Crimean texts
AT the beginning of the month, orders for the cessation of firing from advanced posts were issued by the Generals of the Allied and Russian Armies. But the provisions of the proposed armistice, as interpreted by General Lüders, proved objectionable to Codrington, owing to their restriction of the cruisers of the Allied Fleet from interfering with the movements of Russian troops, artillery, and convoys. (Codrington to Admiral Fremantle, March 3rd, and to Lord Panmure, March 4th.) Thus the actual signing of the armistice did not take place until the middle of the month. The picturesque and animated scene which followed is described by Codrington, March 15th.
As early as March 7th, Panmure, of whose caution in this respect we have had ample evidence, had advised Codrington of the probability of peace being concluded. Slightly later he adds that, as ‘the Conferences are fast verging to a mutual agreement on all the main points,’ he is himself ‘drawing in all his horns, as speedily but as quietly as he can.’ On the 17th of the month, he receives leave from the Queen to go to Scotland for a few days on affairs of his own — this being his first leave of absence since he had taken up office more than thirteen months before. About the same time a change in Codrington’s occupation becomes apparent. The erection of military works at Balaclava, the dismantling and destruction of buildings on the South Side, and the removal of captured guns, had, so far, occupied the army in the Crimea; but the Commander’s attention now began to be turned to stopping reinforcements and to arrangements for evacuation and for sending home the army. His letter of March 29th sketches a plan for its embarkation.
During a good part of this month the weather was severe, and the French, who were ill-provisioned, suffered considerably in consequence. Nevertheless an offer of British surplus stores, at cost price, was refused. Throughout the armistice the relations of British, French, and Russian troops remained friendly.
On the night of March 17th a deplorable accident occurred, by which sixteen men of the Army Works Corps were burned to death in their huts.
On March 30th, the signing of the Treaty of Paris brought the war to an end.
Meantime, at home, Sir De Lacy Evans had brought up a Motion in the House of Commons for the Abolition of Purchase in the Army. It was strongly denounced by Lord Panmure, who, nevertheless, favoured the appointment of a Royal Commission to inquire into the matter — a method of treatment which would have the advantage of ‘preventing so important a subject being dealt with in a manner at all trenching on Her Majesty’s authority.’
On March 13th, in bitterly cold weather, the Queen had graciously gone in person to Woolwich to welcome soldiers returning from the war.
Among other subjects treated of in the month’s letters are, the Army Works Corps — never popular among soldiers of Codrington’s period, — the cessation of the War Allowance and provision for soldiers thrown out of employment by the disbanding of the Foreign Legions, new fortifications at Portsmouth, and barracks at Dover, Gosport, and Colchester.
Owing to the manner in which the Foreign Enlistment Act had been put into practice, Britain’s relations with the United States had become strained; hence the sending of troops direct to Canada from the Crimea is considered.
March 1, 1856.
Protest against recall of Wetherall.
Just as the post goes, arrives the telegraph to send Wetherall home — this in the midst of most important organisation of the Land Transport. It is bad for the public service — it is most essential he should remain — who is to decide all the detail of organisation of the Divisions? We are in the middle of a total change — the executive has to go away!
I do hope you can telegraph to me that this need not be.
Your telegraph admits restrictions on the Navy of preventing convoys or even big guns moving along the Spit of Arabat or elsewhere: surely you do not mean this? — and to let us possibly see on the 31st of March such things safe out of our reach by our own giving in. 1
I shall maintain my view till I get contrary orders.
March 3, 1856.
The Queen returns these samples of the Victoria Cross, having chosen the one, into the case of which she has placed a paper. She wishes later to have one to keep, and wishes that one should also be kept as a pattern at the War Office, as the Tradesmen invariably alter the original pattern agreed upon if they are not watched.
March 4, 1856.
Lord Panmure presents his humble duty to Your Majesty, and has the honour to acquaint Your Majesty that the feeling in the House of Commons will enable the Government to resist Sir De Lacy Evans’ motion, 2 and they intend so to do, but at the same time to hold out the expectation that Your Majesty will be advised to appoint a commission to inquire into the subjects, should such be deemed expedient.
This will prevent so important a question being dealt with in a manner at all trenching upon Your Majesty’s authority.
[Copy undated.]
I have two mails from you, but I am sorry to say that I am little able to notice fully your private letters which have arrived with them. . . .
The Peace draws slowly on. I believe we shall have it after a little more time spent in ‘war of words,’ still we must go on with our preparations. Your destruction gives satisfaction, and your getting the guns from Sevastopol is a good deed.
In regard to our own old damaged guns, you are right not to leave them for lamp-posts. Your best way is to put them on the deck of some of the vessels and throw them into the sea, where they cannot be recovered.
SEBASTOPOL, March 4, 1856.
Protests against additions made to terms of armistice.
If you had wished to leave the armistice, the terms of it, to be arranged by the Generals, you had better not have let any one else go into a detail of words that may cause, and may have caused, serious difficulty. I allude to the telegraphic despatch from yourself to me, and that from Sir Charles Wood to Admiral Grey.
If you had left it as we got it from Paris, ‘convenez d’une suspension d’armes avec le Général en chef de l’armée Russe.’ ‘L’armistice reste sans effet sur les blocus,’ ‘les armées conserveront leurs positions respectives en s’absténant de tout acte aggressif,’ — these terms are general and simple, and the details by land and sea would have been left to us on the spot.
But no; when everything would have gone well with this simplicity, there is sent to the Admiral, and subsequently to me, ‘Our vessels are not to attack anything on shore.’ ‘The naval forces are to abstain from any attack on forts or troops, or other persons on shore.’
Objections to which these additions are open.
Do you know to what my signature to such words would lead? Do you not see what it admits, and the places along the coasts where such admissions might be tolerably vital to us hereafter? Heavy guns, convoys of provisions, troops from Russia might come along the hard road of the Spit of Arabat the whole way to the fort: they might erect earthworks and arm them with those heavy guns whilst our vessels were within musquet shot, and they laughing at us under the terms of an armistice! The same might happen at the mouths of any river, or open spaces on the west coast. From the moment I read the words, I decided that nothing short of orders from England should induce me to put my name to it.
But then the Admiral had considered himself bound to issue his orders to the fleet not to fire upon anything on shore. Fortunately there is no Russian Admiral with whom an armistice has been made in those terms, and the Russians may not hear of an order which I have suggested — if necessary to be given — might be kept secret to senior officers.
No armistice has been as yet signed by any one; proposals, discussions, only have been signed by the Chiefs of the Staffs, and General Lüders probably communicates by telegraph with Petersburgh.
Cessation of fire by the Army has been ordered.
But, during the proposals and discussions, a cessation of fire by the army has been put in general orders by me, and similar orders have been given by French, Sardinian and Russian Generals.
I have entered so fully, and sent copies of my letters publicly, that I need not refer further to it; but I enclose you a letter which I have written to Admiral Fremantle, and which will explain my view of the case.
A private letter from General Vivian, of the 27th February, says that, hearing of the enemy retiring along the Spit of Arabat, he had requested Captain Ryder, in command of the naval force, to send a gunboat:— he left Kertch with three gunboats the previous day. Letters of 2nd March from Vivian say nothing of their return, and I should not be at all surprised at these having been firing upon them. 3 Of course they would, if they had received no orders to the contrary; and this they could not have done, as Admiral Fremantle did not receive his telegraph till the 29th February.
