Crimean texts
The Allies have thus won a great victory. What will they do with it? The apologist of Lord Raglan, trusting to the statement of General Kiriakov, which Todleben altogether ignores, gives that officer the credit of covering the retreat of the Russians, gives to General Martimprey the discredit of not pressing the pursuit, and to General Airey the credit of proposing it. Mr. Kinglake thinks diplomacy interfered, and that Lord Raglan, whom he charged with having deceived St. Arnaud early in the day, began to think at the close of it he was specially charged with the care of the French alliance. How it would have been endangered by a pursuit of the Russians we confess we cannot perceive. His Lordship had those 1,000 sabres, of which we read so often, a magnificent force of artillery almost untouched, and the 1st battalion of Royals, 4th, 20th, 21st, 28th, 38th, 42d, 44th, 49th, 50th, 77th, 79th, 88th, 1st battalion Rifle Brigade, in all 14 battalions, some of which had not been engaged at all, and others of which had suffered no loss, all ready to his hand, to pursue had he been so minded. A Staff Officer, whose Letters from Headquarters are quoted by Todleben, says Lord Raglan desired that the French, who had not been engaged, the Turks, some of our cavalry, and two or three batteries, should follow the Russians, but that the French replied they could send no infantry and that the artillery had exhausted their ammunition. Mr. Kinglake says that the reason assigned by the French for refusing to co-operate was that they must get their knapsacks, which they had left on the ground before going into action. When the French proposed next day to continue their march in pursuit Lord Raglan was not prepared to leave the wounded. The Russians, indeed, having halted on the night of the battle on the Katcha, continued their retreat the following morning, covered by a rear-guard of 6,500 men and 16 guns to the Belbeck, and halted there at midday. The same night Prince Menschikoff resolved on a most energetic and decisive measure equal to the occasion. He sent orders to Aide-de-Camp General Kornilow to sink all the old men-of-war at the entrance of the Grand Bay, and at the same time commissioned Colonel de Todleben to choose a position on the heights of Inkerman to menace the enemy in their advance against the north side. The garrison of Sebastopol on the 14th of September consisted of four battalions and eight guns on the north side, and of six battalions and eight guns on the south side, independently of sailors and detachments. Four battalions of sailors from the fleet did duty on shore.
Fourteen ships of the line and seven frigates were prepared to take the sea, and meantime efforts were made to increase the height and thickness of the walls, and to protect the interior of the North Fort. Todleben at once suspended those attempts, and directed all his energies to cover the sides of the fort with field works, in order to sweep the ravines with musketry and shot. At the same time he set about covering the south side by field works near the Bastion du Mât. While engaged in these preliminary steps the defeated Russians appeared on the left bank of the Belbeck. Owing to the nature of the ground the position was not favourable for defence, and the Russians if beaten would have had to retreat towards the North Fort, or towards Inkerman. In the former case they would have been compressed into a narrow space, and exposed to enormous losses from the fire of the fleet, while the enemy might follow them into the fort itself and occupy the battery on the north side. In the latter case they would have to pass along a narrow causeway between the sea and a deep marsh under the fire of the enemy. Seeing the dangers of the position, Prince Menschikoff sought to take up ground on the east of the post road between Belbeck and the Tchernaya, but the country was very uneven and covered with dense brushwood, presenting no favourable position for defence, and in the case of defeat it would have been impossible to conduct an orderly retreat to Bakhtchiserai. The Prince was therefore obliged to give up all attempts to meet the Allies on the north side, and resolved to move his army to the south of the city. Accordingly, on the evening of the 21st of September the Russians crossed the causeway at Inkerman, ascended Mount Sapoune, and arrived at Sebastopol, leaving the Taroutino Regiment to reinforce the garrison of the North Fort. On the receipt of Prince Menschikoff’s order, Vice-Admiral Kornilow assembled a council of the admirals and captains of the fleet. He explained that the enemy having gained the day at the Alma, could occupy the north-east of the roads, force the fleet to abandon its position, and burn the vessels moored in the Grand Bay. In a burst of heroic or Tartaric despair, Kornilow proposed to sail out of the harbour and attack the Allied fleet off Cape Loukone. If successful the expedition was doomed. If, on the other hand, the attack failed he recommended that t he Russian fleet should grapple with the enemy and blow up their ships alongside them. The army thus deprived of its support would fall an easy prey to the Russian forces on land, and