day per man. The hospitals were crowded. 70 and 80 a-day were dying of starvation. Many had gone raving mad, and all looked like living skeletons. With the townspeople it fared if possible still worse. They all looked to Williams, and his quarters were constantly beset with frantic women who flung their starving children on his steps to die.
Supineness of Selim Pasha, and moral deduced therefrom.
Now, I maintain that all this might have been averted had there been here a man of common pluck and ability. Selim Pasha has not a spark of either. In the return he has furnished to me of the men at his disposal, he has put down the number at somewhat more than 7000. I know from good authority, and from my own eyes, that they are nearly double that. I have been incessantly at him. I have suggested to him what to do. I have offered to take the command of a body of Cavalry and make a dash into Kars with a convoy of provisions, but no — Turkish apathy is not so easily acted upon.
The truth is, if we are to make war successfully in this country, we must have BRITISH Commanders.
Character of Turkish soldiers and officers.
The Turkish soldiers are splendid fellows and might be made anything of, but, from some inherent evil in the national system, it is necessary for a Turk, as he rises in life, to become an adept in falsehood, dissimulation, and selfishness, so that the higher you look in the grades of society, the more accomplished villains will you find. This is the cause of the striking difference that exists between the respective merits of Turkish officers and soldiers. . . .
We must now prepare for the Russians’ fire. The season is unusually mild, and they may come on, but I think we shall be able, if they do, to give them a warm reception.
BROADLANDS, January 1, 1856. 23
How Kars might have been saved.
This letter from Major Stuart is important, as you say, by showing that there were means at Erzeroum sufficient to have saved Kars, if they had been directed by a man of courage and capacity. This letter, moreover, gives one hopes that Erzeroum may not fall like Kars. Reinforcements can more easily arrive, and provisions be more easily conveyed.
The wanderings of the Turkish Contingent and the Turkish Light Horse seem to rival those of Ulysses after the fall of Troy.
November 30, 1855.
. . . You seem to have set your shoulder to the wheel in earnest to repair damages, 24 and I sincerely hope that, with huts and double tents, the men will carry through this winter in sound health.
Decrease in intemperance.
I am very glad to see in one of your letters that you consider intemperance to some extent to be corrected. I hope your stringent measures may effectually put an end to it. I had a suspicion myself as to libraries in situations with extended radii, and I am much obliged to you for sending me so much information on the subject. You shall have plenty of books, and I will not fail to follow up this source of amusement.
I quite enter into your views as to the Chief of the Staff, and with your determination to work it to good purpose, I am sure it will become a popular appointment in our Army, and one that will save a general’s time.
I can say nothing on your arguments against the Corps d’Armée until I talk the matter over with Lord Hardinge, but I dare say Sir Colin Campbell’s return to the Army may change your views on this point. . . .