Crimean texts
We have followed the Russian engineer very closely over the ground in his first volume; the second will not admit of such constant companionship. We have seen the movements of the allies, the change in plan, if plan there was at all, in the mode of attack, and the diffusion of such strength, quite adequate for a coup de main, into the devious channels of the trenches and toilsome operations of a siege — and such a siege! The calculations of French and English engineers must have been made in ignorance of every fact connected with Sebastopol. They set to work as if they thought the Russians must remain idle. One of the reasons assigned for not attacking the place was that there was a large covering army. Was it not certain a portion of that army, having free access to the town, would be available to work at the fortifications and to garrison the place? Large men of war had been sunk, others were moored in harbour — would not their guns be made available, and become more formidable in the earthworks, which rose much faster than our own, than they were on board the ships? Was not the attack of the Allies directed against Sebastopol because it was, among other things, a vast arsenal? With guns, powder, ammunition, and the soldiers, sailors, and labourers at hand, what earthly reason was there for supposing the Russians would not maintain in a siege the relative superiority in all those particulars which prevented our assaulting them till we had tried a bombardment? The Allies had a siege-train manifestly little heavier than the maindeck guns of three or four of the line-of-battle ships. But the engineers prevailed, and they challenged the Russians to meet them in the trenches. The principle on which Todleben acted was to watch the works of the enemy, and to establish against them on every point a superiority of fire, by multiplying the number and increasing the calibre of his guns. Nevertheless, the fire of the Allies, principally of the English, at the great bombardment of the 17th of October caused terrible losses to the troops destined to resist the assault. The embrasures were filled up by the loose earth of the parapets which fell down from the fire of the pieces behind them, the revetments crumbled away — those made of sacks and planks caught fire from the guns’ muzzles and fell in. Through the thick smoke, again and again, the Russians fancied they saw columns advancing to the assault, and opened with grape on the imaginary enemy.
Suddenly, at 9.30 am, one of the French magazines blew up. In half-an-hour afterwards a second magazine exploded in the French trenches. Gradually the French fire became weaker. At 10.30 it ceased all along their line. Such was not the result of the Russian contest with the English batteries. Let us be proud of Todleben’s admission that our artillery was not long in establishing a great relative superiority. The Redan and Malakhoff suffered above all. In the latter Kornilow, the soul of the defence, received his mortal wound. By the explosion of a magazine, caused by our fire, the whole of the salient of the Redan was thrown into the ditch, with more than a hundred men. The Russians there, at all events, only waited for the assault. Only two guns remained intact out of the 22 with which the work was armed, and there were only five artillerymen left, who fired these guns at rare intervals. The fire of the allied fleet that day produced but little effect, although they had 1,244 guns in broadside against the 152 with which the Russian works were armed. It was from that fleet, however, arose the cry, “For God’s sake keep out the shells.” And in fact the men inside stone and earth had the best of the men inside the wood, and the Russians lost only an eighth of the number killed and wounded in the allied fleet. In estimating the number of guns in the Russian trenches and the allied trenches General de Todleben seems to us to leave out of account the guns on board the two-deckers and the steamers, which made very considerable play on our works that day. The Russians lost 1,112 men on the 17th of October, of whom more than one half were put hors de combat in the section of works in front of the English. the latter lost only 144; the French lost 204. The general conclusion at which De Todleben arrives is, that the object of the allied bombardment having been to dismount the Russian artillery and prepare the way for an assault, it was only the English batteries which obtained a complete success in annihilating the enemy’s works and guns, but that such a partial success altogether answered the end in view, and that after the Allies had obtained it, they ought to have assaulted under cover of the smoke, and have advanced before the Russians could come out of cover to resist them. The ditch was filled, the parapet beaten down, and the Russians could only have collected 8,000 men to resist our taking the Karabelnaia.