the Russian fleet would perish gloriously. This project of a heroic audacity did not obtain the approbation of the council of war, and very few members adhered to it. Indeed, Todleben points out how little chance of success there would have been in an encounter between a sailing fleet and a steam navy, but he does not trouble himself to inquire what might have been the effect of the terrible alternative. Kornilow dismissed the council. But he made one more effort to keep his ships above water. He made strenuous attempts to gain Menschikoff’s support for his project, but he only obtained from the Prince a reiterated order to sink the ships at once. Accordingly on the night of the 22d of September five of the oldest men-of-war and two frigates were sunk with their guns in the channel at the entrance to the roads, and the ten remaining men-of-war were moored along the south side from Artillery Bay to Careening Bay to sweep the north side. All the other vessels except the steamers were placed in the South Bay to be sunk in case the city should be taken. The crews of the fleet moored in the roads, together with those of the sunken vessels, were formed into 12 battalions of marines, making 17 battalions of sailors, 11 independent battalions formed of reserves of regiments, 1 battalion of recruits, 1 special battalion formed of the crew of two transports, and 4 battalions of sailors, of which two remained on board the men-of-war and two did duty on land by turns. By the time these measures were completed the Allies had made their appearance on the Belbeck, and their bivouac fires were visible from the North Fort on the night of the 24th of September. Every moment the garrison expected to see their feeble intrenchments carried. Their situation was the more critical, inasmuch as Prince Menschikoff had that very night left Sebastopol, and led his army by Mackenzie’s farm to Bak-tchiserai. The Prince confided the command of the troops in the city to Lieutenant-General de Moller, of the north side and the fort to Kornilow, of the sailors and south side to Nakhimow. He left as garrison besides the sailors on the south side, and the artillerymen in the batteries, 17 battalions of sailors, 8 battalions of the reserve of 13 regiments of infantry, the 6th battalion of Sappers — in all, 16,569 men. The allied army, 60,000 strong, was three miles and one-third from the city. Working night and day in the interval between the 14th and 25th of September, the Russians under Todleben’s directions could only run up some field works, of which there is a detailed description in the work under review. On the crest of the shore he constructed a battery of eight guns, and another of six guns, to keep off the shipping and to sweep the coast towards Belbeck, where the ground was entirely hidden from the fire of the North Fort. They were connected by trenches for musketry, with the left flank of the fort. On the right was constructed a battery armed with 12 guns to sweep the plateau on the front and flank. Of the 47 guns in the fort only 12 could be pointed towards the country, and 16 were small pieces to flank the ditches. The walls actually tumbled down in the attempt to repair them, and all along a front of a mile in extent there were only 20 guns to oppose the enemy. Kornilow, however, resolved to defend it to the last extremity, though the Allies were advancing in perfect order towards the Belbeck, and the fleet was coasting towards the south. At 6 o’clock on the morning of the 24th of September, six men-of-war opened fire against Fort Constantine and the Wasp Battery, but the demonstration was insignificant. Next morning Kornilow prepared for the attack of his position, but all the men he could muster was 11,350, nearly all sailors. In fact, his case was desperate. The fort, commanded from the surrounding heights, was crumbling to pieces, a breach was actually formed in the parapet by the wall giving way under the sacks of earth hastily placed on them to cover the artillerymen as the enemy came in sight. The parapet was not high enough to protect the heads of the garrison. A body of sailors, armed with flint muskets, boarding pistols, and the like, placed behind a wretched work, and exposed to the bombardment of an enormous fleet, were to be pitted against 60,000 men flushed with victory! In the event of defeat retreat would have been impossible — the Russian fleet could not aid them by its fire till they had got away. No doubt, the establishment of batteries to intercept the communications with the north side would have been difficult under the guns of the Russian fleet, but it would have been possible, as is proved by the fact that the Allies raised batteries on the south side, which forced the Russian ships to withdraw. It may be objected also that it would have been very difficult for the Allies to have landed their artillery, and that communication with the fleet would have been interrupted, as there was no port. That would have been a grave matter if the troops were obliged to prolong their attack of the north fort, but, considering its power of resistance and the strength of the fleet, the Allies would have had complete success in very little time.