Error of allowing blockade to be active only against ships.
But it is ludicrous to suppose that our blockade by the Navy is to be a question of Russian ships and boats only, on the sea: the main good of our blockade now is against the land, and we are to give that up by an armistice during a very important month of preparation! Surely this can never have been intended; but I suspect they know well at St. Petersburgh the words, and the value of them; and I have no doubt that, after telegraph communication with his Emperor, General Lüders coupled dexterously (but unavailingly as far as my and Pélissier’s signature went) the cessation of aggressive acts mentioned at Paris, with the power of continuing works and movements, mentioned by us here. The mention of the continuance of our operations against anything coming under our naval fire was received with a little wincing at the first conference at Tractir; and now we can understand why. Do not admit any such limitation to the guns of our fleet, for it will make the armistice a positive disadvantage to us, and of proportionate gain to the enemy.
I have ordered the troops up from Malta that are drafts belonging to this army, in order to take advantage of possibly the fleet coming up, and to make room for others which you may wish to send there.
Superiority of the six-pounder when in pursuit.
I have your letter about the Artillery and the Horse Artillery. General Dacres tells me the H. A. has six-pounders: 1 feel glad of this, for the officers of experience, and Lord Hardinge himself, have seen on service the superiority in activity of pursuit of the six-pounder over the heavier nine-pounder.
You will see I have issued a general order here about the information in newspapers: it was a good opportunity for me to take advantage of; it was necessary, and I think will pave the way for your publishing, if so settled, the groundwork of it in the despatch which you lay before the Cabinet.
March 3, 1856.
The telegraphic despatches which you have received, as well as myself, contain words, which, if acted upon, or coming to the knowledge of the Russians, will put the Allies to a very great disadvantage.
Against restricting naval forces of the Allies during the armistice.
I cannot believe it to be the intention that the Naval Forces of the Allies should be put in a worse position by an Armistice, and give a better position in proportion to the enemy.
Such will be the case, if, during the whole of this month, the cruisers of the Allied Fleets, which possibly the season may allow to enter the Sea of Azov, are restricted from interruption to the assembly, the movements of troops, or heavy guns, on spots which hereafter it might be essential for future success to find unoccupied — and this to happen also in sight and in the range of our guns.
The Despatch to me states that the Generals of the Armies are to arrange the Armistice: it is in the sense that the Naval Blockade is to be maintained. I consider that the Naval Blockade does not refer merely to the enemy’s vessels at sea; it refers to the power of the Allied cruisers — the most essential and valuable power of interruption and command on the low coasts and exposed shores, a command which might be vital to success hereafter, and which might be marred by our voluntarily giving it up for a month just previous to the commencement of hostilities.
Codrington has refused to agree to this surrender of naval power.
I therefore, in the communications with Marshal Pélissier and to General Lüders on the part of the Allies, have positively refused to agree to any such surrender of our power over the movements of troops, artillery and convoys, on any part of the enemy’s coast coming under our Naval fire.
No Armistice has as yet been signed:— a cessation of fire from the advanced posts has been merely ordered on both sides. You mentioned to me the necessity you were under to give orders to the fleet for no attack or firing to take place on anything on shore.
I can only represent to you the possible consequences of a restriction which I cannot think is contemplated in its effects by the Allied governments.
If you consider yourself bound to give the orders, perhaps you might consider the policy of at all events letting the Senior officer on stations keep them secret until instructions may be received from England.
It cannot possibly be intended that hostilities are to cease in such a manner as to give this uncalled for advantage to the enemy.
March 7, 1856.
I am in receipt of your last note, and am sorry to perceive that you are not reconciled to your position in event of the war proceeding and the two armies being formed. Your determination to follow the views of the Government in spite of your own personal feeling makes my regret all the stronger. Looking at the operations as a whole, I assure you that I regarded the chances of your being the assailant of the enemy to be fully equal to that of the French Commander.
Peace more probable.
But I will not enter into further argument, as it is pretty clear now that peace is about to ensue, and your first movement will be homewards. I have telegraphed to you to pull in your horns, and you may tell your Commissary-General to put some measure on his future arrangements for supply. It will be a serious affair sending home your army, and I wish you would arrange your order of March in your own mind and give me a guess of the time which it will require to evacuate the Crimea and our other positions in the East. I have robbed you of Wetherall, but he really was absolutely necessary to Airey for his defence. My notion of the Land Transport Corps is that, immediately on peace being intimated, you should return all the officers and men to their different regiments, and then I can break up the Corps and remodel it at home at leisure, when you and others will be here to aid me with your experience and advice.
We are all surprised at the condition of your troops, and John Bull is wonderfully reconciled to his expenditure when he sees such results. Do all honour to the French baby when it arrives.
Private and Confidential.
Between March 7 and 14, 1856.
Writer’s impression that peace is inevitable.
I give this note an extra heading of privacy, as it expresses more forcibly than I have hitherto done my impressions that peace is now inevitable. The conferences are fast verging to a mutual agreement on all the main points, and, when these are defined, I think no differences on minor ones can be made an excuse for interrupting the peaceward course of events. Under these circumstances I am drawing in all my horns here as speedily, but as quietly, as I can. I shall send out no more troops beyond the artillery now under orders, and these you distribute among the Mediterranean garrisons and at Gibraltar in place of men who have been in the war, and who are entitled to come home. You can relieve Sir George MacLean’s mind on the subject of stores, as I am quite convinced that you will find a ready market for all you have to spare, and that if you think it prudent you will get a good price for all your Cavalry horses, instead of being at the trouble and expense of bringing them home. You will turn in your mind the question of sending the 10th and 12th back to India, and let me know your opinion thereupon.
You would do well to curtail your railway expenditure as soon as you can get definite information of peace, and we can give the necessary notices to all our civil employes, many of whom will, I have no doubt, be glad to take employment abroad with Turkey, Austria, or Russia herself, rather than be brought home, and so we may get them off our hands without payment of bounty. However, this is of course only surmise.
Plans for bringing home troops.
In sending your troops home, I think the least invidious way will be to observe the order in which they went out, and to lay down the rule, ‘First out, first home.’ I am concocting a plan so as to bring the men home through France. It will save money and time and all the discomfort of the Bay of Biscay voyage, and we shall have quarters prepared for them by the previous disembodiment of the Militia. Some of the last regiments which joined you will have to go to Malta to take up the duties now done by the Militia.
The principal regret I feel in this sudden peace is that our foreign levies have had no trial in the field, but it cannot be helped. You will of course not betray this free communication to you of what are strictly Cabinet secrets, but I could not think of keeping you uninformed, as you will have much credit in retiring your army, and it would be unfair not to give you every opportunity of thinking over it.
March 8, 1856.
Improved regulations in Barrack Department.
I return your Memorandum on the Works in the Barrack Department, which I have read with the very greatest pleasure, as it ensures a better state for the future. The allowing each Commanding Engineer the free expenditure of small sums, without entering into a correspondence, which costs the country more in labour, stationery, and postage than the whole expense is worth, and prevents that ‘stitch in time’ which is ‘to save nine’ to be given, is an immense improvement; equally so the purchase of stores on the spot.