“This partial success responded fully to the object which the Allies had in view; after having achieved it, they ought to have immediately ordered the assault on the 3d bastion. Taking advantage of the smoke which masked the ground they might, with impunity, have pushed forward their attacking columns and have occupied the summit of the 3d bastion before our troops, obliged momentarily to fall back towards the Naval Hospital and behind the steep coast of the South Bay, could have arrived in sufficient numbers on the point attacked. The Allies would probably not have met with any material difficulty in taking the 3d bastion; the moat was filled up, the parapet razed — there was not on this point any obstacle, either natural or artificial. After having occupied the summit of the third bastion in superior numbers, and driven back our advanced troops, who could not have been concentrated except upon a ground quite unprotected and most unfavourable to us, the enemy would have taken up a position more advantageous than ours, as our soldiers, to retake the bastion, would have had to concentrate on the sloping ground, with the Southern Bay in their back.”
As they did not profit by this favourable occasion to make the assault, it is evident that all their preparations and hopes of speedy victory were doomed to have no result. By a natural reaction, the disappointment which followed was severe. The Allies discovered that the measures they had taken were not sufficient to overcome the strength of a defence which developed itself with as much perseverance as energy. Let us see how the Russians worked:—
“It was determined that not only on the following day no traces of the bombardment should be visible, but that a more imposing force than before should appear, so as to upset, on the very first day, all the calculations of the enemy. During that night attention was especially given to the re-establishment of the 3d bastion, which had been nearly annihilated. the most prodigious activity was displayed upon this point; guns and gun carriages were dug up, platforms were reconstructed, pieces of artillery were conveyed to the bastion and placed in position, while that portion of the bastion which had been destroyed by the explosion was cleared of the rubbish; the embrasures were traced and cleared, the moat which had been filled up was cleared out and powder magazines established. It is due alone to the unexampled zeal of all the troops of the garrison that the bastion was restored to its normal state in such guise that in the morning it was quite ready to reply to the English batteries. The armament of the bastion now consisted of 19 pieces of artillery. The armament on the right front destined to keep in check the powerful English batteries established upon the Green Hill had been notably strengthened as regards calibre. With the same object, that is to say, to strengthen the fire against the batteries on the Green Hill, all the guns dismounted from Battery No. 5 (Nikanow) and from the left face of bastion 4, were replaced by new pieces of heavier calibre and of longer range. The damages along the whole line of defence were also made good, and the number of traverses was increased on the front of the 3d and 4th bastions, which were exposed to a flank fire from the enemy’s batteries. Thus, on the very morning of the following day we were prepared to repel the enemy’s attacks with still greater vigour than on the preceding day.”
The French had no reason to complain of their allies at the first bombardment, at all events. So far as we know, their allies never imputed blame to the French for their conspicuous failure, and expressed no feeling but that of regret for a common misfortune. Next day when the English opened a tremendous cannonade the French were silent, but the English did not obtain so decisive a result as on the first day. When the French ventured to unmask their pieces on the 19th,
“Our artillery established its superiority over the French artillery. The artillery of the 5th bastion caused explosions in the French batteries Nos. 6 and 7; battery No. 5 was obliged to stop firing about 10am, and all the other batteries were reduced to silence about 3pm.”
The Russians worked on, adding guns to the existing batteries and creating new ones, so that each morning was marked by some unexpected ricochet, or direct shot or shell into trench and battery. In the record before us every day’s, or rather every night’s labour is stated in detail, and the damage done each day is indicated, but all we gather from it is that the defence was rapidly asserting a superiority over the attack, and that, in other words, “the more the Allies looked at Sebastopol, the less they would like it.” On the 24th of October the French sharpshooters for the first time began to make the enemy feel the effects of the rifle fire, from which they were doomed to suffer so much. It became necessary for the besieged to organize advanced posts:—
“These posts were occupied by Cossack riflemen, who from their special services in the wars in the Kouban and against the Caucasian mountaineers had acquired great skill in watching an enemy. Each post in ambuscade comprised a sapper to keep an ear to the enemy’s workings, and a sailor taken from our gunners to watch the efficiency and precision of our fire. These measures responded to the object in view. On the first intimation sent from the posts they were withdrawn, and a heavy fire of grape and musketry was opened against the point indicated by our outposts, near the upper portion of the ravine of the town. The cannonade and musketry only lasted for a quarter of an hour, and when they ceased the men were again sent back to their former positions.”