That the attack could not have detained the Allies long Todleben seeks to demonstrate by a rigid analysis of the ground and of the means of defence possessed by the garrison. On the right of the work the Allies would have been exposed, he states, to the fire of seven guns, at long range, from which they would very soon get into cover. In a movement direct on the front they would have been under the fire of six guns. On the left they would have had to encounter the effect of seven guns, which ought to have been very soon demolished by the fleet. The success of an assault, if preceded by a bombardment of the works, and of the uncovered garrison, both of which were commanded by the guns of the fleets, must have been certain and inevitable. If such was the state of affairs after so many days of vigorous preparation which the delay of the Allies permitted the Russians to make, it may easily be conceived what must have occurred if the enemy had marched on the place immediately after the battle when one-half even of these miserable defences were not in existence.
It was not without astonishment, then, that the garrison, on the morning of the 26th of September, heard the Allies were actually marching round towards the south of the city. There was some disquietude caused by the movement in consequence of its cutting off the communication between the garrison and the army, but the sensation of relief from immediate danger was far greater, although the south side was exceedingly weak, and was garrisoned by only 5,000 men. Nachimow disembarked two battalions of the crews of his squadron, which he prepared to sink in case of necessity, and in the course of the day Kornilow crossed to his assistance with 13 battalions of sailors and two batteries. It would be difficult to paint the general uneasiness of the people when the news arrived in the evening that the enemy had succeeded in seizing some of the baggage of the army, and that communication with Menschikoff was cut off. Next day they learnt that the enemy had occupied Balaclava, and it was not long before they saw their outposts on the hills over the city.
Todleben examines the reasons, we had nearly said the excuses, for the celebrated flank march. He contends that the argument in favour of that movement, which is founded on the absence of a port on the north shore, has no solid basis. Unless the Allies, having originally resolved to land on the north side, found out when they had done so that an attack de vive force was impossible, and that it would be necessary to undertake a siege of the north side, they could not have needed a port. Did they not know, he asks, beforehand that the north shore had no port, and did not they nevertheless effect a descent on the north side? The inference is clear that the Allies intended to operate against that side of the grand Bay of Sebastopol. They had no reason whatever to think the north side impregnable. Their fleet looked into the place. If they had made a few reconnaissances, they would, no doubt, have been satisfied of the possibility of taking the works. It has been argued by the advocates for the flank march that the Allies might have taken the north side, and yet have failed to destroy the Russian ships and arsenals. Todleben is of a different opinion: he asserts that the fleet and arsenals could have been really destroyed from the north side. Weighing all the facts of the case, he arrives at the conviction that there was a change in the councils of the Allies, and an uncertainty which, in spite of Mr. Kinglake, he ascribes to St. Arnaud’s illness and also to the impression produced by the sinking of the ships in the harbour.
The flank march of Menschikoff had, he considers, a far better reason. It was only natural to suppose the Allies would attack the north side, and that they would occupy the Mackenzie Farm and the heights of Inkerman. Once there, they would cut off the Russian army and force them to remain on Mount Sapoune, which was far too extended a position for them to occupy. At the same time they would be cut off from all their bases of supply and reinforcements. In case of another action the army, the fleet, and the city would have all been lost at one blow, if the Russians were beaten. Troops were marching into the Crimea. It was above all things desirable to get into communication with them. In the hope, therefore, that the garrison would be able to hold out till he could come back to help them, Menschikoff marched away from his dangerous position, and was able to get at his supplies of food and men. On the night of September 24th he put his columns in march, and occupied Mackenzie’s Farm. Part of his army crossed over by the Tractir Bridge, which was very soon afterwards crossed by the Allies on their way to Balaclava.
