Crimean texts
[Transcribed by Megan Stevens]
After leaving Lords Lucan and Cardigan, the observations of Colonel Tulloch are directed in the next place to the case of the Quartermaster-General, Sir RICHARD AIREY. For nearly two months the men were separated from their knapsacks, and deprived of almost every article of clothing except what they had upon their backs, and this at a time when they were suffering from the severest weather and from constant exposure by night and day, and were employed in the trenches on fatigue duties, which soon reduced their only suit to rags. Such, indeed, was the destitution of the troops in this respect that, as they landed fever-stricken and covered in filth and vermin on the shores of Scutari, it excited the astonishment and awakened the sympathy of all Europe. Was this deprivation, then, the result of circumstances beyond control, or were the Commissioners right in regarding it as one of those events against which a moderate degree of foresight might have provided?
The Chelsea Board attributes the separation of the men from their knapsacks to the department of the Adjutant-General, but the Commissioners complained, not of separation, but that no prompt measures were taken to recover them. The Board makes light of the inconvenience by stating that the packs contained very little that could have added to the comfort of the men, a proportion of their necessaries having been left in the squad-bags at Scutari. Colonel Tulloch properly replies that the knapsack is valuable to the soldier, not merely for what it contains, but as a means of keeping his necessaries together; that for the want of it the shirt, boots, and socks brought in his blanket on landing were in most cases lost even before he reached Sebastopol. The knapsack did, however, contain, among other things, a pair of trousers, which was not such a trifling object to men shivering in tatters; and if the knapsacks were sailing about the Black Sea, the squad-bags, containing the shell-jackets, shirts, and socks, were, at all events, stationary, and there could be no difficulty in knowing where to find part at least of the soldier’s equipment. Yet in most cases the whole of the first winter was allowed to pass without their being sent for. Out of a total of 20 regiments none recovered them till the end of December or beginning of January, when five regiments had that good fortune; two did not receive them till February or March, and the remainder not till April or May, the soldier being left during most of the interval almost in rags, a prey to vermin, and without a change of any kind. At least it might have been expected that the destitute sick and wounded who landed at Scutari in the early part of the winter might have found these articles forthcoming, but the phantom garments eluded their search, and, if the sick soldier at length obtained the covering which cleanliness and decency required, the relief was due to The Times fund and to the resources supplied by private charity. To the neglect which was then evinced we have now to add, on Colonel Tulloch’s showing, the lâches of the Board, who made no inquiry regarding the fate of these squad-bags, and who seem to have contented themselves with the fact that they were not forthcoming as an incident quite in the order of Providence, and which tends rather than otherwise to the credit of Sir Richard Airey.
On the next head, the “Issues of Warm Clothing from England,” Colonel Tulloch contends, in reply to the Board, that when the Commissary-General was not prepared to provide transport for its conveyance the Quartermaster-General was bound to have brought under the consideration of the General Commanding-in-Chief the consequent difficulties in which he was placed, and the question would then have arisen whether extra transport animals should not have been obtained from the opposite coast to carry up these supplies. The scarcity of transport was a difficulty which the Commissioners were neither disposed to conceal nor to underrate; but, whatever it may have been, on the other hand it could afford no excuse to the Quartermaster-General for not having made the regiments or divisions acquainted with the clothing in store, so that they might send for their proportions if they chose. Sir Richard could not know what exertions the men might be disposed to make themselves, or their officers to make for them, in order to get up supplies so essential to their existence. No such exertions, however, could be expected when nothing was known by either of the stores being there. Colonel Tulloch estimates that a very small number of men would, in fact, have sufficed to carry up these stores to the front. The employment of 100 men from each regiment would have carried up all the rugs, greatcoats, and watchcoats, and another day and a like number of men would have sufficed in the end of that month, when further supplies of these and the additional blankets had arrived. Besides, the larger portion of the force at Balaklava and Kadikoi had no difficulties as to transport; they were close to the stores, and yet apparently shared no better in the division of them than the men in front:—
“It must always be kept in view that at the period when these various supplies of clothing were not made available the men were falling by thousands under the rapid stroke of cholera and dysentery, or the slow torture of frost-bite; while morning after morning they returned from sitting knee-deep in mud of the trenches to tents the floors of which were scarcely drier, their only clothing consisting of the regimental suit, which, to borrow the words of Sir Richard Airey, they had had ‘in the first voyage out to the Mediterranean, through the service in Bulgaria, through the sea-voyage to the Crimea; they had worked in these coats in the trenches, and fought all through with them; they were perfectly threadbare, and in many instances did not exist.’
While this was the condition of the army, the knapsacks were on the Black Sea, the squad-bags at Scutari, thousands of pairs of trousers missing, thousands of coatees unused, and tens of thousands of greatcoats, blankets, and rugs filling the Quartermaster-General’s stores or the harbour at Balaklava.”