Every step was taken to economize ammunition, projectiles, and food, and to secure the health of the garrison; and the details of those methods show that under the Russian system men are educated who are not inferior in administrative capacity even to the free, self-reliant Briton. As it was now evident that the Allies had abandoned any intention of assault, and were about to undertake a regular siege, it became important to strengthen the Russian army in the Crimea sufficiently to enable it to operate against the besiegers from outside the city. The Allies had received reinforcements which raised their strength on the 18th of October to 85,000 men. Between the 19th of September and the 22d of October the Russians received 24 battalions, 12 squadrons, 56 guns, and 12 sotnias of Cossacks; but Menschikoff had been obliged to send 31 battalions and 28 guns to strengthen the garrison, so that he could not well carry out any offensive operations till he was well assured of an increase to his army. These, however, were rapidly arriving, and on the 22d of October Prince Menschikoff organized the corps of Tchergrune under Lieutenant-General Liprandi, consisting of 17 battalions, 20 squadrons, 64 guns, a total of 18,354 men on paper, which was not more than 16,000 men effective. Having occupied Tchergrune on the 14th of October, General Mackenzie made several reconnaissances of the English position before Balaclava, and the Russian general resolved to attack it on the morning of the 25th of October.
“The unskilful measures taken by the English Commander-in-Chief naturally could not fail to contribute to the success of the Russian arms. Lord Raglan had, in fact, established a vast intrenched camp, which was by no means in proportion with the number of his troops. destined at the same time to carry on the siege of Sebastopol, to cover the ridge of hills between Inkerman and Balaclava, and finally to defend the latter town itself.”
The attack was made in three columns. The column of the left, under General-Major de Gribbé, consisting of 3¼ battalions, 4 squadrons, 1 sotnia, and 10 guns issuing from Baidar, was to occupy Komari; the column of the centre, under General-Major Semiakine, intended to take the heights on which our camp was pitched, was to take the road to Kadikoi. It was divided into two corps, one on the left, under Semiakine in person, of 5¼ battalions and 10 guns, that on the left [sic — right?] under General-Major Levontzky, of three battalions and eight guns. The column of the right, under Colonel Scudery, was composed of 4¼ battalions and eight guns, and three sotnias, and was to act against redoubt No. 3, occupied by the Turks. Sixteen squadrons, six sotnias, and two horse batteries, were to cross the Tchernaya and form in columns of attack to wait Liprandi’s orders. One battalion of the Light Infantry Regiment of the Ukraine, one company of the 4th battalion of Tiraileurs, and Battery No. 8 formed the reserve. A detachment, under General-Major Jabokritsky, of 7¾ battalions, two squadrons, two sotnias, and 14 guns, covered the right flank of the corps operating from Tchergovine. This is Todleben’s account of the Battle of Balaclava:—
“At 5 o’clock on the 25th of October, in obedience to the order given the preceding day, the troops of the detachment of Tchernaya began to march towards the redoubts. General-Major Levontzky having approached the heights of Kadikoi advanced his artillery and opened fire on redoubts No. 1 and No. 2. General-Major Gribbé marching on Komari drove out the enemy’s advanced posts and established himself there. A sotnia of Cossacks, which had been despatched along the road which led to Baidon, at once occupied St. John’s Chapel. After this first success he established his artillery on the heights, and opened a cannonade against Redoubt No. 1. By the occupation of Komari our left flank was protected from the attacks of the enemy, General Semiakine following Levontzky’s column, and, protected by the fire of the artillery and a line of skirmishers, advanced rapidly and took up ground on the left of Levontzky’s columns. Having arrived at 150 paces from the hillock on which Redoubt No. 1 was placed, he ordered the regiment of Azoff to begin the attack. Notwithstanding the obstinate resistance of the Turks who held the redoubt, it was carried by assault, and at 7.30am the regiment of Azoff planted its standards upon it. The camp and three pieces of artillery fell into our hands. Struck by the brilliant attack executed by our troops against the principal hill, and by the rapid occupation which was the result, and perceiving also the battalions of the regiment of Ouglitch which advanced towards Redoubts Nos. 2 and 