The arguments on these points are, of course, set forth at greater length. There may be exceptions taken to them. So far as the authority of the Russian Engineer can weigh, the question is decided with respect to the certainty with which the north side would have fallen into the hands of the Allies, and to the ease with which they could have destroyed the ships and arsenals of the south side afterwards. For better or for worse, however, there were the Allies pouring down the slopes of Mackenzie’s farm across the line of Menschikoff’s retreat, and taking up the ground from which for a long twelvemonth they thundered in vain at the gates of Sebastopol for admittance. When General Mansfield was at Warsaw he held some interesting conversations with Prince Gortschakoff concerning the events in the early part of the war in the Crimea which he reported to the authorities, or to his friends at home. In the valuable “Military Opinions” of the veteran Engineer and soldier, Sir John Burgoyne, some comments are made on these remarks of the Russian General respecting the very question at issue. Prince Gortschakoff maintained “there was nothing to stop the Allies marching into the town.” Sir John argues that the north side was very strong. Todleben proves it was very weak. The impression made by the look of the works was, no doubt, due to the remoteness and imperfection of the reconnaissances of the place. The officers of the fleet did not throw much light on the defences. Sir John evidently did not know that the garrison was so weak, the works so slight, that there was a breach in them, and, above all, that the covering army under Menschikoff, to which he alludes, had marched away and left the garrison to its fate. Again, Sir John states, the fort was not commanded in any way, and quotes the authority of Major, now Lieutenant-Colonel, Graham. RE, to show it was a culminating point of a ridge. Todleben, who must know the ground at least as well, says, “Le Fort du Nord, n’étant pas défilé des hauteurs environnantes, ne mettait à l’abri que les soldats placés immédiatement derrière les parapets,” and alludes in several places to its uncovered position, while he insists on its openness to a cannonade over and over again. Let us leave the question as it stands, and follow the course of actual events.
The Allies, as we say, hastened away from the place they had fought a battle to get at, and were marching round it, while Prince Menschikoff, in order to save it, was marching away from it. We were now in front of Balaclava. In his account of the defence of the old Genoese Fort the general has been misled by the Greek heroes of the garrison. To their excited imagination it appeared that they were bombarded by 20 men-of-war, and that they made a most desperate resistance to the whole British fleet and army. There were 110 of the Greek battalion, commanded by Makarow and Manto, in the fort, who fired feebly out of their little mortars, and scarcely ventured to pull a trigger. Yet Todleben says that when they surrendered there were only six officers and 60 men, all covered with many wounds! Those who were there saw a very different state of things, and good Colonel Manto will scarcely be more surprised than his friends are to find him embalmed in Todleben as a hero. The Allies were now on the south side, safely established in communication with the fleet, and with a harbour and base of operations. They had avoided the north side. They now found the look of the south side was not more attractive. Let us go over, side by side with Todleben himself, the works and means of resistance which were here presented to the enemy, in the hope that the task will not try the patience of our readers too severely. The defences had been planned to meet an enemy from the sea creeks on the south, and to cover the west and south-west. Commencing on the left, we find that Bastion No. 6 (Quarantine), the most important of all, was armed with 16 guns. The crenellate wall to Bastion No. 5 (Central) was armed with 11 guns of small calibre. The Schwartz Redoubt was armed with 12 guns. Between it and Bastion No. 4 (du Mât) the barricades contained 14 fieldpieces and light guns. The Bastion du Māt was armed with 17 guns, next to which was the Gribock Battery, with two carronades. Four barricades closing the space at the bottom of the Peressep up to the height on the right flank of the Redan were armed with 14 12-pounder carronades. On the site of the Redan was a battery of seven short 18-pounder guns, a barricade armed with three shell 10-pounder guns closed the proper left flank of the Redan, and next to it was the Hospital Battery, armed with six 18-pounder carronades. The Malakoff Tower on the next height was 28ft high, had walls 5ft thick, and a glacis 6ft deep, and on its right was a battery on the site of the intended Bastion No. 2, armed with six 18-pounder and 24-pounder guns, and that on the site of No. 1 Bastion with four carronades, to which we have only to add the nine shell guns in the rear and barricades from the hospital to the docks. These works were all weak. The total number of guns available for the defence on the south side was 145 pieces, which were spread over a space of nearly five miles.
To these had been added 27 guns in different places after the news of the loss of the Alma. The only part capable of resisting an assault was at the 6th and 7th Bastions. Fieldworks of the feeblest profile, the open spaces, and unfinished works armed with light guns were all that could be said to defend the city, garrisoned by 16,000 men and 32 field guns. Neither the exultation of the troops nor their resolution to fight to the last extremity could have saved Sebastopol if the enemy had attacked it immediately after the passage of the Tchernaya. To this Sir John Burgoyne, in the work already quoted, says there was a series of very strong positions much strengthened by walls, towers, and strong buildings, with a corps d’armés to defend it almost equal to the assailants who had only field artillery.