The Commissioners, under these circumstances, held that “the arrangements relating to the issue of the supplies from the Quartermaster-General’s store” were “of questionable expediency.” The Board, on the other hand, considered the principle adopted in their apportionment “a very judicious one,” but then the Board assumed that orders had been sent that the regiments should apply for them according to their strength, which Sir John Campbell and Sir Richard England have contradicted. Moreover, while the poor cavalry horses were losing half their little barley for want of nosebags, and were eating each other’s tails in lieu of more substantial nutriment, the following was the simultaneous experience of Lord Lucan:— “The Quartermaster-General always said that they had not got them in the army, till the Captain of the Jason came to me to beg that I would assist him in relieving his ship of all those horse stores.” In like manner the same authority may be cited to prove that the horse medicines, after being urgently required for five or six months, were at last discovered on board the Medway in the month of January.
In justice to Sir Richard Airey it ought to be stated that during a large portion of this time, from the 16th of November till the 18th or 20th of December, he was prostrated by illness. And in justice to the Commissioners it should be added that this was the reason why he was not himself examined by them as to the delays and omissions in issuing the clothing. Colonel Gordon and Colonel Wetherall acted in his stead during the interval of his illness, and the petulant and baseless recriminations of the former, and the discrepancies and self-contradictions of the latter, are most material topics in this review of Colonel Tulloch. The unenviable position which these gentlemen must henceforth occupy after his searching exposure must also to a considerable extent be shared by the Board itself, who in the case of Colonel Gordon endorsed his puerile cavils without warranty or fair examination. The questions thereby opened comprehend too many details to be capable of clear explanation here, and they must be followed through their minutiæ to their full solution, paragraph by paragraph, in the volume itself. One or two specimens only of their tendency shall be given, and our readers must judge for themselves the bearing of the remainder. Colonel Wetherall, for example, has to explain why certain coatees were not issued to the troops, and the answer is — first, that they were found to be too small, by reason of the great quantity of underclothing worn by the men, when at the date they arrived, the 28th of November, the men had no underclothing at all, and when most of them were without even a shirt, except what they had had on their backs ever since their arrival in the Crimea. Secondly, the coatees “were not issued, because the new clothing for each regiment was shortly expected,” an expectation which, however, was not realized till two months later. Thirdly, they “would probably have been issued, but their being in store was not reported.” And, fourthly, they were not issued because at the time they arrived “the regimental clothing had also arrived of which the Commissioners in the Crimea received the information under the second head, that ‘it was shortly expected.’ ” These excuses exceed in variety and incongruity those of the old lady who declined to lend her washing-tub, but they are not more contemptible than the complaint of Colonel Gordon, and which was lightly and loosely sanctioned by the Board, that he had not a sufficient opportunity of correcting his evidence, when his evidence remained in his hands from June to September, with a written authority from the Commissioners to “alter it as he thought fit;” when he made nearly 100 alterations in consequence, and finally re-wrote the whole of it, and had, moreover, himself testified that “nothing was more liberal than the way in which the Commissioners behaved to him.” And, finally, this may be capped by the Board itself, who, when a question arose as to the relative value of rugs and blankets, which they could have determined by sending to the Ordnance Department for a sample of each, and ascertaining their relative weight and material, contended themselves with the discrepant evidence of the two Colonels thus ludicrously distinguished.
But we must follow Colonel Tulloch to the larger and concluding section of the Board’s Report, which is entitled “COMMISSARY-GENERAL FILDER’S CASE,” to comprehend fully the farce of a review of the Commissioners’ inquiry by men who had none of them a Crimean experience. The general question between Mr. Filder and the Commissioners, of which there are numerous branches, was as to the sufficiency of the supplies in store. Of these the first item is biscuit, of which the Commissioners observed that the ration was reduced on the 7th of November to 1lb., on the expressed ground of the supply of biscuit being insufficient to furnish the increased ration lately authorized. Mr. Filder contended that there was at all times a sufficiency of supplies in store, but is contradicted in respect of biscuit by the General Order of Lord Raglan. At all events, Mr. Filder justifies this proceeding, and the Board came to the conclusion that he “was justified in recommending the discontinuance of the extra allowance,” for reasons which Colonel Tulloch thus reduces to their true dimensions.
Mr. Filder contends that “the established ration for troops in the field was not reduced,” and with this he contents himself. It is no concern of his that the established ration does not, according to every trustworthy scientific authority, contain an amount of nutriment sufficient to support any man in health; and that even with rice, sugar, and coffee it would be inadequate to maintain for any considerable time the strength and health of soldiers undergoing severe labour, with the watching and exposure they underwent in the Crimea. Vegetables were then wanting, and the soldier was placed in circumstances under which, whatever might be his wants, he could purchase nothing for himself. Such was the condition of the troops on the 7th of November, when, with scurvy in the camp, Mr. Filder recommended that the issue of one-third of a pound of biscuit per man should be discontinued, not because there was any scarcity in the supply, but, as he alleges, because it was notorious that the men could not consume 1 1-3lb. of biscuit, but sold or gave away a part of what they received to the French troops who frequented our lines.