I hope that the rule about plans, and the vigorous prosecution of the works sanctioned, will be extended also to the Fortification Department.
SEBASTOPOL, March 8, 1856.
A return of winter weather — impedes progress of works at Balaclava.
Rather a bitter additional winter is come suddenly upon us; snow on the ground still, and the thermometer, with a cold northerly wind, is at 22°. It came down a real fall of snow again on the 27th February, again on the 28th, but with thawing weather, and everything in a mess; then hard and cold, then, on the 4th, a regular deep snow-storm, which, continuing at intervals, with a gale of wind, gave us the drifts and poudré of a Canadian winter; the earth, however, was warm, the gale from the S.W. was thawing everything rapidly, when, yesterday and to-day, some more sleet, with a northerly wind and thermometer at 22°, have made us feel that winter has not yet given up its hold of the Crimea. With this weather it has been impossible to do anything but preliminaries of work; a company of sappers is encamped on the west of Balaclava, tracing out the works of the batteries and lines; but to camp many men there at present would necessitate probably as much work, to take care of themselves in this severe weather, as would be obtained rather later for the main purpose when the climate is more to be trusted.
I have requested Colonel Staunton, R.E., to be placed in communication with Sir Colin Campbell as to the maintenance and improvements of the lines or batteries in front of, and to the east of, Balaclava.
Removal of captured guns.
I have about 40 Russian guns here on the plateau, and shall probably have 70 retained altogether, for replacing our own now in position. In order to move the Russian guns both from the gun wharf and creek batteries on the level of the water, and from the Redan and Barrack batteries, the Woronzoff road was repaired by a detachment of the Army Works Corps, and openings were made through the rampart and across the ditch of the proper left face of the Redan. The greater part of the Artillery horses have been daily employed during decent weather in this: it is a heavy business, but 406 guns or carronades have already been put on board of ship for England: the detail of what they are will go home, of course, to Woolwich. There are many of the Redan guns which, with their carriages, showing the knocking about of shot upon them, I thought might be interesting; and one or two big mortars also.
Captured buildings of the South Side, and proceedings with regard to them.
I hope you do not let them forget at Paris that we hold power over the quay and buildings of Fort Paul: don’t let us be bound not to destroy, unless we get an equivalent. There is any quantity of timber inside them; for the interior is made with timber supports for the great weights of stores above, and they [there] are two stories of them. Very likely the Russians will prefer the pride of having entirely excluded our flag; bon; if so, do not let us be bound not to have our command over them: they will make the destruction on our side pretty complete. The inside walls of the large barrack buildings at which poor Major Rankine was engaged are all down, and thus, taking the support from one side of the whole roof, it has fallen, inside the outer wall, upon the mines. The outer walls all round form a shell, a screen, for our collection of the wood, which being deal, and all of course squared, may be of use for many things in case of hostility from this side. I keep it as religiously as I can from the purloining habits against wood of every soldier.
The outer walls of these buildings are all prepared for loading the small chambers with powder, and blowing down when they have answered our purpose. I have not prepared the mines for Fort Paul quay and buildings, though the plan is ready.
Application of Lüders’ proposed armistice to these buildings.
These buildings — the whole of them — and the gun wharf, being under the fire, and in sight of the batteries on the north shore, you see how completely the wording of Lüders’ proposed armistice might have prevented our doing even as much as we can now do in spite of any fire; for we should have bound ourselves not to attempt it.
Britain’s surplus stores offered to France.
There is no doubt the French troops are suffering much from scurvy, and are in want of many things. I fancy that the authorities must be hampered by not incurring expense: we have given them lime juice, we have offered them our surplus stores, of which we have so much: 4 — 30,000 rugs, 20,000 blankets, 10,000 waterproof blankets, 100,000 pair of socks and stockings, 10,000 pair of gloves, 6,000 waterproof capes, 100 gutta percha tent floors, 18,000 great coats (over), 5,000 ditto, 10,000 pair of ammunition boots, 5,000 pair of sabots, 2,500 pair of thigh boots, 1,500 pair of knee boots, 10,000 horse rugs — at the price charged to the Government.
I have not got Pélissier’s, or rather Martimprez’ answer; for you will understand the object was not to make a public show of such offers, but to be of real service without offence to amour propre. You remember they would not take the huts which we offered to them before sending them away to Constantinople.
The Imperador arrived at Kasatch with 800 men from Malta.
The offer rejected.
I just hear that the ‘Intendant’ of the French army does not wish for any of the articles offered by us.
March 10, 1856.
Nothing could give the Queen greater pleasure than to receive her gallant and noble soldiers, and she will make a point of going to Woolwich to receive them if she knows when it will be. It will be a fine and interesting sight.
March 10, 1856.
Having read Mr. Fergusson’s republished book, I asked Colonel Foster to call upon me to ask him some questions. I find that Fergusson is quite wrong in his measurements with regard to the distance of the proposed new forts, particularly Elson, from the Gosport Lines, which will be 3000 and not 800 yards.
New Forts in the Portsmouth District.
With regard to Portsmouth and the works to be undertaken this year, I find that for Gomer Fort it requires to have the contract executed before the works can be commenced; up to that point all preliminaries are completed.
ELSON FORT; all the drawings and plans have gone in to your department, and it is required to get the contracts advertised.
The purchase of Land for the great enceinte round Gosport ought to be put at once into the hands of the Land Surveyor. I am afraid that the Lawyers will take a long time about it, as they do about everything, and the sooner begun the better.
March 11, 1856.
Queen to go to Woolwich to receive soldiers.
The Queen has informed Sir Hew Ross 5 that she will be at Woolwich at half-past three on Thursday, and wishes only to be told by telegraph if the vessel arrives, or if she is delayed, in which case the Queen would be equally ready to go there on Friday or Saturday.
Sir Hew Ross will communicate with the Admiralty so that everything will be arranged.
Provision for the German Legion after the war.
As (the Queen fears) peace seems now pretty certain to be concluded, she is very anxious to press upon Lord Panmure the question of the German Legion; she trusts that there is no doubt that they will be provided for in the Colonies in the manner he mentioned, as these poor men have many of them lost their nationality, and the Queen is certain that it would be very bad policy to act ungenerously towards them. It would greatly add to the unpopularity in Germany which we owe to our Press, and, on the other hand, if we treat them well, it may have a very good effect on the Continent.
March 11, 1856.
The mail this instant arrived brings me your private letter up to the 25th February, and some telegraphic messages. . . .
Drafts from Malta ordered up, on second thoughts ordered to be in readiness.
You will know that I ordered up all drafts from Malta — it was quite time if they were to be available by the beginning of April: you must counter-order from England — on second thoughts I will write to General Pennefather to-day to hold his hand as to these; 6 for of course if the fleet and transports come up full, they will only have to take down the same number again — a great loss of transport.
Your probabilities of peace are so strong that I think you will approve of this. . . .
New decision as to armistice.
I send you officially the account of our last decision for armistice: no answer has yet been received: if peace is so probable, l should think the directions to Lüders will be to agree to it. I think the French are now glad that we did not give in — or rather that I did not give in.
French Army suffering much from sickness.
