Crimean texts
[Transcribed by Megan Stevens]
The debate which took place in the House of Commons on Friday evening had the effect of eliciting from Lord JOHN RUSSELL a more precise definition than we had before obtained of the objects to which the allied Powers are disposed to limit the war they are waging against Russia, and of the extent to which they carry the conditions proposed for the re-establishment of peace. It is on every account desirable that more clear and accurate notions should prevail on these subjects, for, as Mr. COBDEN observed, with considerable truth, it is not uncommon to meet with extraordinary disagreements between intelligent men on the objects of the war; and this confusion of ideas has been increased by a vast deal of bombast and unthinking declamation. We do not the more agree with Mr COBDEN in his inference that the objects of the war cannot be defined, and we think that Lord JOHN RUSSELL was not unsuccessful in his attempt to define them. But, in the prosecution of this great contest, in which the resources and the honour of the country are already so deeply engaged, it is of the utmost importance to our consistency and to our national interests to keep steadily in view the motives for which we took up arms, and the terms on which we may consent to lay them down again. We are not engaged in a war of territorial conquest, and, if by the success of our arms we should succeed in wresting from Russia any important portion of her dominions, it would not be easy to determine what should be the future condition of that territory. France and England expressly disclaimed, by a formal article in their treaty of alliance at the commencement of hostilities, “any particular advantage” to themselves from the war, by which expression they are clearly precluded from any territorial aggrandizement of their own possessions. The idea of extending the limits of the Ottoman empire, which already includes more provinces than the Ministers and armies of the SULTAN can govern or defend, is evidently preposterous; for such an arrangement would only lead to fresh contests and perpetual hostility between the PORTE and its powerful neighbour. We therefore record with satisfaction the declaration of Lord JOHN RUSSELL, that “the Government have no wish to continue the war for the sake of dismembering Russia or depriving her of any portion of her territories; and that, if we can arrive at a peace which would give us security, we have no desire for any indefinite object to continue the miseries of war.” It is needless to add that, as this war has not been undertaken for any purpose of territorial aggrandizement, so neither can it be persevered in from any vindictive motive or from false notions of military glory. The Emperor of RUSSIA, indeed, has attempted to convert it into a war of religious fanaticism and political opinion. He has, in his manifestoes to the Russian nation, represented the antagonists whose power is arrayed against his unwarrantable aggressions as infidels and incendiaries, renegades to the faith and rebels to authority. But these extravagant appeals to the ignorance and the passions of his subjects have done more to injure his cause in Europe than to justify it at home. This is not a war of religious or revolutionary propaganda, any more than it is a war of conquest; never, on the contrary, was a war more strictly confined to the political necessity in which it originated, and its object will be obtained when we have extorted from the CZAR those solid guarantees for the future without which no peace can be concluded.
It deserves further to be borne in mind that these are the principles of our alliance not only with Austria but with France, and that the solidity of that alliance depends mainly on the disinterestedness and moderation of the high contracting parties. It is because they are united for common objects of the deepest concern to Europe, and not for the gratification of any particular ambition or resentment, that the policy of France and England is perfectly united, and that we entertain confident hopes that the leading Powers of Germany will eventually lend their full support to the common cause. For England to fight the battles of the continental Powers without the support of the chief continental States; for England to invade the territories of Russia, and send an army against her strongest fortresses, unless we knew that other great military Powers would join in our operations, and press from more than one side upon the frontiers of the common enemy, would be a Quixotic enterprise, of questionable advantage and of improbable success. But England has not hesitated to engage in this struggle hand in hand with France, believing that the Emperor of the FRENCH is no less resolved than we are ourselves to bring it to a glorious termination; and we have increasing reason to hope that, if the Emperor of RUSSIA is still opposed to our just demands, the year which is about to open under circumstances of so much interest will see at least a considerable part of Germany allied to our cause. Lord JOHN RUSSELL appears to have felt the propriety on Friday night of wiping out as far as possible the unfortunate consequences of the unfounded and impolitic suspicions he had appeared to throw upon the intentions of Austria on a previous occasion. He has now declared it to be his belief that, “if Russia shall not consent to the very moderate terms proposed by the allies, we shall, before the opening of the next campaign, have the alliance of Austria both in offensive and defensive operations;” and with reference to the points connected with this subject on which we had recently occasion to dispute the conclusion at which Lord JOHN RUSSELL had arrived, we may be permitted to observe that this second Ministerial statement is more consistent with the language of the QUEEN’S Speech, and with our own view of the case, than with the expressions used by the President of the Council on the first night of the session.
These considerations, however, bring us back to the interpretation of the Four Points on which alone the possibility of a restoration of peace depends. The Prussian Government has taken upon itself to affirm that Russia already admits, “without reservation or equivocation,” the basis of negotiation which the Cabinets of London and Paris drew up a short time ago; but it must be observed that a similar communication was made by Prince GORTSCHAKOFF at Vienna on the 28th of November without producing a similar effect. The Austrian Cabinet treated the Russian acceptance of the Four Points as illusory, and proceeded four days afterwards to sign the treaty of alliance with the belligerent Powers. Lord JOHN RUSSELL has now stated in Parliament the general interpretation put by the Government on these points; but, admitting that Russia is prepared to sacrifice her separate treaties with Turkey respecting the Principalities, her control over the navigation of the Danube, and her claim to the protection of the Christian subjects of Turkey, one point still remains which must be settled by the fortune of war rather than by negotiation. The revision of the treaty which regulates the admission of ships of war to the Black Sea, in the interest of the balance of power, raises the whole question of the maritime ascendancy of Russia in those waters; and the decision of that question rests upon the success of the operations of the allied armies against the stronghold of Russia in the Crimea. When that great enterprise is accomplished — when the valour and endurance of our soldiers have triumphed over the enemy, and over hardships more terrible than the Russian columns — we may hope to secure by treaty the results of the war; but as long as Russia wields that tremendous weapon of offence against the coasts of Eastern Europe and of Asia it is scarcely possible that any treaty should give us the security we require. As long as Sebastopol stands we cannot expect to obtain by negotiation more than we have conquered by our arms. It is by the military and naval power of the allies, and not by their diplomacy, that this huge material obstacle to the restoration of peace can alone be removed; and no doubt the Russians will take advantage of the prolonged resistance of the fortress to decline any surrender on this point. When Austria concluded with us the treaty of the 2d of December, she knew that our military honour and our policy were pledged to obtain this result, and she must have resolved upon the part she was assuming on the side of the Western Powers, in connexion with the military operations in which they were already engaged. We must therefore infer that the Court of Vienna, like those of London and Paris, regards the successful termination of the Crimean expedition as a material part of the guarantees to be obtained from Russia, and it is on that point that we cannot anticipate that either party will recede from their present position until the result of the campaign shall be more clearly determined.