Let us now see what the Russians were doing on the south side. Previous to the 14th of September the armament of the works on the line of defence from Careening Bay to the sea consisted of 145 guns, many of which were carronades and pieces of 24, 18, and 12 pounds. On the 27th of September, when the Allies made their appearance, there were 16,000 men and 32 guns on the south side, there were 3,500 men on the north side, and 3,000 sailors on board the ships. Todleben, at all events, availing himself of the delay which took place on the part of the Allies, proceeded to fortify the place. The principle on which he proceeded was to occupy the least extended position and the nearest to the city which would satisfy the necessary conditions, to arm the principal points of the line so selected with the most formidable artillery which could be procured from the fleet, to connect those points with trenches for musketry, and to enable the separate batteries to concentrate a powerful fire on the front and flanks, to sweep the sinuosities of the ground as much as possible. One obstacle to the choice of the best line was presented by the works already constructed, to the line of which he was obliged to conform, as there was no time to rectify the errors in trace which they presented. The besieged had only time to throw up the soft earth, as they could not excavate the rock, and the guns were put in position before the batteries were ready to receive them. Men, women, and children laboured at the defences. Even the convicts and felons took their share. It was rarely they could dig as deep as 2½ feet without coming on the stony subsoil.
On the 30th of September, to the inexpressible joy of the garrison, Prince Menschikoff appeared with his army on the north side, and next day received reinforcements of 8,000 men, field guns, and Cossacks. Column after column streamed into the Crimea, and each day the garrison was strengthened by accessions from the army, till on the 5th of October there were 32,000 men ready to receive the assault of the Allies. Todleben, however, thinks that the assault could scarcely fail to have been successful. He applies himself to show that the chances were the Allies would certainly get possession of some part or other of the lines, as the Russians were so placed that they could not concentrate more than 2,500 to oppose the storming columns, and he demonstrates that the occupation of any one would have been fatal to the besieged. The Allies, too, could have distracted the garrison by false attacks, and burst in on the real point of assault. They could have assaulted just at daybreak, before the artillery of the place could make them out and disorganize the columns. Again and again the Russian engineer insists that success was quite certain.
By their indecision the Allies had lost the most favourable opportunity of attacking Sebastopol. A few days’ more delay gave the Russians such an advantage that they began to breathe freely. The dark hour was overpast. The enemy, indeed, was at hand, but so dubious, slow, and uncertain were his movements that when the first signs of his purpose were made manifest, in the shape of certain lines which grew up by night in the clay soil, those trenches which were to grow into batteries were supposed by the Russians to be defensive works, covering the front of the allied armies. Their generals “poked about” in front of the place. Mr. Kinglake tells us Lord Raglan disliked to disturb his mind by plans. St. Arnaud was dead. His successor was not a man who liked to disturb his mind by anything in particular except fighting. The result of the remote examinations of the Russian works which the allied generals made was the idea that it would be imprudent to make an assault till the works had been bombarded. Todleben evidently thinks that if the reconnaissances had been closely pushed and properly made they would have arrived at a very different conclusion. The garrison, wasted and worn and anxious, waited hour after hour for the supreme moment, scarcely daring to hope for more than a creditable defence. With joy inexpressible they saw one fine morning long lines of earth which revealed the purpose of the Allies. They were going to besiege Sebastopol. Here was indeed a hope of safety — nay, more, a guarantee of success. From the point occupied by the French engineers the Russians calculated that they were to be attacked by 40 guns.
The Russians immediately resolved to overwhelm their fire by the weight of metal, and while the Allies, working with great slowness, laboured to throw up their batteries, the Russians, confident that if they could only resist the first attack they would receive powerful reinforcements, exerted themselves to the utmost, and on the 2d of October had effected immense improvements, and had increased the garrison to 32,000 men and 28 guns. The guns in position had been increased to no less than 341, of which 216 heavy pieces had been lately mounted. With a detailed account of the various changes and improvements in the armament and an abstract of the daily work up to the evening of the 16th, when the garrison saw the fleet laying down buoys, and perceived that the batteries were all ready for the next day’s bombardment, the First Part of the First Volume of this elaborate work is brought to a close.
*Défense de Sébastopol. Ouvrage rédigé sous la direction de Lieutenant-Général E de Todleben, Aide-de-Camp Général de S M L’Empereur. Tome I. Première Partie, Deuxième Partie. St Pétersbourg: Imprimerie N Thiebelin et Cie, 1863.