The French are suffering much, very much, from sickness, arising, I think, from want of liberality as to food, and appliances of all sorts. A marked contrast to what England has done for its army this year, and which would have shown true economy if we had had to open the campaign early next month.
Defence of General Airey.
I look upon the attack of England, if it is to be considered so, upon General Airey as a ‘set for a victim’; I think it ungenerous, as it will turn out unjust. Supposing there were errors, deficiencies, during a time of great trial and difficulty, and under a sudden resolution of necessity that we were to pass the winter here: is that to be the ground of ruining, for the sake of catching at some victim, an officer who served well in other things besides road-making, boots or flannel shirts? Is every other service of importance with Lord Raglan to be forgotten, his constant presence, his constant and intimate work with him on the most confidential subjects?
HEAD-QUARTERS, March 14, 1856.
In accordance with your orders I went with General de Martimprez and Colonel Pettit this day to the bridge of Traktir, where we arrived at 1 P.M.
General Timacheff and M. Ozéreff met us on the part of the Russians, as on the previous occasion.
General Lüders having, as you are aware, consented to our terms as forwarded to him after our receipt of the counter-propositions, we had nothing to do but to make the articles agreed upon binding upon all quarters as regarded the Ottoman forces in the Crimea.
This we did, and then signed the papers.
After the public business was transacted, General Timacheff asked me if I thought the allies were now entitled lawfully to destroy the hospitals, etc., in Sebastopol. I replied, ‘Certainly; I do not know that it will be done, but we certainly have the right to do it.’
Although the weather was extremely cold, the meeting passed off most amicably, the younger ones of both sides seeming to think the champagne sent down by Marshal Pélissier and you particularly good, and the cigars by no means to be despised.
The Russians came in more state than on previous occasion, and towards the end of the conference a great many soldiers (say 1500) came down to have a look at us and say good morning to their enemies. They behaved very civilly and well.
March 14, 1856.
In a letter from Lord Clarendon received by the Queen yesterday, he says that the Medals for the Queen’s army 7 will be sent off the moment that Colonel Claremont receives the number required from Lord Panmure. As they were to be given at the rate of 10 for every 1000 men, the Queen does not think it would require much time to give the number. The selection of the men had best be left, the Queen thinks, to the Regiments themselves. Would Lord Panmure consult Lord Hardinge with respect to these points at once, and let Marshal Vaillant have the number as soon as possible?
When will the Lists for the Légion d’honneur be finally ready for the Queen to see?
German Legion.
With respect to the subject of the German Legion, which the Queen mentioned to Lord Panmure the other day, she wishes to add, that it is the officers whose cases are the hardest, and who she trusts something may be done for. They have gone to great expense, and probably will find themselves in a very painful position in their own countries for having ventured to enter the Queen’s service. If, therefore, they were not considered or treated with generosity, the effect on the Continent would be most mischievous as regards this Country.
March 14, 1856.
Lord Panmure presents his humble duty to Your Majesty, and has the honour to inform Your Majesty that he has decided to ask for 500 War Medals, to cover 50,000 combatants — non-commissioned officers and men.
Selection of men to receive medals.
On the question of selection of men to receive these medals, Lord Panmure will consult with Lord Hardinge and communicate the result to Your Majesty.
Lord Panmure is of opinion that Your Majesty, with your wonted capacity, has named the best mode.
The lists for the Legion of Honour are now preparing for submission to Your Majesty. The Emperor has kindly given the few decorations required to reconcile the lists of Sir James Simpson and Sir William Codrington. Lord Panmure will do all in his power to carry out Your Majesty’s views in regard to the officers of the German Legion.
PARIS, March 14, 1856.
As to the Peace Conference in Paris.
. . . I suppose we may look upon peace as settled, though I expect trouble to-day at the Conference about the matter of ships to be maintained in the Black Sea. I have had more trouble in fighting Walewski than Orloff.
I must know clearly what conditions to make for facilitating the withdrawal of our troops. Palmerston wants the Russians to withdraw to Perekop, but they are not likely to agree to that, nor do I see that it is necessary.
14th March 1856.
Since I last wrote you I have received heavy mails from you, and I am sorry to find you are at issue with me on the position selected for you had the war gone on. It is of no use to disguise the approach of peace in writing confidentially to you, and this renders unnecessary any argument on the question, otherwise I think I could have given you good reasons, and as strong prospect of activity, to reconcile you to remaining before Sevastopol. Mind I do not for a moment suppose that you would have failed in one tittle to carry out the instructions of Government, whatever they were.
Prospects of peace set aside controversies.
For the same reason, namely the impending of Peace, I forbear from answering some of your public confidential despatches, as I see no good in controversies, although amiable, and much writing — which is always to be avoided. We are all proud of your review and the condition of your men, and we feel grateful to you and all your officers for your application of the means placed at your disposal.
Your press order has only roused the Times, and his bark is now worse than his bite. . . .
I have written you a short despatch approving your order, and thereby making myself a partner in any responsibility that may attach to it. The selections from the Siege train landed yesterday at Woolwich, and the Queen went down to receive them.
It was a bitter cold day, but all went off well.
I may possibly miss the mail of Monday week, the 24th, as I am going to look after my own affairs for the first time since 1st February last year.
March 15, 1856.
War preparations to continue, but reinforcements to be suspended for the present.
Although your last private letters tell me to keep on preparing to the utmost, yet your telegraph of the 6th of March enables me to hold my hand in many things.
The increasing the amount of troops, particularly horses, in the Crimea, is such a disadvantage — such an useless occupation of transport, not so much in coming up as in going away, that I thought it right to stop the large reinforcements coming from Malta just now, but requesting, or suggesting, that the transport should remain there in readiness to bring them up immediately upon orders from England, or from any known continuance of the war by information from hence. . . .
Inquiry as to ultimate destination of the Army.
No doubt you will let me know, when you can give me a hint, of what becomes of the army. If to remain anywhere in the voisinage of present events, the nucleus of all establishments will have to be kept up.
Anticipates discontinuance of Land Transport and Commissariat Establishments.
I only wish to know from a desire not to extend establishments that, as sure as England is England, and railroads exist, will cease with the immediate necessity which created them. Perhaps you might think of Ireland as the place where a Transport and commissariat corps might be maintained-for I imagine movements of troops there depend somewhat upon ‘Irish cars.’
The Armistice concluded.
I am able to send the copy of the terms of the armistice yesterday at the Tractir bridge. 8 It was very cold but interesting. I remained on the Fedouchine Spur myself, out of the way or mixing officially in it, but ready in case of any reference being required: and when the conference broke up, I crossed over and joined the mixture of troops of all nations which accompanied the Russians across the plain to the rising ground right of the Tchernaya. Tartar Cossacks, in scarlet and yellow, the usual Cossacks in grey, Russian uniforms of all sorts, helmets, plumes, prancing horses, many of our own and the French varied uniforms, crowds of Russian soldiers — unarmed — (got up for the occasion, I think), all were mixed in the swaying crowd across the plain: some champagne and cigars sent down by Pélissier and myself had had all attention paid to them, and intimacy and ‘eternal friendship,’ ‘au revoir,’ and even to kissing became the wind up to the ‘good-bye’ of the day. All passed off very well.