3, the Turks charged with the defence of the works abandoned them, leaving five guns, which fell into our hands. Meanwhile the Light Infantry Regiment of Odessa advanced against Redoubt No. 4 with eight guns. But the enemy, terrified by our success, did not want to fight at that point either. Abandoning the three pieces of artillery which defended the redoubt, the Turks retired towards Kadikoi. Besides the 11 guns we found also in the intrenchments tents, powder, and pioneers’ tools, which the enemy had left. The Redoubt No. 4, which was situated too much in front, was at once levelled, the guns which remained were spiked, the wheels of the carriages broken, and the pieces thrown down the hill. After this expedition the Regiment of Odessa came with eight guns to join the right wing of the line of battle. The cannonade which sounded through the hills of Balaclava was heard in the Allied camp, and created an alarm. At the first news of the Russian attack the garrison of Balaclava got under arms. The English and French troops which occupied the town ranged themselves in order of battle between the fortifications of Balaclava and the advanced redoubts half-way between them. The Turks retreated in the same direction, and placed themselves on the right of the English. The Division Bosquet, on learning the attack of the Russians, took up a position on the slope of Mount Sapouné, with its left flank resting on the telegraph of the Woronzov railroad. At the same time the batteries of the line of circumvallation opened fire. Lord Raglan sent immediately to find the First and Fourth Divisions. While awaiting their arrival he ordered Cardigan’s Brigade to proceed towards the heights on which the redoubts were established, and Scarlett’s Brigade to mass on the left of the 93d Highlanders. General Canrobert also arrived in all haste on the field of battle. Perceiving the Russian standards on the redoubts, he at once ordered the cavalry and the Brigades Espinasse and Verney to march. The first, forming in line of columns, took up a position on the slope of Mount Sapouné, to the right of the Division Bosquet, and the second placed itself to the left of Kadikoi, parallel to the road to Ramiche, and the division of Turks and the cavalry of d’Allonville occupied the space between the Brigades Espinasse and Verney. After the capture of the redoubts General Liprandi advanced the brigade of hussars, nine sotnias of Cossacks, and two horse artillery troops on the slope of hills looking towards the enemy’s camp, and ordered General-Major Rijow to make an attempt to destroy the park of artillery placed near Kadikoi, and the two horse batteries, and the Light Battery No. 12 and the Battery of Position No. 3 of the division advanced rapidly, took up a position, and opened fire. Immediately afterwards six squadrons of hussars of the Grand Duke of Saxe Weimar, and 3 sotnias of Don Cossacks, charged the 93d Highlanders, while 8 squadrons of the hussars of the Duke of Leuchtenberg and the Cossacks of Oural advanced to the right against Scarlett’s Brigade. The Highlanders, having allowed our hussars to approach within musket shot, received their attack by a fire of grape and many salvoes of musketry. Our hussars, nevertheless, penetrated as far as the park of the enemy placed in the middle of the camp, and intrenched with ditches. In face of this unexpected obstacle our hussars, as well as our Cossacks, already tried by a cross-fire of the enemy, were obliged to retire. At this moment the hussars of the Duke of Leuchtenberg and the Oural Cossacks, met by a charge of the English dragoons and the grape of a troop of horse artillery of Scarlett, were also compelled to retreat. All our cavalry fell back to reform its ranks behind the right wing of our line of battle. Scarlett, encouraged by his first success, tried to pursue our hussars, but having fallen between the crossfire of our batteries placed near the Redoubts Nos. 2 and 3, he suffered great loss, and, forced to retire, came to take ground on the left flank of Cardigan’s Brigade, which had taken up a position at the foot of Mount Sapouné. It was at that moment General-Major Jabokritsky arrived, and, advancing his artillery, drew up on the Fedrickpine [sic] Heights. At 10 o’clock, at the same time that General Jabokritsky appeared, the English also began to receive their reinforcements — the division of the Duke of Cambridge and the French cavalry. The English division placed itself on the left flank of the 93d Highlanders, forming an angle with it. The French cavalry placed itself on the left of the English cavalry. Half-an-hour later arrived the division Cathcart, which massed itself in the left rear of the