It is admitted by Colonel Tulloch to have been notorious, not that the biscuit was more than the men could eat, but that it was frequently exchanged for fresh bread, because that necessary of life could not be obtained from the British Commissariat, even for the sick; but this traffic, far from being stopped by the reduction of the ration of biscuit, appears rather to have increased as the season advanced, and the diet of salt meat and biscuit became day after day more and more intolerable. The practice was adopted not by the men only, but by the officers; and, considering that hard biscuit is described by several of the regimental surgeons as being not only distasteful, but injurious to men who were suffering from bowel affections, the exchange was rather to be commended than found fault with.
Not only was there a reduction in the ration of biscuit, which, therefore, the alleged reasons are not sufficient to justify, but on the 15th of November the rice was also ordered to cease, so that in one week the troops were, in most cases, deprived of nearly half a pound of the vegetable and farinaceous food so much required to counteract a salt meat diet, and this too when scurvy had established itself, and the fresh vegetables which were looked for were not forthcoming. The diet of the soldier in respect of nutriment, as shown by the tables of Professor Christison, was not only thus reduced to less than that of the Hessian soldier, by nearly ten ounces a day, but it was less than what is considered necessary, for example in the prison at Perth, to maintain health even in confinement. If the Board of General Officers had referred to such facts as these they would have been less disposed to second Mr. Filder’s theory that 1 1-3lb. of biscuit was more than the men could eat. We have already observed they were utterly destitute of experience of the particular circumstances which had a further bearing upon the case before them. As Colonel Tulloch says, it is possible that they may have been influenced by a recollection of the usual accessories to a soldier’s ration in other localities and under happier circumstances, but which the experience of a Crimean General would speedily have dispelled.
On the deficient supply of salt meat as well as of biscuit the Board made no comment, for “it was apparently too serious a matter for seven general officers to express their concurrence in an experiment under which an army was left with only eight days’ salt provisions at a season when the communications by sea were liable to interruption.” In dealing with a question “of such fearful magnitude” the Commissioners had been already as considerate as they could to Mr. Filder, while conscious that a warning was required against similar shortcomings in future. The discovery of this circumstance, Colonel Tulloch informs us, had the effect of inducing Lord Raglan to call for periodical returns of all the supplies in the Commissariat store, and was, indeed, as we may fairly infer, a perilous piece of mismanagement, to be permanently referred to for avoidance.
The Board passed over this question, however, to commit themselves to a characteristic blunder on the subject of “the issues of vegetables and rice.” The Commissioners had stated that in the Crimea, during the greater part of November and December, and also in a great measure during January and part of February, the soldier was confined exclusively to biscuit in addition to his salt meat, on which the Board, in their superior judgment, undertook to pronounce “that the statements of the Commissioners are by no means borne out,” Colonel Tulloch remarks on this, in a gentle form of comment, “that it is to be regretted that, before asserting thus much, the Board did not refer to the recorded answers by the commanding officers of corps to the questions on this head distinctly put by the Commissioners,” and of which he then gives a summary in corroboration of the Commissioners’ statement. The Board, however, relied upon certain “returns” of vegetables and rice issued to the troops during the months in question, without troubling themselves to inquire further. But the quantity entered as received and issued is no certain evidence that the troops received it, as Colonel Tulloch demonstrates in this instance. Of 340,818lb. of vegetables stated to have been issued to the troops in November, 336,000lb., shipped by the Harbinger, left the Bosphorus in a very bad state. That vessel reached Balaklava on the 9th, and lay there till the 24th of that month, because the captain could get no one to take away the cargo. In the meantime the vegetables rotted, and were either thrown overboard or scrambled for on the deck by the Zouaves and such of the soldiers belonging to the division at Balaklava as happened to be present. Had the Board referred to Mr. Drake’s accounts they would have found that 263,842lb. were admitted to have been destroyed; few or none of these vegetables reached the troops in front; and how they were disposed of appears in evidence which the Board seems never to have perused, or even to have heard of.