As to buildings in Sebastopol still undestroyed.
The remark to Windham 9 about the only remaining buildings on Fort Paul quay shows the Russians value them: although I am somewhat tempted on my own authority here to say what condition I could make for saving them, yet, having left it so long ago in your hands, I have been debarred. It is very possible it might have, and might still turn the balance in favour of our use of the harbour. And had I to do it, I should have openly told General Lüders that it was for the sake of the sort of bargain that I had not previously destroyed them. I leave you at Paris to make the best of it. They are the only buildings of any size existing in the whole South side of the harbour, and therefore valuable to them as the shelter for the first military re-occupation of Sebastopol.
Our winter is not gone: the cold wind of yesterday brought some snow in the evening — not much — but a bright sun does not prevent the cold being great to-day from the northerly wind.
March 16, 1856.
As the ground for the Military Hospital has been acquired, and a sum of money voted for its erection, the Queen would wish soon to lay the first stone of it herself, and would propose do so when we are in the Isle of Wight during the Whitsuntide holidays. This would leave nearly a month for the completion of the plans and other preliminary proceedings, and would put an end to further delays. The Queen would therefore wish Lord Panmure to give orders to this effect, so that everything may be ready by the middle of May.
The Queen sends Lord Panmure two of the pins which she mentioned to him the other day as a good plan for attaching the Medals or Crosses to the recipients’ coats.
She has tried it herself and found it answer extremely well.
March 17, 1856.
The Queen thanks Lord Panmure for his letter received this morning, and readily grants him leave to go to dear Scotland, which he must be so anxious to do.
March 17, 1856.
A conversation with the Chancellor of the Exchequer yesterday has convinced me that the notion exists in some quarters that the sum of money taken this year for works (Barracks, Fortifications, etc. etc.) is too large, and that it may be desirable not to spend it, and to reduce the works!
This renders it the more necessary to go vigorously ahead in your Department.
Desirability of pushing on with the new Barracks and Forts.
I wish to remind you that the Queen has not yet had submitted to her the plans for the new barrack at Gosport, nor of that for Dover. This is the proper season for the works, and it is very important to push them.
The Queen has also not had submitted to her the plans for the completion of Gomer Fort, for Elson Fort, and for the new works at Dover.
An anomaly at Colchester.
I have not been able to go to Colchester, but on inquiry I find that, although a camp for 3—2000 men has been erected there, there is not drilling-ground there even for a complete Battalion. On whose recommendation was this spot selected? The Horse Guards disclaim all knowledge of it. You will not suppose that I put this question in fault-finding spirit, but merely to assist in guarding against mistakes which must defeat the object the Government, and you in particular, have in view.
A bargain in land in Carmarthenshire.
The Queen has had submitted to her the proposal to sell 210 acres of waste land in Carmarthenshire for the sum of £425, therefore at £2 the acre!! The Queen will not sign the paper before knowing whether the Ordnance may not want it. To obtain for £400 what sometimes is quite impossible to find. This might be made the place for training the Welsh Militia.
A couple of thousand pounds would get up the Hutting necessary to keep them, and thus a good deal of money might be saved to the country.
You will see that the land is quite square, with stream flowing through it.
March 17, 1856.
Equipment of Colchester Camp.
There is no drilling-ground attached to the Colchester encampment but 20 acres; an addition of 13 is, I believe, contemplated; this together would be useless, and the ground is not level enough for a parade!! A field of 140 acres adjoins the camp on the opposite side, and could have been had at a rent of £300 when the camp was formed. It would be quite necessary to try to obtain this on a sufficiently long lease, if the whole expense of the camp is not to be thrown away.
Gas could be supplied (and is much wanted) at an outlay of £1,500, which would save £250 a year according to the Engineer’s statement.
The General and his staff are most anxious for both these measures.
Promotion of Codrington, Colin Campbell, and others.
It appears but just and fair that Sir W. Codrington and Sir Colin Campbell should be promoted to the rank of Lieut.-Generals — having commanded whole armies, and that the Colonels who have been made Brigadiers to command Brigades, but have since commanded Divisions, should, on resigning their Commands, be made Major-Generals.
They are Colonel Garrett, Colonel Cameron and Lord W. Paulet. I should add Colonel Storks, who has commanded in Chief at Scutari.
Now the war is closed, the objection entertained by the Queen to the appointment of Generals Barnard and Lord Rokeby to K.C.B., originally recommended by Lord Panmure, no longer exists.
WAR DEPARTMENT, March 17, 1856.
As to withdrawing British forces from the seat of war.
I am as yet unable to write you officially on the subject of the Peace, but you will gather from my various telegrams that it is coming on very rapidly. You had better turn in your mind the easiest mode of withdrawing your force, and I am in hopes to secure the facility for so doing from both the quays of Sebastopol and those of Balaclava. Do you think you could in any way find a fair market for our Cavalry and Artillery horses, for, if this could be done, much trouble and expense might be saved, as there is nothing which costs so much to move as horses do? All the heavy and serviceable siege guns can be packed at Malta and Gibraltar, and I venture once more to suggest to you that all unserviceable iron ordnance should be carried in lighters outside the harbour of Balaclava and there consigned to the deep.
I hope you will now finally put an end to all purchases of Land Transport horses as far as you can, and that the agencies may be speedily paid off. Any large contracts for hay or barley should be avoided, except so far as necessary to keep a sufficient store in hand for present service. I think you will find, in reference to the shipment of our stores, it will be far more satisfactory to have them all given to Captain Gordon, and let him be responsible for their embarkation or disposal, as the case may be.
War allowance.
There is one point to which I would especially draw your attention, and that is the extra 6d. per day. As soon as peace is proclaimed this will cease, as the warrant only extends to a period of actual warfare. I am not quite certain whether a previous armistice might not affect the issue, but the men shall have the benefit of the doubt.
Soldiers [sic] beards.
Can you by any means bring your men home without beards? You will do a great service if you can, because we cannot allow them here, and for this among other reasons, that it is a cover for desertion. A man with a beard deserts and immediately shaves. He cannot be recognised, and we shall lose a vast number of men. This is no fancy, we have experienced it in the German legion, and therefore I am anxious on the subject. Moreover these beards are not pretty at home, though I dare say they may be useful abroad.
Of course all your Balaclava works are now unnecessary, and I shall send you no more railway horses or plant.
There was an idea of asking the Russians to withdraw while we were retiring, but this has been abandoned as an unworthy request to make.
I presume they will be required to keep their positions. . . .
March 18, 1856.
Burning accident to men of Army Works Corps.
St. Patrick’s Day will have its celebration in most places; and it has been attended with a very sad result last night to the Commissariat branch of the Army Works Corps, among whom sixteen men have been burned to death in their huts, and with good reason to suppose that they were lost in consequence of intoxication.
There having been no time to get a real and correct report — for the bodies are in a shocking and undistinguishable state — I would not telegraph the loss, in order that anxiety might not be kept alive for so long previous to the arrival of correct details. I have sent you an official letter subsequent to my seeing personally Mr. Wakefield, the superintendent.
The weather has been bitterly cold; a strong northerly and easterly wind, with the thermometer well below freezing — 13° last night, and at 20° and 25° to-day with a bright sun.
