Crimean texts
The suspense of the country during the absence of authentic information from the seat of war has been but partially relieved by the imperfect, and, at first sight, inconsistent telegraphic accounts which have at length found their way to us from the Crimea. On a comparison of these several announcements it will appear that we possess — 1st, intelligence (in all cases telegraphic) from British sources up to the 25th stating that the operations before Sebastopol were proceeding favourably for the allies; 2d, intelligence from Russian sources to the same date, stating that on the 25th General LIPRANDI attacked our position at Balaklava, stormed four redoubts, took eleven guns, and destroyed half our Light Cavalry; 3d, latest intelligence, also from Russian sources, intimating that nothing decisive had occurred since the affair of the 25th; 4th, a despatch telegraphed from Constantinople by Lord STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE, giving a more circumstantial, and in some respects alarming, account of the attack upon our camp; and, 5th, a second version of this affair and its sequel, brought by the Himalaya steamer to Varna and thence forwarded by the English Consul. From these statements we shall now endeavour to construct a plain relation of what actually occurred, and to ascertain as far as possible the position and prospects of the allies, according to the latest intelligence. As a preliminary step, it will be advisable to recall for a moment to the reader’s mind the relative situations of the belligerents, as existing after the commencement of the siege.
The whole southern portion of Sebastopol, from the Quarantine Bay on the left to the river Tchernaya on the right, was invested by the allied forces — the French occupying the ground to the left, and the British that to the right of that inner harbour or inlet which separates the town of Sebastopol from the dockyard and the suburb of Karabelnaia. Our own lines, in particular, were extended from the Tchernaya to the inner harbour, their centre point being about opposite the extremity of a small bay called the Careening Bay. These, however, were but the works by means of which we approached Sebastopol; our base of operations was Balaklava, distant some seven or eight miles from our lines, and between the two points was our camp, the headquarters being at a place about equidistant from Sebastopol and Balaklava. In addition, therefore, to the operations of the siege we had to protect our own position against attack from the Russians — a precaution the more necessary, inasmuch as the garrison of Sebastopol was very numerous, the place itself open for ingress or egress on the northern side, and the enemy reputed to be in considerable force at various points of the country. In our impression of Saturday, the 28th ult, we published a letter from our correspondent on the spot, giving a description of the fortifications by which our position was to be defended, and among the works there enumerated were specified five forts or redoubts, each of which was to mount two heavy guns, and to be garrisoned by 250 Turks. “These five batteries,” continued the letter, “will be invaluable in defending the road to Balaklava, and the Turks will fight behind such works to the last.” Let us now apply this description to the accounts before us.
We are told by Lord STRATFORD that the Russians, 30,000 strong, attacked “the forts in the vicinity of Balaklava,” — that they encountered “Ottoman troops and Scotch”, — that the former gave way, and that certain guns and forts thus fell into the hands of the enemy. From what direction this attacking force advanced we are not informed, nor would the words “vicinity of Balaklava” apply to one point of the British position much more particularly than to another; but, from a comparison of accounts, we are led to understand that the affair was not a sortie from the garrison, but an assault from without. It seems, in point of fact, to have been a regularly concerted attack by General LIPRANDI, at the head of what we may term the relieving army, or the Russian force at large in the Crimea, made upon our position, with the view of cutting us off from Balaklava, or compelling us to raise the siege. The forces brought up for this purpose, if they were indeed 30,000 in number, exceeded the entire British army, and, as many regiments must have been engaged at some distance upon the siege operations, could at first have encountered only a part of it. The assault, according to all probability, was made upon the forts or earthworks above-mentioned, committed to the keeping of the Turks, and the number of guns (eleven) said to be taken, and redoubts said to be stormed, correspond pretty accurately with the description of our correspondent. In one respect, however, his anticipations have been disappointed. The Turks, intrepid as they have recently shown themselves, did not “fight behind these works to the last,” but, on the contrary, seem to have abandoned them at once in some unaccountable panic. This gave the Russians immediate success; but, as our own troops, Highlanders first and other regiments afterwards, came up to the points attacked, the tide was turned, and the Russians were repulsed. In the course of the engagement our Light Cavalry suffered serious and most unfortunate losses. Lord STRATFORD’S message represents them as caught between the “cross-fires of the Russian batteries” — meaning, probably, the guns of LIPRANDI’S army on the one side and those of the forts just abandoned by the Turks on the other; but the account from Varna describes them as bravely charging a superior force of Russians, and thus suffering considerably, until the Scots Grays and 5th Dragoon Guards came to their support, and “routed the enemy completely.” The Moniteur adds that the heavy cavalry were also supported by a French division. It is further added, that on the succeeding day (the 26th) the Russians in Sebastopol made a sortie against the Second Division of the British army, but were repulsed in half an hour, with the loss of 1,000 left dead on the ground. Whether this is another version of Lord STRATFORD’S statement respecting an unsuccessful assault of the Russians upon the French position on that day we cannot pretend to determine, but it is hard to see how an attack on the French position could be made “from the side of Balaklava”, since in this quarter they are covered by the British.
Upon a comprehensive view of the affair we think it may be concluded that the Russians have gained no real advantage, and the allies suffered nothing beyond the loss of men, unfortunately occasioned by the first success of the surprise. It is clear from what is related of the events next day that we were still masters of our position, that the attempt to disturb us had cost the enemy dear, and that the siege works had not been interrupted at all. The attack, in short, always anticipated from the army at large in the Crimea, had been made in very great force and under favourable circumstances, but without any permanent success, while the losses of the enemy must have largely exceeded our own. These conclusions, we think, may be easily reconciled with the several telegraphic despatches. Perhaps the initial accounts of the 25th were sent off before the action commenced on that day which would explain their omission of any reference to the affair. Prince MENSCHIKOFF’S announcement that up to the 27th nothing further had occurred is a Russian way of stating that Sebastopol was not yet taken, and that the Russians had done nothing effectually interrupt the siege. He knew that the action of the 25th had produced nothing decisive in furtherance of his purpose, and after he had proclaimed, therefore, the first success of the assailants, he treated the sequel as unimportant. Finally, if Lord STRATFORD’S message should be thought to exceed the Russian version in the gravity of its tenour, it should be remembered that it is only official as between his lordship and our Government. It rests upon no official authority as coming from the Crimea, being, not a despatch from the British Commander, but, as is expressly added, a statement made by the captain of a transport of “nearly what had been gathered from several persons who were eye-witnesses.” Eye-witnesses, however, are not always comprehensive observers of a battle, and there is evident room for errors in such a communication.
Nevertheless, we believe in the substance of the facts related, but we feel convinced that neither the position of the allies nor the prospects of the siege have suffered any material injury. How so large a force as that under LIPRANDI’S command could have been permitted to approach our position undiscovered is a circumstance requiring explanation, but that the Russian generals, disposing, as they do, of such numerous bodies of men, should endeavour, by attacks in force, to dislodge us from our position is no more than we must expect. It is evidence, indeed, of the sanguine expectations created by the first false news that an assault upon our camp, which, though it was for a moment successful, and entailed upon us a deplorable loss of men, appears to have terminated in a decided repulse, and to have been avenged by a signal retribution, should be regarded in the light of a reverse. For the particulars of these losses we now wait in painful anxiety, but we entertain a perfect conviction that the siege of Sebastopol, if it has not already been crowned with triumph, is proceeding with uninterrupted success.