In regard to the supply of vegetables for December, if they found their right to correct the Commissioners upon that, it appears that it could not have amounted in the course of that month to have more than three-quarters of a pound, or about two potatoes and one onion per man, in the course of thirty-one days, provided the sick in hospital did not exhaust the supply. In January the issue would have afforded about half a-pound a-week to each individual, subject to the same objection with regard to the sick. The issue in the whole of February is also consistent with the alleged deficiency, a deficiency which proved so fatal to the troops, and which, as respects December and January, remains yet to be explained. So early as the 24th of October it appears that Mr. Filder was informed of the presence of scurvy and was urged to act with promptitude in this behalf by the Quartermaster-General. In reply he addressed a remonstrance, stating that it was not his duty; that according to the usage of the service vegetables were provided by regimental arrangement. Without explaining how the unhappy regiments on the plateau of Sebastopol could “arrange” in their own behalf he made objections to purchasing potatoes which were for sale in the harbour; and in the vicinity of the market of one of the largest capitals in Europe, where vegetable diet forms a considerable portion of the food of 650,000 inhabitants, for some months the British army were allowed to rot of scurvy for the want of a commodity which there is little doubt that he could have procured them. At all events, the assumption of the Board that he did supply it, on the ground of which they corrected the Commissioners, is, like many of their assumptions, now finally disposed of.
With respect to the issues of rice during the same period — viz., from November to February inclusive, Mr. Filder endeavoured, apparently with success, to impress upon the Board that, though this was declared by General Order to be no longer a part of the daily ration, the troops actually received within a mere fractional part of the quantity to which the ration would have amounted. It appears never to have occurred to the seven sages that, if this was the case, Lord Raglan would not have incurred the odium of making it appear by his General Orders that his army was deprived of such an essential. The “returns” of the rice issued, which again misled them, would have been otherwise accounted for if they had not omitted the essential inquiry, to whom had the issue been made. If they had examined the returns, instead of quoting them, they would have found that in the first of these months about 20,000lb. was issued to Turkish troops at Balaklava alone, and about 4,000lb. to the Royal Marines, besides what may have been issued in other parts of the camp; while in December there were issued 25,142lb. to Turkish troops and 4,836lb. to the General Hospital at Balaklava, thus confirming what had often been stated in evidence to the Commissioners, that rice could not be issued to the British soldiers because it was wanted for the Turkish troops. The remainder of the rice may be accounted for without supposing it was consumed as part of the rations by the men in health, by the large proportion of sick chiefly labouring under scorbutic dysentery and diarrhœa, with which the camp was crowded, and who absorbed nearly, if not all, the quantity sent up to the front. This, however, Mr. Filder reckons as if it had been part of the daily rations of the troops; and the Board, in the face of Lord Raglan’s order, and a vast amount of concurrent testimony, appear to have adopted his representation, though little or no rice was received for upwards of six or seven weeks which could be applied to general use. When the issues of rice were again authorized, though the issues to the Turkish troops had by that time been discontinued, the “returns” show that the quantities were double those of the previous two months; yet the Board, who attached such importance to the bare figures of the returns, never adverted to and possibly never remarked the significant circumstance.
With respect to the continuance of the issue of rice from the 30th of September to the 15th of November, and which appears to have gone to the sick, the Commissioners gave Mr. Filder credit for having been moved to that judicious step by the sufferings of the troops from diarrhœa. But from his letter to Mr. Peel it appears they were in error in attributing to him such motives, and it would seem that he has yet to be impressed with the essential importance of rice under such circumstances.
“Had Mr. Filder referred to Peninsular experience to guide these arrangements, he would have found that when the Duke of Wellington’s army was suffering from bowel complaint the issue of two ounces of rice per man was authorized as a remedial measure by general orders dated the 1st of August, 1812; and when the Duke was obliged to put his army on two days’ salt provisions per week he, by general order, dated the 26th of October, 1810, directed a similar allowance of rice to counteract the injurious effect of that diet. The Crimean arrangements, however, show the converse of this, as the very period when the army was subsisting almost entirely on salt meat was that selected for depriving it of rice, though then doubly valuable for the health of the men.
The Board conclude their observations, under the head of rice and vegetables, with the following remark:— ‘We may here add, with respect to the remarks of the Commissioners on the subject of vegetable food, that we entirely concur in the view of the Commissary-General that his department is not responsible for the particular articles of diet which constitute the ration of the men; his duty is only to furnish it according to the order of the General Commanding.’
I am not aware that the Commissioners ever expressed any contrary opinion. It can hardly be doubted, however, that it was the duty of the Commissary-General to keep the General Commanding informed of the supplies of every description in his possession which could be rendered available for the use of the army, and to call his attention to the expediency, from time to time, of making such changes as they admitted. Had he done so, it might probably have brought out the fact that, while thousands were suffering from scurvy and scorbutic diarrhœa in their worst forms, 20,000lb. weight of lime-juice were lying in his custody unused for nearly a couple of months, — and that while Lord Raglan was authorizing the stoppage of rice and biscuit, in the belief that there was not a sufficient quantity of either in store, Mr. Filder had, according to his own statement, abundance of both.”
* The Crimean Commission and the Chelsea Board, being a Review of the proceedings and Report of the Board, by Colonel Tulloch, late Commissioner in the Crimea, London, Harrison, 1857.