On the 16th, the letters came from General Lüders with his signature to the armistice, consequent upon the previous interchange of the terms signed by the respective Chiefs of the Staff at the Tractir bridge.
Peaceful march of three Divisions of the Army.
On Sunday the 16th, three Divisions, the 1st, the 2nd, and the 4th, were ordered to march from their camps with their Artillery and Land Transports, take up a position near the Monastery of St. George, cook, and return to camp after I had seen them about 2 o’clock. The day was fine, but the cold wind increasing, the cooking and parading was cut short. I went out with them, as they passed by Headquarters about 9 o’clock; General Barnard commanded the whole; the movement of troops, always a fine sight, and interesting, as they passed up valleys, or across ridges, converging to the high ground between Balaclava and the Monastery.
Incomplete Land Transport.
None of the Land Transport of these Divisions is complete: there is the foundation of each Department of it, the first, reserve of ammunition, the ambulance, and the camp equipage; but the old carts and waggons are not yet replaced in these Divisions, nor have I thought it advisable now to take more men than are necessary from the ranks. I had desired that the 3rd Division should be completed as much as possible; and men, and horses, and matériel, are all nearly up to the field mark in that Division. I had also desired the Highland Division to be completed in a similar manner: they are so pretty nearly as to animals, but they have only 81 men taken from the Regiments at present, the L. T. Corps making up the remainder, and Colonel Wetherall did not wish to send the whole of the animals to them at Kamara till the weather was more decidedly fit for it. Nor under present circumstances shall I think it worth while taking more soldiers from their ranks.
General La Marmora is returned; we exchanged a few words on the road yesterday, as we had missed each other at our respective quarters.
Trophies for the Sardinians.
I have asked by telegraph as to our giving to the Sardinians a share of the trophies and guns from Sebastopol. There seems to have been no order to my predecessor to do so; but the Sardinian army was added to the English army to make up our right to the one-third proportion, and it seems fitting that that army should have its proportionate benefit. I wish you could have got for us the use of the harbour by our fleet, even by open boats and coasting.
Captain Osborne, R.N., will go to-morrow to command at Kertch and in the Sea of Azof. At present it is not navigable from ice. He called upon me by desire of the Admiral, and I was glad to have information from him relative to some parts of the coast.
Recommends warning rather than force in the Sea of Azof during the armistice.
I suggested that, in maintaining the naval power over the shore movements of Russian troops, it would be as well to avoid firing during an armistice, and that a previous warning of any troops might probably induce them to return or desist; but that the terms insisted on left our navy full power over everything coming under their guns, except unnecessary attack upon towns and coasts.
Sir George Maclean goes home at once. . . .
Coupling your telegraph of the 6th March with the probable date of embarkation of the troop and batteries of Artillery for the period between the 2nd and 10th March, I imagine you will have counter-ordered them for the present.
March 22, 1856.
Continued cold.
This month has been as uncomfortable in point of climate as any period of our year and half residence here. But it is not unhealthy — on the contrary, there is the same continued freedom from disease, the same continued smallness of numbers on the sick-list. Therefore we will say nothing about the misère of a low thermometer, with as strong and as bitterly cold a N.E. wind as ever twinged faces and ears.
Independent spirit of the French.
I am sorry to hear of the French losing men and suffering much from sickness at Constantinople as well as here: at Constantinople, however, they have accepted, and I wish they had done so here, some little assistance in port wine, arrowroot, and essence of beef. But with their sick here lying on the ground under canvas, they did not some time ago accept the offer of huts, or more lately of hospital trestles, which are sent to Scutari to prevent encumbering our stores at Balaclava. . . .
Unless increased, the Land Transport Corps cannot be looked on as prepared.
I did not get any telegraph from you by the last mail — my latest date being of the 6th March, in which you mention the probability of peace, inducing your advice to check increase, though to undo nothing. But you must be quite aware that, as far as Land Transport goes, not increasing and not completing is, in fact, not being ready. And I am loth to take more bayonets from the ranks, or to make that Corps permanently a source of expense, though its efficiency is impaired by my not doing so.
Slackness of French sentries.
The Russians and ourselves and French are all very good friends in the place of contact, the borders of the Tchernaya. But it is very curious that the French, nominally, and sometimes very apparently, strict, and even disagreeably so in the matter of their sentries, should be so slack as that many of the Russians have been up on the heights into the French camp, and two Russian officers were asking the way about on the plateau. I wonder what would have been said had ‘les Anglais’ been in charge of outposts and such things happened.
Amenities of the armistice.
On Easter Monday we are to have some races on the flat — steeplechases and hurdle-races, etc. — on our side of the Tchernaya, below the Fedioukine: I have sent some printed ‘cards of the races’ to General Lüders, in case any of the Russians should like to come and see what is going on. General Timacheff was mentioning their absence of news, which enabled Colonel Blane to send him, at his request, some Galignanis and other newspapers. The accounts we have, from information, are that their communications are difficult, their rations somewhat reduced, and that there is a great extent of sickness in their army, and their stores of provisions very much reduced. . . .
I have suggested to Count Zamoyski that Varna should be his Headquarters, in preference to Scutari: it is easier to move his infantry there than his cavalry to Constantinople from that place, and his guns can go more easily to his horses at Varna than his horses to the guns now at Constantinople. 10 Besides this, it will give room at Constantinople, and General Storks is overcrowded even now.
The Army Works Corps — its weak points.
It seems to me a stretch of imagination, and a considerable one, for any one to say in Parliament that the army would have been as badly off this year as last had it not been for the Army Works Corps. This is ‘un peu fort.’
I wonder of what use the 800 men of that Corps have been, or likely to have been, whom Mr. Doyne is now on the point of sending to England from the various causes of inefficiency which he is to detail to me?
A very long time was occupied, as indeed we all expected, in making themselves comfortable with their huts, and the etceteras of a camp: I do not mean that they, as well as others, are not made more efficient by this means; but, to read what is said of them, one would fancy the curious belief that they started at once working for the advantage of the army, which could not have got on without them. A very great mistake; and the very sauntering way in which I see, and plenty of others see, their work done on the roads, the very small inducement that makes a knot of them lean on their spades in conversation on the road which is their special care, all this has not given to these expensive and easy-going gentlemen the character of great energy or activity in work.
Costliness of the same.
I think your lordship would be somewhat surprised at the cost, from departure from the shores of England to return thereto, compared with the real amount of work done for the army. Hence we certainly do not believe in much of what people persuade themselves in England.
March 25, 1856.
Slowness of communication by mail-packet and importance of its being accelerated.
[After complaining of the slowness with which news is brought out by the mail-packet, Codrington writes:]
All news as to peace, all directions from you as to the destination of troops, and particularly of Cavalry, Artillery, and siege matériel, should come as soon as possible; for instance, the Candia arrived with Artillery to-day, I keep the horses on board, for the mail may bring the advisability of their return immediately to England or Scutari: I have written to General Storks, to stop what I can at Scutari; but I hope you will telegraph to him direct on such subjects. Perhaps it would be well for the Admiral at Constantinople to have the means of some small and fast despatch-boats for telegraph and instructions from you, now that the electric wire is not continued to us. The destination of troops, either to Mediterranean or to England direct, is a knowledge which may facilitate arrangements very materially as to the sort of vessel in which to place them, and whether for two short trips such as Corfu or Malta, or the whole voyage home.