English infantry, and soon afterwards appeared the Brigade Espinasse, which occupied the ground near Redoubt No. 5. The Brigade Verney was also directed towards the same point. During this period our cavalry continued to reform behind the left wing of the infantry. Four squadrons of the combined regiment of lancers on the left wing were sent to the right wing. Towards noon Lord Raglan thought he saw that the Russians had an intention to retire, and that they were taking with them the artillery they had taken. He sent in consequence to Earl Lucan, who commanded the English [sic], an order to advance and to seize the heights. The Division Cathcart was to support Earl Lucan. But this last officer made no haste to execute this order. About 12 o’clock, however, he received a letter from the Quartermaster-General Airey, in which he repeated the order to advance to pursue the Russians, and to prevent them as far as possible from carrying away the guns they had taken in the redoubt [sic]. A troop of horse artillery was to support the movement. After this reiterated order, and the injunction to execute it immediately, Lucan commanded Cardigan to deploy the cavalry in two lines. Cardigan in turn showed some slowness in the execution of the order, but at last he commenced to deploy his cavalry, taking care to place in the first line two squadrons of dragoons and two of lancers, and in the second line two squadrons of dragoons and two of hussars. One squadron of hussars was left in reserve. Scarcely had our cavalry succeeded in reforming when the English cavalry issued from behind the hill which had concealed it from our sight. Without stopping for the well-directed fire of eight guns of the light battery No. 7, and of the artillery, General-Major Jabkritsky [sic], of that of the riflemen of the regiment of Odessa, and of a company of the battalion of rifles, Cardigan dashed at the battery of Don Cossacks which was in front, cut down the gunners, then charged our cavalry, overthrew it, and swept on as far as the line of the redoubts in pursuit of our horse, which ‘fled towards Tchergovine.’ (Bravo, General Todleben!) But this brilliant charge of the English cavalry had no decisive advantage on the fortune of the day, and cost the English dear. While their cavalry charged the battery the Cossacks attacked its flanks, but were overthrown by a squadron of the 8th Hussars, which had been left in reserve. But, at the same time, three squadrons of the combined regiment of lancers were placed in such a manner as to be able to attack the enemy in flank. Meanwhile, the English cavalry, drawn along by the dash of its first success, went in hot pursuit of our cavalry, but, at the moment when it least expected to be attacked, the three squadrons of the combined regiment of Lancers, of which we have spoken, rushed on its left flank. The manœuvre had a decided success. The English cavalry, stopped in pursuit, were ‘ecrasé.’ Unexpectedly attacked in flank, finding itself at the same time under a crossfire of artillery and musketry, it broke its ranks, turned, and, pursued by our Lancers and the fire of our batteries, was plunged into total rout. The field of battle was strewn with the dead bodies of men and horses. The defeat of Cardigan’s Brigade made such an impression on the enemy that Scarlett’s Brigade which was advanced to sustain it suddenly suspended the movement and wheeled round. To alleviate in some degree the disastrous retreat of the English, two squadrons of Chasseurs threw themselves on the detachment of Major-General Gaby, swept along the line of our skirmishers, turned the left flank of the battery of position which enfiladed the squadrons of Cardigan, and began to sabre the gunners. These two squadrons were about to be followed by others. To check them two battalions of the Wladimir Regiment advanced rapidly to the front. The French cavalry began to give way, and effected its retreat under the fire of our sharpshooters, which followed them to the very foot of the hill. After these several affairs the enemy opened a cannonade along the line, and commenced to direct fresh troops to its left wing. It was then that Liprandi also began to reinforce his right. Nevertheless, the Generals-in-Chief of the allied army did not decide to take the offensive. Lord Raglan calculated that to support the attack he would be obliged to descend from the plateau he occupied, and submit to the concentrated fire of our batteries. General Liprandi on his side judged it right to confine himself to the defence of the heights and works of which he had made himself master that day, and for that purpose placed his troops in the position he had won in the following manner.”