Reverts to drawbacks of the plan of campaign.
. . . I cannot help feeling that the English army would have been in an inferior national and military position in the plan of campaign; 11 and remember that that part of the army would have had to be kept up from hence, that in case of loss, sickness, attack of the Russians, diminution of the French or Sardinian armies, it might have been necessary for me to send the greatest part, or a most efficient part, of the English army to carry on operations on the vital point of the campaign, and yet that it would have but been considered a detachment of the army under French Command. And I say nothing of the personal position in which I should then have been placed by the orders of the Government.
The French prince 12 was saluted with 101 guns by us, at the same time as the French, and 80 guns English marched past us, in file, in good order afterwards.
It is said by information that the Russian horses would not be able to transport their Artillery in case of the Allies having to advance at the end of the Armistice.
March 27, 1856.
As to disposing of foreign forces in our service.
. . . I am most anxious that a right decision should be come to about the Turkish Contingent, the Irregular Cavalry, the Ottoman Cossacks, and the Swiss, Italian, and German Legions. Let me beg of you not to be in a hurry in letting go our hold upon any of them.
Liability [sic. "Liberality" intended? DK] recommended in regard to them.
I hope there will be no disbanding as yet, and above all that we shall behave liberally to our foreign legions, — our name and fame in Europe will depend upon it, and liberality will not be bad economy, for I cannot bring myself to believe that this peace will be of long duration, and if war breaks out again we may want foreigners in larger numbers even than we have now procured, but our recruiting will be easy or next to impossible according as we deal with the men at present in our service.
Counsels putting Malta and Gibraltar in a complete state of defence.
You cannot too soon, although in an unostentatious way, put Malta in a complete state of defence and Gibraltar too. It will be easy, as well as natural, to deposit at those places the guns, so necessary for their defence, that you will be bringing home from the Crimea.
I expect that John Bull will turn up his nose at our peace, but we must swear till we are black in the face that he has got as good conditions as he was entitled to demand.
March 28, 1856.
I have just arrived from a week’s run in Scotland, and I find plenty of grouse and shall be glad to give you a turn at them, since we have so scurvily robbed you of your sport against the Russian bear.
Abstinence from destruction of Russian buildings.
You have done your armistice well, and you have been quite right in declining, as Windham has done, your power over the buildings at Fort Paul. I have mentioned this subject to Lord Clarendon some time since, and I hope your abstinence from destruction may be attended with good results to ourselves. You have judged very prudently in staying your Reserves at Malta, and I will send word to the General to detain them from encumbering you for the present. I feel quite confident that you require no instructions from me in guiding you to economy of the public resources, and, when peace is definitely signed, I anticipate with satisfaction as cordial assistance in the recall of our Army as you have given the Government in its organisation and preservation. Your enclosure of the parade of Sir W. Eyre’s Division, as reported in a note from him to General Windham, gave me great satisfaction, and will, I am sure, do the same to the Queen, from whom I could not withhold so interesting a document. I can only say of the treaty of peace that it is progressing to a final signature, but many little hitches will arise, and I fancy a diplomatic conference uses as much ceremony to remove a molehill as they would devote to a mountain. We shall have to renew our armistice by telegram. . . .
PARIS, March 28, 1856.
As to arrangements for evacuation of territory.
As soon as Peace is signed, which I expect it will be on Sunday (if not on Saturday, though I don’t think that possible), we must have a supplementary convention with both the Russians and the Turks about evacuation of territory, and I will beg of you, therefore, to let me know in detail what I am to stipulate for.
By our Treaty with Turkey we are bound to evacuate in 40 days, or sooner if possible, and the French are bound to do so equally with ourselves, but they say they cannot quit Constantinople until their last man comes away from the Crimea, i.e., in six months, and I think they are right, because they ought in the first instance to remove all their troops from the enemy’s country, for which all the shipping they can obtain will be necessary. I suppose we had better pursue the same course, and give ourselves elbow-room for quitting our different positions in Turkey, though none of our Establishments are upon the enormous scale of those of the French at Constantinople.
I was alarmed late last night by a telegram from Hammond, saying that there was a doubt as to whether orders had been sent to Codrington not to renew hostilities without further instructions. I feel quite sure that you must have sent orders, but to make certain of no untoward event happening I have telegraphed to Codrington.
Private.
March 29, 1856.
Lord Panmure on agreement as to proceedings on the conclusion of peace.
We have agreed to the following points to-day with reference to proceedings on the conclusion of peace.
1. That we must have six months to evacuate Russian territory, and withdraw our troops, material, etc. We will do it sooner if we can, of course.
2. In consideration of our having abstained from destroying the quays and storehouses at Fort Paul, that we should be allowed to introduce such vessels as we can into the harbour of Sebastopol for the purpose of facilitating the embarkation of our matériel.
3. The same time will be required for evacuating Turkish ground.
4. If you could coax Ali to give us one of the large brass ordnance, either from Dardanelles or Smyrna, as a memento of our war alliance, it will be gratefully received.
5. Say something about protecting the graves of our gallant soldiers at Sebastopol.
I think you need not be afraid to sign your treaty on Sunday, even a rigid Presbyterian must admit it to be a work of mercy.
SEBASTOPOL, March 29, 1856.
Objects to omissions, not noted as such, in despatches.
I wrote to you last post officially about omissions in despatches; I forgot to refer to it in my private letter, and to explain my feelings on the subject. It may not be of consequence in such things as those mentioned in my official letter. . . . But I do not think it should be considered in the power of any one to omit part of a public despatch, if it is published, unless showing that there is such omission, either by saying it is an extract, or by asterisks. It is not that an officer is at all to judge of whether a despatch or information is to be published or not; but if it is, — as conveying facts, or opinions on those facts, — he is entitled to his own full representation, or to the knowledge of its being an extract only. . . .
It must depend on Lord Hardinge to settle the stations of particular regiments, after the Government has settled what is the political destination, or the military separation of the army. It is no use my attempting anything, or holding out hopes, for England or elsewhere, which other necessities of the service or arrangements might immediately alter.
If you were to leave the business to me, irrespective of the destination of regiments, I think the following would be the course I should take in succession of embarkation.
Sketches a plan for embarking troops, etc.
First to embark all siege train and stores and impedimenta of every description, sending them to Malta or Corfu or to Scutari, and getting the vessels back, if the whole vessel was necessarily occupied by such stores, so as not to delay for long the embarkation of troops. If troops have to go to Malta, or Constantinople, or Corfu, to remain, then these vessels should take partly stores, partly troops.
If the Turks wish, and our Government consents, I would sell to them cavalry horses, the Land Transport and whole of its matériel, and many of the Engineer and Artillery stores: the whole of these I should then assemble at Sinope and the Dardanelles, the shorter voyages to which would allow quick return here for embarking troops.
Considerations to be kept in view in parting with horses.
The horses of Artillery are not easily replaced, and any disposal of these, and of cavalry horses, must be viewed in reference to the inefficiency created in both arms by disposing of them, compared to the percentage of loss, and time occupied in paying transports, on the voyage.