Here follows a description of the formation of the Russian troops, which has no particular interest for our readers. He goes on:—
“At 4 o’clock the cannonade ceased. Our loss on the day was seven officers and 124 men killed, 32 officers and 418 soldiers killed or contusioned, and 15 missing. Our trophies consisted of one flag taken on the redoubt No. 1, 11 cast-iron guns, all the material of the Turkish camp, 60 caissons, and some pioneers’ tools. The Allies reckoned their loss at 508 — French, 38; English, 300, and Turks, 260. The capture of the Turkish redoubts seriously alarmed the Generals-in-Chief of the allied armies. By this feat of arms and the occupation by the Russians of the left bank of the Tchernaya at 1¼ miles from Balaclava, the base of communication of the English was menaced. If the corps of General Liprandi had received some support that day Balaclava would have fallen into our hands. But the superiority of the enemy’s forces, the rapid advance of the works in front of the bastion du Mât, and the incessant action of the siege batteries did not permit our Commander-in-Chief to weaken the garrison of Sebastopol to reinforce the corps at Tchorgoune. The corps of General Liprandi, which had concentrated at Tchernaya, was joined at a later period by all the reinforcements which had arrived to Prince Menschikoff, and on the 30th of October the headquarters was moved there also. We acquired the conviction by means of reconnaissances that it was only by means of heavy siege guns, and only on the east side of Balaclava, we could inflict injury on the troops encamped near the city and to the ships anchored in the bay. But the ground presented in that place such great difficulty that we could not even dream of carrying up heavy guns. It was that which principally prevented Prince Menschikoff undertaking any important movement after the affair of Balaclava till the 5th of November.”
Those who are at all familiar with the events of the day will not require to be told that there are many inaccuracies in this account of the actions of Balaclava, and that the Russian cavalry did not penetrate to our park, nor did they actually charge our 93d Highlanders, nor did they actually charge our cavalry home during the retreat, nor did the French Chasseurs charge to alleviate our retreat. In fact, according to what we know to have taken place, we have many more grounds for exception to the statements of General Todleben, but we must admit the great danger in which we were placed, and express our agreement with him that if Liprandi had been powerfully reinforced he might have taken Balaclava. Todleben informs us that the news of the success obtained by the Russian troops — the taking of the Turkish redoubts, the annihilation of the large mass of the English cavalry, and the occupation of an advanced position at Komari — produced a most favourable impression on the garrison of Sebastopol, which had not had a single day of repose, had indeed been harassed by increasing labour ever since the landing of the Allies, and had been kept ceaselessly in a state of suspense by the expectation of an assault.
“The catastrophe of the Alma was forgotten; unlimited confidence was again placed in the superiority of Russian arms, and the moral tone of the garrison being completely restored, it returned to the display of the greatest energy. The principal object of the defence was henceforth not to allow the artillery of the besieger to achieve an advantage over ours. Most especial attention was, therefore, directed to meet the fire of the new batteries, which the French evidently had the intention of establishing at the right extremity of the first parallel before the capital and left front of bastion No. 4.”
The measures which were taken for that purpose are set forth at length, but are only to be understood by reference to the plans. On the 26th October, in order to distract the attention of the enemy from Liprandi, Prince Menschikoff ordered a sortie against Mount Sapouné, consisting of six battalions of the Regiments of Bontirsk, and Borodino, and of four guns of the Light Battery No. 5 of the 17th Brigade, under colonel Federow. At 1 o’clock pm, having crossed Careening Bay Ravine, the riflemen of the two regiments, supported by a battalion in columns of companies, advanced, and having ascended the heights, formed with the rest of the troops a second line in columns of attack, the artillery in intervals, and marched on the post of the English, which was about two miles from the mouth of Careening Creek.
“At the sight of the approaching troops the English skirmishers retreated rapidly, and the generale was beaten in the English camp. The enemy concentrated 16 battalions and 18 guns on the post road; but without regarding their superiority, and the evident danger of seeing their retreat cut off, our weak detachment advanced courageously, with drums beating, under a crossfire of artillery and musketry, against one of the works of the besiegers, on ground altogether unknown, covered with thick brushwood, and cut up with deep ravines. A few soldiers of the Regiment of Boutirsk, under Ensign Koudviawzew, advancing in front of the column, rushed upon the enemy’s intrenchments, and were engaged in a hand-to-hand combat, in which the ensign was killed, when suddenly, to the general consternation, Colonel Federow was grievously wounded.”