The Candia lost 9 out of 189,
The Jura lost 4 out of 205,
The Argo lost 14 out of 190,in their voyages of about 16 or 18 days from England lately.
Continues plan of embarkation.
Then, as soon as the Siege train and stores, and Land Transport, and cavalry and Artillery field batteries are gone from hence, I would send the infantry, or possibly one or two divisions simultaneously with them, to their destinations. I should not care about moving the siege train and stores from Scutari, if it occupied transport that could be employed in the evacuation of the Crimea.
Then, again, you might have some political advantage in keeping the whole of the infantry of the army together in light marching order, and letting a fleet of men of war and fine merchant steamers show that the same power of simultaneous and rapid removal shows a future facility for disembarkation in any given locality.
All this outline, and indeed the detail of the disposition of regiments, must be settled in England. All the rest you may throw upon me in any quantity of work or responsibility you choose.
As to proposed passage of British troops through France.
I think your passage through France of troops is questionable as to time, and possibly in other points. If your five steamers can bring cavalry or artillery out here in 16 days, do you think you can economise time or money by their landing at Marseilles? I should doubt it. The entente cordiale between the nations and armies is very good now; you might or might not improve it by a passage of many troops through France. . . .
Disposal of L.T.C. horses.
Colonel M’Murdo dined here yesterday; of course the whole arrangements for completion of the L.T.C. are at a standstill; if the animals are to be disposed of to the Turks, I think there will be sufficient men of that Corps, and of natives, to take over, and care for the animals at Sinope and at the Dardanelles — thus letting me bring all soldiers back to the ranks. The officers put to the Corps, ‘pending H.M.’s pleasure,’ are I think entitled to their commissions, after having done the duty, and under such a pledge as that given in the General Orders of this army.
The armistice is renewed indefinitely by us. I have not received Lüders’ signature, but I think it is by this time with the French. . . .
Disappointment of military aspirations.
There are many disappointments indeed in the hopes to which I had looked forward in this fine command; it need not be said, but can well be felt by every one, with what feeling of pride the whole army would have made its effort for England, which had been looking forward, and would have been looking on; and whether here, or in Asia — under whatever difference of opinion as to my own position or the locality of the war — my efforts should have been given to doing all in my power in return for the command in which I had been placed. You may reckon upon my not wishing quitting, though with many inducements to do so, this country till the hard work is over.
PY., March 30, 1856.
Force to be sent to Canada from the Crimea.
I conclude that the four Regiments which you are going to send to Canada from the Crimea will take up at Malta their additional Companies and their Drafts, and that they will go on at a strength of nearly a thousand each, but I think we ought to send five thousand men at least and some good Staff Officers and a good General to command. This American dispute l3 may, and most likely will, end in smoke; but we must be prepared for the case of its ending in gunpowder smoke, and as Peace is now signed, and our troops are disposable, we should be greatly and justly blamed if we lost a day in properly reinforcing the garrison of our North American Colonies — we ought also to send a sufficient supply of artillery-men.
What sort of troops would you choose for sending to N. America? Should they not have, as a portion, a Rifle Battalion?
Private.March 30.
The Commander-in-Chief fired away at 10 last night 14 as you would hear, instead of 10 this morning, but it does not matter as we have several precedents.
Troops for Canada, and prospects there.
In regard to sending more troops to Canada, I have seen Hardinge, and there will be no difficulty in sending immediately from the Crimea 5 regiments of 800 rank and file each, which will be 4,000, and a field battery of artillery, as well as two Companies from home for the works out there. I proposed to him to constitute the force in British North America into a Division of two brigades, and to send a Lt.-General from the Crimea with the 5 Regiments. This would give you a reliable Officer in case of necessity, and Major-General Horne in Canada and Sir G. Le Marchant in Nova Scotia will fall into the command of the two Brigades. The name of Sir William Eyre is here mentioned as under consideration for the command. We will have some good staff-officers sent out to put things in order, and the munitions of war will be ready to ascend the St. Lawrence as soon as the ice will fairly permit them. I think you will do well to have one rifle regiment among the troops selected, and you cannot go wrong with any now in the Crimea — I am not afraid of any filibustering inroad, or even of a regular set to, but for the latter we shall and ought to be better prepared.
WINDSOR CASTLE, March 31, 1856.
Sanctions sending of troops from Crimea direct to Canada.
The Queen would wish to see Lord Panmure at 6 at Buckingham Palace to-morrow. Lord Palmerston has written to her about Troops being sent direct to Canada from the Crimea, which she has sanctioned, but at the same time has stated her wish that these Troops should be sent out organised as a division, with their complement of Artillery and Transport ready to take the Field. If this is not done, we shall be directly falling back into all our old ways, which we have all so strongly condemned.
The Queen has not a doubt that Lord Panmure will concur in the obvious necessity of this.
WINDSOR CASTLE, March 31, 1856.
Contrast of French and British Army.
The Queen thanks Lord Panmure for his letter. The good accounts of her Army are very gratifying to her, and a great contrast to the melancholy picture of the state of the French Army.
But let us keep one thing well up, and well organised, at Home, so that we can never be found again as we were in ’54!
The Queen wishes to repeat to Lord Panmure that plans for the new Barracks at Dover and Gosport, as well as of Fort Elson and the Casemated Barracks of Gomer Fort, have not yet been submitted to her. To-morrow we shall already enter the month of April, and these matters do not advance! Have the Cavalry Barracks at Aldershot been begun, the plans for which the Queen approved at Christmas?
March 31, 1856.
Peace signed.
The Park and Tower guns have announced that Peace is signed, and I only regret that you have not had an opportunity of proving the sagacity of the advice which placed you in command of the army by taking it into the field.
You will now set about bringing it away. I have sent you a despatch authorising you to use full discretion, and to dispose of everything you can which it would be useless or cumbersome to bring away. I have no doubt that much economy may be achieved in that way, and I think we owe it to the country to save every penny we can creditably, in return for the lavish hands with which they loaded the army with comforts of every kind. I shall order home the Militia regiments immediately, and make room for some of your regiments in the Mediterranean, which we mean to keep strongly garrisoned. You will have to send five regiments direct to Canada, and one of them must be a rifle battalion and the others well trained to the Minié. On this head you will receive official orders, but you will of course keep your own counsel on their destination till they sail.
As to evacuation of the Crimea.
The fact is we have denuded N. America too much, and Jonathan is bumptious; but our hands are empty if he wants a trial, and I think he would come second-best off. The regiments which had longest home service before the war will be those to go to America, I presume. We shall have some corps in the Mediterranean, and more in proportion than existed before the war. Six months will be quite long enough for you to have for evacuation, but you must not bring your best men away before the French. I think your sick should begin to voyage homewards as soon as you can find good ships for them. I am quite clear for your selling every mule you have at any price you can get, and it will also be infinitely more economical to dispose of all your Cavalry and Artillery horses than to bring them home. You should make known to the Turkish Government and to the Austrians your willingness to sell them, and a very low figure may be accepted. We can soon remount our cavalry in this country, and we have a great many fine artillery horses on hand.
We have terrible accounts of the state of the French army, and on the whole I am not sorry to see peace signed, as I feel convinced we could not have carried out our plans of campaign with our Allies in their present condition.