Then the Russians retired with the loss of 25 officers and 245 killed and wounded. This is General Todleben’s account of Little Inkerman. Those who were there will be surprised to learn how few were the enemy, and how close they were to the intrenchments. Sir De Lacy Evans estimated their loss at 600, and he had some reason, for he took 80 prisoners, and had about 130 of their dead left in or near his position.
While these affairs went on outside, both Russians and the besiegers worked away with vigour, and the increasing numbers of the French permitted them to open new trenches and to push the approaches towards the Bastion du Mât in such a way as to cause serious disquietude to the enemy. The account of what was done reads like the description of a game of chess, in which new pieces are continually added to instead of taken from the board. On the 1st of November the French had so far gained ground that they opened 30 guns and 14 mortars from new batteries against the Bastion du Mât (No. 4), in addition to the 30 pieces already directed against it, and it appeared as if the Russian artillery on that point would have been completely annihilated, but the heroism of the defence enabled it to triumph over the tremendous fire. Still the bastion was in danger, and if an assault had been made it would have gone hard with the garrison. Prince Menschikoff took the most energetic measures to meet the danger. Houses were loopholed, barricades thrown up, special organizations of troops made to resist and drive out the enemy, in case they succeeded in gaining a footing in the interior of the bastion; but, after all, the Russians could only concentrate there about 12,000 men. They had, however, a reserve of 14 battalions and 12 fieldpieces, and in the Karatchuaia there were 21 battalions and eight fieldpieces. Prince Menschikoff having completed his interior line of defence, set to work once more to suspend the siege works and give a death blow to the besiegers. The French had increased the force of their batteries to 91 guns; the English had only been able to keep 67 guns in position. Deserters informed the Russians that an assault was imminent. The French trenches were within 60 yards of the Bastion du Mât.
As to the danger, Todleben says:—
“Placed under advantageous circumstances, and supposing that the fire of grape had done its work in proper time, this small garrison might doubtless have offered some resistance to the besieger, but it evidently could not have stopped a vigorous attack of the enemy’s columns. We were not certain of being always prepared to the minute to repulse the enemy, even supposing our vigilance pushed to its extreme limits; for the continual and prolonged expectation of an assault and the imminence of an incessant danger nearly always lead to an exhaustion of strength, and create to a certain degree a sort of carelessness. If the French, after having occupied Bastion No. 4, had intrenched themselves behind its gorge, and had established a communication between its moat and their advanced parallel, they would have been in a position to concentrate in the bastion itself and in its moat, as also in their trenches, a considerable number of troops, even 20,000 men or more. To drive the French from Bastion No. 4, the troops of our general reserve would have had to climb the very sharp incline of the Boulevard height covered with felled trunks of trees and stones, and they would have had to stand the fire of the French batteries established on Mount Rodolph, and near the upper portions of the city ravine, and also that of the English batteries on Green Hill. Having no chance of preserving their order of battle, and thrown into disorder by the enemy’s fire, our troops, after having scaled the heights, would have met the superior forces of the assailant on a ground where all the advantages would have been in favour of the latter”
. . . . .
“After having intrenched themselves in Bastion No. 4 there was no necessity for the enemy to give an assault to the town, which would, doubtless, have been repulsed with great loss to him. Nevertheless, our line of defence would have been forced, divided, mutilated, and the interior defence of Sebastopol would have become almost impossible; for the enemy would not have failed to establish heavy batteries on the crest of the height of Bastion No. 4; he might then have played upon Bastions 6, 5, and 3, and swept the town and South Bay, and thus forced us to evacuate Sebastopol. The internal line of defence which we had raised in the town itself could only serve us usefully to assure our retreat.”
The French had with much energy pushed their approaches to within 65 sagenes of the salient of the Bastion du Mât, “il faut reconnaitre que les forces de la défence touchaient à leur agonie.” This was on the eve of the Battle of Inkerman. The Allies were assembling reinforcements, which could be transported to the Crimea by sea with much more facility than the Russians could march down their troops by roads rendered almost impassable as the season advanced. Such a state of things necessarily called on the Russian army to undertake some decisive action, and the moment appeared well chosen, as the 4th Infantry Corps had arrived at Sebastopol in the latter half of October.